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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Contingent claims models have recently been applied to the field of corporate 
insolvency prediction in an attempt to provide the art with a theoretical methodology 
that has been lacking in the past. Limited studies have been carried out in order to 
empirically compare the performance of these “market” models with that of their 
accounting number-based counterparts. This thesis contributes to the literature in 
several ways: The thesis traces the evolution of the art of corporate insolvency 
prediction from its inception through to the present day, combining key developments 
and methodologies into a single document of reference. I use receiver operating 
characteristic curves and tests of economic value to assess the efficacy of sixteen 
models, carefully selected to represent key moments in the evolution of the art, and 
tested upon, for the first time, post-IFRS UK data. The variability of model efficacy is 
also measured for the first time, using Monte Carlo simulation upon 10,000 randomly 
generated training and validation samples from a dataset consisting of over 12,000 firm-
year observations. The results provide insights into the distribution of model accuracy 
as a result of sample selection, which is something which has not appeared in the 
literature prior to this study. I find overall that the efficacy of the models is generally 
less than that reported in the prior literature; but that the theoretically driven, market-
based models outperform models which use accounting numbers; the latter showing a 
relatively larger efficacy distribution. Furthermore, I obtain the counter-intuitive finding 
that predictions based on a single ratio can be as efficient as those which are based on 
models which are far more complicated – in terms of variable variety and mathematical 
construction. Finally, I develop and test a naïve version of the down-and-out-call barrier 
option model for insolvency prediction and find that, despite its simple formulation, it 
performs favourably compared alongside other market-based models. 
  
4 
 
The author would like to express his love and appreciation to his beloved family; Beccy, 
Tara, and Matthew, for their understanding and boundless love, throughout the duration 
of his study. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to his supervisor, Prof. 
Richard Jackson who has offered invaluable assistance, support and guidance 
throughout this process. 
 
 
 
  
  
5 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 15 
2 History and context of this study ................................................... 24 
2.1 The origins and evolution of credit, interest and debt ...................................... 24 
2.2 Development of the financial ratio and credit rating institutions ..................... 27 
2.2.1 Fitch ratings ...................................................................................................... 28 
2.2.2 Moody's Investors Service ................................................................................ 28 
2.2.3 Standard & Poor's ............................................................................................. 29 
2.3 The use of ratio analysis for credit assessment ................................................. 29 
3 Bankruptcy, insolvency and financial distress ............................. 32 
3.1 Bankruptcy and insolvency .............................................................................. 32 
3.2 Financial distress .............................................................................................. 32 
3.3 Causes of financial distress ............................................................................... 33 
3.4 Technical/legal insolvency ............................................................................... 35 
4 Formal processes, research avenues and limitations ................... 37 
4.1 Individuals ........................................................................................................ 37 
4.1.1 Bankruptcy Orders ............................................................................................ 37 
4.1.2 Debt Relief Orders (From 6th April 2009) ........................................................ 37 
4.1.3 Individual Voluntary Arrangements ................................................................. 38 
4.1.4 Deeds of Arrangements .................................................................................... 39 
4.1.5 Individual bankruptcy rates and economic significance ................................... 39 
4.1.6 Research limitations ......................................................................................... 42 
4.2 Private companies limited by shares ................................................................ 43 
4.2.1 UK corporate insolvency processes .................................................................. 43 
4.2.2 Private limited firm insolvency rates ................................................................ 46 
4.2.3 Economic significance ...................................................................................... 48 
4.2.4 Limitations for academic research .................................................................... 49 
4.2.5 Summary ........................................................................................................... 53 
4.3 Public limited companies .................................................................................. 54 
4.3.1 PLC insolvency rates ........................................................................................ 54 
4.3.2 Costs to society and economic significance ..................................................... 56 
4.3.3 A wealth of academic research ......................................................................... 57 
4.3.4 Reasons for this wealth of research .................................................................. 59 
4.3.5 Summary ........................................................................................................... 63 
5 The prediction of corporate insolvency: a literature review ...... 64 
5.1 1928-1968: the univariate approach to insolvency prediction .......................... 64 
5.2 1968-1980: the step from univariate to multivariate discriminant analysis ..... 76 
6 
 
5.2.1 Introductory comment and overview ................................................................ 76 
5.2.2 Development of  the Z-score models: Altman (1968) ...................................... 77 
5.2.3 Further application and adaptation of the Z-score model ................................. 84 
5.2.4 A comparison of the different models: Scott (1981) ...................................... 104 
5.2.5 UK application of Z-score models .................................................................. 110 
5.2.6 Discussions on the validity and pitfalls of the MDA methodology ............... 118 
5.2.7 Summarising remarks ..................................................................................... 124 
5.3 The 1980s: conditional probability, a new contender ..................................... 127 
5.3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 127 
5.3.2 Ohlson: a first application of a logit model to insolvency prediction ............ 128 
5.3.3 Comparing and contrasting MDA and logit methodologies ........................... 136 
5.3.4 Notable applications to UK data ..................................................................... 141 
5.4 The rise of the artificially intelligent systems in the 1990s ............................ 144 
5.4.1 An Introduction to neural networks ................................................................ 144 
5.4.2 Application of NN’s to the prediction of insolvency ..................................... 148 
5.5 Issues arising from the traditional approaches to insolvency prediction ........ 161 
5.5.1 Problems related to the classical paradigm ..................................................... 161 
5.5.2 Neglecting of the time dimension of failure ................................................... 165 
5.5.3 Problems related to the application focus ....................................................... 166 
5.6 Theoretically driven models of the 21st century ............................................. 170 
6 Objectives and research questions .............................................. 183 
6.1 Objectives ....................................................................................................... 183 
6.2 Research questions ......................................................................................... 185 
7 Data................................................................................................. 187 
7.1 Specification of data items required and data sets sought .............................. 187 
7.1.1 First consideration .......................................................................................... 187 
7.1.2 Second consideration ...................................................................................... 188 
7.1.3 Third consideration ......................................................................................... 188 
7.1.4 Fourth consideration ....................................................................................... 190 
7.1.5 Fifth consideration .......................................................................................... 190 
7.1.6 Sixth consideration ......................................................................................... 191 
7.2 Possible alternatives for the collection of data and associated problems ....... 192 
7.3 Methodology and composition of the final dataset ........................................ 196 
7.4 Structure of annual samples ............................................................................ 202 
7.5 Reduction, training and validation .................................................................. 203 
8 Method ........................................................................................... 207 
8.1 Model selection ............................................................................................... 207 
8.2 Model specification ........................................................................................ 212 
7 
 
8.2.1 Single variable models .................................................................................... 212 
8.2.2 Discriminant Analysis (Z-Score Models) ....................................................... 216 
8.2.3 Ohlson’s  logit model ..................................................................................... 223 
8.2.4 Artificial Neural Networks ............................................................................. 227 
8.2.5 The European call contingent claims model ................................................... 231 
8.2.6 The down-and-out call barrier option ............................................................. 236 
8.2.7 A new naive DOC model ................................................................................ 239 
8.3 Comparing the models .................................................................................... 241 
8.3.1 Converting scores into probabilities ............................................................... 242 
8.3.2 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves ............................................ 242 
8.3.3 Test of economic value ................................................................................... 245 
9 Results and findings ...................................................................... 249 
9.1 ROC Analysis: summary statistics ................................................................. 249 
9.2 ROC Analysis: predictive power .................................................................... 251 
9.3 The effects of outliers on discriminant function accuracy.............................. 257 
9.4 Distributional properties of models using repeated random sub-sampling. ... 262 
9.5 Economic value .............................................................................................. 276 
10 Thesis extension: a best of breed model ...................................... 286 
11 Integration of results and conclusions ........................................ 298 
11.1 Summary of objectives, methods and findings ............................................... 298 
11.2 Conclusions and achievement of objectives ................................................... 303 
11.3 Implications .................................................................................................... 305 
11.4 Difficulties, limitations and suggestions for further research ......................... 306 
11.4.1 Addition of technologies ................................................................................ 306 
11.4.2 Distributional properties of neural network models ....................................... 307 
11.4.3 Data limitations and representativeness of sample ......................................... 308 
11.4.4 Multiple year-ahead forecasts ......................................................................... 315 
11.5 Afterword ........................................................................................................ 315 
12 Appendices ..................................................................................... 317 
12.1 Appendix A: Member bodies of the joint insolvency committee ................... 317 
12.2 Appendix B: Formal procedures of the five main insolvency processes ....... 318 
12.3 Appendix C: Theoretical derivation of the MDA methodology ..................... 322 
12.4 Appendix D: A brief guide to gambler’s ruin theory ..................................... 329 
12.5 Appendix E: Derivation of the conditional probability models ..................... 332 
12.5.1 The logit model ............................................................................................... 334 
12.5.2 The probit model ............................................................................................ 338 
12.6 Appendix F: A brief guide to neural networks and back-propagation ........... 339 
12.7 Appendix G: Derivation of the Down-and-out call option formulae ............. 342 
8 
 
12.8 Appendix H: Derivation of the European call option pricing formulae ......... 349 
12.9 Appendix I: Detailed results of the elimination test ....................................... 352 
12.10 Appendix J: Genetic algorithms ..................................................................... 355 
13 Bibliography .................................................................................. 357 
 
 
  
9 
 
List of Tables  
 
Table 5.1: Beaver (1966) expectations of ratio performance .............................................. 69 
Table 5.2: Comparison of median values of stock returns .................................................. 73 
Table 5.3: Year in which failure was predicted ................................................................. 744 
Table 5.4: The confusion matrix.......................................................................................... 80 
Table 5.5: Altman’s confusion matrix ................................................................................. 82 
Table 5.6: Prediction results for Altman’s Z-score ............................................................. 82 
Table 5.7: Fourteen variables: Deakin vs Beaver ................................................................ 85 
Table 5.8: Blum’s (1974) failing company model .............................................................. 94 
Table 5.9: Blum’s FCM validation and (training) sample accuracy. .................................. 95 
Table 5.10: Comparing ZETA and Z-score models: percentage of correct predictions.... 102 
Table 5.11: Coefficients and t-statistics of Ohlson’s variables ......................................... 132 
Table 5.12: Variable pool and their assignation to the different models ........................... 154 
Table 5.13: Variables selected for discriminant analysis .................................................. 155 
Table 5.14: Variables selected for logit analysis ............................................................... 155 
Table 5.15: Variables selected for neural networks using genetic algorithm .................... 155 
Table 7.1: Summary of the sample sizes analysed in a selection of prior studies ............. 189 
Table 7.2: The Number of firm-year observations employed in the study........................ 206 
Table 8.1: Summary statistics for different model types and their accuracy .................... 211 
Table 8.2: Summary statistics for SIZE variable ............................................................... 214 
Table 8.3: Summary statistics for B/M variable ................................................................ 215 
Table 8.4: Summary statistics for BV model .................................................................... 216 
Table 8.5: Summary statistics for Altman’s Z-score and its variables .............................. 218 
Table 8.6: Summary statistics for the Taffler Z-score and its variables ............................ 220 
Table 8.7: Z-score models and their initial parameter estimates ....................................... 222 
Table 8.8: Ohlson's logit model and parameter estimates ................................................. 224 
Table 8.9: Summary statistics for the Ohlson logit model and its variables ..................... 225 
Table 8.10: Summary statistics for the neural network models ........................................ 229 
Table 8.11: Summary statistics for HKCL model and its variables .................................. 234 
Table 8.12: Summary statistics for BS model and its variables ........................................ 236 
Table 8.13: Summary statistics for  DOC and its variables............................................... 239 
Table 8.14: Summary statistics for  JW_DOC and its variables ....................................... 241 
Table 8.15: The confusion matrix...................................................................................... 243 
Table 9.1: Mean predicted probabilities of failure for failed versus non-failed groups .... 250 
Table 9.2: Area under curve (θ) and accuracy ratio (AR) ................................................. 253 
Table 9.3: Descriptive statistics for AZ and TZ ................................................................ 258 
Table 9.4: Comparison of coefficients at the point of intersection ................................... 261 
10 
 
Table 9.5: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as measure by area 
under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ). ......................................... 266 
Table 9.6: Comparison of ROC accuracies between original time-split sample and 
Monte Carlo simulation .................................................................................. 272 
Table 9.7: Credit spread for artificial economy ................................................................. 277 
Table 9.8: Economic value tests upon sixteen credit scoring models ............................... 278 
Table 9.9: Economic value second-phase test upon ten credit scoring models ................. 281 
Table 9.10: Economic value elimination test – resulting ROI .......................................... 283 
Table 9.11: Re-entry of JW_DOC ..................................................................................... 285 
Table 10.1: Step-wise reduction showing coefficient estimates with Wald ChiSq in 
parenthesis ...................................................................................................... 289 
Table 10.2: Correlation between the 24 variables ............................................................. 293 
Table 10.3: Step-wise reduction of non-correlated variables, showing coefficient 
estimates with Wald ChiSq in parenthesis ..................................................... 295 
Table 11.1: Comparison of included and excluded samples ............................................. 310 
Table 11.2: Differences in industry proportions ................................................................ 312 
Table 11.3: Comparing the sample to Lara et al (2006) .................................................... 313 
 
  
11 
 
List of Figures  
 
Figure 1.1: Total number of company insolvencies in the UK per year ............................. 16 
Figure 4.1: Total number of UK individual bankruptcies 1960-2009 ................................. 40 
Figure 4.2: Component individual bankruptcy procedures 1960-2009. .............................. 40 
Figure 4.3: Total number of private firm insolvencies in the UK per year 1960-2009 ....... 46 
Figure 4.4: Component private firm insolvency procedures 1960-2009. ............................ 47 
Figure 4.5: Rate of private firm insolvencies 2000-2009 .................................................... 48 
Figure 4.6: Number of public company insolvencies 1960-2010. ...................................... 55 
Figure 4.7: Rate of public company insolvencies 2000-2009. ............................................ 55 
Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of Beaver’s six ratio means. ..................................... 70 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Z-scores within sample. ............................................................ 87 
Figure 5.3: The black-gray-white method. .......................................................................... 92 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of Zeta scores one year prior to failure. ...................................... 101 
Figure 5.5: Graphical representation of failure probability ............................................... 107 
Figure 5.6: Ohlon’s examination of error rates verses cut-off point ................................. 133 
Figure 5.7: A feedforward neural network with backpropagation. ................................... 145 
Figure 7.1: Thomson One Banker command ribbon. ........................................................ 196 
Figure 7.2: Sectional extract of the resulting initial datasheet. ......................................... 200 
Figure 7.3: Sectional extract of the final dataset. .............................................................. 201 
Figure 7.4: Lead-time between portfolio date and availability of accounting data ........... 203 
Figure 8.1: Frequency of models employed in previous studies ....................................... 208 
Figure 8.2: Accuracy of insolvency prediction models employed in previous studies ..... 210 
Figure 8.3: Aggregated predictive accuracies across the literature ................................... 212 
Figure 8.4: A feedforward neural network with backpropagation .................................... 228 
Figure 8.5: ROC examples ................................................................................................ 244 
Figure 9.1: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. ............................................ 256 
Figure 9.2: The effects of Winsorisation on the Altman model ........................................ 259 
Figure 9.3: The effects of Winsorisation on the Taffler model ......................................... 260 
Figure 9.4: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as measured by area 
under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) .......................................... 272 
Figure 9.5: Relative frequency distributions of area under receiver operating 
characteristic curves (θ) for thirteen insolvency prediction models. Based on 
10,000 random splits between training and validation samples ..................... 273 
Figure 10.1: ROC accuracies achieved through step-wise reduction of 24 variables ....... 291 
Figure 10.2: ROC accuracies achieved through step-wise reduction of 17 variables ....... 294 
 
  
12 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
AR. Administrative Receivership 
 
AZ. Altman Z-score 
 
AZN. Altman Z-score variables run through a neural network 
 
AZU. Altman Z-score with updated coefficients 
 
B/M. Book to Market 
 
BM. Brownian Motion 
 
BS. Bharath and Shumway’s Naïve European Call option 
 
BV. Beaver’s best performing ratio – cash-flow / total debt 
 
CA. Current Assets 
 
CGC. UK Corporate Governance Code 
 
CF. Cash-Flow 
 
CDF. Cumulative Density Function 
 
CFTL. Cash-Flow divided by Total Liabilities 
 
CHIN. Change in Net Income 
 
CL. Current Liabilities 
 
CLCA. Current Liabilities divided by Current Assets 
 
CPM. Conditional Probability Model 
 
CR. Current Ratio (current assets / current liabilities) 
 
CVA. Company Voluntary Arrangement 
 
CVL. Creditors Voluntary Liquidation 
 
DOC. Down-and-Out Call option 
 
EBIT. Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
 
EBITTA. Earnings Before Interest and Tax divided by Total Assets 
 
EU. European Union 
 
FRC. Financial Reporting Council 
13 
 
FUTL. Funds provided by operations divided by Total Liabilities 
 
GCQ. Going Concern Qualification 
 
GDP. Gross Domestic Product 
 
GNP. Gross National Product 
 
HKCL. Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt European Call option model 
 
IMF. International Monetary Fund 
 
IR. Income Ratio (net income / working capital) 
 
INTWO. One if NI was negative for the last two years, zero otherwise 
 
JW_DOC. Jackson and Wood Naïve DOC model 
 
LF. Likelihood Function 
 
LGD. Loss Given Default  
 
LLF. Log Likelihood Function 
 
LMDA. Linear Multivariate (or Multiple) Discriminant Analysis 
 
LDF. Logistic Distribution Function 
 
LPM. Linear Probability Model 
 
LSE. London Stock Exchange 
 
LSPD. London Share Price Database 
 
MDA. Multivariate (or Multiple) Discriminant Analysis 
 
ML. Maximum Likelihood 
 
MVL. Members Voluntary Liquidation 
 
NCI. No-Credit Interval 
 
NI. Net Income 
 
NITA. Net Income divided by Total Assets 
 
NLV. Net Liquidation Value 
 
NN. Neural Network 
 
OENEG. Dummy variable. One if total liabilities exceeds total assets, zero otherwise 
 
14 
 
OL. Ohlson’s logit model 
 
OLN. Ohlson’s logit model variables run through a neural network 
 
OLS. Ordinary Least Squares 
 
OLU. Ohlson’s logit model with updated coefficients 
 
QMDA. Quadratic Multivariate (or Multiple) Discriminant Analysis 
 
QR. Quick Ratio (cash or cash equivalents / current liabilities) 
 
RETA. Retained Earnings divided by Total Assets 
 
RMA. Robert Morris Associates 
 
ROC. Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
ROI. Return on Investment 
 
SBA. Small Business Associates 
 
SEC. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
SIZE. Deflated Market Value of Equity 
 
STA. Sales divided by Total assets 
 
TA. Total Assets 
 
TL. Total Liabilities 
 
TLTA. Total Liabilities divided by Total Assets 
 
TZ. Taffler Z-score 
 
TZN. Taffler Z-score variables run through a neural network 
 
TZU. Taffler Z-score with updated coefficients 
 
UK. United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
 
US. United States (of America) 
 
VE. Market value of Equity 
 
VETL. Market value of Equity divided by Total Liabilities 
 
WCTA. Working Capital divided by Total Assets 
 
WRDS. Wharton Research Data Service  
15 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
The prediction of financial distress and corporate insolvency and the assessment of 
credit risk have been the subject of much academic and professional research over the 
last half century (e.g. Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Taffler, 1984; Coats 
and Fant, 1993; Charitou et al, 2004; Reisz and Purlich, 2007; Bharath and Shumway, 
2008; and Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). As when a pebble is thrown into a lake, the 
ripples or shockwaves reach far beyond that of the initial impact. If a company becomes 
financially distressed or insolvent, there are adverse consequences for its diverse 
stakeholder groups – investors, managers, employees, customer, suppliers, etc. – which 
impact onward into other firms, the wider economy and society. According to the 
president of R3 (the UK association of business recovery professionals)1 Steven Law 
(2010): 
 
“Any future increases in corporate insolvencies are likely to affect others as 
Insolvency Practitioners estimate that around 27% of corporate insolvencies are 
triggered by another company's insolvency - the ‘domino effect’.” 
 
In a similar vein, a member of the Turnaround Management Association UK asserts 
in Cooper (2010) that: 
 
“As business struggle to survive into 2010, they are likely to put increasing pressure 
on their suppliers. Payments will be withheld for as long as possible. If and when a 
company fails, it is likely that the other businesses it owes money to will get little or 
nothing in return. Unfortunately, the knock on effect will be that other firms will also be 
starved of cash and more will find themselves under financial pressure.” 
 
The area of distress/insolvency prediction is of high economic significance, in terms 
of the number of firms and individuals affected; and the implications for investment and 
lending decision making. Studies such as Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) estimate that 
the loss given default (LGD) approximates to 40% of the investment, suggesting that on 
average only 60% of the value of loans are recovered upon default. Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) use an LGD of 45% under the assumption that lending institutions follow the 
                                                 
1
 Termed “R3” due to their slogan; “Rescue, Recovery, Renewal”. 
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Basel II Foundation Internal Ratings-based approach, and that all loans are unsecured 
senior debt. This latter approach makes more intuitive sense as its successor, Basel III, 
is set to be introduced from 2013 with wider international adoption and inheriting much 
of the Basel II capital adequacy and LGD estimates. Under Basel II we are able to 
estimate, therefore, that the amount of investment which is able to be recovered given 
default or insolvency is approximately 55%. 
 
Up-to-date research is mandated by the present era of global financial difficulty 
which follows recent periods of financial sector institutional failure and credit crunch. 
Figure 1.1 shows the number of UK insolvencies annually since 1960. The glut of 
insolvencies during the economic downturn of the early 1990s is clearly visible; as is a 
sharp rise in the incidence of insolvencies since 2007.2 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Total number of company insolvencies in the UK per year 
Source: www.insolvency.gov.uk 
 
As regards the current prognosis for the incidence of insolvencies over the coming 
period, R3 (2010) has the following sober message: 
 
“We would still expect a spike in the number of insolvencies in the five or six 
quarters following a recession because many businesses that suffered during the 
recession find it hard to borrow as lending requirements tighten. Many of them will see 
‘green shoots’ but will not be able to fund expansion, especially if interest rates 
increase. And when a recession ends and assets rise in value, creditors are encouraged 
to move ahead with more aggressive debt collection.” 
                                                 
2
 A more detailed evaluation of the number and rate of insolvencies can be found within Section 4 of this thesis. 
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This thesis evaluates a number of different methods which have been popularly 
employed in the prior literature to assess firm health and some more recent extant 
approaches attributable to credit rating agencies. In the current economic climate of 
global financial turmoil, I seek to assess, using data from recent insolvency cases and 
post-IFRS implementation, how these various methods and approaches perform for the 
UK. As a result, this thesis will be able to determine the most accurate methods 
available to predict insolvency and assess credit risk, aid financial institutions in their 
lending decisions by highlighting weaknesses in their existing methods and, as a result, 
forgoing losses attributable to default. 
 
The comparison of corporate insolvency prediction models is by no means a novel 
idea, and is something which is widespread throughout the literature. Zavgren (1983) 
provides a discussion regarding the “state of the art”, describing and contrasting several 
different modelling approaches. Similarly Scott (1981) discussed a variety of models 
attempting to find a theoretical rational for the use of some of the more popular 
variables found within multivariate insolvency prediction models. Jones (1987) and 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) also discuss a variety of different modelling methodologies, 
comparing and contrasting their benefits and weaknesses. Although these papers 
compare and contrast many different models between them, what I consider lacking 
from the literature is an independent empirical analysis of modelling techniques, not 
simply a discussion of their associated strengths and weaknesses. 
 
The empirical analysis of insolvency prediction and credit risk models is also nothing 
new in itself. The general trend within the literature is geared towards producing a new 
model, which is generally purported to provide a higher degree of accuracy than any 
model before it (a poorly performing model would of course not warrant inclusion in 
any academic journal therefore, as a general rule, only models with high accuracy 
claims are normally found in the literature). To demonstrate these claims, the new 
model is often pitted against a popular predecessor, with the new model usually coming 
out on top with regards to the associated accuracy tests. For example, Altman et al 
(1977) compared the ZETA model with that of the original Altman (1968) Z-score, the 
ZETA model showing improved accuracy; Reisz and Purlich (2007) compared 
contingent claims models again with the Altman Z-score and show that in all but one 
instance, the contingent claims models are superior in accuracy; and Agarwal and 
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Taffler (2008) compared the Taffler Z-score to two contingent claims models and 
suggest that it is the Taffler Z-score which is superior. 
 
Other papers empirically compare modelling technologies. Salchenberger et al. 
(1992) for example, compared neural networks to logistic regression and found that 
neural networks out-performed logistic regression considerably with regards to their 
classification accuracy. A comparison of neural networks and discriminant analysis was 
conducted by Altman et al (1994). Their study did not definitively demonstrate a clear 
winner when it came to classification accuracies; but it was surprisingly discriminant 
analysis which yielded marginally better results – contrary to the findings of prior 
studies such as Odom and Sharda (1990). 
 
These studies and many others are described in detail within the literature review of 
chapter 5 which traces and describes the evolution of the literature to date. What is 
abundantly clear from the literature review is that there is no general consensus as to 
what constitutes the best approaches/methods/and indeed variables which should be 
used to predict insolvencies or determine credit risk. 
 
The thesis contributes to the insolvency prediction and credit risk literature in several 
ways: Firstly by independently considering a wider variety of models for empirical 
evaluation than has been seen prior to this study, I am able to evaluate the accuracy 
claims of a large number of models and techniques; Secondly, developing several new 
methods for testing model accuracy (a Monte Carlo approach to determine the 
distribution of model accuracy over multiple sample splits, and an elimination test based 
upon economic value), this thesis provides an in-depth descriptive and empirical 
analysis of the evolution of insolvency and credit risk modelling from its inception 
through to the present day. The thesis also presents two new models; the first of these 
models forms a natural extension to the existing credit risk literature, based upon sound 
theoretical arguments and well defined formulae; the second model is derived in an 
arbitrary manner in order to demonstrate some of the inherent problems associated with 
the more traditional statistically-based modelling techniques. The latter model shows 
that given an arbitrary choice of variables and modelling technology, a model can easily 
be constructed to fit the data and out-perform extant models from the literature. The 
inherent problem with this arbitrary approach, as will be discussed in length during this 
thesis, cannot (and will not) guarantee similar success in alternate or subsequent 
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datasets. Therefore as a generalisation, I show that it is the models which rely upon a 
sound theoretical underpinning which ultimately, over time, outperform those which do 
not. 
 
The timing of this thesis encompasses the current financial crisis which provides an 
opportunity to empirically evaluate extant models under the conditions of economic and 
financial turmoil. If these models are adequately able to distinguish between healthy and 
non-health firms in a period of financial instability, then this can act as reassurance to 
their various user groups, particularly to lenders within a loan decision process, as to the 
robustness of these models over time. The timeliness of this study therefore provides an 
additional robustness factor with regards to model evaluation which would otherwise be 
lacking in times of economic stability. 
 
The current global financial crisis is the most significant financial meltdown the 
world has seen in a generation and is arguably only eclipsed by the “great depression” 
born out of the 1929 Wall Street crash. The current crisis stems from the realisation of 
problems within the sub-prime mortgage lending markets of the United States in April 
2007. Sub-prime mortgages were securitised by banking institutions and traded 
globally. When customers began defaulting on these mortgages, banks were forced to 
increase interest rates on mortgages for those customers who had not defaulted in a bid 
to cover their losses. Consequently more mortgage customers began defaulting, 
snowballing unsustainably, which ultimately led to these sub-prime securities losing the 
majority of their market value. With many financial institutions holding securities of 
this type, the result was a reluctance to lend within the financial sector. The severity of 
the problem was bought to public attention some months after the sub-prime lending 
revelations. On the 9th of August 2007, investment bank BNP Paribas announced a 
"complete evaporation of liquidity" in the financial market 3. The ensuing shortage of 
inter-bank borrowing saw a number of high profile UK banking institutions experience 
financial difficulties eventually resulting in government intervention at Northern Rock, 
The Royal Bank of Scotland and Bradford and Bingley, for example. Despite the Bank 
of England cutting the base rate gradually to just half of one percent, the lowest level in 
its 315 year history, the UK economy officially went into recession on 23rd January 
                                                 
3
 Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=worldwide&sid=aNIJ.UO9Pzxw. 
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2009 when the government reported a second consecutive quarter of negative economic 
growth4 and subsequently entered a double-dip recession after the first quarter of 2012. 
 
It is not for this thesis to provide a detailed analysis of the causes of the financial 
crisis but a brief discussion of some key areas is required to place the overall 
importance of this study into context. It is suggested that many institutional failures, 
particularly in the financial sector, have the true causes of their problems rooted deep in 
their governance policies. The failure of many such companies, it is posited, has come 
about because of poor risk management, a failure to detect and mitigate such risks and 
excessive remuneration for directors5. The UK has in place the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (CGC) which through its various guises has attempted to provide 
sufficient guidance to manage and mitigate the risks of large companies for the last 
seventeen years and it has been suggested that the governing bodies and companies 
alike have been sufficiently happy with the content of the code. 6 
 
“When the FRC reviewed the implementation of the 2003 Code in the second half of 
2005, we found that it was generally felt to be bedding down well. There was no 
demand for major changes; rather, there was a widespread desire for a period of 
stability”. Sir Christopher Hogg, Chairman of the FRC (June 2006).7 
 
It may be said that although these guidelines are in place, albeit on a “comply or 
explain” approach, many companies may simply treat their governance requirements a 
“box-ticking” exercise rather than a serious attempt to properly understand the real risks 
that they might face in the future, as suggested by Cassidy (2003) for example. This can 
be seen in the case of Northern Rock, whose annual report was fully compliant with the 
CGC and full of facts and figures indicating the company was experiencing increased 
growth and profitability. The corporate governance section of the annual report gave 
details of the work undertaken by the audit committee, risk committee and internal 
control committee. The risk committee, which met four times, reviewed "the key risks 
inherent in the business" and concluded; 
                                                 
4
 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7846266.stm. 
5
 See for example the “no free lunch” column of the Investors Chronicle by Alistair Blair 
http://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/Columnists/NoFreeLunch. 
6
 The current 2012  version of the code has evolved from earlier work by the Cadbury committee (1992) and 
Greenbury committee (1995) for example and is updated and reviewed regularly (e.g. Higgs, 2003; Smith, 2003; 
Turnbull, 2005). The latest version can be found here: http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx. 
7
 http://www.frc.org.uk/press/pub1130.html. 
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“Northern Rock is a well-controlled, risk-averse business that continues to adopt a 
prudent stance in the management of risk”. Northern Rock Annual Report (2006).8 
 
Whether the CGC requirements were treated simply as a box-ticking exercise or the 
management really failed to identify a major flaw in their risk management operations, 
the impression that the board reports is not very dissimilar to the thousands of reports 
published throughout the UK every year. 
 
“...it is an example of how a company can have its corporate governance gleaming 
like a Rolls-Royce but have the satnav set on a course for disaster”. (Jamieson 2008). 
 
It is not just the management who should accept blame for this failure. Why did 
nobody else identify this major risk? The investors, auditors, Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), government and the Bank of England all failed to identify the 
problems with Northern Rock and indeed, with many other companies which have 
suffered recent financial distress. A subsequent report by the FSA (2008) suggests that 
the overall supervision of Northern Rock by the tripartite9  was not in line with its risk 
profile, it was initially looked after by the insurance group department before being 
transferred several times, which led to the admittance by the tripartite supervisory 
regime that there was an overall “lack of knowledge of Northern Rock”. (Financial 
Services Authority - Internal Audit Division, 2008) 
 
In light of this financial crisis through cases like Northern Rock and others, whether 
down to poor governance, risk management or simply the insolvency ripples resonating 
through the economy, many UK companies are facing financial difficulties today.10 
 
UK lending institutions have for some time, since the onset of the current financial 
crisis, and like their counterparts around the globe, been urged to re-expand their 
                                                 
8
 http://companyinfo.northernrock.co.uk/downloads/results/res2006PR_AnnualReportAndAccounts.pdf  p.16. 
9
 Bank of England, The Treasury and the FSA make up the tripartite that regulates and supervises the banking 
sector in the UK. At the time of writing this thesis, the government intends to abolish the tripartite system. This 
will result in the FSA ceasing to exist in its current form, and the establishment of three new regulatory bodies in 
early 2013: the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). The PRA and the FCA will be responsible for the majority of the functions currently 
performed by the FSA. 
10
 For example the retail sector has shown a 91% increase in firms facing financial difficulties.  
http://www.retail-week.com/retail-sectors/number-of-retailers-facing-financial-difficulties-soars/5004495.article 
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willingness to lend in order to alleviate the current credit crunch and promote economic 
growth;11 and under Project Merlin, as announced on 9th February 2011 by George 
Osbourne, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, the four largest UK lending banks agreed, 
inter alia, to lend £190 billion during 2011 – with the Bank of England to monitor 
achievement of lending targets. 
 
In this regard it is apparent that extreme care should be taken in relying, wholly or in 
part, on information obtained from a firm health-determining model for the purposes of 
financial or economic decision making particularly with regards to the perceived 
accuracy of insolvency prediction and credit risk models. My study provides a stark 
warning to lending institutions seeking to re-expand their lending portfolios as to the 
technologies they might employ to assess insolvency and credit default risk, a key 
aspect of lending. The literature shows that many insolvency prediction and credit risk 
models have shown good ex post efficacy in past studies; my findings suggest that many 
of these models (which are largely statistically-based) prove to have a more modest 
ability to predict insolvency or financial distress in the current economic downturn, 
although alternate models based upon sound theoretical underpinnings perform 
relatively well. It is clear therefore that it is the latter type of modelling technique which 
should be adopted or revised by the lending institutions in order to provide a sound 
basis for future lending and, ultimately, economic recovery. 
 
This thesis continues as follows: section 2 discusses the history of credit, interest and 
debt, and describes the evolution of the credit rating institution in order to contextualise 
this thesis; section 3 defines what constitutes failure, bankruptcy and insolvency and 
section 4 discusses in detail the formal avenues available to individuals, private and 
public companies along with any potential avenues for research; section 5 provides an 
in-depth literature review, tracing and providing discussion upon the evolution of the art 
of insolvency prediction and credit risk modelling; section 6 details the objectives and 
research questions underlying this thesis; section 7 describes selection and development 
of a sample of firms and firm-level data against which to test the different models; 
section 8 provides an overview of the methods and models tested within my study along 
with the development of the proposed new methods by which to compare the models, 
                                                 
11
 UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, 20th May 2010: ‘There is an urgent priority that is getting lending going to 
small- and medium-sized businesses. That is an absolute urgent priority”. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS/idUKGOVT20MAY20100520. 
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and section 9 present the results of the comparison along with an evaluation of the 
distributional properties of the model accuracies; section 10 provides an extension to the 
research, namely an attempt to construct a “best of breed” model based upon the results 
obtained in section. Section 11 integrates the results and provides concluding remarks 
along with recommendations for future research. 
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2 History and context of this study 
 
2.1 The origins and evolution of credit, interest and debt 
 
Since the first concepts of trade, commerce and monetary values became common 
place in society, individuals have been forced, through necessity, to come to terms with 
credit, interest and debt along with their inevitable associated problems. It would be 
somewhat foolish to believe that the various financial crises which have transpired over 
the last one hundred years are a new occurrence, a direct result of the industrial 
revolution and the rise of the capitalist economy. In fact, history tells us that the struggle 
with credit and debt can be traced back several thousands of years with the earliest 
recorded documentation suggesting that the human race has faced much more difficult 
periods of financial woe than that which we see today. 
 
Historians suggest that systems of credit and debt were in place as much as 5,000 
years ago, long before the earliest evidence for the written word. At this time, a system 
of counting tokens, possibly an early form of money, was used to keep track of various 
trades and obligations. Not only tokens were used as currency, but cattle, gold and grain 
were given values and used for trade. It is believed that the art of writing came about as 
a necessity to record and understand these financial dealings. 12 
 
The earliest known recordings of financial transactions were written in clay tablets 
around 3,000 BC in the city of Uruk, now Warka, which is situated south of Baghdad, 
Iraq. The tablets recorded information regarding who owed what to whom, contracts, 
and fiscal records. 
 
The concept of interest, the idea that a lender should be returned an amount greater 
than the initial loan value, is thought to have originated with the Sumerians around 
2000-3000 BC. The concept arose with the lending of cattle which were the primary 
source of currency at that time. If a herd of cattle was lent to an individual for a period 
of say, one year, then the lender would expect to receive more cattle back at the end of 
                                                 
12
 Several insights and examples are taken from the Code of Hammurabi (1792-1750BC) of which reprints are 
readily available through library and online resources. Other insights can be gained from Davies (2002) and Van 
De Mieroop (2004). 
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the period as the herd multiplies. This idea of “giving birth” to your assets transferred 
into other commodities where equal recompense would be expected. 
 
The first known example of regulatory systems put in place to control interest, credit, 
debt and forgiveness were developed during the reign of Hammurabi in ancient 
Babylonia (1792-1750 BC). Interest was seldom charged on any form of cash advance, 
providing that the loan was paid back as agreed. Failure to pay back the debt as per the 
terms of the contract resulted in high interest rates or worse: 
 
“If anyone owes a debt for a loan, and a storm prostrates the grain, or the harvest 
fail, or the grain does not grow for lack of water; in that year he need not give his 
creditor any grain, he washes his debt-tablet in water and pays no rent for this year. 
If any one fails to meet a claim for debt, and sell himself, his wife, his son, and 
daughter for money or gives them away to forced labor: they shall work for three years 
in the house of the man who bought them, or the proprietor, and in the fourth year they 
shall be set free. 
If any one fails to meet a claim for debt, and he sells the maid servant who has borne 
him children, for money, the money which the merchant has paid shall be repaid to him 
by the owner of the slave and she shall be freed. 
If a inn-keeper gives 60 liters of beer on credit she will receive 50 liters of barley at 
harvest-time”. (The code of Hammurabi) 
 
Some 1,500 years after Hammurabi we have the first known example of an interest 
agreement written in 172 BC: 
 
“Theokles, son of Euboulides, Macedonian of the epigone, has lent to Aristokles, son 
of Herakleides,Corinthian of the epigone, 3 talents 780 drachmai of bronze money 
produced to view, for 13 months from the above date, with interest at 2 drachmai the 
mina per month. Aristokles shall repay to Theokles the aforestated loan, namely 3 
talents 780 drachmai in bronze money, plus the interest accruing thereon, in the month 
of Apellaios, or in the Egyptian calendar, Pauni, in the tenth year. 
If he does not repay it, he shall pay as penalty the loan plus fifty per cent and simple 
interest, and Aristokles shall have the right of execution upon Aristokles or his surety, 
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whichever of them he may choose, or upon both, as if by court decision”. (Cited in 
Davies, 2002) 
 
These early credit lending examples paved the way for banking institutions such as 
the Greek Bank of Delos (323-30 BC) to evolve as a direct result of the desire for credit. 
Delos’s influence was to replace physical cash transactions with credit receipts and 
payments made on simple instructions with accounts kept for each client. The Model 
employed by the Bank of Delos was adopted by the Roman Empire throughout their 
territorial reign over much of Europe, Africa and Asia between 27 BC and 476 AD. The 
importance of the credit granting banking system, however, was limited during this 
period due to the Roman preference for cash transactions with coins. The fall of the 
Roman Empire meant that banking was all but forgotten and had to be re-invented much 
later. 
 
The re-invention of banking occurred during the time of the crusades, approximately 
1100-1300 AD.  
 
“The Crusades gave a great stimulus to banking because payments for supplies, 
equipment, allies, ransoms etc. required safe and speedy means of transferring vast 
resources of cash. Consequently the Knights of the Temple and the Hospitallers began 
to provide some banking services such as those already being developed in some of the 
Italian city states...  In Italian city states such as Rome, Venice and Genoa, and in the 
fairs of medieval France, the need to transfer sums of money for trading purposes led to 
the development of financial services including bills of exchange. Although it is possible 
that such bills had been used by the Arabs in the eighth century and the Jews in the 
tenth, the first for which definite evidence exists was a contract issued in Genoa in 1156 
to enable two brothers who had borrowed 115 Genoese pounds to reimburse the bank's 
agents in Constantinople by paying them 460 bezants one month after their arrival”. 
(Davies 2002). 
 
The development of banks and financial growth of these northern Italian cities 
throughout the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries evolved into what we might term the 
“modern” banking system. The most famous and largest of the early banks is the Medici 
bank, established in 1397. The Medici banking system re-invented and overhauled the 
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profession of accounting making notable contributions towards the improvement of 
ledger control by developing and improving the double-entry book keeping system in 
order to keep track of credit and debits more effectively. 
 
The 17th century saw an explosion of banking, finance and commerce, centred on the 
lucrative East Indian trade companies of Amsterdam, London and Hamburg. Individuals 
could purchase bills of credit, stock, which meant that for the first time both banks and 
companies, were being owned by the public as opposed to a few wealthy individuals. 
By the 18th Century the publicly owned bank was commonplace, indeed, many of the 
banks we see today along with their credit policies were founded around this time.  
 
The first example of a “cash-credit” system was introduced by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland upon its formation in 1727. Certain applicants could apply for loans to 
withdraw cash as they required, with interest being charged only on the amount which 
was withdrawn. This concept was adopted by other banks in Scotland, then England and 
throughout Europe and is the origin of the bank overdraft. 
 
2.2 Development of the financial ratio and credit rating institutions 
 
The history of insolvency prediction and credit assessment has its roots embedded 
within the concept of financial statement analysis. It could be proposed that financial 
statement/ratio analysis to a large extent is insolvency prediction, with the primary use 
of financial ratios being that of evaluating the performance of companies as a going 
concern, driven by the needs of both the lending and investing stakeholder groups. As 
far back as 1849, credit rating institutions such as Dun & Bradstreet have been 
providing an independent opinion of firm credit worthiness13, although the ratings and 
rating agencies akin to the likes of which we see today did not begin to evolve until the 
early 20th century when financial statements became commonplace. 
 
The establishment of the UK Companies Act in 1900 and the introduction of the 
compulsory balance sheet audit by non-insiders provided an increase in publicly 
available financial statements. The introduction of the Act was particularly necessary as 
the economic and industrial evolution seen in Western Europe was being sought by 
                                                 
13
 The first publication of commercial credit ratings was produced by the Bradstreet organisation in 1849. 
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America as it strived for industrial maturity which leads to a shift in economic power to 
financial institutions as more and more firms were now seeking financial backing in the 
form of credit. Commercial banks began to request financial statements for lending 
purposes as early as the 1870s; but this did not become a widespread practice until the 
1890s. During the 1890s, the volume and flow of financial information increased greatly 
(Horrigan, 1968), driving the need for greater comparability and reliability of financial 
statements. The result of the new Companies Act requirements ensured that this was 
achieved, providing a greater volume of comparable and reliable information which 
could now be readily obtained and analysed by institutions, investors, academics and 
other interested parties. 
 
The influence of this Act on the evolution of the credit rating sector can be 
demonstrated if I refer back to the conception and beginnings of several of the leading 
and best known credit rating agencies that are in existence today, each becoming 
prominent around the turn of the century.14 
 
2.2.1 Fitch ratings 
 
John Knowles Fitch founded the Fitch Publishing Company in 1913. Fitch published 
financial statistics for use in the investment industry via "The Fitch Stock and Bond 
Manual" and "The Fitch Bond Book." In 1924, Fitch introduced the AAA through D 
rating system that has become the basis for ratings throughout the industry. With plans 
to become a full-service global rating agency, in the late 1990s Fitch merged with IBCA 
of London, subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., a French holding company. Fitch also acquired 
market competitors Thomson BankWatch and Duff & Phelps Credit Ratings Co. 
 
2.2.2 Moody's Investors Service 
 
John Moody and Company first published "Moody's Manual" in 1900. The manual 
published basic statistics and general information about stocks and bonds of various 
industries. From 1903 until the stock market crash of 1907, "Moody's Manual" was a 
national publication. In 1909 Moody began publishing "Moody's Analyses of Railroad 
Investments", which added analytical information about the value of securities. 
                                                 
14
 The proceeding short histories are taken from Finney (2009). 
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Expanding this idea led to the 1914 creation of Moody's Investors Service, this, in the 
following 10 years, would provide ratings for nearly all of the government bond markets 
at the time. By the 1970s Moody's was rating commercial paper and bank deposits, 
becoming the full-scale rating agency that it is today. 
 
2.2.3 Standard & Poor's 
 
Henry Varnum Poor first published the History of Railroads and Canals in the 
United States in 1860, the forerunner of securities analysis and reporting to be 
developed over the next century. Standard Statistics formed in 1906, which 
published corporate bond, sovereign debt and municipal bond ratings. Standard 
Statistics merged with Poor's Publishing in 1941 to form Standard and Poor's 
Corporation, which was acquired by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. in 1966. 
Standard and Poor's has become best known by indexes such as the S&P 500, a stock 
market index that is both a tool for investor analysis and decision making, and a U.S. 
economic indicator. 
 
2.3 The use of ratio analysis for credit assessment 
 
The financial ratio and financial statement analysis have been integral to the 
evolution of credit assessment. It may even be stated that financial ratio analysis to a 
large extent is insolvency prediction, with the primary use of financial ratios being that 
of evaluating the performance of companies as a going concern, driven by the needs of 
both the lending and investing stakeholder groups. This proposition can be 
demonstrated by the conception of the financial ratio itself, noticing that the evolution 
of the ratio is closely tied in history to the evolution of the credit rating institution. 
 
Although the primary cause of the evolution of ratio analysis in general was Euclid's 
rigorous analysis of the properties of ratios in Book V of his Elements in about 300 B.C., 
the adoption of ratios as a tool of financial statement analysis is a relatively recent 
development (Horrigan, 1968). During the latter decade of the 19th century, financial 
institutions would compare a firm’s current assets to that of its current liabilities, being 
the predominant factor in assessing a firm’s credit worthiness. The current ratio, as it 
was termed, became the first example of the modern financial ratio and a firm was 
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considered in good health if its current assets outweighed its current liabilities 2:1. 
Although other ratios were developed around that time, the current ratio bore a long-
lasting and significant impact upon financial statement analysis and credit assessment, 
indeed it is the current ratio above all other which was first cited in academic 
publication by Rosendale (1908) in his article “Credit Department Methods”. 
 
The early 20th century saw several studies which investigated the use of different 
financial ratios for the determination of a firm’s financial position. Most noticeably a 
“Study of Credit Barometrics” by Wall (1919), examined a large sample of financial 
statements, now freely available due to regulatory requirements, and scrutinised seven 
different ratios. Wall determined that there were large variations in ratios between 
different geographical areas, and although his results would come under much criticism 
by modern standards of analysis; his study was historically significant because it was a 
widely-read, overt departure from the customary usage of a single ratio with an absolute 
criterion (Horrigan, 1968). Wall’s study sparked great interest in the use of the financial 
statement and ratios for firm analysis throughout the 1920s, notably Lincoln (1925) who 
discussed and illustrated forty different financial ratios, the largest number of ratios 
discussed during this period. It was, however, Wall himself who provides possibly the 
first example of combining financial ratios to create on overall picture of a firm’s 
health. Wall and Duning (1928) attempted to quench the explosion of ratio usage by 
developing a ratio index. The index was effectively a weighted combination of several 
different ratios with the weights being arbitrarily chosen by the authors resulting in a 
naive model approximating the first real linear multivariate discriminant function. 
 
From this moment onward, the empirical evaluation of financial statements and their 
contained ratios became widespread, driven by the need of financial institutions and 
investors to better understand and assess firm health and credit worthiness, embedded in 
the foundations of the capitalist economies that we see in the present day.  
 
This section has provided an introduction to the evolution, conception and 
foundations of insolvency prediction and credit assessment methodologies which we are 
familiar with today. The literature review of section 5 examines in detail the evolution 
of these models, methods, and technologies through the latter half of the 20th century 
through to the present, with respect to the particular research avenues that are available 
for this thesis. The field of insolvency/bankruptcy prediction, credit assessment 
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(company and individual), detecting financial distress, academic/institutional failure 
research, call it what you will, is vast. One could spend a lifetime empirically 
researching all of the avenues potentially available for study. Section 4 investigates 
some of these avenues of possible research in order to determine which particular areas 
provide the possibility and/or warrant further empirical work. Before this discussion 
however, an introduction must be made of some of the terms and generalisations that 
will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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3 Bankruptcy, insolvency and financial distress 
 
3.1 Bankruptcy and insolvency 
 
In this thesis I will be using legislative terminology predominately from a UK 
perspective and the data for my empirical analysis will be from UK companies. Many 
academic papers to which I refer are from US authors who use the term “bankruptcy” 
whereas I will refer to the process as “insolvency”. The difference in these terms is born 
through legal differences. In the United States, where the majority of insolvency 
prediction literature originates, the term “bankruptcy” refers to the legal insolvency 
process used for both companies and individuals. In the UK, “bankruptcy” is the 
process for individuals only; companies in the UK will enter one of several legal 
insolvency processes which are discussed in section 4.1.15 
 
3.2 Financial distress 
 
Financial distress is a term which is used to describe a firm which is suffering from 
short-term financial difficulties. If the “symptom” of financial distress is not “treated” 
effectively and efficiently, then this can often lead to the onset of insolvency 
proceedings; although financial distress can often be detected many months before any 
formal prescription or legal action need be sought, and therefore one might say that with 
appropriate intervention insolvency can often be avoided altogether. In accounting and 
financial terms, financial distress could be thought of as being one of the following 
scenarios. 
 
• Company operating returns are lower than its cost of capital 
• Costs are greater than revenue 
• Actual returns are less than expected returns 
• Outflows are greater than inflows 
 
                                                 
15
 Although I have stated that my analysis, explanations and thesis will be focusing on UK, the legal distinctions 
need to be classified and compounded even further as Scotland has its own form of legalities when dealing with 
insolvency. In fact I will be referring to the insolvency practices of England and Wales only throughout the 
remainder of this thesis but refer to them as UK practices for convenience. 
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These scenarios are unlikely individually to cause the company to fail and through 
adequate management skills these problems more often than not can be addressed 
before they become out of control and irreversibly lead to legal insolvency process. 
Traditionally, insolvency prediction models aim to pick up signs of these financial 
distress signals contained within past accounting data and assess the likelihood of the 
distressed company becoming formally insolvent. 
 
A theoretical explanation of distress perhaps originates with Walter (1957) who 
perceived a company to be akin to a reservoir of liquid assets (or working capital) with 
this reservoir being supplied by monetary inflows and drained by its outflows. He 
describes financial distress as the exhaustion of this liquid asset reservoir which acts as 
a cushion or bolster, dampening the impact of variations in monetary flows. Taffler 
(1983) suggests that with all else being equal, the probability of failure is greater when: 
 
• The size of the reservoir is smaller 
• The inflow of funds from operations is smaller 
• The claims on resources by creditors is larger 
• The funds flow required for business operations is larger and 
• The variation of inflows, outflows and claims on the company is higher 
 
These ideas form the basis of much academic literature on insolvency prediction by 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Taffler (1983), for example, who, by using 
accounting data and financial ratios, have been able to detect stark differences between 
the financials of failed and non-failed companies. 
 
3.3 Causes of financial distress 
 
The R3 conducts regular surveys that consistently show that many insolvency 
proceedings could have been avoided if professional advice has been obtained earlier, 
and the longer a company delays seeking professional help the higher the chance that 
the business cannot be rescued.16 
 
                                                 
16
 For example the R3’s Ostrich’s guide to business survival (2002). 
34 
 
Economic failure has no real concrete definition but in economic terms, research by 
the R3 suggests the following common reasons why a company may become 
insolvent:17 
 
• Loss of market: where companies have not recognised the need to change in a shrinking 
or changing marketplace, because their margins have been eroded or because their 
service has been overtaken technically (29%) 
• Management failure to acquire adequate skills, either through training or buying them 
in, over-optimism in planning, imprudent accounting, lack of management information 
(22%) 
• Bad debts (10%) 
• Lack of working capital (20%) 
• Other reasons including excessive overheads, new venture/expansion/acquisition are 
also attributed. 
 
The decision of the management team is critical if any signs of financial distress are 
detected, but all too often there is a reluctance to seek professional help which may 
ultimately save the business. Foreman (2003) provides evidence that floored business 
plans and poor execution are the root causes of corporate failure given that traditional 
financial ratios concerning relative profitability, capital structure, and the power to 
finance growth internally almost completely explain which firms would fail within 2 
years. 
 
“Early intervention can be a tough decision to make… Often the thought of taking 
advice from insolvency professionals is unpalatable to the management team as they 
fear that insolvency professionals are like vultures – circling prior to the terminal 
insolvency event. If insolvency is to be avoided, it is about taking appropriate advice as 
the earliest opportunity”. Cawkwell (2008).18  
 
“It appears that financial distress happens to companies whose operating decisions 
perform below expectations. Bankruptcy, in contrast, seems to be a result of a decision 
                                                 
17
 Figures taken from Ostrich’s guide p.17. (Percentage of total insolvency cases in parenthesis). 
18
 Andrew Cawkwell, head of corporate recovery and insolvency with Watson Burton 
(www.watsonburton.co.uk). 
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that companies make to relieve themselves of problems such as excess debt levels”. Platt 
and Platt (1994, p.155). 
 
3.4 Technical/legal insolvency 
 
The Companies Act (2006)19 is the legislation that governs all companies within the 
UK and refers to the definition of insolvency in accordance with that of the Insolvency 
Act (1986) Section 123.20 Insolvency is described as the inability of a company to pay 
its debts and is defined in two ways, in terms of cash-flow and in terms of the balance 
sheet: 
 
“123. Definition of inability to pay debts 
(1) A company is deemed unable to pay its debts - [...] 
 
(a) if a creditor (by assignment or otherwise) to whom the company is indebted in a 
sum exceeding £750 then due has served on the company, by leaving it at the company's 
registered office, a written demand (in the prescribed form) requiring the company to 
pay the sum so due and the company has for 3 weeks thereafter neglected to pay the 
sum or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the 
creditor. [Cash-flow insolvency]. 
 
(2) ...if the value of the company's assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, 
taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities”. [Balance sheet 
insolvency]. 
 
Legal insolvency thus occurs when a company cannot meet its immediate liabilities, 
or when the total liabilities are in excess of its total assets. If insolvency is detected then 
it is the responsibility of the company directors to ensure that appropriate formal steps 
are pursued. If the company continues to trade after this point the directors must take 
every step thereafter to minimise the potential loss to the company's creditors, otherwise 
wrongful trading may be established and the director may be ordered to contribute to the 
                                                 
19
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
20
 http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislation/uk/insolvencyact.pdf. 
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assets of the company for the benefit of the creditors and/or face disqualification. The 
court will use both objective and subjective tests to determine whether wrongful trading 
has occurred. A director, therefore, has to match the standards of performance 
"reasonably expected" of directors having similar functions, else a judgement of 
fraudulent trading may be established which is a criminal offense. Unlike fraudulent 
trading which includes an element of dishonesty or recklessness with intent to defraud 
creditors, wrongful trading is not a criminal offence. 
Insolvency in England and Wales is governed by the Joint Insolvency Committee 
(JIC) which is assembled from representatives from each of the insolvency Recognised 
Professional Bodies (RPBs) and from The Insolvency Service.21,22 
The role of the RPB is to regulate Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) to which they hold 
licence. An IP is authorised by one of the RPBs to carry out and act in insolvency 
matters, often working in a specialist insolvency department within a leading 
accountancy firm. The largest regulator of IPs in England and Wales is the ICEAW. The 
guidelines to which all IPs must act are the Statements of Insolvency Practice (SIPs) 
which are commissioned by the JIC and produced by the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, the R3. 
Once insolvency has been detected there are several courses of action that are 
available which will be discussed in the next section. To ensure that there is no further 
depletion of assets or increase in liabilities during these proceedings, the affairs of the 
company are usually taken in control by an IP who also has the responsibility of 
reporting to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) regarding the conduct of the 
company’s directors. 
Section 4 now discusses insolvency processes in detail in order to understand and 
investigate the avenues of possible research, by way of determining which particular 
areas provide the possibility of and/or warrant further empirical work. 
  
                                                 
21
 The Insolvency Service is part of the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) 
which licenses some Insolvency Practitioners but mainly focuses on the monitoring of the RPBs. 
22
 The seven member bodies of JIC are listed in Appendix A. 
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4 Formal processes, research avenues and limitations 
 
4.1 Individuals 
 
Individual insolvencies within the UK (or bankruptcy as it should be correctly 
termed), have reached an all-time high in recent months. Mounting personal debts, 
tighter restrictions on credit granting, falling house prices and rising unemployment 
have been the main contributors to the overall number of bankruptcies. There are 
several different legal proceedings and avenues which may be pursued by either the 
individual or their creditor(s, should that individual find themselves in a financially 
distressed situation and are unable to meet their debts as they fall due. 
 
4.1.1 Bankruptcy Orders 
 
Bankruptcy is an option that often has to be considered when you cannot pay your 
debts as they fall due. The bankruptcy proceedings free you from overwhelming debts 
so you can make a fresh start and make sure that your assets are shared out fairly among 
your creditors. A court makes a bankruptcy order only after a bankruptcy petition has 
been presented. It is usually presented either yourself (debtor’s petition), or by one or 
more creditors who are owed at least £750 by you and that amount is unsecured 
(creditor’s petition). Once a bankruptcy order is issued by the court, an official receiver 
is appointed to administer the bankruptcy, protect the individual’s assets and act as a 
trustee to the bankruptcy. (Source: The Insolvency Service. www.insolvency.gov.uk) 
 
4.1.2 Debt Relief Orders (From 6th April 2009) 
 
DROs provide debt relief for individuals but are subject to some restrictions. They 
are suitable for people who do not own their own home, have little surplus income and 
assets and have less than £15,000 of debt. An order lasts for 12 months. In that time 
creditors named on the order cannot take any action to recover their money without 
permission from the court. At the end of the period, if your circumstances have not 
changed you will be freed from the debts that were included in your order. DROs do not 
involve the courts. They are run by The Insolvency Service in partnership with skilled 
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debt advisers, called approved intermediaries, who will help you apply to The 
Insolvency Service for a DRO. (Source: The Insolvency Service. 
www.insolvency.gov.uk) 
 
4.1.3 Individual Voluntary Arrangements 
This is a formal version of the Debt Relief Order. An individual voluntary 
arrangement (IVA) begins with a formal proposal to creditors to pay part or all of the 
individual’s debts. An application is made to the court and an insolvency practitioner is 
assigned to the individual. Any agreement reached between the individual and his 
creditors will be binding on them. The IVA process is as follows: 
• First, find an authorised insolvency practitioner prepared to act for you. (Your local 
court can give the names of local practitioners.) A list is also available for you to look at 
in your local Official Receiver’s office. 
• Then you apply to the court for an "interim order". This prevents your creditors from 
presenting or proceeding with, a bankruptcy petition against you while the interim order 
is in force. It also prevents them from taking other action against you during the same 
period without the permission of the court. 
• The insolvency practitioner tells the court the details of your proposal and whether in 
his or her opinion a meeting of creditors should be called to consider it. 
• If a meeting is to be held, the date of the meeting and details of the proposals are sent to 
your creditors. Only those creditors who had notice of the meeting are bound by the 
arrangement, so it is important that you have accurate records of all your creditors’ 
names and addresses. Otherwise, the arrangement might fail because the practitioner 
cannot contact all the creditors and, therefore, bind them to it. 
• At the meeting, the creditors vote on whether to accept your proposals. If enough 
creditors (over 75% in value of the creditors present in person or by proxy, and voting 
on the resolution) vote in favour, the proposals are accepted. They are then binding on 
all creditors who had notice of, and were entitled to vote at, the meeting. 
• The insolvency practitioner supervises the arrangement and pays the creditors in 
accordance with the accepted proposal. (Source: The Insolvency Service. 
www.insolvency.gov.uk). 
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4.1.4 Deeds of Arrangements 
 
Deeds of Arrangement are very simple to draft. The Debtor decides on the offer he 
wishes to make to his creditors and these are forwarded in the form of a Deed to them. 
Only a majority in value is required for the arrangement to be approved, however, 
unlike IVA’s only those creditors who voted in favour of the arrangement are bound by 
its terms. The dissentients remain entitled to continue or commence enforcement action 
against the debtor irrespective of the arrangement which can result in its failure. A Deed 
of Arrangement is a relatively little used procedure today, but can be highly appropriate 
when dealing with only a handful of creditors. In these circumstances, it is an under-
utilised procedure in favour of IVA’s or the instruction of debt management companies. 
(Source: www.businessrecoveryadvice.co.uk) 
 
After the Insolvency Act 1986 was brought into force, the act of entering into a deed 
of arrangement could no longer automatically form the basis of a bankruptcy petition 
and therefore reduced the threat that any dissenting creditor might petition for 
bankruptcy. 
 
Although Deeds are not used as a means of proposing an arrangement with creditors 
as frequently as Individual Voluntary Arrangements under the Insolvency Act 1986, 
they do have the advantage of only requiring the approval of a simple majority of 
creditors in number and value; and they may in some circumstances be cheaper and 
simpler as there is no nominee, no report to court and it is not necessary to call a 
meeting of creditors. On the other hand, the level of protection is much lower; a 
dissenting creditor is not prevented by the relevant legislation from taking action against 
the debtor. (Source: The Insolvency Service. www.insolvency.gov.uk) 
 
4.1.5 Individual bankruptcy rates and economic significance 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the total number of individual bankruptcy cases from 1960-2009 
and Figure 4.2 shows the number of bankruptcies cases split into its component parts. 
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Figure 4.1: Total number of UK individual bankruptcies 1960-2009 
Source: www.insolvency.gov.uk 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Component individual bankruptcy procedures 1960-2009. 
Source: www.insolvency.gov.uk 
 
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that personal bankruptcy levels have rocketed to an all-time 
record high total of 134,142 bankruptcies as at the end of 2009. Individual bankruptcy 
orders are the predominant contributor totalling 74,670 (an increase of 10.7% on 2008), 
and IVAs contribute 47,641 cases (increasing by 21.8% on the previous year). The 
remaining contributing cases consist of 11,831 debt relief orders (a new alternative to 
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bankruptcy coming into force on the 6th April 2009). Only one Deed of Arrangement 
case has been recorded since 1999 and only a handful since the introduction of the 
Insolvency Act in 1986 showing that Deeds of Arrangement are indeed a rarely used 
procedure.  
 
From the above figures the individual bankruptcy boom is evident. Up until 1986 and 
the introduction of the Insolvency Act (allowing for a cheaper and more attainable 
variety of processes), bankruptcies numbered around 5,000 per year, a small fraction of 
the levels which we see today. A rise in bankruptcies can clearly be seen, not only as the 
Insolvency Act takes effect in the late 1980s but leading to a sharper rise as we hit the 
recession of the early 1990s. This rise however is nothing compared to that which can 
be seen in recent years with the number of bankruptcies being almost five times larger 
today than in 2002. This may, in part, be attributed to the reform of the Insolvency act in 
2002, now superseded by the Enterprise Act 200223. The most considerable change to 
the individual bankruptcy process to come out of the introduction of the new Act is the 
bankruptcy period itself. Before its introduction, bankruptcy would typically last for a 
period of three years, but it is now usual for a bankruptcy to be discharged after just 12 
months. Perhaps it is for this reason that the number of bankruptcies has risen quite 
dramatically since the Act’s introduction, with the bankruptcy “punishment” seemingly 
a more attractive proposition to the individual than it was previously. 
 
The total bankruptcy levels that we see today are now a cause for economic concern 
with an average of 368 individuals becoming bankrupt each day.  
 
Mark Allen at Grant Thornton Accountancy suggests that 
 
"We are seeing people with higher salaries coming to us as many who could 
previously cope with their monthly commitments and considered themselves relatively 
well off in the past are hit by a reduction in their monthly disposable income and falling 
house prices, which leaves them with few alternatives when facing up to their financial 
problems." (www.insolvencynews.com) 
 
Mark Sands, director of personal insolvency at RSM Tenon, suggests that: 
 
                                                 
23
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/ukpga_20020040_en_1. 
42 
 
“Despite the recent news that the recession has come to an end, the impact of 
unemployment and falling incomes mean that we will see levels of personal insolvencies 
continue to increase into 2010 as the effects of the recession continue to linger. We 
should therefore expect to see a further rise of around 12% in annual insolvency figures 
this year to 150,000 and these levels are likely to remain until at least 2012". 
(www.insolvencynews.com). 
Alec Pillmoor, head of personal insolvency at Baker Tilly, concurs: 
"Whilst the recent unemployment statistics have been more favourable, many 
families are finding it difficult to manage their finances with reduced hours of work. 
Our major concern is for 2010 as the predicted increase in interest rates and reductions 
in public sector spending may result in even more individuals entering insolvency." 
(www.insolvencynews.com). 
 
4.1.6 Research limitations 
 
Although I have demonstrated that individual bankruptcies have a large economic 
significance, one overriding factor inhibits the conduction of any thorough academic 
research in this area. This limiting factor is the availability of appropriate data to 
conduct such a study. Financial data on individuals is not publicly available and is 
guarded by the Data Protection Act 1998 which governs and protects the use of personal 
data information by businesses and other organisations. A study of individual 
bankruptcy prediction or individual credit assessment by academia, therefore, is not 
possible due to the proprietary nature of the data required which is held predominantly 
by the banking sector. The banks themselves use and analyse this data in order to 
produce their own proprietary credit rating systems on which loan decisions are made. 
From the outside it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to gauge the methodology, extent 
and accuracy of such systems, and whether there are major differences between each 
bank’s proprietary system. This avenue of potential research is therefore closed to the 
researcher seeking trans-sector samples of publically available information and we must 
turn our attention to company insolvencies.  
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4.2 Private companies limited by shares 
 
4.2.1 UK corporate insolvency processes 
 
 If insolvency is deemed inevitable then there are a number of remedies available to 
both the company and its creditors, these range from the more formal and restrictive 
actions such as administration, compulsory liquidation and administrative receivership, 
to the informal, less restrictive voluntary arrangements. The details of each of the 
different processes are described below and the exact requirements and procedures 
according to the Enterprise Act 2002 are provided in Appendix B24. 
 
4.2.1.1 Administration 
 
The purpose of administration has been changed by the introduction of the Enterprise 
Act 2002 and is now an out-of-court procedure although the old form of administration 
is still available in certain circumstances (see Appendix B.II). The new purposes of 
administration follow a strict hierarchy as follows:  
 
• Rescue the company as a going concern and if not reasonably practicable then;  
• Achieve a better result for the company's creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
company were wound up and if not reasonably practicable then;  
• Realise the company's property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors. 
 
The appointment of an administrator can be made by the company, its directors or a 
qualifying floating charge-holder, and is it usual for the period of administration to last 
12 months. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Also applicable to Public Limited Companies. 
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4.2.1.2 Administrative receivership 
 
Administrative Receivership (AR) is usually a consequence of a company failing to 
meet its long term borrowing obligations where an administrative receiver is appointed 
by the credit granting institution (e.g. a bank)25. The administrative receiver takes 
control of the company and its affairs usually with a view to sell the company as a going 
concern rather than selling off assets individually. The number of ARs has declined 
substantially and will eventually be phased out altogether when there are no longer any 
pre-Enterprise Act (15 September 2003) floating charges in existence. 
 
4.2.1.3 Company voluntary arrangements 
 
The company may propose a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) which is a 
formal agreement between itself and its creditors which satisfies both parties regarding 
the payment of debt. This usually will involve a delayed or reduced payment, capital 
restructuring or an ordered disposal of assets. These arrangements must satisfy at least 
75% of total creditors to be legally binding, warranting very little involvement by the 
courts and is solely governed by a proposal which sets out the details of the scheme. 
The Proposal can be made:  
 
•    Where the company is not in liquidation or subject to administration by its 
directors;  
•    Where an administration is in force, by the administrator; or 
•    Where the company is being wound-up, by the Liquidator  
 
The company remains under the control of the directors but the scheme itself is under 
the control of an IP who acts as a supervisor. The CVA procedure is designed primarily 
as a mechanism for business rescue, but is often used instead of liquidation as a means 
of distributing funds upon the conclusion of an administration. 
 
                                                 
25
 Note that it is generally no longer an option to appoint an administrative receiver for charges made after 15th 
September 2003. 
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4.2.1.4 Creditors’ voluntary liquidation 
 
A Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) is the process whereby the directors of a 
company would meet with an insolvency practitioner to discuss the details of their 
financial problems and seek his/her advice. Should that advice be that the company be 
liquidated, then the following procedure should occur. The winding-up of the company 
is initiated by a resolution of the members of the company, in agreeance that the 
company is insolvent and is to be placed into liquidation. This decision is then ratified 
by its creditors (rather than by court order), during a formal meeting with attendance by 
the way of a “Form of Proxy” receipt and acceptance by each creditor concerned. 
During the meeting, the directors must detail all of the company’s assets and liabilities 
in a “Statement of Affairs”, the insolvency practitioner is formally appointed, and the 
terms of the liquidation are detailed.  
 
4.2.1.5 Compulsory liquidation 
 
Compulsory liquidation (CL) (or compulsory winding up) is a liquidation ordered by 
the court, made as a result of a creditor petition, incomplete registration or failure to 
commence business. A winding up order is also, more often, made as a result of the 
company becoming insolvent in accordance to the definitions within the Insolvency Act 
1986 and is usually preceded by a period of attempted rescue such as the administration 
process. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry may also present a winding up 
order to the court on the grounds of public interest. 
 
4.2.1.6 Members’ voluntary liquidation 
 
Although members’ voluntary liquidation (MVL) is a formal liquidation process for 
the purposes of this thesis it cannot be categorised as being part of the failure/insolvency 
process, although it must be mentioned for completeness. For legitimate reasons, a 
director(s) might wish to wind down the affairs of a company whilst it is still solvent, 
for example if the director wishes to retire, or if the company is deemed non-profitable.  
An MVL is only applicable if the company is able to pay all of its debts within one year 
and the director(s) make a declaration of solvency. The MVL process therefore will not 
46 
 
be included, or enter further into any discussion regarding failure and insolvency 
processes. 
 
4.2.2 Private limited firm insolvency rates  
 
The total number of private limited firm insolvencies from 1960-199 are shown in 
Figure 4.3, whereas Figure 4.4 splits the total number of limited firm insolvencies into 
the five component parts as described in section 4.2.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Total number of private firm insolvencies in the UK per year 1960-2009 
Source: www.insolvency.gov.uk 
 
As with the bankruptcy of individuals, we observe a large increase in these 
insolvencies circumventing the recession of the early 1990s. The introduction of the 
Enterprise Act in 2002 does not seem to cause a large increase in insolvencies like that 
of the individual, but what we can see is the rise in administration processes due to the 
increased availability and entry routes that the Act conceived. This rise in 
administrations appears to be associated with a fall in the number of creditor 
liquidations from 2002 to 2008. Administrations rise from 643 in 2002, to 2,512 by 
2007 (an increase of 390%), whereas the number of creditors’ liquidations falls 27.1% 
from 10,075 to 7,342 over the same period. 2007-2009 shows an increase in the total 
number of insolvencies and Figure 4.4 shows that the main driver for this increase is the 
sharp rise in creditors’ liquidations although the number of administrations is also 
continuing to climb. 
 
The Enterprise Act 2002, although offering a simplified and relaxed route for the 
restructuring of a failing company as compared to its Insolvency Act 1986 predecessor, 
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offers no legal barrier for the directors of a failed firm to continue directorship with an 
existing or new start-up company. Only in extreme cases will a director be disqualified 
and this decision is made on an individual basis by the courts rather than the insolvency 
practitioner. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 seeks to ban "unfit" 
directors from being directors of a limited liability company. This action is taken only 
when it is proven the director has acted wrongfully, fraudulently, or just very badly. A 
government agency will first have to prove wrongful trading or "unfit behaviour" before 
any action can be taken. The period of disqualification can range from 2-15 years 
suggesting that the punishment for unfit behaviour can to some extent prevent further 
insolvencies from occurring within the immediate future. The overall impact that this 
has on the number of insolvencies, although difficult to measure, is likely to be 
negligible as disqualification is a rarity rather than the norm. 
 
. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Component private firm insolvency procedures 1960-2009. 
Source: www.insolvency.gov.uk26 
                                                 
26
 The data obtained from the insolvency website required some adjustments: 
 
(i) The numbers obtained from the downloaded excel spreadsheet contained statistics for ALL UK 
companies. Deductions were therefore required to remove those companies which were not 
privately owned (i.e. Public Limited Companies). The number of  PLC insolvencies were obtained 
from the London Share Price Database. 
(ii) Receivership appointments comprise administrative receivers appointed under the 1986 Insolvency 
Act (and the 1989 Order for Northern Ireland) and certain other receiver appointments, for example 
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If we calculate the rate of insolvencies as a percentage of the total number of firms, the 
resulting chart again shows an increasing trend over the previous decade 2000-2009, 
with the rate showing the greatest increase in the final two years. This result is shown in 
figure 4.5. The rate of insolvency shows a 0.22 percentage point increase from 2007 to 
2009, represented by an increase in total insolvencies of 11,307, offset by an increase in 
firm population of 154,965. The rise in the rate of insolvencies is what we would expect 
given a period of recession. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Rate of private firm insolvencies 2000-2009. 
Source: www.insolvency.gov.uk 
 
4.2.3 Economic significance 
 
With 29,545 private limited firms entering insolvency in 2009 it is clear that these 
numbers have economic significance. If we are to believe the R3 in that 27% of all 
insolvencies are a direct result of another firm failing, then in 2010 almost 8,000 of 
these private sector firms will be directly sent dominoing into failure by the 2009 
                                                                                                                                                        
under the Law of Property Act 1925 - due to the use of the same statutory documentation for 
different types of receivership, it is not possible to give a breakdown between them. 
(www.insolvency.gov.uk). 
(iii) Administrations include both the old administration procedure under Part II of the Insolvency Act 
1986, and the more streamlined inclusion of additional entry routes under Schedule B1 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002. 
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insolvency glut. As the ripples of the recession continue to flow through the economy 
we would expect that the total number of private firm insolvencies in 2010 to continue 
to rise.  
 
Are we able however, to place a value on these 29,545 private firm insolvencies? 
Exact statistics for this type of investigation are not apparent but we are able to make an 
approximate estimation using data obtained from the Office for National Statistics27. A 
statistical press release (October 2009) by the Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills provides a number of statistics on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) 
which we can use to estimate the economic significance of private firm (approximated 
by SME) insolvencies. 4.8 million28 private sector enterprises are estimated to exist by 
the publication (99.9% of all UK firms) which suggests that during 2009 the percentage 
of these firms entering insolvency is just 0.6%. We can therefore apply this percentage 
to get a rough estimate of the costs to the economy in terms of turnover and 
employment. Total employment within the SME sector is an estimated 13.7 million 
people, and had an estimated combined annual turnover of £1,500 billion. These 
numbers give us a rough approximation of the economic costs of private sector SME 
insolvency of 82,200 job losses and £9 billion of lost economic revenue. 
 
4.2.4 Limitations for academic research 
 
The vast majority of insolvency prediction literature focuses on large companies, i.e. 
those which are listed on, and, priced by the market. There have been a relatively small 
number of prior academic studies which examine the usage and effectiveness of 
insolvency prediction and credit scoring models with reference to the smaller private 
firms. The most notable of these studies are that of Edminster (1972), Peel & Peel 
(1987), and Falkenstien (2000).  
 
The reasons for the apparent deficiency of such papers throughout the literature are 
most probably due to both the difficulty in obtaining sufficient data for empirical 
analysis and, the reliability of any such data should it be acquired. These difficulties 
stem from the way the data is prepared and reported compared to that of the larger 
                                                 
27
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk, rounded to the nearest 100,000. 
28
 Consisting of 3 million sole proprietors (306,000 with employees), 462,000 partnerships and 1.3 million 
companies. 
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corporation. For most (if not all) of the global markets and economies, far more 
emphasis is placed on the regulation and governance of the larger publicly traded firm 
than that of the smaller private company. Although regulation exists for limited 
company accounting they are not subject to the more stringent rules faced by the listed 
firm, the differences born through the ever evolving needs and requirements of markets, 
the economy, and shareholder protection. 
 
Similarly the application of models derived through the analysis of public firm data 
should not be extended to assess the health of a private limited company.  
 
“The relationship between financial variables and default risk varies substantially 
between public and private firms. An important consequence of this is that default 
models based on public firm data and applied to private firms will likely misrepresent 
actual default risk”. Falkenstein (2000). 
 
I now examine and discuss the main causes of the lack of private data for empirical 
academic analysis and the reasons why it may not be as reliable when used in the 
construction of insolvency prediction models compared to the data obtained from the 
public firm sector. 
 
4.2.4.1 Accounts preparation and audit exemption 
 
All UK private limited liability companies are required to keep records of the 
company's financial transactions. The records must contain sufficient detail to enable 
the financial position and performance of the company to be determined, and the 
directors must provide profit and loss account and balance sheet accounting statements 
in compliance with the Companies Act 2006. The records should contain details of any 
income and expenditure and a record of the company's assets and liabilities. It is a 
statutory requirement for all companies to submit financial statements to Companies 
House within 9 months after the accounting year end. There is no legal obligation for 
these accounts to be prepared by a certified accountant but ultimately it is the director’s 
responsibility to ensure that the annual accounts are true and fair. The accounts prepared 
by the limited company must include: 
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• A profit and loss account, or an income and expenditure account if it is a company not 
trading for profit 
• A balance sheet, signed by a director  
• Notes to the accounts 
• Group accounts - if appropriate 
The accounts are normally accompanied by an auditor's report, unless the business is 
exempt from audit. For limited companies, the accounts must also be accompanied by a 
director’s report, with a business review if the company does not qualify as small or 
medium. To qualify as a small or medium company and be eligible to file abbreviated 
accounts and negate the auditor’s report, the company must satisfy at least two out of 
the following three conditions (for financial years on or after the 6th April 2008):29 
To qualify as a small company; 
• Annual turnover must be no more than £6.5 million 
• Balance sheet total must be no more than £3.26 million 
• Average number of employees must be no more than 50 
To qualify as a medium-sized company; 
• Annual turnover must be no more than £25.9 million 
• Balance sheet total must be no more than £12.9 million 
• Average number of employees must be no more than 250 
 
Under the Companies Act 2006, total audit exemption exists if the qualifies as a 
small company as described above. For the large majority of companies, externally 
audited accounts are not filed and therefore may be viewed with a degree of uncertainty 
with regards to their reliability. Currently in the UK (2010), 86.3% of non-dormant 
companies do not have their individual accounts audited.30 
 
                                                 
29
 Note that for financial years starting before the 6th April 2008 the requirements are different but in most cases 
are now irrelevant. 
30
 Companies House, Statistical Tables on Companies Registration Activities 2009-10, Table F2. 
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It is perceived that a lack of audit inhibits the inherent usefulness of the accounting 
data to make survival and credit-granting decisions. Melumad and Thomon (1990) 
demonstrate that in some cases, although audit is non-mandatory, private firms may 
appoint an audit team because lending institutions conclude that it is only borrows with 
a high credit risk that would choose not be audited. This voluntary appointment of 
auditors therefore acts as a signal to the lender that the company is of a low-risk nature. 
Lennox and Pittman (2011) suggest that under a voluntary audit regime, companies 
which are audited receive credit ratings which are on average 14 points higher than 
those which are not. 
 
4.2.4.2 Availability of accounting data 
 
If we negate the suggestion, for the moment at least, that the accounting numbers 
contained within private company accounts, due to their regulatory lack of external 
scrutiny, may not be as reliable as the financial statements produced by the larger 
companies who are subject to compulsory audit; and also believe in the ideology that 
the an efficient market would dictate these accounts to indeed be true and fair; then we 
may wish to investigate where the relevant data items may be obtained. Unlike public 
companies, accounting data is not widely available for empirical analysis through the 
use of electronic financial databases and is more difficult to obtain. Some online 
database resources such as Hemscott Company Guru Academic do provide information 
and data from UK private non-listed companies. From experience, however, the data 
supplied is often missing, incomplete, or subject to large rounding errors, rendering the 
use of such resources extremely problematic. The data items provided by these 
resources are also geared towards those larger firms of which audit is either compulsory 
or volunteered (13.7% of all private firms) and therefore not entirely representative of 
the true population. 
 
A further problem associated with private firm data is that all the numbers are 
accounting-based, that is to say, by their very nature private firms shares are not traded 
by the public and therefore no market-based data will be available. Many of the recent 
insolvency prediction and credit risk models to be published (e.g. Sobehart and Stein, 
2000; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2004), use market data as a 
fundamental part of their analyses. Without such data, the more modern approaches to 
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insolvency prediction modelling will not be applicable to the private limited company. 
Any analysis that is undertaken will therefore be restricted to the use of accounting-
number based data. 
 
To obtain the most accurate and complete accounting data for these firms, the most 
direct approach would be through Companies House where the records of all UK 
companies are filed. From the Companies House website 
(www.companieshouse.gov.uk), it is possible to obtain copies of the accounts for any 
registered company, albeit for a small fee of £1 per document. This method however 
would prove to be quite expensive and very time consuming given the number of data 
items required for a thorough empirical analysis. In a potential analysis, therefore, there 
needs to be a trade-off between cost, time, and accuracy when collecting private limited 
company data, perhaps this is why there are only a small number of studies of this 
nature within the literature. 
 
4.2.5 Summary 
 
Although the lack of data and its reliability issues inhibit a study of privately owned 
firms by the academic, some proprietary systems do exist to assess the credit worthiness 
of private limited companies and are generally found within the banking sector. The 
banking sector, where small business loans are granted for example, may not treat or 
assess the loan applicants by generalised number-based system similar to that of the 
individual, but are often treated on a case-by-case basis. This can be demonstrated 
following the recent criticism faced by banks for their unwillingness to lend to small 
businesses as shown by the current failure to meet lending requirements as set out 
within project Merlin31. These feelings are rebuffed by the Chief Executive of the 
British Bankers Association (BBA) who stated that “Banks have made repeated 
commitments to support business. There are funds available to lend to firms with a 
viable business plan”.32 
 
                                                 
31
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17009985. 
32
 “BBA statement regarding banks profitability” available at 
http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=145&a=18035 
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Credit rating agencies also have proprietary systems for evaluating the smaller firm 
such as Moody’s “RiskCalc” for private companies as detailed in Falkenstein (2000). 
Moody’s are able to utilise their proprietary database of firms in order to model default 
risk for private companies. 
 
“The model's key advantage derives from Moody's unique and proprietary middle 
market private firm financial statement and default database (Credit Research 
Database), which comprises 28,104 companies and 1,604 defaults”. Falkenstein (2000). 
 
For the reasons stated in this section, the ability to obtain and rely upon the necessary 
data for an empirical study of private firms is problematic. The focus of this thesis 
therefore will now move onto the public limited company where the majority of 
research in the field of insolvency prediction and credit risk assessment has occurred to 
date.  
 
4.3 Public limited companies 
 
4.3.1 PLC insolvency rates 
 
The number of public companies which become insolvent each year is shown in 
Figure 4.5. We can see that the absolute number of firms which are flagged as insolvent 
is miniscule compared to the private company figures presented in the previous section. 
This is not particularly surprising as public companies tend to be the largest firms with 
extensive systems of governance, operating under greater scrutiny from its shareholders 
and regulators. Figure 4.5 shows that on average less than 10 PLCs become insolvent 
each year which increases as we enter times of economic downturn such as the early 
1990s and the latest recession. Although the absolute number of insolvencies seems 
quite small, we must remember that they are drawn from a relatively small population 
of approximately 2300 firms each year which are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange’s Main Market. The rate of insolvency occurrence as a percentage of the total 
population of firms is provided in figure 4.7. In 2000 the insolvency rate amongst public 
companies was approximately 0.5%, which is not dissimilar to the average rate shown 
by private firms. This rate rose briefly in 2001 and 2002 to 1.8% in accordance with the 
high number of administrations which occurred in those years. The rate then fell from 
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2003-2007 to a minimum of 0.46% in 2005. Post-recession and by 2009, the rate of 
PLC insolvencies grew to over 2%, mush higher than the 0.6% attributable to private 
firms in the same year. This suggests that although these larger firms are subject to 
greater accounting, governance and legal regulations which are primarily aimed at 
protecting the shareholder and the company’s very existence, the rate of insolvency is 
far higher than that of the smaller, private firms, which seems to be somewhat 
counterintuitive.  
 
If we examine the different types of insolvency proceedings for public firms we can 
note several points of interest. Firstly, since the introduction of the Insolvency Act 1986 
we can see that liquidations have been all but phased out, being replaced by the more 
popular administration process. The number of receiverships has also declined since the 
introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002 where it is generally no longer an option to 
appoint an administrative receiver for charges made after 15th September 2003. 
Currently therefore it is the administration process which is the most popular insolvency 
route for PLCs seemingly because of its rescue mandate and lowered entry barriers 
post-Enterprise Act 2002. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Number of public company insolvencies 1960-2009. 
Source: London Share Price Database 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Rate of public company insolvencies 2000-2009. 
Source: London Share Price Database 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Costs to society and economic significance 
 
Data collected from the Thomson One Banker database provides information 
regarding the 47 UK PLC insolvencies which occurred during 2009. The loss of these 
companies meant that approximately 40,000 jobs and £4.5 billion of turnover were lost 
during this period. Comparing these figures to that of 82,000 jobs and the £9 billion of 
lost turnover associated with the private limited company sector we can see that in terms 
of economic significance, PLC insolvencies contribute roughly half of the value 
attributed to private firms. This is unsurprising given the absolute number of firms 
which are observed for each sector class (47 vs 29,545). Interestingly, we can calculate 
the economic value (based on employee and turnover losses) per firm for both sectors 
which gives us an approximate per-firm estimate. The per-firm value estimates provide 
significant differences between the two groups33. For smaller private firms the number 
of employees lost per insolvency is 2.7 compared to 851 that are lost for every public-
firm insolvency. In terms of turnover, the private limited firms contribute approximately 
                                                 
33
 Based on 2008 figures. 
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£300,000 of lost turnover per insolvency which compares to £9.5 million attributable to 
each listed firm. 
 
We can see that although private companies provide around double the economic 
losses in real terms for the economy compared to the listed firms, this is not 
unsurprising considering the sheer number of insolvencies which occur within the 
private limited company sector. When I scale these figures down to the value attributed 
to each individual firm, again it is unsurprising that a public company has more 
economic significance should it enter into insolvency than its private limited 
counterpart. This is one possible reason, perhaps, why there has been a great deal more 
academic attention focused on the public company, although other factors are also 
prevalent and will be discussed shortly. Before this discussion however, I feel it 
necessary to provide a brief overview of the insolvency prediction and credit risk 
research/literature that has been directed at the public listed company, in order to both 
contextualise this thesis and to provide some understanding of the history and 
magnitude of public firm insolvency prediction and credit risk analysis. 
 
4.3.3 A wealth of academic research 
 
The work of Beaver (1966) seeded the modern literature on insolvency prediction 
with a univariate approach, treated further in Tamari (1966) and Beaver (1968). 
Methods in the 1970s centred on a multivariate framework, with the widespread use of 
multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) models and the production of the ‘Z-score’ 
and similar technologies (Altman, 1968; Deakin, 1972; Edminster, 1972; Blum, 1974; 
Diamond, 1976; Taffler and Tisshaw, 1977; Taffler, 1983). Criticisms relating to 
violations of the statistical assumptions underlying the MDA approach,34 however, led 
researchers of the 1980s to concentrate their efforts on the development of conditional 
probability models, the most popular being the logit35 (Ohlson, 1980; Hamer 1983; 
Zmijewski, 1984; Zavgren, 1985; Keasey and Watson, 1987). 
 
                                                 
34
 See, for example, Joy and Tollefson (1975, 1978), Eisenbeis (1977), Moyer (1977), and Altman and Eisenbeis 
(1978). 
35
 Refer to section 8.1 for an evaluation of methodological popularity. 
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Technological developments and an increase in the availability and power of 
computer processing allowed the insolvency prediction researchers in the 1990s to 
adopt a wider range of methods. Much of the work in the 1990s concentrated on 
artificially intelligent systems such as neural networks, genetic algorithms, case-based 
reasoning and recursive partitioning (Odom and Sharda, 1990; Coats and Fant, 1993; 
Boritz et al., 1995; Charitou et al., 2004). Despite the voluminous research, however, 
insolvency prediction suffered much criticism because of a lack of theoretical 
underpinning – giving rise to problems associated with the classical paradigm (choice of 
definition of firm failure, non-stationarity and instability of data, and sample selection) 
and the arbitrary selection of variables and modelling method.36 
 
The latest modelling developments are the contingent claims models which are based 
on option pricing theory as set out in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). 
Such models are known by various names: ‘BSM’ (after Black, Scholes Merton), 
‘KMV-Merton’ (after KMV Corp., a company specialising in tools for managing 
corporate credit risk, and Merton), and ‘Merton model’ for example. Prior to the 
acquisition of KMV by Moody’s Corp. in April 2002 very little was known publicly 
about KMV’s proprietary credit risk appraisal methodologies – which included 
contingent claims models. After the acquisition, a large selection of papers written by 
various practitioners became publicly available to download from the Moody’s KMV 
website,37 and contingent claims models have since attracted a deal of interest from 
academics. Comparisons between these models and traditional accounting number-
based models have been performed by Bharath and Shumway, 2004, Hillegeist et al., 
2004, Vassalou and Xing, 2004, Campbell et al., 2006, Reisz and Purlich, 2007, and 
Agarwal and Taffler, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 See Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) for an excellent discussion of the problems. 
37
 http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/New%20Research_sectionl.html. 
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4.3.4 Reasons for this wealth of research 
 
4.3.4.1 Accounts preparation and audit process 
 
The annual reports of public companies are a more attractive proposition for analysis 
than that of the private firm for two key reasons. Firstly, the reports themselves are, for 
the norm, readily and easily obtainable, not only by the academic but also the general 
public. Any stakeholder of a particular company will, quite quickly, be able to find 
detailed financial information on that firm by either visiting their corporate website or, 
by visiting one of many websites dedicated to providing for free, databases of UK and 
international company financial content38.  These free resources may fulfil the needs of 
the private investor, but often lack the detailed information and mass-download-ability 
that an academic would require for a thorough empirical analysis. Larger and more 
concise databases are available, but often accompanied by a hefty price tag. These 
include Datastream, Thomson-Reuters, and Bloomberg. The price of access to these 
databases varies; for instance a Bloomberg terminal would set you back somewhere in 
the region of £20,000 per annum, not something the average member of the public could 
afford, but a valuable asset to a top university. The advantages of holding a license for 
one of these databases is the number of companies covered, the amount of information 
which is available for each company, and the ability to create custom reports for 
required data items and download the report into a single file.  
 
Secondly, we have the requirement of the compulsory audit. All listed company 
accounts must be prepared in conjunction with a qualified audit team. This differs to 
that of a private firm where a compulsory audit is not required should it meet the 
conditions as discussed in section 4.2. I therefore suggest that the use of public firm data 
would be more reliable and complete than that of the private firm because the financials 
have been validated by an external source and not simply left to the director’s 
discretion. The reasons for the external audit are born through regulatory and 
governance evolution as mandated by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) with key 
factors influencing reporting evolution including size, economic significance, public 
interest, and investor protection. 
                                                 
38
 For example Yahoo Finance (uk.finance.yahoo.com) , Hemmington-Scott (www.hemscott.net), and your 
standard Iphone stocks application. 
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4.3.4.2 Linking going concern and insolvency prediction 
 
A key feature of the compulsory external audit, and particularly relevant to this 
thesis, is the going concern qualification (GCQ). Part of an auditor’s duty to the 
company is the requirement of the audit team to assess the firm as a going concern. 
Financial statements are prepared on the assumption that the firm is a going concern and 
will continue to operate throughout the next reporting period. Therefore, annual reports 
issued on a going concern basis have already been judged to survive the following year 
and remain solvent. In reality however, studies show that it is extremely unlikely for a 
failing firm to be issued with a GCQ (e.g. Citron and Taffler, 1992). The lack of GCQs, 
is perhaps the reason why accounting number-based insolvency prediction models have 
apparently been able to detect signs of impending failure from accounting records, even 
if by definition the accounts represent a solvent company perpetual in existence. 
 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) provide 
guidance to auditors on how to evaluate a client’s viability status within ISA 570. The 
auditor must assess the client’s ability to meet its obligations as they become due 
without having to liquidate its assets, restructure debt, be forced by outsiders to revise 
its operations, or other similar actions. 
 
Conditions or events that raise doubts about the client’s ability to continue in 
existence include: 
 
• Negative trends e.g., recurring operating losses, working capital deficiencies, negative 
cash-flow from operating activities, adverse key financial ratios. 
• Indicators of possible financial difficulties e.g., default on loan or similar agreements, 
arrearages in dividends, denial of usual trade credit from suppliers, restructuring of debt, 
non-compliance with statutory capital requirements, need to seek new sources or 
methods of financing or to dispose of substantial assets. 
• Internal matters e.g., work stoppages or other labour difficulties, substantial dependence 
on the success of particular projects, uneconomic long-term commitments, or need to 
significantly revise operations. 
• External matters e.g., legal proceedings, legislation, or similar matters that might 
jeopardize an entity’s ability to operate; loss of key franchise, license, or patent; loss of 
61 
 
a principal customer or supplier; or uninsured or underinsured catastrophe such as a 
drought, earthquake or flood. 
If the aggregate effect of these conditions and events suggest that the client may have 
continuity problems, the auditor must consider and evaluate the feasibility of 
management’s plans for dealing with these adverse effects. Management plans include: 
• Plans to dispose of assets and the effects of such disposals; 
• Plans to borrow money or restructure debt and the effects of such plans on existing 
covenants; 
• Plans to reduce or delay expenditure and the effects of such delayed expenditure on 
operations; and 
• Plans to increase ownership equity. 
If substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern remains, 
the auditor’s report must include an explanatory paragraph with the audit opinion that 
comments on the going concern uncertainty. (Accounting, Finance & Tax)39 
Citron and Taffler (1992) suggest that unless the chances of a company failing are 
very high, the probability of a GCQ is very low. The reason for low GCQ rates is likely 
to be based on the independence of the auditor and the possible reliance on future 
economic benefits gained should the firm continue to exist untarnished by a detrimental 
audit report. Literature in this area by Kida (1980), Altman (1982) and Moizer (1985) 
suggests that there are a number of cost factors that may lead to a reduction in auditor 
independence which can be summarised as: 
 
• The value of the auditor's economic interest in the client 
• The likelihood that this economic interest will be lost either due to the client switching 
auditors or failure brought about by the GCQ itself (self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis) 
• The likelihood that the client will sue if the report is qualified and the client does not 
fail. 
 
                                                 
39
 http://accounting-financial-tax.com. 
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Conversely they show that there are certain cost factors which lead to an increase in 
independence, namely: 
 
• The loss of future revenues due to loss of reputation should the auditor not qualify and 
the client fails. 
• The likelihood of lawsuits by third parties if there is no GCQ and the client fails. 
 
In a sample of UK quoted companies observed over the decade 1977-86, Citron and 
Taffler (1992) find some evidence in support of an association between the presence of 
a GCQ and auditor switching. No evidence was found to support the self-fulfilling 
prophecy hypothesis, and a further finding was that GCQ rates are not affected by firm 
size. 
 
Kida (1980) conducted a survey of audit firms, requiring them to rank companies on 
a six point scale of failure given past data from forty anonymous manufacturing 
companies. His results showed that on average the auditors (using a five variable 
discriminant model) correctly predicted the outcome of 33.2 out of the 40 firms. In 
reality, however, studies often paint a different picture. Further evidence by Citron and 
Taffler (1992) suggests that only 26% of failed firms are qualified on a going concern 
basis in the period prior to insolvency and were not subject to a GCQ unless failure was 
imminent.  
 
Several authors have examined the link between insolvency prediction models and 
the issue of the GCQ. Altman and McGough (1974) suggested that a model to predict 
bankruptcy may help auditors judge a company’s ability to continue its operations by 
alerting the auditor to certain problems that may be difficult to detect using traditional 
auditing procedures. Likewise Koh (1991) posits that insolvency prediction models can 
be useful to auditors in making going concern assessments. Paquette (1996) suggests 
that bankruptcy prediction models can assist auditors in assessing the validity of the 
going concern assumption by directing attention to indicator ratios as well as by 
providing a method for combining the information contained in the ratios.  
 
The notion that insolvency prediction models may be used as a tool by the auditor to 
detect impending failure is unsurprising. The determination of a company’s health, 
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whether it be for audit GCQ’s, investment appraisal, mergers and acquisitions, credit 
ratings, or credit risk; are all intrinsically linked by the need to evaluate all of the 
available data and information to make an informed judgement. Some will be privileged 
to more information than others on which to base their decisions, but many of the 
processes and technologies will remain the same. Gaganis (2007) provides an excellent 
review of the technologies employed within the field of audit GCQ’s and the similarities 
to the insolvency prediction literature are clearly evident. 
 
Perhaps surprising on initial consideration, there are examples within the literature 
which suggest that a going concern qualification acts in a positive manner when 
appraising survival chances. Taffler and Tseung (1984) found that only 20% of firms 
which received a GCQ subsequently failed. “A going concern qualification 
paradoxically is associated with the continuance of an enterprise not its failure” 
(Taffler and Tseung, 1984, p.25). This evidence was further supported by Peel and Peel 
(1987) who find that when used as a dummy variable in a predictive context, the GCQ 
had a sign which was wrong a priori in predicting failure 
 
4.3.5 Summary 
 
 
This section has discussed in some depth the process of insolvency along with 
potential research avenues and limitations for the three broad groups; individuals, 
private companies, and public companies. In summation it is evident that the relative 
availability (and perceived accuracy) of information makes the study of PLCs a more 
empirically sound option than its counterparts. The difficulties discussed earlier in this 
section inhibit the efficacy and accuracy of such a study for both private firms and 
individuals. I have also provided evidence as to the economic importance of a failing 
PLC, in that although the frequency of PLC insolvencies is far less than for private 
firms, the value of these firms is considerably more on an individual basis in terms of 
both monetary and social impact. One further point to note is that credit risk theory 
relies heavily on market data thus a study on private firms (or individuals) is not 
possible if one wishes to incorporate credit risk models into the research. As one of the 
primary aims of this study is to empirically evaluate a comparison between accounting 
number-based models and contingent claims market-based models, it is evident that 
public company data must be used.  
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5 The prediction of corporate insolvency: a literature 
review 
 
5.1 1928-1968: the univariate approach to insolvency prediction 
 
Section 2.2 traced the evolution of the accounting ratio and concluded with a naive 
model by Wall and Duning (1928) approximating the first example of real linear 
multivariate discriminant function. Attempting to thwart an explosion of ratios and ratio 
usage which was prevalent at this time, Wall and Duning created a ratio index, a 
weighted combination of several different ratios with the weights being arbitrarily 
chosen by the authors and providing a numerical snapshot of any given firm. Although 
the ratio index is possibly the first example of a multivariate use of ratios, because of 
the inherent lack of any sound statistical methodology during the weight selection 
process, it cannot be truly classed as a multivariate model. Although Wall and Duning’s 
work was specifically directed towards the area of insolvency it still remains, however, 
a forerunner to the ratio analysis and insolvency prediction models that we are familiar 
with today.  
 
The first example of an academic study of financial ratios directed solely towards the 
field of bankruptcy came four years after Wall and Duning’s pioneering ratio index. 
Fitzpatrick (1932) investigated the differences between ratios of “successful industrial 
enterprises with those of failed firms”. In his study he analysed twenty matched pairs of 
firms from the period 1920-1929 and discussed the usage of thirteen of their accounting 
ratios as predictors of insolvency. The evidence that Fitzpatrick presented was that there 
were persistent differences in the ratios of the two groups of firms for at least three 
years prior to failure. He suggested that all of the ratios predicted failure to some degree 
but the best indicators were net profit to net worth, net worth to debt, and net worth to 
fixed assets. Although this analysis has a clear shortcoming in the size of the sample 
(twenty firms), this paper was significant within the field of insolvency prediction as it 
provides the first example of insolvency prediction methodology and the ability of the 
accounting ratio to predict failure.  
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In a similar vein, Smith and Winakor (1935) analysed a sample of twenty-nine 
companies which had experienced financial difficulties and distress during the period 
1923-1931. They investigated the trends of twenty-one accounting ratios, analysing the 
mean of each ratio up to ten years prior to the occurrence of the financial difficulty, 
(although what is deemed to constitute a “financial difficulty” is somewhat unclear from 
the text). They concluded that the ratio of net working capital to total assets was the 
most accurate predictor of failure, with its declination evident a full ten years before the 
event. Their data also demonstrated (but not emphasised) that the ratio of net worth to 
fixed assets was also one of their best indicators, agreeing with the findings of 
Fitzpatrick (1932). The study of Smith and Winakor (1935) has, however, a serious 
drawback. The timeliness of this study and the data that it incorporates encompasses the 
Wall Street crash of 1929, and the lack of a comparative selection of healthy firms 
leaves the findings of this study somewhat ambiguous. 
 
Merwin (1942) was described in Horrigan (1968) as being “...the first really 
sophisticated analysis of ratio predictive power”. Merwin overcame some of the 
shortcomings of the previous studies by Fitzpatrick (1932) and Smith and Winakor 
(1935) by analysing a far larger sample of firms. His study investigated the ratio 
properties of 936 small manufacturing corporations from the period 1926-1936 with the 
sample separated into “continuing” and “discontinuing” firms. Firms were considered 
insolvent if the corporation discontinued making reports of income tax at some time 
before the end of 1936. This study suffers the same problem in timeliness as the Smith 
and Winakor study in that the sampling period envelopes the Wall Street crash of 1929. 
It is quite surprising however when Merwin reports that from the 939 firms drawn as a 
sample in 1926, 558 (approximately three-fifths) of the companies become insolvent by 
the end of the sample period. 237 of these firm discontinuations occurred from 1927-
1929 and a further 189 between the years 1930-1932. Withstanding the economic 
conditions surrounding the study, the percentage of firms apparently becoming 
insolvent seems surprisingly large. 
 
The glut of discontinuing firms and the timeliness of the study may have been 
fortuitous, providing the author with a larger sample of failing firms than had previously 
been examined. Merwin found that from an undisclosed “large” number of ratios which 
were examined, three ratios were “especially symptomatic of impending 
discontinuance”; current assets to current liabilities (quick ratio), net worth to total debt, 
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and net working capital to total assets. These three ratios “showed a decidedly 
unfavourable trend for all five industries when measured by the empirical standards of 
the remaining solvent corporations”. Merwin was able to detect differences in the ratio 
means for as much as six years before discontinuance, with net working capital to total 
assets being the most sensitive indicator of ultimate discontinuance. 
 
It is not for another twenty-four years that any further direct and dedicated 
insolvency prediction studies become apparent in the literature. A number of studies do 
however arise within this period which continues to evaluate the financial ratio as a 
useful decision tool. These studies largely focus on the need for identifying good credit 
and the pricing of bonds in the corporate market. Hickman (1958) analysed the default 
experience of corporate bond issues during 1900-1943 and found that the net profit to 
sales and the times-interest-earned ratios were the best predictors of default. Other 
studies such as Saulnier et al. (1958) found evidence that borrowing firms with poorer 
current ratios and net worth to debt ratios were more prone to loan defaults. These ratios 
are the same best indicators as suggested by Merwin (1942) which demonstrates the 
intrinsic linkage between insolvency prediction and credit appraisal. 
 
In 1966 William H. Beaver published his seminal paper “Financial Ratios as 
Predictors of Failure” which is widely regarded as being the forefather of modern 
insolvency prediction literature. Encouraged by the findings of the earlier studies of 
Fitzpatrick (1932), Smith and Winakor (1935), and Merwin (1942), Beaver hoped to 
incorporate the potential of the ratio as a predictive tool, with the liquid reservoir 
theoretical explanation of insolvency provided by Walter (1957) discussed in section 3.2 
of this thesis. The primary objective of Beaver’s work was to determine the usefulness 
of financial ratios in the general sense, but declared that ratios could only be regarded as 
being “useful” if successfully tested in relation to some particular purpose, in this 
instance, he chose the prediction of company failure. Beaver (1966) warrants particular 
discussion as I feel it provides a sound platform for the understanding of the proceeding 
evolution of the literature. 
 
Having gone through the process of data collection for my own empirical research, I 
begin with expressing my highest regard to Beaver and, indeed, all authors of similar 
studies around this time. They were able to gather, analyse and process voluminous 
amounts of financial data without the use of modern tools such as computers and online 
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databases, which has proved very time consuming and laborious for myself even with 
these recent technological advancements. Using Moody’s Industrial Manual40, Beaver 
gathered a sample of financial ratios from 79 failed firms over an eleven year period 
(1954 to 1964 inclusive) and a comparator selection of non-failed firms. The selection 
of non-failed firms was made according to a matching pair analysis based on industry 
and firm size, that is to say, that for every failed company in the sample, a non-failed 
firm was selected from 12,000 leading US corporations matched on the basis of both 
industry and firm size. This methodology of sample matching has been adopted by 
many studies to date . 
 
Littleton (1926) was the first to provide empirical evidence that ratio distributions are 
different between industries and the theoretical underpinnings for the matching pair 
design may be traced back as early as Bliss (1923) who suggested that for any complete 
ratio analysis, consideration of industry factors must be included. 
 
The matching of firm size is also important because, as Beaver (1966) posited, “there 
are certain statistical reasons for believing that asset size alters the relationship between 
ratios and failure”. He suggests that even if two companies have identical ratios, if one 
company is larger than the other then that company will have less of a chance of failure 
than the smaller one. Statistical evidence of the time supports this idea and showed that 
the return on assets is subject to less variability, the larger the size of the company.41 A 
more recent study by Falkenstein et al. (2000) shows that the distributional properties of 
listed and private firm ratios are significantly different: “A model fit using public data 
will deviate systematically and adversely from a model fit using private data, as applied 
to private firms.” (p.46). 
 
Initially, Beaver intended to simply compare the ratios of each matched pair. By 
using this paired approach however, Beaver suggests that there was one “serious 
drawback”. He noted that this particular method is not able to draw inferences regarding 
a single observation but can only show the relationship between pairs of observations as 
found in a previous study of his, where he could only make restrictive statements using 
matched pairs such as “A is more solvent than B” which leads to the question: but how 
                                                 
40
 Moody’s Industrial Manual contained financial statement data for industrial, publicly owned US corporations. 
41
 For example, Alexander (1949). 
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solvent is B? Such ambiguity lead to Beaver dropping the idea of matched pair analysis 
in favour of analysing the samples as a whole, where averages (or profiles) of each ratio 
were compared between the two groups of firms42. 
 
From a pool of thirty financial ratios selected on the basis their popularity in nineteen 
financial analysis texts43, the thirty ratios were classified into six common element 
groups and one ratio from each group was selected for further analysis44. The six ratios 
chosen were selected so that each ratio provided; (a) as much additional information as 
possible, (b) reflected the liquid reservoir theory described by Walter (1957), and (c) 
provided the best results in mean or “profile” tests. 
 
The final ratios selected for analysis (representing group in parenthesis) were; cash-
flow to total debt (cash-flow ratios), net income to total assets (net income ratios), total 
debt to total assets (debt to total asset ratios), working capital to total assets (liquid asset 
to total asset ratios), the current ratio (liquid asset to current debt ratios), and the no 
credit interval (turnover ratios). 45 
 
Using the liquid asset reservoir theory as a backdrop for the insolvency process, it is 
possible to make inferences regarding the differences between the mean ratio values of 
the failed firm group and the values obtained from the non-failed firms. For example, if 
I refer to the cash-flow to total debt ratio, I would expect that the non-failed group of 
firms would have a higher mean profile than that of the failed firm group. The reason 
for this is that the liquid reservoir theory dictates (with respect to this ratio and all else 
being held constant) that a particular firm is more solvent than the next if either the 
reservoir inflows are greater, or that the reservoir outflows are smaller. For the cash-
flow to total debt ratio, cash-flow acts as the inflow and total debt (more precisely the 
debt repayments) act as the outflow, stipulating therefore that the mean ratio should be 
                                                 
42
 Very large companies were omitted from the analysis in accordance with the idea that very large companies 
have little or no variability in their ratios. 
43
 Beaver suggests that the popularity of those ratios might be detrimental to the study as their popularity may 
attract the most amount of management manipulation. 
44
 Some were mere transformations of others and many shared common numerators or denominators so only one 
from each group was selected. 
45
 The No-Credit interval is the time a company can continue its operations from its immediate assets if all other 
forms of short term finance are cut off. Measured in days it is more directly it is defined as (immediate assets 
(current assets – stock) – current liabilities) divided by daily operating costs excluding depreciation. 
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higher for the non-failed group of firms. The inferences for each of the six ratios are 
presented in Table 5.1. By analysing and comparing the ratio means for each group for 
each year up to five years before failure, Beaver was able to confirm these predictions 
which are shown graphically in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Beaver (1966) expectations of ratio performance 
Ratio Prediction of mean values 
Cash-flow to total debt (CFTL) Non-Failed > Failed 
Net income to total assets (NITA) Non-Failed > Failed 
Total debt to total assets (TLTA) Failed > Non-Failed 
Working capital to total assets (WCTA) Non-Failed > Failed 
Current ratio (CR) Non-Failed > Failed 
No credit interval (NCI) Non-Failed > Failed 
 
 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates that indeed there are noticeable differences between the 
samples of failed and non-failed firms suggesting that financial ratios may be possible 
to predict impending firm failure. These illustrations, however, provide no information 
on the distribution or variation of the data. For a particular ratio it would be a perfect 
system if all failed companies have a value lower than a particular number (cut-off 
point) and non-failed firms are higher in value (or vice versa), the overlapping 
distributions of the data however almost always ensure that this is not the case. Given 
this principle it can be seen that wherever the cut-off point is placed, some firm’s 
profiles will appear the wrong side of the “line” thus causing a misclassification error. 
The underlying necessity of any prediction model is to find an appropriate position to 
place the cut-off point which minimises these misclassifications. 
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Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of Beaver’s six ratio means. 
Source: facsimile from Beaver (1966, p.82). 
 
 
Misclassifications in any statistical process can be of two types. A type I error is 
rejecting a null hypothesis which is true and a type II error when you fail to reject a null 
hypothesis which is false. In the case of insolvency prediction the null hypothesis is 
usually that the company has failed46. Therefore predicting a firm to be non-failed when 
it actually failed would be a type I error and predicting a firm as failed when it has not 
failed would be a type II error. 
 
                                                 
46
 This is not a requirement but is used, one suspects, to be consistent with the seminal work of Altman (1968). 
71 
 
The importance of determining a suitable cut-off point which minimises these errors 
can be explained by use of the small example of a credit lending institution. The 
institution wishes to assess their client’s abilities to meet their repayment obligations 
should a loan be granted. A prediction model is being developed to determine which 
clients (if any) will become insolvent in the near future. The priority of the institution is 
to not lend any money to those firms which it suspects will become insolvent and 
default on its obligations i.e., reduce the number of type I errors. It would be possible to 
completely remove any chance of such an error by raising the cut-off point of the model 
so high the institution in fact will not lend to any firm thus failing to provide any loans 
to worthy applicants (type II errors) and not doing any business at all. Thus, although 
reducing type I errors is of high importance it must not be done at the expense of 
creating an unnecessary number of type II. A careful balance must be sought where the 
institution must be prudent with its lending without being too restrictive on its overall 
operations, placing a high importance on the determination of the appropriate cut-off 
point of the prediction model. 
 
In his analysis, Beaver (1966) found that the distributions of his best predicting ratio 
cash-flow to total debt showed an increasing overlap between the sets of firms the 
further back in time the comparison was made. Once the appropriate cut-off point was 
established, the ratio’s one year prior to failure provided an 87% accuracy in predictive 
ability but deteriorated to just 78% using data five years prior to failure, indicating that 
the further back in time you go, the harder it is to find any distinction between the 
groups of failed and non-failed companies. This is somewhat expected as many factors 
influence the life-cycle of a company. Two companies which had identical profiles 
twenty years ago will, over the years, see their profiles change reflecting their 
environment and management team strategies. 
 
A note must be made here of a critical assumption made by Beaver and other 
insolvency prediction model authors: that all accounting data is normally distributed and 
which is a necessity for some of the statistical techniques to hold. Evidence suggests 
that this property is extremely unlikely (and impossible in some instances); but it may 
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be possible, however, to transform the data to normal47. This matter will be discussed in 
more depth later in this thesis. 
 
Although the evidence provided by Beaver indicates that individual financial ratios 
can be used to measure differences between sets of failed and non-failed companies, he 
suggests that the predictive ability of these ratios may be overstated. Two good reasons 
for this overstatement stem from the fact that financial ratios were, and still are, widely 
used as measures of insolvency. If these ratios are used to determine the financial 
solvency or “illness” of a company, there will be many cases where this illness is 
detected sufficiently earlier enough that the company can be saved. The companies 
which appear in the sample of failures will largely include those whose problems were 
not detectable by ratio analysis. Alternately, credit lending institutions may fail to grant 
credit to companies who do not meet the required profile standard thus influencing the 
future solvency of the company in question. Thus Beaver suggests that the use of ratio 
analysis for predictive purposes should be used with some caution. He suggested that 
insolvency prediction using financial ratios would perhaps be better served using a 
multivariate approach instead of his single ratio methodology, using a combination of 
several ratios and their changes over time. Attempts by Beaver to develop such a model 
proved fruitless and seemed to provide no greater predictive ability than his single best 
predictive ratio, cash-flow to total debt. 
 
Beaver (1968) extended this work to include market-based comparators to the 
accounting ratio predictor and investigated two key areas. Firstly, Beaver determined 
that the extent of the change in market pricing of stocks could also be used to predict 
failure. Secondly, investors have reliance upon the financial ratio when assessing the 
solvency position of firms. 
 
To determine whether market data could be used in a similar fashion to the financial 
ratio in order to detect impending firm failure, Beaver (1968) analysed five years of 
return data for the same sample of firms as Beaver (1966). He showed that in each of 
the five years before failure, the median of the failed returns is below that of the non-
failed, and that this difference increases as the failure date draws nearer. Table 5.2 
                                                 
47
 See Deakin (1976) and Watson (1990) for examples. Unless otherwise stated, this paper will assume that the 
normal distribution of these ratios applies. 
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demonstrates this finding along with the observation that “although the non-failed firms 
exhibit no upward or downward trend, the median of the failed firm’s drops over time 
with the largest price decline occurring in the final year”.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of median values of stock returns 
 
 denotes non-failed firms and 	denotes failed firms. 
Source: facsimile from Beaver (1968, p.182). 
 
 
Beaver noted that the performance of the market returns coincided with the results 
obtained from his earlier ratio analysis, and that investors appear to adjust to the new 
solvency positions of the firms continuously over time. The largest unexpected 
deterioration still occurs in the final year before failure, indicating that investors are still 
surprised at the occurrence of actual failure. This similarity with the ratio performance 
is evident suggesting that there is a relationship between returns and ratios, which is 
unsurprising as investors are likely to incorporate financial ratio analysis into their 
investment appraisal methodologies. 
 
To what extent investors use, or rely upon, financial ratios as part of their investment 
appraisal, Beaver undertook a time series analysis to determine the comparative failure 
prediction lead times between market returns data and four financial ratios; cash-flow to 
total liabilities, net income to total assets, total debt to total assets, and working capital 
to total assets. Table 5.3 presents Beaver’s results in which the number of firms 
correctly predicted as failing for each of the five years prior to actual failure is reported. 
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Failure was predicted at a time when the ratio or return showed a substantial 
deterioration in solvency. 
 
“This point in time was operationally defined as the year when the first large drop in 
the market price occurred. A large drop was defined as a negative rate of return so 
large that very few non-failed firms ever incurred such a return during the time period 
studied. Examination of the data indicated that if the return is equal to -0.50, only six 
non-failed firms fell below either of these values and all but six failed firms fell below 
one of these values at least once. The analysis was based upon 42 non-failed and 34 
failed firms for which return data were available for all five years before failure. The 
point in time at which the financial ratios predicted failure was similarly defined. For 
the cash flow to total debt ratio, the year failure was forecast was defined as the year in 
which the ratio fell below 0.02 and never rose above 0.08 subsequently. The critical 
values for the net income to total assets ratio were -0.01 and 0.05, respectively; for the 
total debt to total assets ratio, 0.65 and 0.45; and for the working capital to total assets 
ratio, 0.10 and 0.30” Beaver (1968, p.187). 
 
Table 5.3: Year in which failure was predicted 
Source: facsimile from Beaver (1968, p.189). 
 
Beaver’s results show that investors forecast firm failure earlier than that of the ratio 
which is consistent with the notion that analysts rely upon ratios in their decision 
making process. This evidence therefore suggests that investors rely upon sources of 
information other than the financial ratio in order to aid their decision process, or that 
the ratio may not be considered in isolation but as a combined effect/deterioration of 
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multiple ratios. Beaver himself suggests that “...research in progress tentatively suggests 
that a multi-ratio model, consisting of the most recent value of the cash-flow ratio and 
the first differences of the previous values, possesses greater predictive power than any 
single ratio.... more knowledge is needed about the non-ratio information investors rely 
upon and how investors use the ratio information in a multivariate context.” 
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5.2 1968-1980: the step from univariate to multivariate discriminant 
analysis 
 
5.2.1 Introductory comment and overview 
 
The move away from univariate analyses towards combinations of variables into a 
multivariate function is perhaps, given hindsight, an obvious progression. In 1968 
Altman revolutionised corporate insolvency prediction when his seminal paper 
“Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy” 
which for the first time combined several ratios into one single linear function, the Z-
score, popularising the art and pushing it into mainstream financial literature. 
 
Z-score models consist of a linear combination of variables estimated through 
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA)48. MDA was initially developed in the 
1930s for use in the field of biological and behavioural sciences and its methodology 
was first described in Fisher (1938). MDA is in essence a reversed multiple analysis of 
variance (MANOVA). MDA classifies a particular observation into a particular 
category or a priori group; in this case there are two groups, failed firms and non-failed 
firms49. The outcome is a linear combination of the different data characteristics which 
best discriminates between the groupings; the characteristics in this particular case are 
usually financial ratios or other qualitative or categorical variables. 
 
The scores obtained from the resulting discriminant function allow for an ordinal 
ranking of firms, and the higher the score usually denotes the better the predicted 
solvency50. The application of a cut-off point score then divides firms between those 
predicted to fail, and those predicted to survive (if a firm scores higher (lower) than the 
                                                 
48
 The functional form does not have to be linear (e.g., Altman et al., 1977 use quadratic discriminant analysis). 
Linear discriminant analysis, however, is by far the most popular method in prior literature and, therefore, we 
use ‘MDA’ to refer to the linear methodology. 
49
 A full derivation of the discriminant process, function, and maximum likelihood estimation technique can be 
found in Appendix C. 
50
 Studies such as Ooghe et al. (1994) define their model alternatively, higher scores denoting higher probability 
of failure. Later in this thesis, I change the signs on my tested Z-score models not only to match such ranking 
systems but also directly to compare these to other methodologies which, instead of rankable scores, provide 
probability of failure estimates. A later section of this thesis explains this transformation in more detail.. 
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cut-off point, then it is classified as being predicted non-failed (failed)). The choice of 
the cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary and leads to several restrictive assumptions and 
requirements associated with MDA models. 
 
First, many researchers have chosen cut-off points in order to attempt to minimise 
the overall error rate of the model which may result in the misleading or incorrect 
estimates of model accuracy – although the differing economic impacts and values 
attached to the individual type I errors (incorrect classification a failing firm as a non-
failing firm) and type II errors (incorrect classification of a non-failing firm as failing) 
has often been acknowledged (Edmister, 1972; Eisenbeis, 1977; Deakin, 1977; Zavgren, 
1983). Some studies such as Altman (1977) investigate differing error costs and others 
such as Taffler (2008) look at economic value when misclassification costs are 
different. Second, the classic insolvency prediction paradigm is that the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, treating failure as being discrete, non-overlapping and 
identifiable; and thus not reflecting the true nature of financial distress and the various 
insolvency procedures which may or may not ensue. Third, two statistical requirements 
of the MDA model are of multivariate normality and that the two a priori groups to be 
separated have identical variance-covariance matrices. These statistical requirements are 
rarely satisfied by the data, thus concerns as to bias pertain. 
 
A consequence of ignoring the foregoing is that the MDA modelling technique is 
often applied in an inappropriate way, with the resulting models being unsuitable for 
generalization (Joy and Tollefson, 1975; Eisenbeis, 1977, Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
These issues are addressed further in section 5.5 of this thesis. 
 
 
5.2.2 Development of  the Z-score models: Altman (1968) 
 
Edward Altman, Professor of Finance at New York University, encouraged by the 
findings of Beaver (1966) remarked that there was a “definite potential of ratios as a 
predictor of bankruptcy” (Altman, 1968), when developing what is probably the most 
widely recognised insolvency prediction model, the multivariate “Altman’s Z-score”. 
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For the purpose of his analysis Altman purported that the most appropriate way to 
develop a multivariate model would be to use multivariate discriminant analysis 
(MDA). MDA is a statistical technique which classifies a particular observation into a 
particular a priori group; in this case there are two groups, failed companies and non-
failed companies.  By collecting data for all observations within mutually exclusive 
groups, MDA is used to establish a linear combination of the different characteristics of 
the data which best discriminates between the groupings; the characteristics in this case 
are financial ratios.  
 
By considering an entire profile of ratios it is possible to compute which are the 
predominant determinants of the group differences, not only on an individual ratio basis 
but by constructing a variance-covariance matrix one can observe each ratio’s 
interaction with each other and ratios which are have high correlation with each other 
can be reduced to a single variable. By using this technique Altman (1968) suggested it 
would remove some possible ambiguities and misclassifications that where observed in 
earlier multivariate attempts which used integer and linear programming. The MDA 
methodology results a single linear function which best classifies the data into its two 
groups with the form: 
 
 =  +			……+	 
(5.1) 
 
where Vn	are the discriminant coefficients and Xn are the independent variables (ratios). 
 
A full derivation of the discriminant function along with any associated statistical 
assumptions is provided in Appendix C of this thesis. This derivation has particular 
relevance to the critical assessment of MDA which pertains within the following 
sections of this study. 
 
To develop his model Altman (1968) gathered data from 33 failed manufacturing 
companies during the twenty year period 1946-196551 (that filed a bankruptcy petition 
under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act during the period), and following the 
methodology of Beaver (1966), selected a matched sample of 33 non-failed companies 
                                                 
51
 As ratios tend to vary over time, Altman was somewhat reluctant of his restricted choice. 
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(based on firm size and industry) whose financial data was collected from Moody’s 
Industrial Manual. Large companies were omitted due to their high improbability of 
failure at that time. 
 
 Regarding the selection of appropriate variables, Altman (1968) derived a list of 22 
potential variables that were found to be significant indicators of financial distress based 
on previous studies (although the single best ratio as determined by Beaver (1966), 
cash-flow to total debt, was not selected as an appropriate variable because Altman 
considered there to be a lack of consistency and imprecise data on depreciation 
measures used in its calculation). The 22 ratios were then categorised into five distinct 
categories, liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency and activity. By repeatedly 
running the MDA analysis exploring different combinations of these ratios, their 
individual significance, inter-correlations and the predictive accuracy of each 
combination, a final function was derived as being the best discriminator between the 
two groups of companies which is now known as the Altman Z-score: 
 
 = 	0.012 +	0.014	 +	0.033 +	0.006 +	0.999 
(5.2) 
 
where 
 
X1 = working capital / total assets (WCTA) (%), 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets (RETA) (%), 
X3 = earnings before interest and tax / total assets (EBITTA) (%), 
X4 = market value of equity / book value of total liabilities (VETL) (%), 
X5 = sales / total assets (STA) (number of times), and 
Z = the overall index or “Z-score”. 
 
The more common iteration of the formula forgoes the percentage terms and is found 
expressed in the more convenient form: 
  = 	1.2 +	1.4	 +	3.3 +	0.6 +	 
(5.3) 
 
The expectation for each of the ratios considered is that they will be higher in value 
for the non-failed firm thus the lower the score, the greater the chance is that the 
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company will fail. A problem thus arises as to how determine an appropriate cut-off 
point for classification; that is to say, where should the line be drawn (score X) on this 
scoring system that categorically designates a firm into either the predicted non-failed 
class of firms should its associated score be above the cut-off point X, or into the 
predicted failed class of firms should its score be below X. 
 
5.2.2.1 Determining the optimal cut-off point X 
 
Table 5.4 is a contingency table (which for the remainder of this thesis shall be 
termed a confusion matrix in accordance with the majority of literature in the field of 
predictive analytics). The confusion matrix (sometimes termed the matching matrix) is 
used as a visualisation tool, making it easy for the researcher to determine whether the 
model is confusing two or more classes. 
 
 
Table 5.4: The confusion matrix 
  ACTUAL 
PREDICTION Failed Non-failed TOTAL 
Failed TP FP TP+FP 
Non-failed FN  TN FN+FP 
TOTAL TP+FN TN+FP TP+FP+TN+FN 
 
 
The predicted class of an observation (as determined by the model) is compared to its 
actual class membership (observed). The observations are each classified as to whether 
or not the model successfully predicted their correct class membership. TP (true 
positive) states the number of observations which were correctly predicted as being a 
failed company. FP (false positive) states the number of observations which were 
incorrectly predicted as failed but actually did not, (also known as a type II error). TN 
(true negative) states the number of observations which were correctly predicted as 
being a non-failed company. FN (false positive) states the number of observations 
which were incorrectly predicted as non-failed but actually failed, (also known as a type 
I error). 
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To determine an optimum cut-off point for a particular model, a cut-off must be 
selected in order that both the type I and type II error rates are kept to a minimum. The 
error rates are calculated as the proportion of incorrect classifications for each of the 
classes, thus the type I error rate is defined as FN / (FN+FP), and the type II error rate is 
defined as FP / (TP+FP). Traditionally a balance is sought which minimises the overall 
error rate, i.e. FP+FN / (TP+FP+TN+FN) treating the cost of each type of error as being the 
same. In practice however an equal cost of errors is unlikely to be satisfied which can be 
explained by example of a credit lending institution.  
 
The institution wishes to assess their client’s abilities to meet their repayment 
obligations should a loan be granted. A prediction model is being developed to 
determine which clients (if any) will become insolvent in the near future. The 
institutional priority is to not lend any money to those firms which it suspects will 
become insolvent and default on its obligations i.e., reduce the number of type I errors. 
It would be possible to completely remove any chance of such an error by raising the 
cut-off point of the model so high the institution in fact will not lend to any firm thus by 
failing to provide any loans to worthy applicants (type II errors) and not doing any 
business at all. Thus, although reducing type I errors is of high importance, it must not 
be done at the expense of creating an unnecessary number of type II errors. A careful 
balance must be sought where the institution must be prudent with its lending without 
being too restrictive on its overall operations, placing a high importance on the 
determination of the appropriate cut-off point of the prediction model. 
 
Section 8.3 of this thesis discusses some alternate methods for model evaluation in 
the situation where these misclassification costs do differ in their economic value, and 
whether the difference in economic error costs has a significant impact when comparing 
a selection of insolvency prediction models. For now though the discussion follows with 
the assumption that these costs remain equal as we continue to follow the evolution of 
the literature. 
 
Through use of the confusion matrix, Altman (1968) was able to determine that 
companies having a Z-score above 2.99 clearly fall into the non-bankrupt group whilst 
those with a score below 1.81 are all bankrupt. However, there is a grey area or “zone of 
ignorance” which lies between the two values, and that in this area, classification must 
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be treated with caution; although it is probable that the company is suffering some form 
of financial distress, even if it has not yet lead to formal bankruptcy procedures. 
 
By calculating the score for each of the 66 companies from the accounts one year 
prior to failure, each company could be classified into one of the groups. The 
classifications (or predictions) were compared to the actual failed or non-failed status of 
the companies and the total predictive accuracy of the model was established. Altman 
(1968) presents the results in a style similar to the now conventional confusion matrix, 
incorporating hits (H) for correct prediction and misses (M) for incorrect prediction. M1 
corresponds to type I errors and M2 for type II. (Table 5.5). By using a cut-off point of 
2.99 the initial sample provided an overall combined accuracy of 95% correct 
classification. (Table 5.6)  
 
Table 5.5: Altman’s confusion matrix 
 Predicted Membership  
Actual Membership Bankrupt NonBankrupt 
Bankrupt H M1 
NonBankrupt M2 H 
 
 
Table 5.6: Prediction results for Altman’s Z-score 
 Predicted Membership  
Actual Membership Bankrupt NonBankrupt 
Bankrupt 31 2 
NonBankrupt 1 32 
 
 
The model was tested again with accounting data from the same sample in the 
second, third, fourth and fifth years prior to failure. Beaver (1966) and others52 had 
suggested that a firm exhibits signs of failure as much as five years prior to the actual 
failure date although Altman (1968) suggests that there is little mention of the true 
significance of such statements. Altman’s results show a mark drop of in the accuracy 
of his model over five years prior to failure, from years one to five the percentage of 
companies that were predicted correctly were 95%, 72%, 48%, 29% and 36% 
respectively. He concluded that the Z-score has little or no predictive ability when the 
                                                 
52
 FitzPatrick (1932) and Merwin (1942) for example. 
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lead time is larger than two years and that the change in results from year to year has 
little or no meaning past this point.53 
 
To test the predictive ability of his model further, Altman (1968) applied it to a hold-
out sample of companies. This follows an earlier paper by Frank et al. (1965) who 
described two validation procedures for determining an unbiased estimate of the 
predictive power of a multivariate discriminant function. They suggested that the split 
or “holdout” sample approach was the preferred method when a large sample is 
available54. Altman selected 66 firms, within the same range of firm size as his training 
sample, but this time the sample was chosen so that a large majority of the companies 
has suffered negative profits in the previous 2-3 years (symptoms of financial distress). 
For the 25 failed companies whose firm sizes were in the same range as the first sample, 
24 (96%) were identified correctly by the model (a type I error rate of 4%). For the 
sample of non-failed companies, 14 were unsuccessfully classified by the model (31% 
type II errors), although Altman noted that ten of them lay within the grey area with 
scores of between 1.81 and 2.99, suggesting that they were suffering from some form of 
financial distress even though they had not met the legal definition of insolvency. 
 
Altman had successfully demonstrated that multiple financial ratios could be 
combined into a single linear function whilst improving on the accuracy achieved by 
Beaver’s best performing ratio, cash-flow to total debt, for a one-year-ahead forecast. 
Correct predictions made by Altman’s model however, deteriorated considerably when 
evaluating firm health in a timeframe any further than two years prior to failure. Both 
Beaver (1966), and Altman (1968), sparked widespread interest in the field of corporate 
insolvency which remains embedded in the art to this very day. The next section 
underlines the contribution made by these two authors by discussing the literature from 
the following decade, the nineteen seventies, and how, despite advances in 
methodological technique, computer processing power, and credit risk theory, the MDA 
methodology (particularly the Altman Z-score) has remained a regular contestant for 
academic study and benchmarking to the present day. 
 
                                                 
53
 A later model by Altman, the Zeta score, is discussed later in this dissertation which proposed a higher 
accuracy over a longer period of time. 
54
 The second method (the simulated sample approach) is treated later in Edminster (1972). 
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5.2.3 Further application and adaptation of the Z-score model 
 
 
The first notable paper to assess the work of both Beaver (1966; 1968) and Altman 
(1968), was Deakin (1972). Deakin’s study sought to evaluate the methodologies used 
in the aforementioned papers and propose an alternative model which predicts failure as 
early as possible. He noted that “Although Beaver’s empirical results suggest that his 
method has greater predictive ability, the method used by Altman has more intuitive 
appeal”. In his study he analysed the same fourteen ratios as Beaver (1968), but 
conducting the analysis a smaller sample of failed firms than Beaver (32 failed 
compared to Beaver’s 78). Although the sample period adopted by Deakin was just six 
years (1964-1970) compared to Beaver’s ten (1954-1964), the criteria required to meet 
the definition of failure as proposed by Deakin was fundamentally different and more in 
tune with Altman’s definition (filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter X of the 
National Bankruptcy Act). 
 
“…the term failure was defined here to include only those firms which experienced 
bankruptcy, insolvency, or were otherwise liquidated for the benefit of creditors. Beaver 
included firms which defaulted on loan obligations or missed preferred dividend 
payments. But unless the nonbankrupt firms were matched by debt structure as well as 
by size and industry, there could be a potential bias in certain of the ratios”. Deakin 
(1972). 
 
Table 5.7 shows the results of Deakin’s analysis and the error rate for each of the 
ratios from one to five years prior to failure with Beaver’s results in parentheses. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient denoted by rs describes the relationship between 
the relative predictive ability of each variable across the two studies. 
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Table 5.7: Fourteen variables: Deakin vs Beaver 
 
Source: facsimile from Deakin (1972, p.169). 
 
From the results it is clear that there is a definite correlation between the two studies 
with the highest rank correlation coefficient of 0.88 coming from a one-year-ahead 
forecast, although the correlation is much lower at three years than at any other point. 
Deakin commented on the apparent drop in correlation at three years. Noting a 
considerable rise in the total assets of failed firms in the third and fourth years before 
failure, he suggested that a rapid expansion of the fixed asset base, financed by 
increased debt rather than common stock or retained earnings, led to the failure of these 
firms if they were unable later to generate sufficient sales and net income. Another 
notable difference between the two sets of results is the cash to sales ratio.  
 
“While most of the other ratios tended to be consistent with those observed by 
Beaver, this ratio was consistently and significantly different. One possible explanation 
is that corporations tended to invest more of their cash reserves during the late 196O's 
when interest rates were high. Thus a low cash/sales ratio may have been due to good 
money management rather than to general company mismanagement”. Deakin (1972). 
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Following the MDA methodology employed Altman (1968), Deakin inputted the 
fourteen variables into his “discriminant analysis program”, combining the variables 
into single linear functions (in this case, one distinct function for each of the five years 
before failure). Having a separate model for each of the five years is far less appealing 
than a function, such as Altmans, which is applicable to, and encompasses all years of 
data.  We need to ask ourselves how are these models to be applied in practice?  Does 
each company need to be tested on each model individually? How are the results to be 
interpreted if a company scores well in some years and not so well in others?  
 
Practical applications aside, Deakin’s results nevertheless indicated that each of the 
variables added significant value to each model beyond the 0.001 critical level for the 
first three years before failure, and were still significant in years four and five at the 
0.01 and 0.05 critical levels respectively. This finding indicates that each of the fourteen 
ratios considered by both Beaver and now Deakin, (considered at inception both 
because of their popularity in literature and a previous pilot study by Beaver), have 
significant discriminatory power when separating failed and non-failed firms.  
 
In a deviation from these past methodologies, Deakin forgoes the selection of an 
error-minimising arbitrary cut-off point to classify his companies. Deakin noticed that 
the largest number of misclassifications occurred close to the cut-off point of which an 
example is provided in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of Z-scores within sample. 
Source: facsimile from Frank and Weygandt (1971, p.123). 
 
Instead of the cut-off point, Deakin assigns each company to a particular class by 
assigning it a probability based on a multivariate extension of the univariate Z test. To 
correctly apply this method, two assumptions must be made. Firstly the vectors of 
discriminant scores follow a p-variate normal distribution and secondly, the variance-
covariance matrix of the two classes matches the variance-covariance matric for the 
population. If these conditions are satisfied then the following statement is valid and 
companies are assigned according to the probability distribution. 
 
Σ		~		 
(5.4) 
 
where  d’ = the row vector of deviations from the mean score 
 d = the column vector of deviations from the mean score 
 Σ = the population variance-covariance matrix 
 n = number of observations 
 
Using this classification method, Deakin’s results showed that by using a 
combination of all fourteen variables he was able to successfully classify 97%, 95%, 
and 95% of the companies using one, two, and three year-ahead forecasts, with accuracy 
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dropping to 79% and 83% in years four and five, much higher than any ratio evaluated 
in isolation. These results however, are misleading as they only report firms which were 
used to construct the model, i.e. the original training sample. In a second test Deakin 
used a validation sample consisting of 11 failed and 23 non-failed companies to assess 
his model. The resulting accuracies of 78%, 94%, 88%, 77%, and 85% for the five years 
before failure respectively, hold up reasonably well despite an obvious deterioration in 
the first year55. I would not expect the accuracies to be quite as high those achieved with 
the training sample by convention, but the provision of such a small validation sample 
means that we should not make too many inferences regarding these results. 
 
What we can gain from Deakin (1972) is that by combining variables into a single 
multivariate function we can expect to improve on the discriminatory power that we 
would otherwise have had if evaluating each variable in isolation. Although Altman’s 
(1968) multivariate results demonstrated a lower misclassification rate than that of 
Beaver’s (1966; 1968) univariate approach, only one of Altman’s variables (debt to total 
assets) appears in the Beaver paper(s). That is to say that until Deakin (1972) there was 
no direct comparison between a set of single ratios and there combined functional form, 
Deakin provided empirical evidence for the first time that the latter yields a greater 
predictive ability. 
 
The next paper I would like to discuss is that of Edminster (1972), who conducted an 
interesting study on small business failure prediction. Besides being the first of a limited 
number of small firm insolvency prediction analyses, the evolutionary merit of this 
paper comes in three forms, firstly in the use of “trend-level” ratio analysis, and second 
in model validation techniques. Similar to Altman (1968) and Deakin (1972), Edminster 
also provides a version of the Z-score model created through MDA but unlike the 
previous authors Edminster uses a binary coding system for the discriminant variables 
 
Edminster’s methodologies focused upon testing four hypotheses: (1) a ratio’s level 
and/or relative level (compared to an industry standard) as a predictor of small business 
failure; (2) the three-year trend of a ratio as a predictor of small business failure; (3) the 
three year average of a ratio as a predictor of small business failure; (4) a combination 
                                                 
55
 Deakin himself commented that “…the deterioration in the first year is rather severe and cannot be explained 
by the presence of any unusual events peculiar to the sample used”. 
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of the industry relative trend and the industry relative level for each ratio as a predictor 
of small business failure. 
 
The combination of the industry relative trend and industry relative level for each 
variable (trend-level) is an interesting concept originally suggested by Weston and 
Brigham (1966) who noted: “Although Composite Company's current ratio is below the 
industry average, a credit analyst would not mark the firm down badly on this count, in 
view of the favourable trend”. A trend-level analysis based on industry may be able to 
detect patterns and distinctions across data classes which would not be apparent when 
performing a market-wide company comparison.  
 
Two samples were selected from a population of Small Business Administration 
(SBA) borrowers over the period 1954-1969. The first (small) sample consisted of 42 
borrowers of whom three consecutive years of adequate company data were available. 
The second (large) sample consisted of 562 borrowers that provided just one year of 
adequate data. The large sample would be subject to the split (holdout) sample approach 
following Altman, and the small sample would be subject to the Frank et al. (1965) 
alternate validation technique, the simulated sample approach, as such a small sample of 
firms inhibits the meaningful use of holdout sample analysis. 
 
Using 19 common ratios advocated by theorists or found to be significant predictors 
of business failure in prior studies, Edminster sought to determine their discriminatory 
power both in single and combined form, reporting that the ratios predictive power is 
cumulative in that no single ratio predicts nearly as well as a small group. Edminster 
does not report the finding of his univariate analysis, only those of his discriminant 
function. Also he was not able to determine with any confidence a discriminant function 
derived from the large sample. He concluded that: 
 
“…the small business function fails to discriminate when only one statement is 
available, whereas Altman, and Beaver show that one financial statement is sufficient 
for a highly discriminant function for large businesses. This leads the author to qualify 
his conclusion above with the provision that at least three consecutive financial 
statements be available for analysis of a small business”. Edminster, (1972). 
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For his three-year-statement discriminant function Edminster’s MDA program 
employed a step-wise procedure in which a variable was not allowed to enter the final 
function if it had a correlation higher than 0.31. Altman (1983) remarked on this 
approach stating that: 
 
“A major shortcoming with this approach is that important explanatory power may 
be excluded from the regression equation because of the arbitrary correlation 
coefficient cut-off point”.  
 
Another interesting deviation from Altman’s methodology was the use of a binary 
coding system where rather than the variables entering the equation in their raw form; 
each ratio is transformed into a qualitative zero-one variable based upon an arbitrary 
cut-off point. Seven variables entered the final equation; the details of each and their 
cut-off criterion are defined in Equation 5.5.56 
 
 = 0.951 − 0.423 − 0.293	 − 0.482 + 0.277 
                 (4.24)         (2.82)         (4.51)         (2.61) 
 
 −0.452 − 0.352$ − 0.924% 
    (2.60)          (1.68)         (7.11) 
(5.5) 
 
   R2 = 0.74     F = 14.02     (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Z = 1 for a successful (non-loss) business and Z = 0 for a failed (loss) business. 
X1 = Annual funds flow (net profit before tax plus depreciation) to current liabilities. It 
equals one if the ratio is less than 0.05 and zero otherwise. 
X2 = Equity to sales ratio. It equals one if the ratio is less than 0.07, zero otherwise. 
X3 = Net working capital to sales ratio divided by its respective RMA average. It equals one 
if the ratio is less than -0.02 and zero otherwise. 
X4 = Current liabilities to equity divided by its respective SMA average. It equals one if the 
ratio is less than 0.48 and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
56
 SBA refers to the SIC industry average as per the Small Business Administration. RMA refers to the industry 
average as per Robert Morris Associates’ Annual Statement Studies. 
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X5 = Inventory to sales ratio divided by its respective RMA average. It equals one if the  
ratio shows an upward trend but remains less than 0.04. Zero otherwise. 
X6 = Quick ratio divided by its respective RMA average quick ratio. It equals one if the   
ratio shows a downward trend and its level is less than 0.34 just prior to the loan. 
X7 = Quick ratio divided by its respective RMA average quick ratio. It equals one if the 
ratio shows an upwards trend and zero otherwise. 
 
Edminster’s function was able to correctly classify 39 out of 42 private companies 
(93%) within his sample, and provided an interesting discussion as to the determination 
of the required cut-off point. 
 
He noted that the cut-off should be selected so as to equate the probability of type I 
and type II errors with the ratio of the explicit cost of accepting a failure to the 
opportunity cost of rejecting a success. Edminster represented this by using the 
following equality: 
 '(('( =
)*()*(( 
(5.6) 
 
where: 
PII = the probability of rejecting a loan to a successful firm (type II error), 
PI = the probability of accepting a loan to a failing firm (type I error), 
MCII = the marginal opportunity cost of rejecting a loan to a successful firm, and 
MCI = the marginal actual cost of accepting a loan to a failing firm. 
 
Anderson (1962) shows us that the optimal cut-off point under certain assumptions 
(equal variance-covariance matrices and multinormal populations) is therefore: 
 
*' = ln ,-*-,--*-- 
(5.7) 
 
where: 
CP = the optimal cut-off point, 
qI, qII  = the prior probability that a firm will be either classified as failed (qI) or non-failed (qII), 
CI = the cost of accepting a loan to a failing firm 
C2 = cost of rejecting a loan to a successful firm 
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One problem arising when trying to determine the optimal cut-off point is, therefore, 
what costs are attributable to each type of error? The associated costs are dependent on 
who the user is, what costs are relevant to the user, and how these costs should be 
determined. Section 8.3 covers this issue in some detail when I evaluate a selection of 
models based on their economic value when misclassification costs differ.  
 
Edminster noted the impracticality of this cost determination and proposed a 
practical alternative which he termed the “black-gray-white” method, reservedly 
treating misclassification costs as being equal. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The black-gray-white method. 
Source: facsimile from Edminster (1972). 
 
 
A sample of Z-score frequencies may appear as in Figure 5.3. Scores less than 0.47 
(the black area) are attributable only to failed firms, and therefore rejecting all loan 
applicants with scores less than this can only benefit the lender. Scores above 0.53 
(firms within the white area) should be accepted. Firms falling within gray area (similar 
to Altman’s zone of ignorance) should be subject to additional analyses over and above 
the Z-score. Edminster suggested: 
 
 “Nonfinancial statement information regarding management, markets, plant and 
equipment, and other factors would be scrutinized in order to classify the applicant as a 
loss or nonloss borrower”. 
 
 Edminster’s optimal cut-off score of 0.53 represents a need to minimise loan losses, 
with the lender unable to grant a loan to any firm with a score below point. 
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To conclude the contribution made by Edminster, I refer the reader back to section 
4.2.2 of this thesis which described the number of private-firm insolvencies over the 
past fifty years. What is apparent from the insolvency data pertaining to these smaller 
firms is that they account for approximately 99.998% of all company insolvencies in the 
UK and 66% of the economic value lost to the process. Although the perceived 
difficulty in obtaining private-firm data somewhat inhibits a thorough analysis upon this 
population, there remains a need to identify the characteristics of financially distressed 
private companies. Edminster was able to show (albeit on a very small number of firms) 
that discrimination between the two classes of private firms can be achieved with 
accuracy comparable to that of previous studies. This may however be due his data 
transformations. Altman (1983) commented on this inherent problem attached to small 
business failure prediction: 
 
“…since the financial ratios for small businesses usually are dispersed widely, it is 
difficult to obtain a meaningful data set without some sort of adjustment”. Altman 
(1983, p.159). 
 
Blum’s (1974) Failing Company Model (FCM) was developed in an attempt to 
predict failure as defined in the failing company doctrine57. One of only a few defences 
to a US merger prosecution at the time, the doctrine could be invoked when one of two 
merging companies is failing and the failing company receives no offer to merge from a 
company with which a merger would have been legal. Blum noted two uncertainties in 
applying the doctrine: (1) the point at which a company is considered failing, and (2) the 
manner of ascertaining absence of good-faith purchasers for the failing company. 
Legally the definition of failure was ambiguously defined as a “grave probability of 
failure” and Blum’s FCM sought to address this uncertainty by developing an MDA 
model which would quantify this probability. 
 
Blum proposed that such a model should be based on the liquid reservoir of cash-
flows as described by Walter (1957) and detailed in section 3 of this thesis. Akin to 
Beaver (1966), Blum proposed a general framework for variable selection, dividing the 
reservoir theory into three component parts: liquidity, profitability, and cash-flow 
                                                 
57
 International Shoe v. F.T.C, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).  
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variability. He proposed the use of 12 variables for his model which are presented in 
Table 5.8 below. 
 
 
Table 5.8: Blum’s (1974) failing company model 
 
Source: facsimile from Blum (1974, p.16). 
 
The FCM was derived using data from the period 1954-1968 and consisted of 115 
failed firms and a matched sample of non-failed firms based on industry, size and fiscal 
year. Validation was achieved by using the holdout sample approach where half of the 
sample was used to train the model and derive the discriminant coefficients, and the 
remaining half used to apply and validate the model. 
 
Because of the “variability” variables contained within the FCM, Blum’s model and 
the pertaining empirical results are difficult to digest. The results are presented as 
separate trend ranges (twenty one sets of coefficients in total), with trends calculated 
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from data covering between three to eight consecutive years. The predictive power of 
the FCM was also separated into one through six years prior to failure. These results are 
shown in Table 5.9 
 
Table 5.9: Blum’s FCM validation and (training) sample accuracy. 
 
Source: facsimile from Blum (1974, p.17). 
 
The accuracies for the four, five, and six year trend ranges are very similar, being on 
average 94%, 80%, and 70% for one, two, and three years prior to failure respectively. 
These accuracies are consistent with the finding of the previous studies discussed within 
this Section, despite the FCM’s greater complexity regarding the use of ratio trends. He 
also noted that the cash-flow to total debt ratio, found to be the best predictor of failure 
by Beaver (1966) received “generally high rankings” and played an important role 
within the model.  
 
Blum included ratios which he felt were consistent with the liquid reservoir theory 
and criticised previous versions of the Z-score model for “searching” for the best 
variables from an increasingly large set of possibilities. However, in his concluding 
remarks Blum suggests that alternative ratios should be considered in future models. 
This arbitrary selection of variables is an inherent problem with MDA and other non-
theoretically based modelling technologies. The liquid reservoir “theory” actually has 
no concrete theoretical underpinning as to what the choice of variables should be, and is 
therefore more of a concept than a theory. A further discussion of the issues and 
96 
 
problems associated with these traditional modelling approaches can be found in section 
5.6 of this thesis. 
 
Although Libby’s study does not pertain to be a member of the MDA assemblage, he 
does provide an interesting study on the practical use of the fourteen ratios previously 
analysed by Beaver (1966) and Deakin (1972). The study was constructed to jointly 
ascertain the predictive power of ratio information and the ability of loan officers to 
evaluate that information in the business failure prediction context. Libby postulated 
that previous empirical studies had provided sufficient support for the notion that certain 
ratios are highly related to business failure. Feltham and Demski (1970, p.637) proposed 
that once the signal’s ability to reflect a priori relevant events has been established, the 
next logical extension is to move from analysis of the signal to analysis of action 
induced by the signal. A prior study to that of Libby was Abdel-Khalik (1973) who 
applied this extension in order to determine whether analysts could successfully use 
accounting ratios. Abdel-Khalik concluded that his results “cast doubt upon the 
usefulness of financial ratios as predictors of failure in an ex-ante prediction situation”. 
Libby suggested that given the limited number of firms analysed within in this study, 
added to the contrary nature of the finding to other research, “further examination of the 
issue is in order”. 
 
In addition to the analysis of Beaver and Deakin’s variables, Libby’s sample 
consisted of 60 out of the 64 firms analysed by Deakin; selected at random as 30 failed 
and 30 non-failed companies. The ratios were then computed (at random) for one of the 
three years before failure, to satisfy that the sample consisted of 10 failed and 10 non-
failed firms for each of the three years. 
 
Using principal components analysis followed by a varimax rotation, Libby sought to 
reduce the number of ratios, remove redundancy, and identify the salient financial 
dimensions represented by the ratios. The analysis identified five sources (or 
dimensions) of variation within the fourteen variable set, namely; (1) profitability, (2) 
activity, (3) liquidity, (4) asset balance, and (5) cash position. To represent these five 
dimensions, net income to total assets, current assets to sales, current assets to current 
liabilities, current assets to total assets, and cash/total assets were selected respectively 
through use of the rotation factor matrix. 
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It is interesting to note here that Beaver’s (1966) best performing ratio, cash-flow to 
total debt, does not appear in the reduced set of ratios. Libby suggests that as this ratio is 
highly correlated with others contained within the reduction and would have little or no 
effect on predictive ability should it be included. To test the performance of the reduced 
set of ratios compared to that of the full set using double cross-validation58. 
 
The results showed that the original fourteen ratio set was able to correctly predict 54 
of the 60 firms (using the derivation sample) and 41 of 60 firms using double cross 
validation. The reduced set of five variables correctly predicted 51 and 43 firms out of 
60 using the derivation sample and double cross validation respectively. Libby deemed 
the reduced set of variables to be satisfactory for his loan officer experiment given only 
the slight reduction in overall predictive ability (the smaller model interestingly 
performs better in holdout tests despite the removal of nine of the ratios). Given this 
result and the greater manageability of the reduced variable set, these were the ratios 
given to the loan officers. 
 
Libby’s experiment was to provide forty-three commercial loan officers with seventy 
ratio data sets, one per firm, with each data set containing five ratios. These seventy 
firms consisted of the sixty sample firms placed in random order with ten repeat firms 
placed as every forth firm following the first thirty cases. The addition of the repeat 
firms allowed Libby a measurement of test-retest reliability over the two intervening 
time intervals while effectively hiding the identity of the repeat firms.  
 
The loan officers were told that half of the firms experienced failure within three 
years of the statement date in order to set the a priori probabilities, and were instructed 
to work independently and complete the cases within one week. To assess the accuracy 
of the loan officer’s prediction, they were told that a correct prediction was worth one 
point and an incorrect prediction cost one point. 
 
Libby found that the accuracy of the loan officers was superior to a random selection 
model, and determined that the ratios had been utilised correctly. Correct predictions 
ranged from 27 to 50 correct out of 60 predictions and the average predictive ability of 
                                                 
58
 Double cross-validation is simply a cross validation (splitting the sample into a training and a holdout 
(validation) sample) performed twice. The average of the two validation tests is taken to be the pertaining 
accuracy of the model. 
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the loan officers was 44.4 out of sixty (74%). The experimental results allowed Libby to 
pinpoint four useful outcomes of his research and concluded that (1) there was no 
significant difference between the mean predictive accuracy of loan officers from small 
banks to those officers from large banks; (2) there were no significant correlations 
between predictive accuracy and loan officer characteristics, such as age and 
experience; (3) there were no differences in short-term, test-retest reliability between 
user subgroups; and (4) there was a relatively uniform interpretation of the ratios across 
all officers. 
 
It is encouraging that results of this study suggest that loan officers are reasonably 
accurate in making predictions upon the likelihood of failure of a potential loan 
candidate. Libby’s evidence suggests, however, that only three-out-of-four loan 
decisions are correct and therefore lending would carry high risk in a real-world setting. 
It is evident then that loan officer’s decisions are unlikely to be determined based on a 
small set of accounting ratios, and are more likely to be based on wide range of 
accounting, economic, and market variables. 
 
Although a useful experiment, one factor of its construction leads to concern, and 
that is regarding the a priori probabilities. The loan officers were told before conducting 
the experiment that half of the firms had failed, yet information of this nature is 
unavailable to analysts. A further study by Casey (1980) found that loan officers who 
were not informed about failure frequencies could only accurately predict 27% of 
bankrupt firms. 
 
Almost a decade after Altman (1968) published his popular Z-score model, a new 
ZETA model was developed by Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) in 
conjunction with a private financial firm. This model was marketed by ZETA Services, 
Inc. (Mountainside, New Jersey). The empirical findings of the ZETA analysis were 
made available to practitioners as a statistical service on a subscription only basis. By 
the mid nineteen-eighties over three dozen institutions (mainly financial institutions) 
had subscribed to the service, providing: 
 
“tangible evidence that the model has had a degree of acceptance in practical circles 
as well as a scholarly journal”, (Altman, 1983). 
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Following the literature evolution of the preceding decade (of which the main 
research has been discussed within this section: primarily aimed towards the 
improvement and extension of the insolvency prediction and classification problem), 
Altman proposed that a new model was required due to the changes which had occurred 
within the financial and business environment since the formulation of his original Z-
score model. He suggested that there were at least five reasons for his expectation that a 
new model could improve on the efficacy of prior studies: 
 
1. The size of firms along with their financial profiles had seen a dramatic change 
over the preceding decade. Many of the prior studies had utilised relatively small firms 
to develop prediction models, and any new model should be as relevant as possible to 
the population to which it was intended to be applied59. The average failed firm size 
utilised by the ZETA analysis was approximately $100 million, with no firm having less 
than $20 million in assets. The largest firm analysed by Altman’s (1968) study had 
assets of less than $25 million. 
2. A new model should be based on data which is as current as possible. The ZETA 
model was derived from firms failing in the prior seven years (1969-1975) with just 
three exceptions. 
3. The majority of previous models had been based upon the wide-ranging 
classification of the manufacturers or even specific industries. Altman wanted to 
broaden this selection to include retail companies which he felt were particularly 
vulnerable to failure and could be analysed on an equivalent basis with manufacturers. 
4. The study was developed to include the most recent changes in financial reporting 
standards and accepted accounting practices. An example of this was to include changes 
to the treatment of lease capitalisation which was brought into effect several years after 
the formulation of the initial version of the model. By taking into account the latest 
reporting practices it was intended that that the model was not only relevant to past 
failures, but also data that would appear in the future. The predictive power and 
classification accuracy was implicit to their efforts. 
5. A new model would enable the authors to test and assess several of the aspects, 
pitfalls and validity of the MDA process with light to recent literature of the time. A 
discussion of this literature is provided in section 5.2.6 of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
59
 Exceptions to this include Altman’s (1973) railroad study, and Sinkey’s (1975) commercial bank study. 
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The ZETA analysis was based upon 53 failed firms and a sample of 58 non-failed 
firms matched by industry and the year of data, of which half of the firms were from the 
manufacturing sector and half from the retail sector. 27 variables were analysed which 
included a number of financial ratios and “other measures” which had been found to be 
significant predictors of failure in previous empirical studies. Using an iterative process 
the number of variables was reduced to just seven which was deemed not only to 
classify the test sample well, but also proved reliable in various validation procedures. 
Adding additional variables to the model did not improve on its predictive ability and 
likewise, no model with fewer variables performed as well as the seven variable model. 
The seven variables included in the model are as follows: 
 
• X1, return on assets, which is measured by EBIT divided by total assets. 
• X2, stability of earnings, a normalised measure of the 10-year trend in X1. 
• X3, debt service, measured by EBIT divided by total interest payable. 
• X4, cumulative profitability, measured as retained earnings divided by total assets. 
• X5, liquidity, defined as the current ratio. 
• X6, capitalisation, measured by the five-year average of the market value of common 
equity divided by total capital. 
• X7, size, depicted by the firms total tangible assets. 
 
Although the variables for the model have been provided, because of its nature (a 
marketed subscription only service), the coefficients of the model have never been made 
available for public viewing or analysis. This, of course, makes the ZETA model in its 
original form somewhat difficult to test or analyse by academics, although an analysis 
of proprietary coefficients based upon the researchers sample, utilising the seven 
variables, would be entirely possible. 
 
With respect to model assumption (5) as listed above, one requirement of the linear 
form of the discriminant function is that the variance-covariance matrices of the failed 
and non-failed samples of firms are equal. This proposition is discussed further in a later 
section of this thesis (5.2.6). For the ZETA analysis Altman sought to investigate this 
further by comparing two version of the model; (1) the linear form of the model where 
the dispersion matrices are assumed equal, and (2) the quadratic form of the model 
where the matrices are deemed to be different.  
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The findings of the ZETA analysis showed that the model was able to successfully 
predict failure with almost 93% accuracy for one year prior to failure using both the 
linear and quadratic versions of the model. Validation tests of the model using holdout 
samples reduced the accuracy of the model from 91% for a one-year-ahead forecast, to 
approximately 77% for forecasts up to five years. These results compare favourably to 
those gained from the original Z-score where accuracy declined dramatically after two 
years prior to failure. Comparing both the linear and quadratic versions of the model, 
the linear model was superior in its validation results. The quadratic version 
misclassified over 50% of the failed firms five years prior to failure with the linear 
model out performing its counterpart by an average of approximately 5%. 
 
The ZETA study continues to present its results based solely on the linear version of 
the model. Following Edminster (1972) a suitable cut-off point was sought using the 
formulation as per Equation (5.7). Altman (1977, pp. 43-44) implicitly assumes equal 
prior probabilities and equal costs of errors, which results in a zero cut-off score, 
compared to the arbitrarily chosen cut-off point of 2.99 associated with the original 
(1968) Z-score. A visualisation of the ZETA’s score distribution is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of Zeta scores one year prior to failure. 
Source: facsimile from Altman et al. (1977, p.49). 
 
The linear ZETA model was compared and benchmarked against the Altman (1968) 
Z-score both in its original form and a version with updated coefficients based upon the 
ZETA data sample of firms. The results of the comparison are provided below in Table 
5.10. 
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Table 5.10: Comparison of ZETA and Z-score models: percentage of correct predictions. 
Model Years before failure 
 1 2 3 4 5 
ZETA 91 89 83.5 79.8 76.8 
Z-Score (1968) 95.45 82.9 48.3* 28.6 
*
 
36 * 
Z-score – ZETA 
sample a 
84.6 86.15 81 73.85 71 
Z-score- Updated b 88.5 84.6 81.2 70.25 63.15 
 
a
 Represents Altman’s 1968 model and parameters applied to the ZETA sample of firms. 
b
 The coefficients of the 1968 model are updated using the  ZETA sample of firms. 
* Accuracy based upon failed firms only. Non-failed firm accuracy not provided in original study. 
 
 
We can observe from the table that the newer ZETA model is much more accurate 
than the original Z-score from two to five years prior to failure with the original model 
the slightly better performer in the initial year (because the 1968 Z-score results from 
years three through five are based upon failed firms only, I am reluctant to draw too 
many inferences for these years). What is more interesting, and perhaps more 
appropriate, is the application of the original model to the later ZETA sample of firms 
and the coefficient-updated model comparison to that of the newer ZETA model. In the 
case of the original model’s application to the new sample, one can observe that the 
ZETA model shows a higher predictive ability for each year prior to failure, being 
especially superior in years one and five. Similarly, this is the case for the updated 
version of the Z-score, with the ZETA model outperforming in each year. An interesting 
observation is that the latter model with the updated coefficients performs less well than 
the original Z-score (derived from much older data, and constructed ten years prior) in 
years two, four and five prior to failure and almost identical in year 3. The only year in 
which the updated coefficients out-perform the original is in the first year. These results 
are somewhat counter-intuitive as one would expect the latter model to be superior in all 
years as it is derived from firms within the same sample population as the test data.60 
 
In an interesting direction taken by the ZETA analysis, the study provides the first 
example of an accuracy estimation based upon differing misclassification costs, where 
all previous studies had assumed the costs to be equal. As I have mentioned earlier in 
this section, it is far more realistic to assume that the cost of misclassifying a future 
                                                 
60
 This anomaly also occurs in my own study where one of the original models which I test, outperforms that of 
the updated version. A discussion of possible causes is contained within the results of section 9.3.  
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failed firm as non-failed would be of greater economic significance than if I misclassify 
a non-failed firm as being failed. 
 
To be able to estimate the misclassification cost component of the discriminant 
analysis and determine a better estimate of a model’s predictive ability, requires the 
specification of the decision maker’s role. The ZETA analysis utilises the commercial 
bank loan function as its framework where errors occur upon the unsuccessful 
judgement by the lender when granting (or not granting) loans. A type I error (C1) 
occurs when an accepted loan defaults, and a type II error (CII) occurs when a loan is 
rejected that would have otherwise resulted in a successful payoff. I can therefore 
specify the error costs of the function as being: 
 
* = 1 − ../0..,          *(( = 2 − 3 
(5.8) 
 
where: 
LLR = amount of loan losses recovered, 
GLL = gross loan losses (charged off), 
r       = effective interest rate on the loan, 
i       = effective opportunity cost for the bank. 
 
The cost of a type I error is therefore dependent upon how successful the bank is in 
recovering the loan amount should a default occur. Altman et al. note that additional 
costs such as legal fees, practitioner fees, lost interest, and transaction charges are 
relevant to the process and suggest that these would obviously increase the error cost 
although they are omitted from the ZETA analysis. LLR and GLL were determined 
from both financial statements from 26 large commercial banks, and 33 usable 
responses obtained from questionnaires which were sent to smaller regional banks. The 
resulted estimation of a type I error was determined to be approximately 70%. 
 
To determine the value of CII, despite its simplified formulation, there are several 
considerations to take into account. If the decision is made not to lend to a firm, then the 
loss may be mitigated by lending the funds to an alternative company at the same risk 
level which is deemed to be a successful loan. In this instance the opportunity cost for 
the bank is equal to the interest rate of the loan and therefore the cost of a type II error 
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would be extremely small or indeed zero. Realistically however, the rejected firm would 
probably carry a higher risk than the alternative secure firm and r – i will therefore be 
positive but still fairly low. At the very least, the bank would be able to invest in a form 
of Treasury bond or other government “riskless” security, in which case Altman 
suggests that r – i would be somewhat higher at around 2-4%. For the ZETA analysis, 
an arbitrary approximation of 2% was assumed for CII. The revised cut-off point for the 
ZETA model could therefore be defined as: 
  
*' = ln ,-*-,--*-- = ln
0.02 ∙ 0.70
0.98 ∙ 0.02 = −0.337 
(5.9) 
 
where the prior probability of failure was estimated to be 2%. 
 
By changing the cut-off point from zero to – 0.337, the predictive accuracy of the 
model also changes. Applying this new cut-off and taking into account the different 
error costs, the accuracy of the ZETA model is affected, increasing the rate of type I 
errors from 3.8% to7.6%, whilst at the same time reducing the rate of type II errors from 
10.3% to 7%. Although the number of misclassifications by the model (8 in total) 
remains the same, it is evident to me that a decrease in type II errors to the detriment of 
type I errors is unsatisfactory for a models construction, albeit a more realistic approach. 
Nevertheless, Altman suggests that the cut-off point should be determined on a 
proprietary basis by individual lenders, based on the prior probabilities and error costs 
attributable to that particular institution and changing economic conditions. 
 
5.2.4 A comparison of the different models: Scott (1981)  
 
The aim of Scott (1981) was to review and evaluate and several insolvency 
prediction models that the previous decade had witnessed. As well as considering 
univariate and multivariate empirical models, Scott also investigated several insolvency 
prediction theories which had been developed in recent years, most notably the 
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theoretical gambler’s ruin model61, and option pricing formulae as derived and 
discussed in both Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974)62. 
 
The concern of Scott was that even though the development of empirical models 
which were able to discriminate between solvent and insolvent firms, was an “important 
accomplishment in modern finance”,  said models did not fully command professional 
acceptance, in part because they “lack the underpinnings of an explicit and well-
developed theory”. That is to say that the majority of the models derived in prior studies 
had been done so by a statistical search through a number of possible financial 
variables. 
 
An exception to this was the gambler’s ruin model which applied an established 
theoretical framework to the task of insolvency prediction.  
 
“Although the theory specified a functional form for the probability of ultimate ruin, 
Wilcox found that this probability was not meaningful empirically. It could not be 
calculated for over half of his sample because the data violated the assumptions of the 
theory: firms that were supposed to be bankrupt were actually solvent. Faced with this 
problem, Wilcox (1976) discarded the functional form suggested by the theory and used 
the variables it suggested to construct a prediction model. It is hard to assess the 
resulting model since he did not test it on a holdout sample. Nevertheless, Wilcox's work 
is notable as the first attempt to use explicit theory to predict bankruptcy”. Scott (1981, 
pp. 323). 
 
Scott sought to investigate the similarities between the variables contained within the 
theoretical strands of both Wilcox’s research and option pricing formulae (Black and 
Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974) with that of the empirical strands of insolvency prediction 
to provide a well-defined theoretical framework to assist the direction of future 
research. The empirical models discussed and evaluated in Scott’s work were Beaver 
(1966), Altman (1968), Deakin (1972), Sinkey (1975), and Altman et al. (1977). He 
                                                 
61
 The gambler’s ruin problem was originally developed by Feller (1968) and its application to the problem of 
insolvency prediction was championed later by Wilcox (1976) and Santomero and Vinso (1977). A brief guide to 
the gambler’s ruin theory is provided in Appendix D. 
62
 A more thorough review of the option pricing literature and its relationship with insolvency prediction can be 
found in section 5.6 of this thesis. 
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noted that the low misclassification rates of these studies suggest that bankruptcy 
prediction is possible but is hard to determine which of the models discriminates the 
best, as different data and differing procedures underlie the reported test results. The 
best multivariate models seemed to outperform the best univariate models, but the best 
univariate models outperformed some of the multivariate models which could 
(probably) be attributed to a degree of over-fitting. Scott also commented that earnings 
or cash-flow variables appear in all of the models, and debt appears in several. All of the 
models rely on accounting data which suggest that there is useful information to be 
gained from company accounts, but stock price data was also an important factor. 
 
“Of the multidimensional models, the ZETA model is perhaps most convincing. It has 
high discriminatory power, is reasonably parsimonious, and includes accounting and 
stock market data as well as earnings and debt variables. Further it is being used in 
practice by over thirty financial institutions. As a result, although it is unlikely to 
represent the perfect prediction model, it will be used as a benchmark for judging the 
plausibility of the theories discussed in the following sections.” (Scott (1981, pp. 324-
325). 
 
To compare and contrast the findings of the prior studies into a single theoretically-
driven framework, Scott first comments on the similarities between the “simplest” 
insolvency prediction model (the single period model) and the Black-Scholes option 
pricing formulae, and how they can (or cannot as the case may be) explain the success 
of empirically driven models. 
 
The single period model states that a firm will become insolvent at the end of a 
period of trading if its liquidation value (V1) is less than the amount which it owes to its 
creditors (X1). 
 
 <  
(5.10) 
 
If V1 has a probability distribution with mean µv and standard deviation σv, 
standardising both sides implies that insolvency occurs if: 
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 − 6787 <
 − 6787  
(5.11) 
 
This inequality is depicted graphically in Figure 5.5, where insolvency occurs should 
the standardised liquidation of the firm value falls into the shaded region.  
 
Figure 5.5: Graphical representation of failure probability 
Source: facsimile from Scott (1981, p.327). 
 
Based on this simple theory, Scott noted that the empirically derived models did not 
contain variables which related to this single period model. Each of the empirical 
models relied on accounting values and earnings variables which do not appear in 
equation (5.11), which only contains stock values. Hence it is clear that the single 
period model is unable to explain the success of the empirical insolvency prediction 
models. 
 
The Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model is similar to this single period model. 
The model views equity as a European call option on a firm’s assets with a strike price 
equal to the face value of its liabilities. The option expires at time T when the debt 
matures. At this point the equity holders either; exercise their option and pay off the 
debt (if the firm’s assets (V1) are of greater worth than the face value of its liabilities (X1)) or, let the option expire (if the assets are not sufficient to cover the cost of the 
maturing debt). If the option is left to expire then the debt holders will file for 
liquidation and the assets will be transferred to them without cost. Merton (1973) 
assumes that the firm’s debt consists of a single zero-coupon bond and therefore equates 
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to that of equation (5.11) in its criteria. As with the single period model, the options 
pricing model does not contain earnings or accounting variables and therefore cannot 
explain the success of empirically-based models. Scott comments that: 
 
“... in principle, the option pricing methodology could be used to determine 
bankruptcy probabilities. However, it has not been used to date”.  
 
In a later section of this thesis I discover that the option pricing methodology is later 
adopted by the art, driven by research within the credit rating fraternity. 
 
The theory of the gambler’s ruin model assumes that a firm has a given amount of 
capital or net liquidation value of stakeholder’s equity (NLV), and those changes in 
NLV, S, occur at random. Positive operating cash-flows lead to positive changes in 
NLV, and losses require the firm to liquidate assets63. Insolvency occurs when NLV 
becomes negative (NLV+S < 0). Scott suggests that if we are willing to assume that 
accounting variables can serve as surrogates for liquidation values, then the gambler’s 
ruin model goes some way in explaining the predictive accuracy of the empirically-
based ZETA model. 
  
Under this interpretation, the NLV is represented by the book value of stakeholder’s 
equity, and S is represented by the change in retained earnings. The normalised equation 
therefor implies that a firm will become insolvent if: 
 : − 6;8; < −(6; + <=)8; . 
(5.12) 
 
If we then divide the numerator and denominator by total assets (TA) and multiply by 
minus one, then the probability of failure will increase with decreases in 
 
> 6;?@A + (<=?@ )8;/?@  
(5.13) 
                                                 
63
 The model assumes that the firm is detached from any security market and that its losses must be funded 
through the selling of assets. The firm therefore can sell neither debt nor equity. 
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The variables contained within this equation are similar to those found within the 
ZETA model and affect the probability of failure in the same direction. ZETA variable 
X4, (cumulative profitability, measured as retained earnings divided by total assets) is 
close to NLV/TA. X1, (return on assets, measured by EBIT divided by total assets) is 
close to 6;/TA, where 6; is the expected change in retained earnings. A third variable, 
X2, (stability of earnings, a normalised measure of the 10-year trend in X1) is also very 
similar to 8;/?@. Of the similarities in the variables, Scott comments that: 
 
 “… although the gambler’s ruin model helps explain the empirical success of ZETA, 
the explanation is imperfect, for ZETA contains additional variables, and even where 
the variables are similar, they are not identical. Some of the additional variables in 
ZETA may be due to statistical over-fitting; however they may also represent factors 
important in bankruptcy prediction, which do not appear in the relatively simple 
gambler’s ruin model”. Scott, (1981, pp.329). 
 
Further in his paper, Scott (1981) describes numerous expansions of the gambler’s 
ruin model and alternative theoretical propositions which converge with many of the 
variables which had been empirically derived as being good predictors of failure. 
Among the expansions, Scott evaluates several generalisations and model variants based 
upon various considerations such as fixed floatation costs, imperfect secondary markets 
for real assets, differences between accounting and economic values, risk aversion, 
personal taxes, inter-temporal dependence in earnings, and debt functions. These 
expansions make interesting reading, although too numerous to detail in this thesis. 
What can be gained from Scott (1981), however, is that there is a connection between 
empirically based models and those which are theoretically driven, although the overlap 
of the models is somewhat imperfect. Variables which are relied upon in theory, often 
find themselves in the results of economic practice, determined through the means of 
statistical searching. Scott suggests that by using the variables and functional forms 
contained within insolvency theory, it may be possible to improve the predictive 
accuracy of future empirical work. There does however need to be a certain amount of 
trade-off between the complex nature surrounding a real company experiencing real 
financial distress or pending insolvency, with that of a parsimonious model able to 
capture all of the important information within a small number of variables. A model 
which is able to effectively capture, in detail, a company’s state of solvency would need 
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to include far more financial, economic, and political variables than would be feasible to 
analyse in a practical sense and such a model, in any case, would be subject to a large 
degree of over-fitting. Scott refers back to Beaver (1966) and concludes that: 
 
“...in this respect it is useful to remember that Beaver’s work suggests simple models 
may work very well”. (Scott, 1981, p. 341). 
 
5.2.5 UK application of Z-score models 
 
The discussion of the literature thus far has centred upon US studies which 
dominated the field throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The success of these studies 
inevitably led to their methodological application to alternative markets and different 
populations of firms. Many countries were subject to studies in line with the 
methodologies devised by Altman (1968) and Beaver (1966). Developed and 
developing countries, non-capitalist countries, smaller economies and large industrial 
nations alike, have a vested interest in the avoidance of corporate failure in both the 
public and private sectors. Altman participated directly in the formulation of insolvency 
prediction models in many countries most notably Brazil, Canada, and Australia64, and 
other applications can be seen in numerous international studies of the time65. An 
overview of this literature can be found in Altman (1984). 
 
The focus of this thesis is not, however, an international critique of insolvency 
prediction models and methodologies, but is primarily concerned with insolvency 
prediction and credit risk models, their application the UK financial market, and the 
evolution of the associated literature. Although US and UK markets are probably the 
most similar in terms of the quality and availability of financial information, in theory 
the UK literature should provide a more appropriate comparison and be more relevant to 
my own empirical research. I therefor turn the focus away from the US literature to 
notable studies which centre on the development of Z-score prediction models within 
the UK. 
                                                 
64
 See Altman et al. (1979, Brazil); Altman and Lavallee (1981, Canada); Altman and Izan (1982, Australia).  
65
 Examples include Cahill (1981, Ireland); Bilderbeek (1977, Netherlands); Van Frederikslust (1978, 
Netherlands); Collongues (1977, France); Mader (1975, 1979, France); von Stein (1968, Germany); Beermann 
(1976, Germany); Castaga and Matolesy (1981, Australia); Takahashi et al. (1979, Japan); Ko (1982, Japan). 
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It is also appropriate to mention here that throughout the 1970s and early eighties, the 
rate of business failures within the UK were possibly the highest in the world. The high 
number of corporate failures was the result of the 1973-75, and 1980-82 recessive 
periods, and with the relatively tight monetary policy (aimed at reducing inflation), 
inevitably leading a declination of company earnings by an average of 35%66. The rate 
of failures within the UK for this period (0.76%) was, on average, twice the failure rate 
of firms within the US (0.35%).67  
 
The most prominent figure in the field of corporate distress prediction within the UK 
is Richard Taffler who was one of the first pioneers of the application of MDA to 
discriminate between failed and non-failed companies here in the UK. Although Taffler 
is widely recognised as being the first to successfully apply MDA to the discrimination 
of failed and non-failed companies within the UK, the very first UK study of this kind 
(and possibly the first outside of the US) was that of Lis (1972) which is described in 
Bolitho (1973).  Lis’s model correctly predicted 24 out of 30 companies, but further 
evaluations of the models performance are non-existent. Curiously, the four variables 
within this model are identical to those found within Altman’s (1983) Z’ score for 
private companies, which in itself has had limited exposure. Taffler (1984) provides 
details and discussions of several other early UK studies upon the prediction of failure 
of UK companies (Earl and Marias, 1979; Mason and Harris, 1978; Datastream, 1980; 
Betts and Belhoul, 1982, 1983; El Hennaway and Morris, 1983). 
 
The number of early UK studies, particularly circa 1980, demonstrates the popularity 
of the art which is still evident today. Many authors can be seen to be competing for 
dominance in the field, with each trying to demonstrate that his/her discriminant model 
has a better predictive ability than the next. For whatever reasons however, it is the 
Taffler version of the UK Z-score which has stood the test of time, being the most 
documented and recognisable insolvency prediction model within the UK over the past 
thirty years. 
 
                                                 
66
 Source: The Financial Times 20th November 2008. 
67
 Source: Altman (1983, pp.339). 
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It is evident from the early literature that there were in fact two competing versions 
of Taffler’s UK Z-score (which it has since become known), one version authored by 
Taffler (1976, 1982), and the second version first appearing in Taffler and Tisshaw 
(1977), and again in Taffler (1983) onwards. The first model is one containing five 
variables and first appears in Taffler (1976) (although it is noted in Taffler (1983) as 
being completed in the summer of 1974). The model is finally, and concisely, described 
in Taffler (1982). There are several peculiar observations surrounding Taffler (1982) 
which I ought to mention at this point. Firstly, Taffler states that: 
 
“The only UK-based work fully documented in the journals is that of Mason and 
Harris (1979), relating to the construction industry” (Taffler, 1982, p.342). 
 
It is interesting that there is no mention of his own earlier study (1976), nor does he 
acknowledge the earlier work by Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) which discusses the two 
competing UK Z-score models (favouring a four-variable version). Curiously however, 
the Mason and Harris (1979) paper does cite Taffler (1976) in its references, but oddly 
there is no mention of the study in the body of the text. The failure to acknowledge two 
of his previous papers in a review of past literature seems to me rather peculiar. I can 
only assume given the similarity between the early Taffler papers and the indecision 
between the two (five and four variable) models of which I shall discuss within this 
section; that the author was on a constant quest to improve upon and update the UK Z-
score as new data became available, and to reflect changes in economic conditions.  
 
The second oddity of Taffler (1982) is that it is later described in Taffler (1983) as 
being used for many years by a firm of London stockbrokers to “provide a service to 
their clients”. Initially I thought that this may explain why the five-variable model does 
not make another appearance in the literature after this publication. The model may 
have been commercially distributed at this point, but this would make no sense as the 
disclosure of the model variables and coefficients was made available in Taffler (1982). 
Perhaps this disclosure is the reason for the discontinuation (or at least the perceived 
discontinuation) of the stockbroker’s use of this version of the UK Z-score in practice. 
Officially a footnote in Taffler (1984) suggests that:   
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“…it appears that the service finally ceased not primarily through operational 
problems but because ‘the style of stockbrokers’ research does not lend itself 
particularly well to Z-score analysis”. (Financial Weekly, 24th June, 1983, p.4). 
 
Interestingly it is the coefficients of the alternative four-variable model (when is 
generally perceived as the UK Z-score model), which were not disclosed in publication 
until recently in Agarwal and Taffler (2007).68  
 
Upon an analysis of 23 failed firms (1968-1973) and 45 non-failed firms (1972-
1973), Taffler (1982) considers an enormous number of variables, perhaps more than 
any other paper within the field. 152 variables were selected on the basis of their 
effectiveness in previous and related studies, popularity in the literature, theoretical 
arguments (such as Walter’s liquid reservoir theory, 1952), and suggestions by financial 
analysts. Fifty-eight ratios were calculated from profit and loss accounts and balance 
sheet items, forty-four were four-year trend measures, and forty-eight ratios computed 
from the funds statement.69 
 
Reducing the variables using step-wise discriminant analysis (where variables are 
eliminated from the Z function if they are deemed not to add sufficient information to 
the model or are highly correlated with another), the resulting model consisted of just 
five variables; X1, earnings before interest and tax divided by the previous year’s (or 
opening) total assets; X2, total liabilities divided by net capital employed; X3, quick 
assets over total assets; X4, working capital over net worth; and X5, stock turnover. This 
five-variable version of the UK Z-score has the following functional form: 
 
 = 0.71 − 0.93	 + 0.32 + 0.49 + 0.53 
(5.14) 
 
 
                                                 
68
 It is possible that the four-variable UK Z-score was used in practice by the credit scoring company Syspas 
Limited for a number of years before it was dissolved in March 2001. It is also possible that Taffler was a 
director of this company, however, only access to the last accounts (1997) would be likely to confirm these 
statements with certainty, which I have so far been unable to obtain. 
69
 Statement of sources and application of funds is a predecessor of the cash-flow statement in the UK. The 
forty-eight cash-flow ratios were later dropped due to instability. 
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Applying this discriminant function to the initial 68 firms (used for the training of the 
model), resulted in an almost perfect number of correct predictions. Only one firm 
(Rolls Royce) was misclassified as being solvent when it had actually entered into 
receivership. Taffler notes however that 
 
“…whether Rolls Royce was strictly speaking insolvent at the date of appointment of 
the receiver, February 4th, 1971, is open to question. All creditors’ claims were 
subsequently met in full, debenture holders were paid together will all accrued interest 
and equity holders eventually received four times the figure the shares stood at when 
dealings were finally suspended. These facts add weight to the argument that Rolls 
Royce entered into receivership as the only way to break its ruinous RB211 jet engine 
contract with Lockheed allowing renegotiation of terms. Consequently, it might be 
reasonably maintained that the solvent classification was a fair reflection at least of the 
financial state of Rolls Royce as at December 31st, 1969, the end of the last financial 
year for which audited accounts were available.” Taffler (1982, p.347). 
 
Given this information, despite the training and validation samples being one and the 
same, and that the sample sizes are relatively small compared to contemporary 
empirical studies, this is the first and, perhaps only time that an insolvency prediction 
model has been purported as being 100% accurate. Further tests of the model on an ex-
post holdout sample of 33 insolvent firms (1974-1976) and 10 non-failed firms (1972-
1973) were also presented to assess the model’s predictive ability. The results of this 
holdout examination showed that from the 43 firms in question, 4 were incorrectly 
classified as being solvent when they actually failed, a type I error rate of 12.1%. None 
of the solvent firms were misclassified as being failed, giving an overall accuracy of 
approximately 91%. 
 
In a further validation test, Taffler sought to determine the number of companies 
which were actually at risk of failure in order to provide “essential” information for any 
user of the Z-score model. The model was applied to 1257 quoted industrial companies 
with accounts held on the Jordan Dataquest database in the year 1975. The results 
indicated that 10.7% (135) of the companies in question were at risk of failure. It is 
unfortunate that Taffler did not provide any further information regarding these “at risk” 
companies, such as what percentage actually failed within the following period(s). A 
similar case is that of the Altman et al.’s (1977) ZETA model, which was reported in 
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Business Week (March 24th, 1980, p.106) as classifying 520 (20%) of 2600 US 
companies listed on Compustat as being possible failures. What percentage of these 
companies actually failed within the proceeding years is not reported.  
 
One study that did provide a follow-up population study was Deakin (1977) who 
examined the five variables which were applied in Libby’s (1975) loan officer 
experiment in an extension to Deakin (1972). The validation of the derived model was 
carried out upon 1980 companies on the Compustat 1800 file for the fiscal year 1971, 
and results suggested that 290 companies (16.3%) had profiles which were similar to 
those of the failed group of firms. Unlike Taffler, Deakin provides a follow-up analysis 
of these firms for a subsequent three-and-a-half year period 1972-1975. He found that of 
the 260 companies in question, only 18 (6.2%) actually failed within the period. Altman 
(1983) however, identifies some interesting arguments regarding the definition of 
failure which is used by Deakin.  The 18 failures which Deakin identifies were based 
upon failure being defined as bankruptcy, liquidation, or reorganisation. Altman noted 
that if the seven mergers which occurred within the group and within the period, 
happened under distress conditions, then the total number of correctly predicted failures 
would rise to 25 (8.6%). Further, defining failure to include dividend cuts or omissions 
causes the number of correct failure predictions to rise rapidly to 224 (77.2%). 
 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of the particularly weak definition failure suggested 
by Altman (1983), it can be seen from Deakin (1977) that the application of insolvency 
prediction models in practice, when they are derived using a small number of (hand-
picked) companies, and applied upon the large population of firms, does not yield 
particularly strong results. Later studies utilise a far greater number of companies for 
their analyses, in fact it is often possible to monitor and evaluate most of the population 
of firms in any western financial market. That the practical application of these early 
models is rarely followed-up and evaluated in the early literature, is not too problematic 
as modern computing power and databases make it possible to provide true ex-post 
empirical studies of these models. 
 
Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) again used the empirical methodology of MDA to 
formulate a predictive function derived from, and to be used upon, UK company data. 
The main focus of Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) was centred upon the apparently low 
number of audit GCQs associated with the sample of firms under their analysis. They 
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suggested that only 22% of the failed companies were actually issued with a GCQ 
which is very similar to the results of Altman and McGough (1974) in the US. From 
their experience they also point out that that it is only around 15-20% of companies that 
display a financially distressed profile that will actually fail in the UK, due to the 
relatively large amount of government aid which is potentially available to keep a firm 
alive, compared to the US where this practice is very rare. 
 
Using a sample of 46 failed70 and 46 non-failed manufacturing companies from 1968 
to 1976, matching by firm size and industry, eighty different ratios were investigated. 
Using a step-wise discriminant package, the eighty variables were reduced to a model 
containing just four variables; X1, Profit Before Tax/Current Liabilities; X2, Current 
Assets/Total Liabilities, X3, Current Liabilities/Total Assets, and X4, No-credit 
Interval71. The model (with undisclosed coefficient estimates) was reported to have a 
one-year-ahead forecast accuracy of 97%. 
 
Taffler (1983) reverts back to the Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) four-variable model in 
a concise discussion of the models formulation, parameters and practical application, 
pausing only briefly to mention his earlier five-variable version. 
 
The Coefficients of the model were not published at the time but later became 
available in Agarwal and Taffler (2007). The functional form of the UK Z-score is as 
follows: 
 
 = 3.2 + 12.18 + 2.5	 − 10.63 + 0.029 (5.15) 
 
The cut-off point for this model is zero with companies providing a score of less than 
zero being those deemed failed as per the definitions described in Taffler and Tisshaw 
(1977) above. Companies with a score above zero are deemed to be healthy and thus 
survive. The predictive ability of this model was evident in a near perfect class 
                                                 
70
 Failure was defined as those companies entering receivership, CVL, compulsory winding up, and interestingly 
government bailouts. 
71
 The No-Credit interval is the time a company can continue its operations from its immediate assets if all other 
forms of short term finance are cut off. Measured in days it is more directly it is defined as (immediate assets 
(current assets – stock) – current liabilities) divided by daily operating costs excluding depreciation. 
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identification of almost 98% accuracy in a Lachenbruch hold-out test72. Although the 
Lachenbruch (1967) jack-knife test is not a holdout test in the strictest sense of the 
word, it is often used to produce almost unbiased estimates of the true model 
misclassification rates when actual holdout data is not available. Two samples of failed 
and non-failed firms with sizes n1 and n2 are used for the jack-knife procedure. For the 
common delete-one jack-knife, a single observation mi is omitted from the training 
procedure and is then classified according to the resulting function. The procedure is 
repeated for each m for i = 1 to (n1 + n2). The misclassification rates can then be 
calculated. 
 
The high accuracy is perhaps why this model had been used widely throughout credit 
grating institutions within the UK, in particular over the last 30 years73. Originally 
designed for use with industrial companies (with separate models developed for retail 
and service enterprises), Taffler (1995) acknowledges that the model can be applied 
with equal confidence to all non-financial companies and hence makes a good candidate 
for further study in this thesis74. 
 
The main aim of Taffler (1983) was to: 
 
“...test the model’s true ex ante predictive ability and the results from its use in 
practice in the several years subsequent to its development”. 
 
The UK Z-score (as it has become known) certainly boasts an impressive track 
record in its predictive ability over time. Taffler (1995) provided evidence for this over 
the eighteen year period from when the model was first developed. Within this period 
Taffler identified 152 outright failures amongst UK public industrial companies75 with 
his model being able to identify 150 of these correctly76. Agarwal and Taffler (2007) 
offers further verification of the UK Z-score’s robustness over time providing much 
                                                 
72
 One of the two companies which were deemed to have survived when they actually failed was Rolls Royce as 
previously discussed in Taffler (1982).  
73
 See Agarwal and Taffler 2007 for details. 
74
 Altman's Z-score model was also originally developed from samples of industrial manufacturing companies 
but has likewise conventionally been applied across the whole spectrum of non-financial companies. 
75
 Defined as receivership, administration, creditors’ voluntary liquidation or wind-down. 
76
 One of the two companies not detected was Polly Peck, now notorious for its scandalous accounting. 
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discussion of theory and strong statistical evidence to suggest that this method of 
detecting financial distress does indeed have true ex-ante predictive ability over long 
periods. Tests over a 25 year sampling period showed that the UK Z-score continued to 
have an impressive 96% type I accuracy, a higher rate than the longevity results shown 
by Altman (2000) in which the original Altman Z-score showed a type I accuracy 
ranging from 82-94% over a 31 year period (1969-1999). 
 
Both the five-variable and four-variable models of Taffler, utilise similar 
methodology and purport similar predictive ability but it is the four-variable version 
which has received the most exposure and testing within the academic literature to date 
due in part to the popularisation and promotion by the author himself. Taffler has 
showed that the prediction of corporate failure within the UK can be achieved with 
highly accurate results. Indeed these results seem to persist over time as shown in 
Taffler (1995), Agarwal and Taffler (2007), and the latest examination of the UK Z-
score provided in Agarwal and Taffler (2008). 
 
The empirical section of this thesis critically evaluates several popularised 
insolvency prediction models which include both the Altman and Taffler Z-scores. 
Although (as I shall discuss) MDA has its critics and is perhaps considered an out-of-
date methodology which is seldom used in modern finance application, I am interested 
to discover whether these models still provided the predictive ability that they once 
claimed. By providing a critical and impartial evaluation of these models using (for the 
first time) post-IFRS implemented company data, I will be able to determine whether 
these models are sufficiently relevant to today’s financial climate and whether they still 
hold any predictive ability at all. 
 
5.2.6 Discussions on the validity and pitfalls of the MDA methodology 
 
Despite the perceived popularity of the MDA approach and the resulting “forest” of 
Z-score-type models, each trying to leave its competitors in the shade, several papers 
are evident from the 1970s which suggest that MDA should be used with caution. The 
MDA methodology gained criticism from various detractors who sought to provide 
evidence that the method was floored, be it statistically, theoretically or otherwise. This 
section outlines some of the key papers and discussions regarding the validity of MDA 
as an insolvency prediction tool. 
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I have briefly mentioned earlier in this section that although many authors (including 
myself) use the abbreviation MDA as representing Multivariate (or Multiple) 
Discriminant Analysis, what I am in-fact referring to is Linear Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis (LMDA). For any classification or prediction exercise, be it separating failing 
and non-failing firms, or otherwise, assumptions pertinent to the MDA methodology 
dictate whether or not LMDA actually provides an optimal solution to the classification 
problem. 
 
If one takes a population of firms separable into two categories (failed and non-
failed), each firm being characterised by a vector of attributes or variables, then these 
attributes must (a) arise from multivariate normal populations and, (b) the two 
categories must have identical variance-covariance matrices. If these two conditions are 
met and the variables exhibit differing mean values between the two categories of firms, 
then LMDA will provide an optimal solution to the classification problem. If on the 
other hand the variables arise from multivariate normal populations, but the variance-
covariance matrices are not identical then it is Quadratic Multivariate Discriminant 
Analysis (QMDA) which will yield the optimal solution. This quadratic form of 
discriminant analysis is gained through the derivation of the MDA methodology as 
provided in Appendix C and is shown that the quadratic (true) form of the model will 
collapse into the less complex linear form of the model only when the two variance-
covariance matrices are equal (equations C.15 and C.16). Theoretically speaking, this 
suggests that QMDA should therefore yield the better classification results as it is 
unlikely that the equal matrices assumption will hold in reality; in practice however 
Altman et al. (1977) for example, demonstrate that (in their analysis) it is the linear 
form of the model which is attributed the greatest classification accuracy. 
 
If the variance-covariance matrices dictate optimal results by the correct application 
of either quadratic or linear discriminant analysis, the problem persists that both of these 
discriminant model forms rely on the assumption that the variables used to characterise 
each firm are multivariate normally distributed. In reality however, financial variables 
attributing multivariate normality are likely to be considered a rarity rather than the 
norm. Indeed, dichotomous variables which are frequently employed along-side 
continuous variables within the discriminant function are by their very definition (being 
either zero or one) will not exhibit multivariate normal distributions. Chang and Afifi 
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(1974) derive and examine classification methods for models containing mixtures of 
continuous, discrete, and dichotomous variables. They propose that the most appropriate 
cause of action would be to split the sample based on either the values of the discrete 
variables, or where possible, the discrete variable itself. This proposition (to me at least) 
seems somewhat impractical. If I was to follow Chang and Afifi (1974) then I would 
effectively be constructing many different discriminant functions for application to any 
given sample of firms. The number of different functions would depend on the number 
of dichotomous and discrete variables that the author wishes to analyse rising 
dramatically as the number of dichotomous and discrete variables increases. It makes 
more practical sense to evaluate the effects of non-normality statistically to determine 
what effects this assumption violation would have on the resulting model. 
 
Eisenbeis (1977) notes that violations of normality assumptions are likely to bias any 
tests of significance or estimated error rates pertinent to the MDA methodology, and 
further asks, to what extent does the relaxation of this assumption have on the 
classification. He suggests that one reason for the lack of attention to this problem was 
that most of the available normality tests were for univariate and not multivariate 
normality, although several tests have been documented and discussed.77 
 
The application of various transformations to data subsequent to the discriminant 
analysis has been widely adopted with the most popular transformations being that of 
the natural and standard logs. The thought process behind these transformations is that 
many of a firm’s variables, such as the market value of equity, book value of debt, or 
employee numbers, tend to exhibit positive skewness with a small number of firms 
producing large out-lying variables whilst the majority tend to be smaller. The 
consequence of the natural log transformation is that the variable’s marginal distribution 
is more symmetrical and is bounded below by zero. Therefore, depending upon the 
variable(s) in question, the log transformation certainly has intuitive appeal because the 
resulting distribution will be more symmetric and, in all probability, more normal. An 
obvious detraction however, is that negative numbers cannot be transformed this way. 
 
Watson (1990) provides a concise examination of multivariate distributional 
properties of a set of financial ratios and concludes that financial ratios are likely to 
                                                 
77
 See for example Malkovich and Afifi (1973), Sharipo and Francia (1972), and Koziol (1982). 
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include multivariate outliers and to differ substantially from multivariate normality. 
Watson was able to determine two procedures which could be used to successfully 
induce an approximation for multivariate normality. 
 
1. Multivariate outliers (an average of four percent) were identified and deleted using a 
generalised distance measure that accounted for the multivariate structure of the data. 
2. Modified power transformations were applied to the data after the multivariate outliers 
were deleted. 
 
With regards to these power transformations Watson follows Box and Cox (1964) in 
changing a variable y to y[λ] by the family of transformations: 
 
CDλF = GHIJK ,	     for y ≠ 0, y > 0  
CDλF = ln	DyF,	     for y = 0, y > 0  
 (5.16) 
 
λ is determined such that the logarithm of a normal likelihood function is maximised 
as per Box and Cox (1964) which results in a value of λ which is appropriate to induce 
approximate normality. Watson deems this to be a better approximation for normality 
that otherwise would be induced by using logarithmic or square root transformations for 
financial ratios that may be skewed (e.g. Deakin, 1976; Bates, 1973). 
 
A further consideration is that if the data does not exhibit multivariate normality then 
the researcher much derive alternative joint probability density functions and fit this 
within the existing methodology, albeit a seemingly impossible task. This is perhaps 
why most researchers are content to accept the notion that the results, estimations and 
significance tests of the discriminant analysis methodology provide a reasonable 
approximation to their true values should multivariate normality exist. Lachenbruch et 
al. (1973) evaluate the robustness of both the linear and quadratic discriminant forms for 
three non-multivariate normal distributions, log normal, logit normal and inverse 
hyperbolic sine normal. They found that linear procedures were quite sensitive to non-
normality but the problems were not so great when the distributions were bounded as 
found for example in the logit normal. Overall Lachenbruch et al. (1973) found that the 
estimated overall classification accuracy rates were not, however, affected to any 
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significant degree. Similarly to the later Altman et al. (1977) paper, the authors found 
somewhat surprisingly that the results of quadratic analysis were not significantly 
greater than their linear counterparts, and in many cases they were inferior. 
 
Finally in this section I would like to discuss a series of papers which focus and 
discuss some further points on the application of discriminant analysis. These papers 
(Joy and Tollefson, 1975; Eisenbeis, 1977; Altman and Eisenbeis, 1978; Joy and 
Tollefson, 1978, and Scott, 1978) largely focus upon the construction of samples, the 
design, application and definition of classification and prediction methods, and the 
importance and interpretation of the resulting explanatory variables within the 
discriminant function. 
 
Joy and Tollefson (1975) argue that the predictive abilities of many insolvency 
prediction models tend to be overstated because the authors confuse ex-post 
classification results with ex-ante predictive abilities. They note that many failure 
prediction studies use ex-post discrimination in a validation sample (cross validation) 
where prediction accuracy is based upon classifying members of a time-coincident 
holdout (validation) sample. 
 
“Prediction means to foretell the future. Ex post discrimination may provide a useful 
foundation for explanation of the past, but it does not provide sufficient evidence for 
concluding that the future can be predicted. However, this fact is virtually unrecognized 
in financial LDF (LMDA) studies”. (Joy and Tollefson, 1975). 
 
However, as Joy and Tollefson also note, under the assumption of stationarity within 
the population over time, ex-post discrimination may be seen as being tantamount to 
prediction. Altman and Eisenbeis (1978) emphasise that this concept of prediction is not 
strictly appropriate in relation to an MDA model because MDA does not explicitly 
incorporate a time dimension. Joy and Tollefson (1978) retort that if indeed this is the 
case then MDA should not be used in studies that require, or propose, the concept that a 
prediction can be made about the future regardless of application focus. Altman and 
Eisenbeis (1978) note that Lachenbruch (1975) criticises the use of a holdout sample 
all-together, in favour of the Lachenbruch jack-knife validation approach previously 
discussed within this section. This is also supported by Scott (1978) who notes that 
studies in finance such as these, where data and sample sizes are often small, the use of 
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the split sample techniques can lead to poor estimates and erroneous conclusions 
regarding the error rates with respect to the discriminant function. Regardless of the 
validation technique employed by each author, it is the erroneous and misleading use of 
the term “prediction” that Joy and Tollefson have issue with, and not any particular 
validation procedure, although I would concur with Scott (1978) in saying that reducing 
the estimation sample in order to provide a unique validation sample is somewhat 
counter-productive when a larger data population is likely to achieve a more realistic 
model. 
 
More recently, studies have been able to forego these small quibbles on phrasal 
technicalities by constructing studies which can, as more data has become available 
through time, evaluate some of these earlier models on a true ex-ante basis. Heine 
(2000) and Agarwal and Taffler (2007) are prime examples of such studies where the 
performance of their original Z-score models are evaluated using new data from up to 
30 and 25 years later respectively. These two studies provide results that indicate only a 
marginal drop in “predictive” ability compared to their original counterparts suggesting 
that discriminant analysis can be fairly robust over time, despite the associated problems 
and discrepancies. 
 
With regards to the importance and interpretation of the variables within the 
discriminant function, it is important to note that the coefficients of the discriminant 
model do not indicate the hierarchic relationship between the constituting variables 
because they cannot be construed or interpreted in the same way as the coefficients of a 
regression. It may be the case that in a univariate context, one or more variables may 
prove insignificant in their discriminatory power, but add significant value when 
combined into a multivariate framework such as an MDA model (Altman, 1968). It is 
also possible that some variables may display counter-intuitive signs (Ooghe and 
Verbaere, 1985). It is therefore unwise (and incorrect) to attach too much importance to 
the magnitude (and sign) of the coefficients within the discriminant function. 
 
Joy and Tollefson (1975); Eisenbeis, (1977); Scott (1978), for example suggest to the 
contrary that we can indeed attach coefficient importance to the individual variables, if 
the coefficients are standardised. Nevertheless, we need to recognise that the attempt to 
assess the role of the individual coefficients is inappropriate in view of the purpose of 
MDA (Zavgren, 1985). 
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Two further points of interest which are worth mentioning at this time are that the 
dependent variable is treated as being dichotomous, treating failure as being discrete, 
non-overlapping and identifiable thus not reflecting the true nature of financial distress 
and the various insolvency procedures. 
 
“In reality, corporate failure is not a well-defined dichotomy. Therefore, 
dichotomizing failure seems  inappropriate and the classic statistical modelling 
techniques, which are based on a dichotomy assumption, are applied inappropriately to 
the topic of corporate failure prediction. In fact, the arbitrary definition of failure may 
have serious consequences for the resulting failure prediction model”. Balcaen and 
Ooghe (2006). 
 
I have also previously mentioned that having an arbitrary choice of variables for 
inclusion in these discriminant functions, fails to allow any such to exactly follow any 
theoretical based arguments for corporate failure. These latter points will be referred to 
in greater depth as I progress through this section which culminates in a discussion 
regarding the main issues arising from the traditional approaches of corporate 
insolvency prediction and the “classical paradigm”. 
 
5.2.7 Summarising remarks 
 
Despite its proven predictive accuracy, the Z-score often comes under fire from 
detractors who through various means seek to provide evidence that it is floored, be it 
statistically, theoretically or otherwise. Taffler (1995) is keen to point out that most of 
the concern regarding the Z-score is through a lack of understanding of what the score is 
designed to do. The Z-score model simply evaluates a company’s financial profile and 
suggests whether it is more in line with that of a failed company or a non-failed one. 
Taffler (1995) argues that criticisms by Morris (1997) and others who suggest that the 
Z-score has no relevance because it is not based on any sound theoretical underpinnings 
are largely unjustified.  
 
These models are not explanatory theories of failure but pattern recognition devices; 
by sifting through voluminous accounting data they are able to provide a readily 
interpretable communication tool portraying the likely distinctions between failed and 
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non-failed company groups. Its “power” comes from the principle that the whole is 
worth more than the sum of the parts, and by considering the many different facets of 
economic information that is contained within a set of financial accounts 
simultaneously; it provides a great deal more information than conventional univariate 
ratio analysis. The liquid asset reservoir model (Walter, 1957) provides an adequate 
underpinning for the Z-score and if a more advanced theoretical framework for the Z-
score could be developed, it would prove unnecessary move away from its actual 
purpose of being a pattern detecting device. 
 
MDA procedures also use the assumption that the groups being investigated are 
identifiable and discrete. In the case of insolvency prediction this is questionable as the 
analysis usually classifies on the grounds of complete failure in the legal insolvency 
sense but as I have already discussed, failure comes in many forms and can often be 
rectified prior to any insolvency process. 
 
Literature has shown us that sometimes it can be difficult to completely satisfy the 
classification problem (e.g. Altman’s grey area) and could therefore theoretically limit 
any practical application of the model, although Eidleman (1995) suggests that the use 
of these models is widespread. 
 
A further critique of Z analysis is that judgements are made on past accounting data 
and do not necessarily reflect the actual current financial position of the company. In 
times of economic downturn such as today, rapid changes in the financial security of a 
company may be prevalent thus rendering the use of such techniques inappropriate. The 
empirical study contained within this thesis hopes to illustrate this fact and provide 
further evidence as to the validity of basing prediction models solely on past accounting 
data. These models also negate to reflect any changes in accounting standards or 
reporting practice which may occur, thus making year-on-year comparisons of the 
models again inappropriate. 
 
The requirement of any Z approach to insolvency prediction modelling is therefore to 
continually redevelop and asses the models using ratios that measure more appropriately 
the different dimensions of a company’s current financial profile, performance 
measures, accounting regimes and current economic challenges. 
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Questions have also been asked as to the validity of some of the statistical techniques 
used in the development of the Z-score model and in particular the use of MDA as an 
appropriate technique78. One of the main arguments is that the use of MDA relies 
heavily on the assumption that the data is normally distributed; financial ratios however 
are generally not normally distributed79 and tend to be highly skewed thus affecting the 
validity and significance of any estimated error rates used within the MDA technique. 
Certain transformations of data have been used in the past to try and approximate ratio 
distribution to normal, the most frequent being that of the standard or natural logs (e.g. 
Bates 1973). This transformation of the accounting data however may detract and 
change the information regarding the interrelationships between the variables being 
analysed and may affect the relative positions of observations within the group 
(Eisenbeis 1977). Gilbert (1968) compared three alternate models with that of the MDA 
function and concluded that the assumption of normality makes little or no difference to 
the predictive ability. 
 
Efron (1975) interestingly found that classification models that use MDA under the 
condition of multivariate normality are more efficient than those employing logistic 
regression which are less restrictive. Contrary to this finding, the next section discusses 
the move away from MDA by researchers, possibly to overcome some of the statistic 
problems, towards conditional probability models such as logit and probit. 
  
                                                 
78
 For instance Joy and Tollefson (1975) and Eisenbeis (1977). 
79
 And would actually be an impossibility for some. 
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5.3 The 1980s: conditional probability, a new contender 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
The conditional probability model (CPM) comes in multiple forms depending on the 
Cumulative Density Function (CDF) assigned within the estimation process. Appendix 
(E) to this thesis provides a derivation of two of these forms, the logit and the probit 
models. For the purposes of corporate failure or insolvency prediction, the most popular 
choice of CPM is the logit model.80 
 
The logit model is a conditional probability model which uses the non-linear 
maximum log-likelihood technique to estimate the probability of firm failure under the 
assumption of a logistic distribution. The parameter estimates are obtained using the 
logit model’s maximum likelihood method as derived in Gujarati (2003). The resulting 
model is of the following form: 
 
'M = N(O = 1|9 = 11 + Q(RSTRUVW9 =
1
1 + QXW 
 (5.17) 
 
where 'M	is the probability that firm i will fail (O = 1) given a vector of attribute 
variables  (ratios, categorical or qualitative variables; for ease of exposition I simply 
denote just one variable M) for firm i, and the YZ are parameter estimates for each M. 
The function (Y + Y	M9 for such models is often simply referred to as Zi.		
	
The logistical function ensures that the probability estimates are bounded between 0 
and 1. To adhere to the majority of prior literature I refer to the model as being 
constructed using a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a failed company, and 0 
for a non-failed company. A high logit score indicates a high failure probability and 
poor financial health; and low logit score indicates good financial health and a low 
probability of failure. The underlying logistic function of the model implies that an 
                                                 
80
 Section 8 of this thesis provides evidence for the frequencies of the logit and probit modelling technology 
choice apparent in a selection of key academic literature. Academic studies employing logit estimations account 
for approximately 21% of the literature compared to only around  1% for probit modelling. 
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extremely healthy (weak) company, as compared to a firm of average financial health, 
must experience a proportionally larger deterioration (amelioration) of its attributes in 
order to deteriorate (ameliorate) its logit score (Laitinen and Kankaanpää, 1999). 
 
The previous section of this thesis discussed some of the key pitfalls and assumption 
violations associated with the popular tool MDA (Edmister, 1972; Eisenbeis, 1977; 
Altman and Eisenbeis, 1978; Joy and Tollefson, 1975; Joy and Tollefson, 1978; Ooghe 
et al., 1994). As the literature enters the 1980s we observe a marked shift away from 
MDA in favour of the conditional probability model, possibly in an attempt to avoid 
some of these pitfalls and violations. In particular, the logit model neither requires 
multivariate normally distributed variables and secondly, nor does it rely on equal 
variance-covariance matrices of the two classification groups (Ohlson, 1980; Zavgren, 
1983). 
 
However, the logit model (as with all CPM’s) and similarly to MDA, still relies on 
statistical features inherent in the classical prediction paradigm, namely: the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, treating failure as being discrete, non-overlapping and 
identifiable thus not reflecting the true nature of financial distress and the various 
insolvency procedures; the input variables are chosen arbitrarily, thus not conforming to 
any theoretical arguments; and the use of the term “prediction” could be construed as 
being incorrectly applied. 
 
5.3.2 Ohlson: a first application of a logit model to insolvency prediction 
 
The first published research within the field of corporate insolvency prediction to use 
the econometric methodology of conditional logit analysis was that of Ohlson (1980), 
although Ohlson himself alludes to several unpublished papers incorporating failure 
probabilities which pre-date his own study.81 
 
Ohlson was under no delusion that the choice of a logit analysis would avoid some of 
the problems associated with the popular MDA methodology of which I have previously 
discussed. Furthermore, Ohlson suggests other reasons why conditional probability 
                                                 
81
 The papers which Ohlson refers to are White and Turnbull (1975a;1975b), and Santomero and Vinso (1977). 
The latter utilising the gambler’s ruin approach (Appendix D). 
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models should be preferred: (1) the output (Z-score) of the MDA model has little 
intuitive interpretation, since it is simply an ordinal ranking device. If the researcher is 
able to ascribe a probability of failure to a particular firm then this would provide a 
greater intuitive appeal; (2) there are notable problems associated with the matching 
paired sample approach which is evident in all MDA studies. Pairs of failed and non-
failed firms are usually matched by arbitrary criteria such as size and industry and 
Ohlson notes that: 
 
 “It is by no means obvious what is really gained or lost by different matching 
procedures, including no matching at all. At the very least, it would seem to be more 
fruitful actually to include variables as predictors rather than to use them as matching 
purposes”. (Ohlson, 1980, p.112). 
 
This latter point is demonstrated by Ohlson’s empirical sample sizes. Populations of 
105 failed firms and 2,058 non-failed firm years (from the period 1970-1976) are 
evidently larger (and more recent) than any previous study within the field of corporate 
failure prediction. Although he would have like to included more firm year observations 
for his empirical study, time restraints limited the number of firm years to just one per 
each company that was listed on the Compustat tape (database). Data for failed firms 
was collected up to four years prior to bankruptcy, in order that a one or two year-ahead 
forecast was potentially possible. 
 
 One further important consideration by Ohlson was regarding the timing of the 
annual report data relative to the bankruptcy date of the failed firms. The structure and 
make-up of the data sample is certainly a critical one, and the issue of report timing had 
not been explicitly considered prior to this study. Previous studies had simply taken 
annual report data as documented, and presumed available, at the company’s fiscal year-
end. In reality this is not the case. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
responsible for implementing financial regulations in the US, allow for an account 
preparation time of four months after the fiscal year-end82. In the UK the statutory 
                                                 
82
 Four months is the preparation time allowed by the SEC at the time of writing this thesis. I am unsure as to 
what statutory requirements were in 1980 but can only assume something similar. Ohlson (1980) notes that 
many cases within his data have at least four and one-half months delay between the fiscal year-end and the date 
of the audit report. He suggests that it is possible for firms to apply to the SEC for an extension, although in 
many cases of bankruptcy, firms do not subsequently file any reports at all. 
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preparation time is a longer period of seven months as dictated by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC).  Therefore in a real-world situation, a company’s accounts 
may not be made available until several months after the official fiscal year-end. An 
issue therefore arises, when one is trying to accurately detect future insolvencies, if the 
derived model is based upon corporate failures which occur somewhere between the 
company year-end and the point at which the accounts are actually published. It is not 
unfeasible given the preparation lag time that such an occurrence would take place, and 
this occurrence may possibly lead to data items within the accounts being over, or 
understated, in order to appease investors or other stakeholders with a vested interest in 
the solvency of the company.83 
 
One finding of the Ohlson (1980) study, with regards to the concept of this timing 
issue, is that previous empirical research seems to have overstated the predictive 
accuracy or discriminatory power of the resulting models. Ohlson suggests that 
evidence indicates that it will be easier to “predict” insolvency if models employ 
predictors derived from data within financial statements released after the event of 
bankruptcy.  
 
To counter this issue of timing I need simply to ensure that accounting data is 
ascribed to the failed population of firms from annual reports which would have been 
available prior to the insolvency announcement. In most cases this simply means that 
the previous year’s accounts are used as a substitute. A direct result of this 
circumvention of the timeliness issue means that the lead time in Ohlson’s study (the 
time between the fiscal year-end date of the appropriate accounting data and the date of 
the insolvency), was fairly lengthy in comparison to previous studies, being an average 
of thirteen months, but nevertheless reflects more accurately the real world conditions 
that a decision maker would encounter. 
 
The logit model itself follows the maximum likelihood estimation methodology as 
described in the introduction to this section and as defined in Appendix (E). Nine 
independent predictor variables were included in three models, representing one, two 
and a one-or-two-year-ahead forecasts. The nine variables were selected, not through 
                                                 
83
 Ohlson uses the term “back-casting” – a method in which the future desired conditions (insolvency) are 
envisioned and steps are then taken to achieve those conditions. 
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any theoretical arguments (observing that prior literature had also precluded such an 
approach), but largely due to their popularity and frequency in said literature. Ohlson 
also notes that no attempt was made to develop any “new or exotic” ratios, but they 
were simply chosen for simplicity. The nine ratios are as follows: 
 
 
1. SIZE = Log (total assets/GNP).84 
2. TLTA = Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
3. WCTA = Working capital divided by total assets. 
4. CLCA = Current liabilities divided by current assets. 
5. OENEG = One if total liabilities exceeds total assets, zero otherwise. 
6. NITA = Net income divided by total assets. 
7. FUTL = Funds provided by operations divided by total liabilities. 
8. INTWO = One if net income was negative for the last two years, zero otherwise. 
9. CHIN = Change in net income.85 
 
The coefficients of the resulting logit model (Ohlson’s “model 1” for a one-year-
ahead forecast) adhered to prior expectations regarding their respective signs and are 
shown in Table 5.11 along with the associated t-statistics regarding significance to the 
model. With a higher “score” or probability indicating a higher chance of failure, the 
three variables which I would expect to have positive signs (TLTA, CLCA, and 
INTWO), do indeed do so. The remaining variables (with the exception of OENEG)86 
all display negative signs, matching prior expectations that having a ratio of a higher 
value, holding all else equal, would lower the probability that a particular firm would 
become insolvent.87 
                                                 
84
 The index assumes a base value of 100 for 1968. Total assets are reported in dollars. The index year is as of 
the year prior to the year of the balance sheet date. The procedure assures a real-time implementation of the 
model.  
85
 CHIN is calculated as being (NIt – NIt-1) / (|NIt|+|NIt-1|), where NIt is net income for the most recent period. 
The denominator acts as a level indicator and therefor the variable is intended to measure the change in net 
income. 
86
 Ohlson notes that OENEG “serves as a discontinuity correction for TLTA. A corporation which has a negative 
book value is a special case”. 
87
 I must note a small mistake in the Ohlson paper. The author notes that three variables (WCTA, CLCA, and 
INTWO) have t-statistics that are less than two and are therefore not significant at a respectable level. Whilst this 
observation is of course correct, there is a failure to mention that NITA is also insignificant. 
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With regards to the accuracy of this particular model, using an initial arbitrary cut-off 
point of 0.5 where failure occurs above this value, the percentage of firms correctly 
“predicted” (within the validation sample itself) was equal to 96.12 percent88. This 
result is comparable to the high accuracies claimed by previous studies, but Ohlson is 
keen to point out several problems with this simplified evaluation of the model. 
 
 
Table 5.11: Coefficients and t-statistics of Ohlson’s variables 
Variable Estimate t-statistic 
SIZE -0.407 -3.78* 
TLTA 6.03 6.61* 
WCTA -1.43 -1.89 
CLCA 0.0757 0.761 
OENEG -1.72 -2.45* 
NITA -2.37 -1.85 
FUTL -1.83 -2.36* 
INTWO 0.285 0.812 
CHIN -0.521 -2.21* 
* Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
Firstly it must be noted that given the unequal populations of the failed (105 firms) 
and non-failed (2058 firms) groups, if I were to simply classify all of the firms as being 
non-failed then the overall accuracy of the model would equate to 91.15 percent 
(2058/2163). Therefore, unlike previous studies, due to the disproportionate samples 
sizes I have a clear portrayal that the marginal unconditional prior probability of failure 
is an important factor when interpreting the predictive accuracy of a failure prediction 
model. 
 
                                                 
88
 Ohlson notes that it would have been preferable to an “error analysis” on a fresh data set (use a validation 
sample), but deemed it impossible given the lack of data beyond the estimation period. An obvious option would 
have been to divide the sample into two and use one half for training and one half for validation, but he deemed 
that the primary purpose of the paper was to minimise the errors in the coefficients rather than getting a precise 
evaluation of a predictive model. 
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Secondly there is no reason to suggest that the cut-off point of 0.5 is adequate or 
indeed justified. Edminster (1972) showed that the optimal cut-off point should take 
into account both misclassification costs and prior probabilities of failure and therefore 
not rely on any arbitrary choice of cut-off, although I am of course now dealing with 
probabilities rather than continuous ordinal ranking and therefor 0.5 has some intuitive 
appeal. As I have also discussed in the previous section(s) with reference to earlier 
univariate and MDA methodological studies, the assessment of model accuracy has 
predominantly been based on the classification (or confusion) matrix as previously 
described and as shown in Table 5.5. The general assumption is that the two types of 
misclassification errors are treated as being equal due to the difficulty of cost 
assignment, and that these two error percentages have an additive property. The “best” 
model has therefore been determined as minimising the overall summation of these two 
errors. 
 
Ohlson’s model appraisal sought to challenge this somewhat traditional view of how 
model accuracy should be determined by evaluating his “model 1” over the whole range 
of possible cut-off points89.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Ohlon’s examination of error rates verses cut-off point 
Source: facsimile from Ohlson (1980, p.127). 
                                                 
89
 This type of analysis is not too dissimilar to the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves which frequent 
modern insolvency prediction literature. ROC curves are discussed in section 8.3 of this thesis. 
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Figure 5.6 plots the error rates of Ohlson’s model over various cut-off points 
between zero and 100. Contrary to my previous discussions on type I and type II errors 
and their occurrence in the prior literature (a type I error being the misclassification of a 
failed firm as being non-failed, and type II errors being the misclassification of a non-
failed firm predicted as failed), Ohlson views his errors as the reversal. For this 
particular study (and I am not particularly sure why prior literature convention is not 
adhered to), a type I error is said to occur if the probability of failure of a non-failed 
firm is greater than the cut-off point, and a type II error occurs when a failed firm has a 
failure probability less than the cut-off point. 
 
The cut-off point at which the sum of the errors is minimised is 0.038 which is 
somewhat difficult to determine by a simple glance at Figure 5.6. What we can observe 
is the expected shifts of the error rates as I reduce the cut-off point from 100 to 0. Type 
II errors drift from 100% misclassification down to zero because I would like all of the 
failed firms to lay above the cut-off point, and type I errors are the reversal. Notice 
however the difference in the curvatures of the two line plots. The plot of type II errors 
on the right hand side is almost linear in nature, curving slightly as it approaches the 
lower cut-off range. The line plot of the type I errors is much more concaved, curving in 
towards zero. 
 
Remember that in absolute terms, that if we simply assigned all firms as being non-
failed then the resulting accuracy would be 91.15 percent (2058/2163). This fact is one 
which is not reflected in Figure 5.6 as the percentage of failed firms is viewed equally to 
that of the non-failed group, although in outright values the two groups differ by a factor 
of twenty. We can therefore see that assigning all firms as being non-failed, the average 
misclassification rate would be fifty percent (and fifty percent accurate) when we use 
this appraisal technique, which reflects more appropriately the need to minimise both of 
the errors. 
 
The error minimising cut-off point (3.8 percent) provides error rates as follows: type 
I errors rates show that 17.4 percent of non-failed firms would be misclassified, and 
type II error rates show that 12.4 percent of failed firms would be misclassified. 
Therefore given an infinite populations of firms of which half of the firms are failed and 
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the other half are non-failed, then the expected combined error rate for the model would 
be 14.9 percent, or a model with an accuracy of 85.1 percent. 
 
Ohlson notes that this result is one which cannot easily be compared to the prior 
literature, given the number of innovative methods which have been employed along 
with differences in the data sampling periods. Although Ohlson’s logit methodology 
appears to be more appealing than discriminant analysis, and despite using a larger 
number of variables and firm populations than any previous study, the one-year-ahead 
model failed to deliver in-sample accuracy close to the high-ninety percentages that we 
have previously seen in the literature.  
 
Three notable studies can compared and contrasted to the results gained by Ohlson as 
they utilise data from a similar sample period. These studies are Altman and McGough 
(1974), Moyer (1977) and Altman et al. (1977). Altman and McGough (perhaps the 
most similar study to Ohlson’s research in terms of sample period and failure 
timeframe) applied the Altman (1968) Z-score to 28 failed firms within the period 1970-
73 which resulted in an error rate of 18 percent, far from the misclassification rate of 
five percent within the original study; errors for the non-failed group of firms are not 
discussed but the results gained are reasonably similar to that of Ohlson. Altman et al. 
(1977) also uses data from the 1970s and as I have discussed in a previous section, the 
resulting accuracies were as high as 96 percent (93 percent holdout) for a one-year-
ahead forecast. Ohlson suggests that accounting data lead times could explain the 
difference in performance, although in general he was unable to account for this 
difference noting that “In sum, differences in results are most difficult to reconcile” 
(Ohlson 1980, p.128), and further noted than another study of the Altman (1968) Z-
score by Moyer (1977) resulted in a misclassification of 25 percent, indicating that there 
are many factors which are likely to affect the accuracy of an insolvency prediction 
model. 
 
“There is always the possibility that an alternative estimating technique, other than 
the logit model used, could yield a more powerful discriminatory device. Unfortunately, 
a priori reasoning appears to be of no use in finding such an "optimal" estimating 
technique. All one can do is to try some alternatives. One approach I tried, MDA, 
produced results which were somewhat "worse" than those previously reported, in that 
the minimum average error rate was 16 percent. More generally, I would hypothesize 
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that many "reasonable" procedures will lead to results which will not differ too much”. 
Ohlson (1980, p.129). 
 
5.3.3 Comparing and contrasting MDA and logit methodologies 
 
Following the work of Ohlson (1980), the most notable research to be published in 
the subsequent half-decade was perhaps that of Zavgren. I would like to continue by 
primarily discussing two of her papers, Zavgren (1983) and Zavgren (1985). 
 
Zavgren (1983) is a small discursive paper describing several preceding insolvency 
prediction models whilst highlighting various statistical and methodological weaknesses 
attached to each of them. The “state of the art” paper covers four of the papers 
previously discussed within this thesis: Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Deakin (1972), 
and Edminster (1972) and also two models that I have previously not mentioned, that of 
Diamond (1976) and Zavgren (1982)90. Zavgren (1983) has been frequently cited in the 
academic literature as providing a good overview (state of the art) of the literature at 
that point in time, and providing a comparative study with respect to their classification 
error rates. With promotion of this nature, it was with bated breath that I waited for a 
copy of this journal article, due to it being a “special” non-university-subscribed source. 
Upon delivery I must admit that I was a little disappointed. What I expected was a 
thorough, independent, empirical examination upon several key corporate insolvency 
prediction models, based on a new population of data. Instead, the paper is discursive, 
providing opinion and critique upon the models previously stated. Despite my 
disappointed expectations, I do agree that the paper is an excellent summary of previous 
work, particularly as it provides the first known comparison of 1960s / 1970s 
discriminant analysis modelling approaches with that of embryonic conditional 
probability application to corporate insolvency prediction. 
 
Jones (1987) also offers a comparative paper, but again there is no empirical 
evaluation of the prior literature but rather a well written discussion of prior MDA and 
logit studies, coupled with an insight into another modelling technique, recursive 
partitioning (RP) which I will discuss later within this section. The issues of the 
                                                 
90
 Zavgren (1982) is an unpublished predecessor of Zavgren (1985) which utilises both logit and probit 
estimation techniques. 
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Discriminant Analysis models are covered in greater detail in this thesis than is in both 
Jones (1987), and Zavgren (1983), but the lack of an independent empirical evaluation 
of prior studies is one of the main inspirations for this thesis. The majority of papers in 
this area, including Zavgren (1983), focus upon finding floors in previous studies, 
leading to the introduction of a new and improved model derived from a new set of 
proprietary data. What I deemed to be lacking from the literature was a completely 
independent review and empirical evaluation of prior models with no ulterior motive91. 
This motivation and others are covered in greater detail in section 6: Objectives and 
research questions. 
 
The principle aim of Zavgren (1985) was to further develop logit and probit 
insolvency prediction techniques by introducing significance tests for model variables 
and coefficients, as well as evaluating the information content contained within. 
Zavgren’s model itself was based upon the ratios contained within Pinches et al. (1973) 
in which these authors identified seven ratios representing seven key factors attributable 
to firm solvency. Zavgren notes that the following ratios “can make unprejudiced, 
accurate distinctions between failing and healthy firms” and are detailed as follows: 
total income/total capital – representing return on investment, sales/net plant – 
representing capital turnover, inventory/sales – representing inventory turnover, 
debt/total capital – representing financial leverage, receivables/inventory – representing 
receivables turnover, quick assets/current liabilities – representing short-term liquidity92, 
and cash/total assets – representing cash position. These seven factors are similar in 
nature to those used by several prior studies already detailed in this thesis, with 
profitability, liquidity, turnover, and leverage being widely regarded as the key 
constituents of a firm’s solvency position. 
 
Zavgren uses a matched sample of 45 failed and 45 non-failed US manufacturing 
firms from the period 1972-1978, a typically small sample for this time period, to 
                                                 
91
 One such study is that of McGurr and DeVaney (1998) who empirically evaluate the MDA and logit models of 
Deakin (1977), Gentry et al. (1985), Gombola et al. (1987), Ohlson (1980) and Zavgren (1985). This study was 
conducted upon a small sample of 112 companies within the retail industry and showed that the models 
performed considerably less well with the new ex-ante data, and significantly different to the results obtained by 
the original authors. 
92
 Zavgren uses the acid test ratio instead of the current ratio as used by Pinches et al. (1973) because it 
eliminates accumulating stock levels which might be apparent and counter-active in the case of a failing firm. 
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develop logit and probit models for the prediction of failure. An in-sample test of this 
model using the standard “find the optimal cut-off point which minimises the total error 
rate” approach, yielded error rates of 18%, 17%, 28%, 27%, and 20% for years one to 
five prior to insolvency. These somewhat unremarkable results are barely worth a 
mention (noting the similarity between the one year misclassification rate to that of 
Ohlson (1980)), with further holdout tests making little progression in academic 
evolution.93 
 
Despite this somewhat standardised introduction I have provided, Zavgren (1985) 
does lead us into a more innovative testing procedure, that of entropy theory. Based 
upon the work of Shannon (1948) and his theory for analysing the transmission of 
information through a communication network, and subsequently applied to accounting 
by Lev (1969). Entropy theory measures the information content gained or lost through 
successive predictions of firm failure, with entropy being defined as the degree of 
uncertainty of the occurrence of the event.  
 
With regards to failure probability p, in a predictive context and if the actual failure 
of a firm is unknown, the entropy h would be defined as h(p) and h(1-p), for failed and 
non-failed event probabilities respectively. Therefore the expected entropy H can be 
weighted by its probability of occurrence and represents the uncertainty remaining over 
the occurrence of failure: 
 
] = ^ℎ(^9 + (1 − ^9ℎ(1 − ^9 
= ^ln(1/^9 + (1 − ^9ln	D1/(1 − ^9F 
(5.18) 
 
Logit and probit models are able to provide successive estimates of failure 
probability over a number of years as more information (messages) becomes available 
(usually in the form of annual accounts). Using these messages it is possible to measure 
the positive or negative increments in information contained within the model after the 
receipt of each new message, which can be represented by: 
                                                 
93
 16 failed and 16 non-failed firms were used as a holdout sample from a subsequent time period, unlike 
previous studies e.g. Beaver (1966) whose holdout sample is derived from the same period as the training 
sample. Seeking inter-temporal generalisation for the first time, Zavgren’s results showed an unimpressive 31% 
error rate. 
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ln(1/^		9 − ln(1/^9 = ln	(^/^	9 
(5.19) 
 
Where ^ is the probability derived from the first set of information, and ^	 is the 
probability calculated from the new set of information. Theil (1967) presents this more 
formally; given two states and two consecutive messages the expected information is: 
 
ln(^	/^	9 = ^(`9ln	a^(`9^	(`9b + ^	(`	9ln	a
^(`	9^	(`	9b 
(5.20) 
 
Zavgren uses this theory to determine the increase/decrease in entropy, as her model 
provides failure probabilities, or messages, over a five year period. The results indicated 
that for the failed firms, eighteen percent more information was made available by the 
model over the five year period on average, measured by a decrease in entropy of 0.11 
nits, increasing the certainty of failure. This result is comparable to that of Lev (1971) 
and his balance sheet decomposition model. For the non-failed sample of firms, the 
uncertainty of survival shrinks by sixteen percent over five years. Using Entropy theory, 
Zavgren provides alternative empirical evidence of failure detection being more easily 
determined closer to the event horizon, complementing the findings of previous studies 
which only used predictive accuracies as their basis.  
 
Keasey and McGuiness (1990) offer an extension to the work of Zavgren (1985), and 
based upon UK data from 1976-1984, they sought to determine whether this entropy 
measure would be a reliable indicator to decision makers. Their results found similar to 
Zavgren in that their logit functions showed increasing information content as failure 
approaches over a five year period. They note that although the results were concordant 
with those of Zavgren, these ex-post studies do not realistically simulate a real-work 
decision making process as the survival state of the firm population is already known. In 
addition, Keasey and McGuiness (1990) apply an ex-ante application of the entropy 
information gained to a cross-sectional holdout sample, and found that the entropy 
measure did not show a general increase in information as the failure date approached. 
The conclude that “…for the UK at least, it is questionable whether it would be sensible 
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to conclude that we can rely on better use of information as the event of failure 
approaches”. 
 
Despite the similarity in the nature of the results of Zavgren’s logit models and those 
found within previous MDA-based models, the entropy theory cannot provide a directly 
comparable link between the two modelling techniques as its requirement for 
probabilistic estimates is not supported by the MDA approach. A method for converting 
the continuous score outputs into probabilities is discussed later in this thesis which 
provides a comparable link between the two methodologies, and indeed allows direct 
comparisons between multiple models of differing methodology. 
 
In section 5.2.6 I discussed some of the pitfalls associated with the MDA modelling 
approach, and as the introduction of this section suggests, the adoption of conditional 
probability models by academics in the 1980s indicates a conscious attempt to avoid 
some of these pitfalls; in particular, the logit and probit models neither require 
multivariate normally distributed variables nor do they rely on equal variance-
covariance matrices of the two classification groups. Given this information, one might 
expect that the conditional probability model would be able to more accurately classify 
failed and non-failed firms than the MDA approach. Despite this intuitive notion, there 
are actually very few empirical tests that try to determine which type of technique is 
actually the more accurate as a predictor. 
 
 One of the first studies of this kind was that of Press and Wilson (1978), whose 
breast cancer study directly compared the logit and MDA approaches. In this direct 
comparison, the authors provided two holdout sample tests for breast cancer prediction 
and found that the logit methodology provided a slightly better predictive accuracy with 
respect to MDA upon an identical data set. The first test accuracies were reported as 
62% and 59% for logit and MDA respectively, and the second test yielded accuracies of 
72% and 68%, showing that logit was the superior modelling technique. A similar result 
was obtained by Collins and Green (1982) who also compared the two modelling 
techniques upon failed and non-failed credit unions, a more relevant exercise with 
regards to this particular thesis. They found in holdout tests that the logit modelling 
technique provided a higher overall predictive accuracy (94%) than its MDA 
counterpart (91%). A more concise comparative exploration of the classification 
accuracies of the logit and MDA approaches can be found in Hamer (1983). Using the 
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chi-square test statistic, Hamer evaluated the differences between the accuracies of each 
of the techniques, based upon four different variable sets over the five years before firm 
failure, and concluded that there was no significant difference between the two 
approaches. These results are consistent with those of Press and Wilson (1978) and 
Collins and Green (1982) who find similar explanatory power when comparing logit 
and MDA approaches. Lo (1986) also finds that under certain distributional 
assumptions, both procedures yield consistent estimates and the MDA estimator is 
asymptotically efficient. 
 
This evidence advocates that, despite a small number of tests demonstrating the 
superiority of the logit model over MDA, in reality there is likely to be little difference 
in terms of predictive accuracy between the two technologies. Lennox (1999) sought to 
determine the reasons for these similarities in predictive abilities, and suggested that 
both logit and probit models could be improved in terms of accuracy if they are 
adequately and correctly specified. Lennox (1999) noted that previous studies do not 
report tests for misspecification, in terms of both omitted variable bias and 
heteroskedasticity; and that these factors may cause bias in both coefficient estimates 
and their standard errors. An application of Lagrange Multiplier tests as developed by 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1984) demonstrated that homoskedasticity could be rejected 
in a large sample of UK firms with respect to a linear probit model. Homoskedasticy 
could not, however, be rejected when tests were applied to both non-linear logit and 
probit models. Lennox (1999) found that non-linear effects were present in his cashflow 
and leverage variables and that once these effects were taken into consideration, a probit 
model’s accuracy could be marginally improved. This improvement and overall 
accuracy of the “well specified” model however, was only significantly different from 
the MDA model over a very small cut-off range and, for the majority of cut-off points, 
the accuracy for each of the six model variants which were tested were not significantly 
different from one another. 
 
 
5.3.4 Notable applications to UK data 
 
 
Peel and Peel (1987) were among the first to apply logit analysis in the UK. In an 
attempt to refine the ‘classic’ financial ratio-based failure model, they added a number 
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of non-conventional ratios and variables (Charitou et al, 2004). The major purpose of 
the paper was to explicitly allow for loss-making companies in the non-failed sample as 
they suggest that “A common feature of previous work on failure prediction models of 
UK companies is that the non-failed samples are restricted to include only sound or 
healthy companies”. The focus of their criticism is aimed at Taffler (Taffler, 1984; 
Taffler and Tisshaw, 1976) in which they note that both studies exclude firms appearing 
less than “healthy” from the non-failed samples94. Peel (1987) discovered that when a 
sample of loss-making companies was included in his non-failed estimation sample, 
both the explanatory power and the classification accuracy of his reported (logit) models 
declined significantly (Peel and Peel, 1987). 
 
The aim of Peel and Peel (1987) was to investigate the loss-making class of non-
failed firms which prior studies such as Altman (1968) would often deem to fall within 
the “gray area”. The data consisted of 146 firms comprising of 56 failures, 56 non-failed 
profit-making firms, and 34 non-failed loss-making firms and a three-group multilogit 
model was employed and compared to a three-group multi-discriminant model. The 
results indicated that the logit model correctly classified 66.7% of firms out of sample 
whilst the discriminant model correctly classified only 62.5%. The authors suggest that 
although the main study was only partly successful, there were a number of interesting 
side-results: the first being that a going concern qualification acted positively in favour 
of the firm surviving, in concordance with finding by Taffler and Tseung (1984), and 
the opposite to what one might expect. Secondly, the authors tried to determine whether 
it was possible for a model to distinguish between the different insolvency procedures 
(receivership vs non-receivership), but unfortunately could not find any variables which 
discriminated between the two categories. 
 
Keasey and Watson (1987) investigate small companies and whether adjustments for 
Current Cost Accounting as recommended by SSAP16 would have any impact on 
insolvency prediction modelling. They find that there is little or no difference in 
classification accuracies between models using adjusted and non-adjusted financial data, 
noting that the CCA adjustment effectively reduces all the companies profit and other 
ratios by a constant amount. Platt and Platt (1990) investigated the effect of industry-
                                                 
94
 See Taffler (1984) footnote 38, which describes the errors of a Datastream Z-score model being attributable to 
a sample not being restricted to only healthy (profit making) firms. 
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relative ratios on the likelihood of corporate failure and found that a model built upon 
industry-relative financial ratios and measures of industry growth was superior to a 
more traditional model using unadjusted variables. Platt and Platt (1994) develop an 
industry-relative “early warning” model utilising data of financially distress and non-
financially distressed firms (no legally defined failures). They suggest that it may be 
possible to identify pending insolvency and take corrective actions to “ameliorate 
financial distress before it disrupts production”. The authors also compare their model 
to a traditional insolvency prediction version with statistical tests rejecting the 
hypothesis that financial distress and insolvency are the same process. 
 
“It appears that financial distress happens to companies whose operating decisions 
perform below expectations. Bankruptcy, in contrast, seems to be a result of a decision 
that companies make to relieve themselves of problems such as excess debt levels”. Platt 
and Platt (1994, p.155). 
 
The issue further treated in Lennox (1999) who demonstrated that the industry sector, 
company size and the economic cycle have important effects on the likelihood of 
corporate failure. He posits that corporate failure is expected to increase when the 
company in question is unprofitable, is highly leveraged, and it has embedded liquidity 
problems.  
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5.4 The rise of the artificially intelligent systems in the 1990s 
 
5.4.1 An Introduction to neural networks 
 
 
The Artificial Neural Network (NN) has been applied extensively to an increasingly 
wide variety of business areas, including financial forecasting, credit analysis, bond 
ratings, bankruptcy prediction and fraud detection (Charitou et. al., 2004).  
 
NN’s were originally conceived in the 1940s and 1950s (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; 
Hebb, 1949; Rosenblat, 1957) as a way of mimicking the function of the human thought 
process, suggesting that the human brain exists as a series of interacting processes 
whose function depends on the interaction and connection between them. These 
processing parts, or neurons, tend to be grouped into cell assemblies with each assembly 
being self-organised to include information and impulses appropriate for certain 
behaviour. It was theorised that this self-organisation leads to unique and appropriate 
interconnections between each of the neurons. 
 
Widrow and Hoff (1960) provides the first practical example of a computer-based 
neural network design in which a traffic control model was developed, and Hopfield 
(1982) developed this theory further identifying that the neural network procedure 
would provide “rapid solutions to some special classes of computational problems”. 
 
The NN consists of a number computational functions, neural nodes, organised in 
particular structure with particular inter-connections which are dependent on the 
designated application. The typical structure of a NN is that of the feedforward network. 
The basic feedforward network comprises three layers of neurons: the input layer, 
hidden layer, and output layer. The connections between these layers flow in one 
direction from the input node through the network in a forward direction of activation 
propagation. When activated, the input node(s) sends information via weighted parallel 
connections to each connected node in the hidden layer. Each node in the hidden layer 
sums the weighted inputs and forms a weighted linear combination of the values (z) 
before applying a non-linear transformation to produce its own output (y) which is then 
sent to the output layer. This non-linear transformation may follow, for example, the 
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sigmoid function, an increasing function with asymptotic properties. The output layer 
receives weighted contributions from each of the hidden nodes, transforms these 
secondary inputs by again, forming a weighted linear combination of the inputs and 
applying the non-linear transformation which results in a single output (see Figure 5.7). 
Mathematically the operation executed by the neuron can be described by equations 
(5.21) and (5.22) given a particular training observation c with 3 variables. 
 
d = ∑ f3g3=0 h3  (5.21) 
 C = i(d) (5.22) 
 
 
The transformations and outputs which occur within the hidden layer and the 
network itself are based on ‘supervised’ learning and are done so by “training” the 
network using data from a training sample. The learning process within the network is 
determined by a training algorithm. The training algorithm is used to identify patterns 
within the data and uses the training sample as a template with the most popular of these 
being the back-propagation algorithm, based on the principle of continuous error 
feedback into the network95.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: A feedforward neural network with backpropagation. 
 
                                                 
95
 The back-propagation training algorithm was originally developed by Rumelhart et al. (1986) and is discussed 
in Appendix I of this thesis. 
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Unlike the MDA and logit approaches, neural networks have the advantage that they 
do not rely on any pre-specification of a functional form, nor are they restricted in its 
assumptions regarding the characteristics and statistical distributions of the variables. 
Further, Neural networks are more able to quickly analyse complex patterns within the 
data and with a high degree of accuracy (Shachmurove, 2002), and that they are able to 
progressively learn from examples, given no prior knowledge (Back et al, 1996). 
 
Neural networks do however have their downsides. Firstly neural networks will have 
a greater tendency to over-fitting (Trigueiros and Taffler, 1996) meaning that the model 
constructed during the training process, may very well fit the training data almost 
perfectly but when applied to a holdout sample of different firms the relative weightings 
may not be so appropriate. This problem, which leads to poor generalisation, is due to 
the large number of parameters usually involved in neural models (Becerra et al, 2005). 
The second problem is related to the “black box” nature of the neural network. With 
regards to this problem, and particularly within the context of failure prediction:  
 
“a neural network does not reveal the significance of each of the variables in the 
final classification and the derived weights cannot be interpreted. We have completely 
no understanding or knowledge concerning how the network classifies companies into 
the failing and non-failing group. It is impossible to understand how the relations in the 
layer-structure are estimated and hence, the network cannot be “applied” as such in 
order to classify new cases. In other words, the black-box problem makes it impossible 
to use the NN in practice, in a decision context”. (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2004). 
 
A further problem pertaining to the neural network can be attributable to its very 
construction. When faced with creating a neural network, the researcher has a number 
of options which are largely selected or applied on a somewhat arbitrary basis, namely: 
the size of the input layer (number of variables), the number of hidden layers, the 
number of nodes/neurons in each of the hidden layers, the number of epochs (training 
cycles), and the type of training algorithm to be used.  Given that the construction of the 
network is likely to be critical in its application, it is strange that there is no consensus 
on any of the answers. The size of the input layer is a problem faced by any insolvency 
prediction methodology, and the optimal choice of variables, as this thesis would 
suggest, has been hotly debated since the conception of the art. Unless a model can be 
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attached to some form of theoretical under-pinning, the arbitrary selection of variables 
with inevitably persist. 
 
With respect to the construction of the hidden layers, in the majority of situations the 
is no clear-cut method for determining the optimal number of hidden layers and the 
number of nodes within them, without training several networks and estimating error 
rates for each. Too few hidden units will result in a high training error and high 
classification errors when applied to further samples because the model is under-fitted. 
On the other hand, if you have too many  hidden units you might get a low training error 
but might still get large errors when applied to further samples because of over-fitting. 
Tetko et al. (1995) provide a discussion as to the effects of this trade-off, whilst others 
offer certain “rules of thumb” for selecting the number of hidden layers and nodes: 
 
"How large should the hidden layer be? One rule of thumb is that it should never be 
more than twice as large as the input layer". (Berry and Linoff, 1997, p. 323). 
 
"To calculate the number of hidden nodes we use a general rule of: (Number of inputs + 
outputs) * (2/3)." (www.neuralware.com).  
 
"A rule of thumb is for the size of this [hidden] layer to be somewhere between the input 
layer size ... and the output layer size ..." (Blum, 1992, p. 60).  
 
"you will never require more than twice the number of hidden units as you have inputs 
in an MLP with one hidden layer.” (Swingler, 1996, p. 53). 
 
"Typically, we specify as many hidden nodes as dimensions needed to capture 70-90% 
of the variance of the input data set." (Boger and Guterman, 1997) 
 
 
With no recognised “best” method for the selection or construction of the hidden 
section of the neural network, a number of constructive algorithms have been proposed 
in an attempt to provide assistance to the researcher when defining the neural network 
structure (Becerra et al, 2005). Pruning algorithms start with a large number of neurons 
and subsequently eliminate those that are identified as redundant (Kun et al., 1990; 
Hassibi et al., 1993). Growing algorithms, on the other hand, start with a small network, 
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which receives new neurons until the performance of the model is considered 
satisfactory (Ash, 1989; Setiono and Hui, 1995). A third possibility is the use of 
evolutionary algorithms (Yao, 1999), which aim at optimizing both the structure and the 
parameter values of the network by using global search methods inspired in the 
mechanisms of natural evolution. It is worth noting that the majority of these 
constructive methods employ search algorithms which are sensitive to the set of initial 
conditions (Becerra et al, 2005). 
 
5.4.2 Application of NN’s to the prediction of insolvency 
 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the application of the neural network to 
insolvency and bankruptcy prediction was gaining popularity within academia, largely 
arising from the increase in computer processing power and off-the-shelf software 
which was becoming increasingly available for both academic and commercial usage. 
Couple this with the less restrictive assumptions of the modelling process, and we find 
that artificially intelligent systems, in particular the neural network, dominate the 
literature throughout the 1990s.96 
 
The first application of the neural network to failure prediction can be attributable to 
Odom and Sharda (1990). Using a simple three-layered (1 x input, 1 x hidden, 1 x 
output) network with a back-propagation training algorithm they compared the accuracy 
of the network to a discriminant analysis model. The input variables for both models 
were the same five variables attributable to Altman’s (1968) Z-score model, and in both 
cases these variables were provided by the annual accounting data of 74 companies 
from 1975-82. In comparing the accuracies of the two types of modelling technologies, 
Odom and Sharda found that the less restrictive neural network provided better results 
than that of the discriminant model, achieving a perfect classification within the training 
sample. Further application of the resulting models to a validation/holdout sample 
consisting of 55 firms, 27 of which were failures, showed that the neural network 
correctly classified 22 (81.5%) of the failed firms, whereas the discriminant analysis 
model only classified 16 (59.3%) correctly. An interesting point to make here is to the 
comparison between these results and those gained by Altman (1968). The original 
model achieved a successful classification rate of 96% in holdout sample tests of similar 
                                                 
96
 Daubie and Meskens (2002) provide an excellent meta-analysis of the literature of the 1990s. 
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size, much higher than either of the models provided by Odom and Sharda. What may 
have been beneficial to this study would be the direct application and comparison of 
Altman’s original coefficients to Odom and Sharda’s data set, in order to determine 
whether these original coefficients still provided such a high discriminant power, and 
how they compared to the new coefficients of Odom and Sharda’s discriminant model, 
which were also not provided in the paper. 
 
Odom and Sharda (1990) also make several observations, possibly criticisms, of the 
neural network modelling procedure. They note that the number of iterations needed to 
“learn (train) the data” was vast, converging after some 191,400 iterations and 24 hours 
on average. The complexity of the continuous feedback provided by the back-
propagation algorithm and the limited processing power of late 1980s computers, 
indicates that although results are favourable for the neural network, the exercise and 
application in practice could be somewhat tedious.97 
 
 
Tam (1991)98 applied neural network architecture to Texas bank failures between 
1985 and 1987. Two neural networks, one two-layered (no hidden layer), and one three-
layered (one hidden layer consisting of ten nodes), were trained upon a sample of 59 
failed and 59 non-failed banks utilising 19 variables. Similar to Odom and Sharda 
(1990) the three-layer network was able to successfully classify all of the failed firms 
correctly within sample. A holdout sample of 22 failed and 22 non-failed banks was 
used to compare the accuracies of these two networks with other modelling technologies 
(discriminant analysis, factor logistic, k nearest neighbour (kNN), and ID3 which is a 
recursive partitioning decision tree methodology99). The results of the holdout test 
demonstrated that both of the neural networks provided greater classification accuracies 
than any of the other modelling techniques, 18.2% and 14.8% overall misclassification 
for the two and three-layered networks respectively. The best discriminant model 
achieved a misclassification rate of 25% one-year prior to failure. Tam concludes that 
neural networks can easily be extended to other financial applications such as credit 
scoring and loan evaluation.  
                                                 
97
 This study reappears under the guise of Wilson and Sharda (1994) several years later. The study uses the same 
empirical results with different phraseology. One questions what happened to Mr Odom. 
98
 See also Tam and Kiang (1992). 
99
 For logistic factor analysis see West (1985); for kNN see Cover and Hart (1967); for ID3 please see Messier 
and Hansen (1988). 
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The comparison between neural networks and more traditional methodologies such 
as MDA and logit becomes a dominant theme throughout the nineteen nineties with the 
majority of papers championing the use of this “new” technology, which given its 
relative lack of constraints, continued to outperform these traditional counterparts. 
Salchenberger et al. (1992), for example, compared neural networks to logistic 
regression and found that neural networks out-performed logistic regression 
considerably with regards to their classification accuracy. With an 18-month lead-time, 
logistic regression provided a 86.4% classification accuracy while the neural network 
achieved an accuracy of 91.7%. Similarly Coats and Fant (1993) compared the 
discriminant analysis methodology to that of the neural network. Particularly, and 
similarly to Odom and Sharda (1990), the discriminant analysis model(s) that they 
compare is based upon the variables of Altman’s Z-score. Their results showed that 
classification accuracy of neural networks was between 81.9% and 95.0%, based upon 
on particular lead-times of four and one year’s respectively. The results of the 
discriminant analysis ranged between 83.7 and 87.9% between the same lead-times. 
Coats and Fant conclude that the NN approach is more effective than MDA for pattern 
classification and although the MDA approach produces consistently higher type II hit 
rates, the type I hit rates of the models are notably less reliable being as low as 63.8% in 
the year prior to failure. 
 
A similar study utilising Altman’s variables was that of Zhang, Hu and Patuwo 
(1999). Zhang et al. compared the performance of logistic regression and neural 
networks without any prior specification of time to failure. Their sample consisted of 
production companies, and they applied a five-layer neural network with multiple 
interactions. They used Altman’s financial ratios for the input variables of the neural 
networks, adding current assets/short-term liabilities as an additional variable.  The 
neural network performed considerably better than the logistic regression model, with a 
classification accuracy of 88.2% compared to 78.9%. 
 
Fletcher and Goss (1993) conduct a similar comparison to Salchenberger et al. 
(1992) upon neural network and logit methodologies. Based on a small sample of 
eighteen failed and eighteen non-failed firms, matched by industry and size, three ratios 
were used as input variables into each of the models. The three ratios used were the 
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current ratio (CR), the quick ratio (QR), and the income ratio (IR)100. Their small study 
showed that neural networks provided a higher predictive accuracy than that of a logit 
regression based upon identical variables and conclude in concordance with other prior 
studies that neural networks “are a viable alternative to more traditional methods of 
estimating casual relationships in data”. 
 
 
Kerling and Poddig (1994) performed a study upon French companies in order to 
compare neural networks and discriminant analysis performance over a three-year lead-
time. Neural network gave 85.3–87.7% accuracy, whereas the accuracy of the 
discriminant analysis gave 85.7%. Kerling and Poddig also tried a number of interaction 
studies and an early stopping algorithm, without any ground-breaking results which 
might have led to a change in the direction of the literature. 
 
Another neural network and MDA comparison was conducted by Altman, Marco and 
Varetto (1994). This time the study was based upon 1,000 Italian companies, and 
compared results based-upon a one-year lead-time. Although their study did not 
definitively demonstrate a clear “winner” when it came to classification accuracies, both 
over 90% accurate on holdout sample tests, it was surprisingly discriminant analysis 
which yielded marginally better results – contrary to the findings of prior studies. 
Altman et al. suggested that neural networks be used with caution and recognise the 
“black box” problem along with sometimes illogical weightings and behaviour patterns. 
The authors suggest that discriminant analysis “compares rather well” to the neural 
network, and although the “fine tuning” of the discriminant function takes longer than 
the programming of a network, the faster estimation speed of the model once it is up 
and running, makes it more cost efficient. They also note that discriminant analysis has 
the advantage in that it is possible to interpret the model’s operating logic on the basis 
of the coefficients. Altman et al. (1994) concludes by suggesting that perhaps a 
combined approach should be adopted for “predictive reinforcement”. The study was 
conducted in conjunction with the Centrale dei Bilanci, Turin, Italy, who aimed to 
incorporate the results of the study into a system which provides banks with a tool that 
quickly identifies companies in distress. Today, Centrale dei Bilanci are part of the 
European Committee of Central Balance and offer credit rating and risk assessment 
                                                 
100
 CR defined as current assets / current liabilities; QR defined as cash plus near -cash assets / current liabilities; 
IR defined as net income / working capital. 
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services to the Italian banking system. It is entirely possible that the Altman et al. study 
provided a foundation for the proprietary systems which they use today, although it has 
not been possible to uncover any direct link. 
 
Alici (1995) was the first study to apply neural networks to UK data. The author used 
principal component analysis and self-organising maps to create a neural network to 
which he compared the results to those gained from MDA and logit methodologies. The 
data for the study was from the period 1987-92 and constituted 46 failed and 46 non-
failed firms. The results showed that, neural networks gave 73.7% accuracy, as against 
that of discriminant analysis (65.6%) and logistic regression (66.0%); in line with the 
majority of prior studies of this nature but its application to UK data makes it 
particularly relevant to this thesis. 
 
Leshno and Spector (1996) investigated a novel neural network comprising of cross 
conditions and consinus relationships. Several forms of the network were experimented 
with and depending on the form of the network, the resulting classification accuracy 
ranges from between 74.2% and 76.4% over a two-year lead time. These results were 
compared to more “simple” linear perceptron network which achieved a slightly lower 
accuracy of 72%. These results suggest that a more complex network adaptation may be 
able to improve classification accuracy, albeit only slightly. 
 
 
Back et al. (1996) provide us with another comparative study. An interesting part of 
this study, however, is the comparison between the neural networks and discriminant 
and logit models. The key difference of this study compared to prior comparative 
studies is that the choice of input variables for each type of model was not identical 
throughout, but each modelling technique was free to “choose its own” variables. Back 
et al. (1996) used a new approach; that of a genetic algorithm to select variables which 
would be most apt to act as input variables to a neural network101. The authors note that: 
 
“The variables for the input vectors can be chosen by an exhaustive search from the 
available variables, but this becomes very time consuming when the choice is to be done 
among several variables. Another method to choose the variables for the networks is to 
use a genetic algorithm”. Back et al. (1996, p.4). 
                                                 
101
 The genetic algorithm process is described in more detail in Appendix J. 
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The genetic algorithm process selected a number of variables from a potential pool of 
31, based on popular prior studies, for three neural network models, one, two and three-
years prior to failure, consisting of 6, 7 and 15 variables respectively.  
 
With regards to the discriminant analysis models, a step-wise selection process was 
used, similar to that of prior MDA studies such as Altman (1968) and Taffler (1984). 
Variables were chosen to enter or leave the model based upon the significance level 
0.05 from an F test of covariance analysis. From the same 31 potential variables, the 
MDA process selected 4, 6 and 3 variables for the models one, two and three-years prior 
to failure respectively. A similar procedure was used to select the variables for the logit 
model although the number of variables selected as inputs was less than that of MDA at 
3, 4 and 2 for one, two and three-years prior to failure. A summary of the variable 
population and to which model they are prescribed as input variables is presented in 
Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12: Variable pool and their assignation to the different models 
 
 
 
 
Source: facsimile from Back et al. (1996, p.6). 
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Table 5.13: Variables selected for discriminant analysis 
 
Source: facsimile from Back et al. (1996, p.7). 
 
 
Table 5.14: Variables selected for logit analysis 
 
 
Source: facsimile from Back et al. (1996, p.8). 
 
 
Table 5.15: Variables selected for neural networks using genetic algorithm 
 
 
Source: facsimile from Back et al. (1996, p.9). 
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What can be deduced from these variable selection processes is the large difference 
between the number of variables which are selected, being between 2 and 15. There is 
also a wide selection of variables being chosen by each process, showing little sign of a 
coherent or definitive decision as to what a “perfect” set of variables might consist of. 
R24, quick assets/total assets is the only variable which is included in all three models 
one-year prior to failure. R25 and R27 are also selected by all three models – this time 
two-years prior to failure. R5, cash/net sales, is the only variable which is selected by all 
three models three-years prior to failure. Back et al. also note that the variables with all 
of the logit models are a subset of those within the discriminant models and that only 
three variables R2, R26 and R31 are not selected at all. 
 
Back et al. suggest the following reasons for these differences: 
 
“There can be real and significant different characteristics in different firms that can 
be measured by different financial ratios. Hence, alternative empirical methods use this 
information in alternative ways and thus all three models differ from each other. The 
second possible explanation to this divergence is that because we have selected a large 
amount of ratios in our original data that was used in model construction, it is quite 
obvious that there are measures which are highly correlated. If the ratios are 
measuring same economic dimension, high correlation can interfere the results or the 
difference in ratios can be so small, that the selection between two or more ratios into 
the model can be more or less random”. Back et al. (1996, p.10) 
 
When comparing the predictive accuracies of each model, cross-validation was used 
instead of a true ex-ante holdout sample. The results that are presented, however, largely 
correspond to previous comparative studies in that the neural network presents a great 
predictive accuracy compared to logit and discriminant analysis. With an accuracy of 
97.3% one-year prior to failure the neural network out-performed logit (96.5%) and 
MDA (85.1%). Interestingly for the models two-years prior to failure it is MDA which 
performs the best with an accuracy of 78.4%, with neural network and logit achieving 
73% and 71.6% respectively. For models three-years prior to failure the neural network 
reclaimed the top accuracy classification with 83.8%. 
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Olmeda and Fernandez (1997) supplied further evidence that neural networks can 
provide higher classification accuracy than other traditional methodologies. Neural were 
compared to MDA, logit and two types of decision trees. The study upon Spanish banks 
suggested that yet again neural networks were the superior choice of modelling 
technique with an accuracy of 82.4% 
 
Piramuthu, et al. (1998) developed a novel technique which allocated symbols to the 
inputs of multi-layer neural networks. They used their method on a sample of Belgian 
companies, and similar to that of Zhang et al. (1999) made no assumptions regarding 
lead-times. This symbol method yielded 82.9% accuracy, whilst the procedure which 
did not utilise the symbols was accurate at only 76.1%. The symbol method was also 
conducted upon American bank solvency positions over a period of two years. Again, 
this new procedure yielded far better results than its traditional counterpart. 
 
 
A large study of Tan (1999) compared probit and a three-layer feed-forward back-
propagation network using a sample of 2144 American credit institutions, of which 66 
were insolvent. He conducted the analysis upon 13 financial ratios and 4 dummy 
variables (in order to avoid seasonal changes in the variables). The classification 
accuracy of the probit model was 92.5%, while that of the neural network having had a 
extremely large 3000 training epochs was 92.2%. The study at least brings some 
balance into the decade in which most papers of this nature posit in favour of the neural 
network in terms of classification accuracy. One does wonder however if this particular 
network was over-trained, given the large number of epochs. 
 
Yang, Platt and Platt (1999) also offer some sobering thoughts perhaps in an attempt 
to stem the flow of positive neural network literature. Despite the popularity of the 
back-propagation algorithm Yang et al. point out that (a) it has a high computational 
intensity, (b) is unable to explain conclusions, and (c) lacks a formal theory which 
imposes a need for expertise on the user, something which will be discussed within the 
next section of this thesis. 
 
Yang (2001) furthered his neural network research by developing an “early warning 
system” with probability-based neural networks using Bayes’ classification theory and 
the method of maximum likelihood, comparing the classification accuracy with those of 
the usual traditional methodologies. Based on the data of 2408 UK construction 
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companies, the probability-based neural network yielded a classification accuracy of 
95.3%, greater than those of the backpropagation network (90.9%), logistic regression 
(88.9%) and discriminant analysis (81.3%). 
 
A study by Charitou et al. (2004), added to the comparative literature with an aim to 
develop reliable failure prediction models for UK public industrial firms, and to explore 
the incremental information content of operating cash-flows in explaining and 
predicting financial collapse. They compare several methodologies and draw on some of 
the issues pertaining to UK insolvency prection:  
 
“Why not use a model developed from US financial data to predict a UK company 
failure? There exists evidence that: (a) there are significant financial reporting 
differences between the two countries (Nobes and Parker, 1999), and (b) the UK and 
US also have different insolvency codes (Franks et al., 1996). As far as UK research in 
corporate insolvency prediction is concerned, evidence shows that such research was 
undertaken mainly in the 1980s and early 1990s.5 It can thus be argued that the models 
developed in those studies may not be currently applicable, given that various economic 
changes have occurred in the UK since then. This study employs a more recent UK 
dataset to develop and test a number of alternative insolvency classification models. In 
addition, since the majority of the existing UK failure classification models were based 
on the MDA approach, a method that was shown to suffer from certain limitations, the 
research is extended by applying more contemporary approaches; namely, logit 
analysis and the neural network methodology”. Charitou et al. (2004, p.473). 
 
The data used within their data consisted of 51 failed companies from the decade 
1988 to 1997 which were paired with 51 companies which remained solvent in a 
matched pair analysis. A frugal model was developed to include only three variables 
(out of a possible 26), representing operating cash-flow, profitability and financial 
leverage. These variables were the result of a step-wise logistical regression and 
respectively representing the afore-mentioned categories were cash-flows from 
operations to total liabilities (CFFOTL), earnings before interest and taxes to total 
liabilities (EBITTL), and total liabilities to total assets (TLAT). These three variables 
were used as the input variables to a feed-forward neural network which unitised a 
conjugate gradient training algorithm (Charlambous, 1992), and compared to a logit 
model with the same three variables as inputs. Models were derived for one, two and 
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three-years prior to failure for each methodology and for overall classification accuracy, 
were tested upon a holdout sample from the period 1995-97. Neural networks achieved 
the highest overall classification results for all three years prior to insolvency, with 
classification accuracies of 83.33%, 76.19%, and 75%. The logit model, although it 
achieved a lower percentage of overall correct classification accuracies (80.95%, 
73.81%, 72.92%) produced slightly lower type I error rates with an average of 16% 
against 17% in case of neural networks. 
 
Further analysis by Charitou et al. (2004) comprised of a comparison between 
Altman’s (1968) model and those models aforementioned in the preceding paragraph. 
The five variables used within this model were applied with updated coefficients based 
upon a logit analysis rather than a discriminant one because of the limitations and 
restrictive assumptions associated with MDA. The resulting classification accuracy of 
the Altman variable model is comparable to the logit and neaural network in the first 
year prior to failure (82.5%) but is substantially less in subsequent years (62.5% and 
68%). The results suggest that the transferability of variables from one side of the 
Atlantic to the other when it comes to insolvency prediction models is not particularly 
interchangeable, and that variables which seem to be well-fitting in one economy may 
not necessarily be applicable to another. 
 
The final paper that I wish to discuss in this section is Becerra et al. (2005) a neural 
network study utilising UK data, subsequent to that used in Charitou et al. (2004), using 
failed (29 firms) and non-failed (31) firms from the period 1997-2000. A form of 
wavelet network102 is developed and compared to a traditional multi-layer perceptron 
neural network and a discriminant model. The sample was split into training (21 failed 
and 21 non-failed firms) and validation (8 failed firms and 10 non-failed firms) sub-
samples. The input variables to all of the models were that of Altman (1968)103. The 
resulting models when applied to the validation sample showed that the discriminant 
model had an accuracy of 78%, the multi-layer perceptron network had an accuracy of 
83% and their version of the wavelet network had an accuracy of 89%. 
 
 
                                                 
102
 For an in-depth discussion on wavelet networks lease refer to Zhang and Benveniste (1992) who pioneer this 
methodology. 
103
 Book value of equity was used instead of the market value of equity in the variable X4 (VETL). 
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Although the neural network and its variants differ widely in their construction and 
statistical make-up, one notion seems apparent from this review of the literature. With 
few exceptions it is the neural network which consistently provides classification 
accuracies higher than that of the more traditional modelling techniques such as 
discriminant analysis and logistical regression. The reason for increase in accuracies of 
these types of model, is largely because they do not rely on any pre-specification of a 
functional form, nor are they restricted in its assumptions regarding the characteristics 
and statistical distributions of the variables. Their sometime time-consuming 
complexity, arbitrary construction, and the associated “black box” problem means, 
however, that practical application to future data is somewhat limited, and perhaps not 
as “attractive” to the general user as a clearly defined multiple regression model. 
 
Neural networks, associated training algorithms, variants such as wavelet networks 
and genetic algorithms, have been discussed here within the context of corporate 
insolvency prediction. These methodologies are part of a class of technologies termed 
“Artificially Intelligent Expert Systems” (AIES), of which many more methodological 
examples can be found. Other constituents are methods such as survival analysis, 
decision trees, recursive partitioning, fuzzy rules, rough sets, and case-based reasoning. 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) discuss some of these alternative methods with respect to 
insolvency prediction, but I will limit this thesis to those already discussed. Although 
time factors do not allow a discussion of every single methodology employed in the 
field of corporate insolvency prediction since its conception, a meta-analysis of the 
literature can be found in section 8.1 which provides the frequency of each of the 
different methodologies within my large selection of literature. 
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5.5 Issues arising from the traditional approaches to insolvency prediction 
 
 
So far, this thesis has discussed the most popular methodologies and technologies 
employed to predict corporate insolvency. With a limited number of exceptions, these 
methodologies have predominantly been statistically and mathematically driven, with 
no fruitful attempts to attach established theoretical underpinning to the problem of 
prediction.  
 
“Business researchers employing discriminant analysis and classification have 
typically started out with a large number of variables and reduced them to a smaller 
number (m) for inclusion in the final model. There are virtually no studies in which the 
variables employed were determined on the basis of a theoretical model that leads 
logically to the specification of the variables.” (Pinches, 1980). 
 
All of these traditional approaches are essentially goal seeking exercises in the form 
of supervised classification which has become termed the classical paradigm. 
 
“given a set of firms with known descriptor variables and known outcome class 
membership, a rule is constructed which allows other companies to be assigned to an 
outcome class on the basis of their descriptor variables”. (Hand, 2004). 
 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) note that this paradigm “clearly fails to take account of 
some important aspects of the real problem of corporate failure prediction”, and offer 
discussions upon four problems associated with the classical paradigm. These problems 
are discussed in short summary below, but for a full discussion of the associated 
problems I would recommend Balcaen Oogue (2006) as an excellent and concise point 
of reference. 
 
5.5.1 Problems related to the classical paradigm 
 
The first problem associated with the classical paradigm is the arbitrary definition of 
failure which by convention, (for most statistical processes this will be a necessity), will 
assume a dichotomous dependant variable. The dependant variable separates the 
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population of firms into failed and non-failed groups, but the definition of failure itself 
is an arbitrary choice made by the researcher. Usually failure is defined as the firm 
entering some form of legal process such as insolvency in the UK or bankruptcy in the 
US, which provides a simple statutory objective criterion on which the group separation 
can be based. A handful of studies however, have used alternate definitions of failure 
for example financial distress (e.g. Platt and Platt, 2002), where the distress definition is 
defined as being either several years of negative net operating income, suspension of 
dividend payments, or major corporate restructuring. Other failure definitions have also 
been used such as cash insolvency (Laitinen, 1994), loan defaults (Ward and Foster, 
1997), and loan covenant renegotiations (Agarwal and Taffler, 2003). 
 
It seems apparent that failure is not a clear or precise dichotomy, but rather a 
complex process which may develop and evolve over many years. Legal insolvency 
itself is often seen as a last resort where the firm may have been technically insolvent or 
financially distressed for time previous, and, even then, insolvency is only one possible 
exit for a financially struggling firm. Other possible routes could include mergers, 
acquisition, or dissolution through the sale of large parts of the business. These exit 
routes for the financially distressed firm are not easily observable on the back of annual 
accounting data, but may be preferable, or indeed more common, than insolvency itself. 
Whereas the omission of these instances as actual failures within the context of an 
empirical study will undoubtedly limit and reduce the population of firms within this 
class, it is not possible to attribute a clear “failed” status to a particular firm merger or 
takeover for example, as the true nature or scale of distress is likely to be known only to 
the management and directors. Therefore the use of clearly defined instance of 
insolvency as a proxy for failure within the context of failure prediction is seen as an 
inevitability.  
 
Financial distress seems to be the symptom detected by many insolvency prediction 
models, indeed if correctly applied in a true ex-ante nature then this will of course be 
the case. What researchers should be interested in, are the final triggers that see a 
company’s position change from being financial distressed due to any myriad of factors, 
into a declaration of a formal insolvency process. For this reason alone it is clear that a 
legal and formal definition of insolvency should be used within this type of modelling. 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006, p.73) suggest that “bankruptcy prediction models may be 
contaminated by firms that are declared bankrupt despite the fact that they do not show 
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any real signs of failure”. In the UK under the Insolvency Act (2000) there are several 
forms of insolvency that may be entered into by a company which have already been 
discussed in section 4. With the exception of Members Voluntary Liquidation (MVL), 
each process must be met by some form of financial failure, be that technical 
insolvency, inability to repay debt, or other. Removing MVL from inclusion to the 
failure defined group ensures that voluntary winding-up does not contaminate the 
models in this instance. 
 
A handful of studies have sought to address this binary classification problem by 
introducing additional failure groups. Lau (1987) investigated five different states; state 
0 - financial stability; state 1 – omitting or reducing dividend payments; state 2 – 
technical default or default on loan payments; state 3 – protection under Chapter X or 
XI of the US Bankruptcy Act; and state 4 – bankruptcy and liquidation. Using a holdout 
sample for testing, Lau’s model forecasted the probability of a firm entering each one of 
the five states. The results showed that she was able to predict entry into the non-failed 
state (state 0) with an accuracy of 85%. Classification of firms into the four states of 
failure however, was less fruitful with correct classifications of 50%, 67%, 20% and 
20% for states one through four. Jones and Hensher (2004) use an innovative mixed 
logit methodology in an attempt to correctly classify firms into three failure groups; 
nonfailure, outright failure (defined as entering administration, receivership, or 
liquidation), and insolvency (defined as failure to pay listing fees, loan default, 
restructuring in order to meet debt payments, and capital raising to finance continuing 
operations). The firm classification by their model boasted an impressive 99.16% 
accuracy, suggesting that the mixed logit approach is one which should be investigated 
in further research. 
 
The second problem with the classical paradigm relates to the instability of data and 
its non-stationarity over time. The traditional statistical forms of insolvency prediction 
models of which I have discussed so far, require that the relationships between the 
variables remain stable over time and will continue to hold true over time, particularly 
within the predictive context in which the majority of models are associated. 
Stationarity implies that there is a stable relationship between the dependant and 
independent variables, and also stable inter-correlations between each of the 
independent variables (Edminster, 1972; Zavgren, 1983). Wood and Piesse (1987) 
suggest that this is closely related to “population drift” (or “data stability”). 
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Regrettably however, many studies have shown that data is not stable over long 
periods of time; in fact there is much evidence of data instability and non-stationarity 
(Barnes, 1982; Zmijewski, 1984). Data instability may be the result of many factors 
including inflation or interest rate changes, changes in economic conditions, changes in 
reporting practices, phases of the business cycle, or strategic or competitive changes 
within the marketplace. It has also been shown that data instability for financial ratios is 
usually at its greatest for firms that are about to fail (Dambolena and Khoury, 1980). It 
can therefore be argued that insolvency and failure prediction models will generally 
suffer from some form of stationarity problem (Charitou et al, 2004). 
 
If we are to presume therefore that all traditional forms of insolvency prediction 
model suffer from the stationarity problem, then it is not possible to assume that a 
model will have robust or efficient failure classification accuracy when applied to future 
samples of data. Therefore these traditional models may need constant redevelopment or 
updating over time (Joy and Tollefson, 1975) resulting in new coefficients which will 
undoubtedly vary from sample to sample. 
 
The third associated problem of the classical paradigm lies with sampling selectivity. 
Ooghe and Joos (1990) suggest that if a classic statistical failure prediction model is 
eventually to be used in a predictive context, the estimation samples of failing and non-
failing firms should be representative of the whole population of firms. It is indeed 
evident from the earlier literature previously discussed within this section (Beaver, 
1966; Altman, 1968; Deakin, 1972; Blum, 1974; Altman et al, 1977; Taffler and 
Tisshaw, 1977, Taffler, 1983; Keasey and Watson, 1987; Altman et al, 1995) that many 
models have been derived using the matched pair sampling approach where failed firms 
are matched by size, industry, or other to a non-failed mate. These samples are often 
hand-picked as it enables the researcher to control for some variables (e.g. size) that are 
thought to attribute some predictive power to the model but are not included in the final 
model’s set of predictor variables (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Ooghe and Verbaere, 
1985; Jones, 1987; Keasey and Watson, 1991). Also, if the estimation samples are non-
random it may be anticipated that the coefficient estimates are biased (Zmijewski). 
 
To overcome this selection problem, studies such as Ohlson (1980) and later studies 
which I am yet to discuss (for example, Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Hillegiest et al, 
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2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008), use a much wider sample of firms within their 
empirical analysis, more representative of the true population, with the selections often 
containing data for all firms which are available at the time of research. Claims that 
non-random estimation samples may have serious consequences for the resulting 
traditional failure prediction model (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) can only be put to the 
test with a true ex-ante study, and is one of many claims and questions which my 
empirical study seeks to provide evidence. 
 
The final problem associated with the classical paradigm is the choice of 
optimisation criteria, or put another way, the way in which the model’s accuracy is 
assessed or measured. Many of the studies that I have reviewed so far use a variety of 
“goodness of fit” measures as their optimisation criteria including the percentage of 
(mis)classifications, often separable into both type I and type II classification errors, R2-
type measures, measures based on entropy, likelihood and discrete hazard models. In 
recent years the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, tests of relative 
information content and tests for economic value have more frequently been used. The 
variety of tests available to assess model performance, different sample constructions, 
and inconsistency of method within the literature, make it very difficult to directly 
compare one model to the next. With regards to the classical paradigm, by arbitrarily 
choosing a particular performance measure, the paradigm fails to take into account the 
true nature of insolvency prediction. 
 
 
5.5.2 Neglecting of the time dimension of failure 
 
Problems with corporate insolvency prediction also arise from the neglect of the time 
dimension of failure. 
 
“The static classic statistical failure prediction models ignore the fact that 
companies change over time, which causes various problems and limitations”. (Balcaen 
and Ooghe, 2006). 
 
Many of the traditional insolvency prediction models are estimated and validated 
using a single observation set for each firm within the sample – one set of annual 
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accounting data contained within one annual report. This relies heavily on the implicit 
assumption that annual reports pertaining to one particular firm are independent to one 
another, which is extremely unlikely to be the case. Several problems relate to this 
single observation or “snapshot” approach. Firstly, Shumway (2001) suggests that the 
choice, or timing, of when to observe a firm is likely to cause selection bias in the 
resulting model. For instance, if a company has a particularly poor financial year, those 
accounts may show the firm as being failed, whereas the adjacent accounts do not. 
Surely, however, such models are constructed in this way in order to detect these poor 
financial performances and warn stakeholders that certain care/precautions should be 
undertaken in the following year to put the company back on track.  
 
There have been, to my knowledge, no studies that incorporate multivariate, 
multidimensional data into a single model which is easy to replicate and apply in 
practice. In the real world it is entirely conceivable that a loan officer would review 
each loan application on an individual basis, involving the perusal of many past years of 
accounting data. To incorporate many years of lagged data into an all-encompassing 
multi-firm model, would require so many variables it would unlikely to be practical. 
Several studies have investigated trend analysis and note its importance (Tamari, 1966; 
Edminster, 1972; Chalos, 1985), and other studies such as Beaver (1966) show that the 
trends of individual ratios vary over time, but none incorporate multiple data lags. 
 
In addition, there is a “signal inconsistency problem” (Keasey et al, 1990; Luoma 
and Laitinen, 1991) pertaining to the use of a single year of observations. In an ex-ante 
predictive context, the repeated application of an insolvency prediction model to 
consecutive annual accounts for one particular company may result in a whole range of 
potentially conflicting predictions. 
5.5.3 Problems related to the application focus 
 
Perhaps the most characteristic problem associated with the traditional insolvency 
prediction models is there inherent arbitrary nature. In constructing a particular model, 
the researcher has an arbitrary choice of predictor variable, an arbitrary choice of 
companies, an arbitrary choice of timeframe, and an arbitrary choice of modelling 
technology and method, thus are the result of “putting the cart before the horse” 
(Cybinski, 2001). 
167 
 
 
Scott (1981) explained the problem with application focus as follows: “Most 
bankruptcy models are derived using a paired-sample technique ... A number of 
plausible and traditional financial ratios are calculated from financial statements that 
were published before failure. Next, the researcher searches for a formula based either 
on a single ratio or a combination of ratios that best discriminates between firms that 
eventually failed and firms that remained solvent” (p. 320).  
 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) augment this notion by stating that “The models are 
simply the outcome of a statistical search through a number of plausible financial 
indicators in order to empirically find some characteristics that distinguish between 
failing and non-failing firms. There seems to be no consensus on the superior predictor 
variables or on the superior modelling method” (p.79). 
 
With regards to the arbitrary selection of predictor variables, the lion’s share of the 
traditional insolvency prediction models begin with some form of empirically-based 
variable selection method which reduces a large group of possible variables to a small 
chosen few. The initial assemblage of variables is usually hand-picked on the basis of 
their popularity in prior literature or/and their reported predictive ability in previous 
research (possibly creating a snowball effect as successful variables will be more likely 
chosen in future research, whereas less successful variables may not even be 
considered). Scott (1981) states that, “In searching for the best set of financial variables 
to predict bankruptcy, researchers are neither guided nor restricted by theory. They face 
an almost unlimited number of possible variables, and since many financial ratios are 
highly correlated [e.g., Foster (1978, ch. 6.2)], the choice of variables is often made on 
the basis of slight differences in predictive power” (p.325). 
 
Beaver (1966) suggests that including variables based solely on popularity may be 
problematic, “The ratios advocated in the literature are perceived by many to reflect 
crucial relationships. It will be interesting to see the extent to which popularity will be 
self-defeating – that is, the most popular ratios will become those most manipulated by 
management (an activity known as window dressing) in a manner that destroys their 
utility” (pp.78-79). 
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Following the selection of potential predictor variables, they usually become subject 
to certain empirical and statistical tests such as their individual discriminant ability, the 
significant of the estimation parameters, predictive accuracy (classification results) 
gained through different combinations of variables, stepwise (discriminant analysis) 
procedures, principle components and factor analysis. The results of these tests advocate 
a reduced number of variables (an arbitrary number chosen by the researcher, most 
popularly between four and seven) for inclusion in the final model. One conclusion of 
Scott (1981) was that “While such tests are useful, they do not change the fact that the 
model itself resulted from an empirical search. The best evidence that some over-fitting 
has occurred is the existence of so many dissimilar prediction models. The danger is 
that the models so derived will not predict well when confronted with new data”.  
 
Despite not conforming to any theoretical underpinning, and the fact that there is 
very little agreement between researchers as to which variables are the best (Zavgren, 
1983; Altman et al, 1977), several predictor ratios have proven to be more popular in 
the literature than their counterparts. Daubie and Meskens (2002) show that the most 
frequently used financial ratios are: current assets / current liabilities, working capital / 
total assets, EBIT / total assets, quick assets / current liabilities, and net income / total 
assets. Keasey and Watson (1991) suggest that empirically-based variable selection has 
some serious drawbacks, namely, the selection of variables is usually sample specific 
(Edminster, 1972; Zavgren, 1985), and that any empirical finding may not be suitable 
for generalisation (Gentry et al, 1897). 
 
Furthermore, several studies (for example Moses and Liao, 1987; Ooghe and 
Balcaen, 2002) show that a high correlation between individual ratios can often explain 
some counter-intuitive signs for some coefficients, pertinent to many prediction models 
such as Ohlson (1980), Zavgren (1985), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), which 
contradicts the common perspective that variables representing factors such as size, 
liquidity and profitability should each act in their intuitive directions with respect to the 
model (Ooghe and Balcaen, 2002). 
 
An additional criticism regarding the selection of variables within these traditional 
prediction models is the fact that they are nearly always accounting-number based, with 
the accounting numbers applied in the form of financial ratios. These financial ratios are 
gleamed from corporate accounts, which, although can be argued to be reliable 
169 
 
representation of a firm’s financial position, this position will always be of one in the 
past. Section 4 argued that the majority of insolvency prediction studies in the past have 
been conducted upon large, publicly owned companies due, in part to the reliability and 
availability of accounting data for these types of firms which consequently limits the 
research conducted upon other smaller firm types. Although larger firm accounts are 
subject to a higher level of scrutiny than their smaller counterparts, a second problem 
with the use of accounting numbers is whether or not this assumption holds that they do 
indeed represent a true and fair view. 
 
Ooghe and Joos (1990) suggest and provide evidence that both non-failing and 
failing firms in particular, have many incentives to manipulate their annual accounting 
numbers, such as attracting further investment, appeasing shareholders, and “taking a 
bath” following a significant change of management. With respect to failing firms, they 
are likely to adjust their earnings upwards to portray a more positive view of their 
financial situation (Ooghe and Joos, 1990; Rosner, 2003; Charitou and Lambertides, 
2003).  
 
A further problem regarding the use of accounting numbers lies with the accuracy 
and reliability of the numbers provided by different financial databases and delivery 
platforms. Personal experience with data collection tentatively indicates that smaller 
providers such as Hemscott Company Guru provide inadequate data due to large 
rounding errors and numerous missing values, but this may be (to some extent) expected 
as smaller/embryonic databases will not have the capability, resources or financial 
backing of some of the larger database providers. 
 
Several studies have evaluated and compared accounting and financial data provided 
by the larger, more established data providers such as Datastream, Thomson Financial, 
and Worldscope, although these studies are primarily focus on US application. The most 
recent study to this effect is that of Ince and Porter (2006) who determined that although 
there is a large inconsistency (over 35%) regarding the misclassification of equity 
securities, and differences regarding firm coverage, returns data is generally consistent 
between Thomson Datastream and the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
 
Evidence regarding the accuracy and consistency of UK accounting and financial 
data provision is somewhat limited. Board et al. (1991) provide a descriptive overview 
170 
 
of several databases but do not provide any empirical comparative evidence regarding 
either coverage or consistency. Lara et al. (2006) do provide empirical evidence that 
there is considerable variation in firm coverage between different databases and find 
that their valuation model was highly sensitive to the database choice, although the data 
gathered for this study was from fourteen European countries and not specifically UK 
targeted.  Alves et al. (2007) concentrate solely on data gathered for UK companies 
upon six leading financial databases. They provide evidence that both firm and item 
coverage vary from one database to another. More importantly perhaps, is the evidence 
provided which suggests that the properties of standard income statement, cash-flow 
statement, balance sheet items, and associated ratios, also differ between each database. 
The authors attribute these differences to the way each database defines and constructs 
key variables. The choice of database for my own empirical study is considered in 
section 7. 
 
The last regard to this section concerns the selection of modelling 
method/technology, an arbitrary choice made by the researcher. Limited theoretically 
based studies (e.g. the gamblers ruin approach: Wilcox, 1971) are apparent in the 
literature, with the vast majority of studies adopting various statistical techniques. 
Although studies such as Scott (1981) attempt to provide links between the variables 
found to be useful in predicting insolvency, and theoretical underpinnings, each of these 
traditional statistical approaches neglect to adhere to any sound theory; the most 
prominent theoretical explanations being attached to Walter (1957) and his loosely 
defined liquid reservoir theory. As I move into the following section and the turn of the 
century, there is, however, a definite shift towards a new group of modelling technique 
which is based on a sound theoretical underpinning: that of the option pricing formulae 
as derived by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). This shift, as we shall see, 
also realises a distinct move away from the term “insolvency prediction” or “bankruptcy 
prediction” towards the somewhat more formative “credit risk” or “credit risk theory”. 
 
5.6 Theoretically driven models of the 21st century 
 
 
Despite the voluminous research, insolvency prediction suffered much criticism 
because of a lack of theoretical underpinning – giving rise to problems associated with 
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the classical paradigm (choice of definition of firm failure, non-stationarity and 
instability of data, and sample selection) along with the arbitrary selection of variables 
and modelling method. These problems have been readily discussed within the previous 
section. 
 
More recent modelling developments are the contingent claims models which are 
based on option pricing theory as set out in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974). The most popular forms of the model are derived from the European call option 
and the down-and-out call barrier option. In its simplest form, the model assumes that 
the shareholders of a firm hold a European call option (EC) on the firm, the exercise 
price being the amount required to discharge its debt liabilities. The time to maturity of 
the debt is, therefore, taken to be the option period; and the expiry date is taken as the 
point at which insolvency might occur. At expiry, the shareholders will either mandate 
discharge of the debt repayment obligation (if firm assets exceed liabilities) or mandate 
default on the debt and insolvency process (if firm assets less than liabilities). The 
method assigns a default (failure) probability independently to each firm. Academic 
examples of the EC approach can be found in Vassalou and Xing (2004), Bharath and 
Shumway (2008), and Hillegeist et al. (2004).  
 
Several studies, including Brockman and Turtle (2002) and Reisz and Purlich (2007), 
derive default probabilities by extending the EC model into a barrier options 
framework. The model values the option as a down-and-out call (DOC). Debt holders 
are deemed own a portfolio of risk-free debt and a DOC option on the firm’s assets 
which can be exercised should the value of the firm fall below a predetermined legally 
binding barrier. 
 
Moody’s were the first credit rating agency to publish details of their ratings 
methodologies. Prior to the acquisition of KMV by Moody’s Corp in April 2002, very 
little was known publicly about KMV’s proprietary credit risk appraisal. After the 
acquisition, a selection of papers written by KMV practitioners became publicly 
available to download from the Moody’s KMV website, and contingent claims models 
have since attracted a deal of interest from academics.104  
                                                 
104
 KMV (Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek) developed quantitative risk management methodologies based 
upon option pricing theory. Moody’s credit assessment as we see it today is developed from  Vasicek (1984). 
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Two papers which were among the first to be released into the public domain by 
Moody’s described its “RiskCalc” for both public and private companies; Falkenstein et 
al. (2000) describes Moody’s RiskCalc for private firms whilst Sobehart et al. (2000) 
details Moody’s public firm model. Merton's original construction of the options pricing 
model (1973), treats debt as having an explicit maturity (one year, for example), with 
the value of the option calculated upon this expiry date. In its simplest form all 
liabilities are also assumed to be zero-coupon bonds following Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1974)105. Firms will default on their debt when the market value of 
its  assets fall below a certain level, which again, in its simplest form, will be equal to 
the value of the company’s debt. The firm will therefore survive and pay its debt 
obligations if the market value of assets exceeds that of the debt value. The Merton 
model constitutes that the firm's market value of assets at time T when the debt matures, 
has a probability distribution defined by its expected value and standard deviation. What 
the model aims to provide is two-fold. Firstly the 'distance to default' is the number of 
standard deviations the future value of assets is away from the value of its debt, or 
default point. Secondly, associated formulae are able to calculate the probability of firm 
default, the greater the value of the firm, and the lesser its volatility, the lower the 
probability that the firm will default.  
 
In practice there are a number of variations of the Merton model, both in construction 
and methodological application augmented by both practitioners and academics. The 
following is intended to generalise the model and formula that underlie these differing 
approaches. To calculate the default probability using the Merton model, the market 
value of equity and its volatility, as well as the value of debt, are required and 
observable. Using the options approach, the market value of equity is the consequence 
of the Black-Scholes formula: 
 
 j = Qkl<() − 	Qml<(	) + n1 − Qklo 
(5.21) 
 
 
                                                 
105
 Hillegeist et al. (2004) point out that further to Merton (1974), “Subsequent studies have incorporated more 
realistic assumptions, such as allowing for debt covenants (e.g., Black and Cox, 1976) and multiple classes of 
debt (e.g., Geske, 1977)”.   
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where N(d1) and N(d2) are the standard cumulative normal function of d1 and d2  
respectively, and where: 
 
 = ln pq +	>2	 +	12 8r	A ?σt√T  
 
and 
 
	 =	 − σt√? =	 ln pq +	>2	 −	12 8r	A?σt√T  
 
The optimal hedge equation is defined as: 
 
8j = [Ql<()8r]j 	  
(5.22) 
 
where: j= market value of equity  = book value of liabilities = market value of assets 
T = time to maturity 
r = risk free rate of return σt = volatility of asset value σw =volatility of equity value 
 
 
From above we can see that there are two equations and two unknown variables: the 
market value of assets (r) and the volatility of assets (σt). Each of the remaining 
variables within the equations are market, accounting, and economic data which can be 
readily observed. Falkenstein et al. (2000) suggest the iterative Newton-Raphson 
technique to solve for r and	σt noting convergance normally within a couple of 
iterations. Other authors such as Hillegeist el al (2004) use specific computer packages 
to solve the equations. 
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Falkenstein et al. (2000) and Sobehart et al. (2000) detail Moody’s implementation 
of the Merton model in which the credit rating agency makes some beneficial 
adjustments to its formulation. The first of these adjustments relates to the “trigger 
point” of default (the debt amount), since in real life, a company will have many 
different liabilities with differing maturities, and hence the Merton model is ambiguous 
in its practical application. It may also be noted that a firm can continue to make 
payments on its debt obligations even if, technically, the firm is insolvent (liabilities are 
greater than assets). There may also be circumstances where delayed payments may be 
negotiated with one, or a number of debt holders, and through careful management legal 
insolvency may be avoided.  
 
To allow for these particular characteristics, Moody’s use half the book value of long 
term liabilities plus current liabilities as a proxy for the 1-year default point, which, 
according to Falkenstein et al. (2000), is “a formulation based on empirical analysis”, 
and therefore differing to the total liabilities figure used in the conventional Merton 
model106. The authors argue that this adjustment is consistent with the distribution of 
recovery rates on defaulted bonds.  
 
“As opposed to having the highest recovery rates close to 100% and declining 
exponentially to zero, as implied by a strict interpretation of the Merton model, the 
mode recovery rate is more likely to be in the 50-60% range rather than the 90-100% 
range. That is, if the trigger point was total debt, the most probable recovery rate would 
be in the highest range; it is not, which suggests the trigger is well below the amount of 
total debt. Direct bankruptcy costs, such as legal bills, imply that 99% recovery would 
not be the mode even if the Merton Model were strictly true, yet empirical estimates of 
these costs are all well below the 40% that corresponds to the recovery rate averages 
we observe”. Falkenstein et al. (2000, p.18)  
 
 
 
A second adjustment to the Merton model is made by mapping the distance from 
default into that of a probability. For the majority of cases, probabilities calculated from 
                                                 
106
 Vasicek (1984) was the first to introduce a distinction between short and long term debt which was adopted 
and developed by KMV. Another variant of the Merton model developed by Vasicek and Kealhofer (also KMV) 
assumes the firm’s equity is a perpetual option with the default point acting as the absorbing barrier for the 
firm’s asset value: See Kealhofer (2003). This model has come to be termed the Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) model. 
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the Merton model are seemingly much too low, less than 0.1%, which would imply that 
the majority of firms should be issued with AAA bond ratings because they are 
extremely unlikely to fail. The probability of default can, according to the original 
Merton formulation, be derived from standard normal probability tables using the 
following formulation: 
 
 
Prob	 = < |− ln pq +	>μ	 −	12 8	A ?σ√? ~ 
(5.23) 
where μ  is the expected return on the firm’s assets 
 
 
To get around this “calibration” problem, Moody’s map their output from the Merton 
model into actual defaults using historical data from proprietary data records, something 
that is of course not possible to achieve by anyone except those with access to Moody’s 
proprietary defaults database. In academia therefore, researchers must be careful not to 
attach too much meaning to the distribution or scale of the outputted default 
probabilities. Although ordinal rankings of firms will be unaffected, the probabilities 
may need to be calibrated or placed in groups of percentiles, rather than suggesting that 
firm X has a definitive Y% chance of failure at the end of this year. These adjustments 
therefore suggest that the Merton model is more of a guideline than a concrete rule for 
estimating a quantitative model. “The final transformation from standard normal 
probabilities into empirical probabilities implies that even the strongest proponents of 
the approach do not take the Merton model literally”. Falkenstein et al. (2000). 
 
The Falkenstien et al. (2000) private firm model itself resides in a comprehensive 
publication spanning some 88 pages which describes Moody’s default model for 
private, middle-market firms. The model was derived using a large database of 28,104 
companies with 1,604 defaults and results in a model utilising ten financial ratios. As 
part of their analysis they investigate a number of different models and methodologies, 
finding interestingly that univariate models quite often outperform the earlier 
multivariate models such as the Altman Z-score. They also found that extra information 
could be added to the Merton model to produce a higher rate of model accuracy. 
 
“We found that by adding information such as profitability, in conjunction with a 
'distance to default' measure based on the Merton approach, we can significantly 
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improve upon a model that uses a stricter interpretation of the Merton framework”. 
Falkenstein et al. (2000, p.12) 
 
Sobehart and Keenan (1999) offer an excellent discussion as to the reasons why 
adding financial statement data to the Merton model can improve its predictive accuracy 
and overall performance, and Sobehart and Stein (2000) argue that the Merton model 
can easily be improved upon. These claims are investigated further in section 10 of this 
thesis where I too attempt to add power to that of the Merton model by constructing a 
best-of-breed model. Kealhofer and Kurbat (2001) retort suggesting that the Merton 
models capture all of the available information contained within traditional credit 
agency ratings based upon tried-and-tested accounting variables, a claim supported by 
Duffie and Wang (2004) who show that the Merton model has significant predictive 
power over time. 
 
With regards to Moody’s public firm model, Sobehart et al. (2000) suggest that 
neither historical financial statement data, nor information gained through market data 
and the Merton model, adequately capture all distress and default information. 
 
 
“The analysis of historical financial statements may present an incomplete or 
distorted picture of the company’s true financial condition. For a variety of reasons 
including the intrinsic conservatism of accounting principles, financial statements do 
not necessarily reflect the complete economic reality of the firm.” 
 
 
“Merton’s original contingent claims model, and most subsequent refinements of it, 
does not contemplate cases in which firms default on their debt obligations due to 
severe liquidity problems. In addition, even in situations where market equity contains 
relatively complete information about a firm’s credit quality, this does not guarantee 
that a structural model will correctly capture and reflect that information. Knowledge 
of the market information alone does not directly inform an investor as to a borrower’s 
creditworthiness.” 
 
The exact methodology that Moody’s use to calculated their credit ratings and 
default probabilities therefore, incorporates components of both the Merton model 
approach and an empirically derived statistical model based upon accounting and other 
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data, resulting in a hybrid of the two forms. Sobehart et al. (2000) describe this hybrid 
model as having five key inputs: 
 
 
• Agency rating when available, 
• Modified version of the Merton model (expressed as a distance to default), 
• Company financial statement information, 
• Additional equity market information; and 
• Macroeconomic variables that represent snapshots of the state of the economy or of 
specific industries which are used for pre-processing model inputs. 
 
 
More precisely, the nine variables which are used as inputs for Moody’s risk model 
for public firms are listed below, although the precise model derivation, methodology 
and resulting coefficients for the model are not disclosed due to its proprietary nature. 
 
• Credit Quality (previous rating) 
• Return on Assets (ROA) 
• Firm Size 
• Operating Liquidity 
• Leverage 
• Market Sensitivity (stock price volatility) 
• Equity Growth 
• Return on Equity 
• Distance to Default (from Merton model) 
 
The model is compared to several other credit risk models using Receiver Operating 
Characteristic curves (see section 8 of this thesis) and the associated accuracy ratio. The 
comparative models which are particularly of interest to this thesis are the Merton 
model itself, and Altman’s original Z-score. The authors also compare the public firm 
model to a Hazard model, a reduced Z-score model, and the single variable ROA. The 
comparative analysis is conducted using proprietary data covering some 1,406 
defaulting firms and 13,041 non-defaulting firms (the largest dataset cited within this 
thesis). 
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What results is that the public firm model achieved the highest classification 
accuracy107 of all the models (86.5%), with the Merton model a close second with an 
accuracy of 83.5%. these results compare favourably to those of the original Altman Z-
score which only achieved and accuracy of 78%. It is clear therefore that although the 
contingent claims Merton model out-performed the somewhat antiquated Altman Z-
score, the combination of both market and accounting variables within the hybrid 
model, provides substantially more information regarding the solvency of US public 
firms. 
 
Academic studies that evaluate the performance of the Merton model become 
apparent in the literature, subsequent to these publications by Moody’s, and are offered 
in two generalised forms. Vassalou and Xing (2004), Tudela and Young (2003), 
Hillegeist et al. (2004), and Bharath and Shumway (2008) investigate variants and 
comparative studies based upon the simplified Merton model (single period European 
call option), whereas Brockman and Turtle (2003) and Reisz and Purlich (2007) extend 
the formulation into a barrier options approach.  
 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) examine the impact that default risk has on equity returns. 
Small firms which also have a high risk of default are likely to have significantly higher 
returns on equity than larger companies who have sound solvency credentials. They 
provide empirical evidence to suggest that in general, firms with a high risk of default 
will provide higher returns than firms with low classes of default risk, providing that 
they are either small in size or have a high book to market ratio. 
 
Tudela and Young (2003) represent the Bank of England and investigate the Merton 
model’s ability to produce a reliable ordinal ranking of companies based upon UK 
company data. Their dataset consisted of 65 companies which entered receivership 
between 1990 and 2001, and 7,459 firm year observations for those which did not fail. 
For one-year-ahead forecasts the Merton models does a sound job in correctly 
classifying 62 out of the 65 failures, although the model misclassified 20% of the non-
                                                 
107
 Based upon the area under the ROC curve (AUC). Not disclosed by the paper but can easily be calculated 
from the provided Accuracy Ratio. AR = 2*(AUC+0.5). 
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failed group. The authors suggest that based on this evidence, “the Merton model 
appears to be useful tool for identifying companies at risk of receivership”. 
 
Brockman and Turtle (2003) provide a framework for extending the traditional form 
of the Merton model (standard call option), into one which is expressed through a 
closed-form, down-and-out-call, barrier option approach (DOC). 
 
The primary feature distinguishing a DOC from a standard call is the existence of a 
barrier which, when breached, causes the termination of the option (i.e., failure). The 
barrier level can be set at, above, or below the exercise price of the option, although it 
must be set initially below the underlying asset value to be viable. A DOC is classified 
as path-dependent because its payoff is not simply a function of the terminal value of the 
underlying asset, but is dependent on the specific path taken by the asset over the life of 
the option. If the barrier is hit at any time before maturity, the DOC expires worthless 
even if the underlying asset value subsequently recovers. In place of a zero payout upon 
hitting the barrier, DOCs can pay out a positive value referred to as the rebate… The 
DOC framework explicitly recognizes the consequences of bankruptcy whenever asset 
values fall below a pre-specified barrier value. Asset ownership is transferred from 
shareholders to creditors and any subsequent rise in asset values will accrue to 
creditors since equity holders’ residual claims have been permanently extinguished. In 
this way, equity value behaves as a DOC option on the underlying assets of the firm. 
(Brockamn and Turtle (2003, p.514-5). 
 
The probability of firm default using the barrier option approach is calculated 
similarly to the Merton model albeit with a more expansive formulation as per Equation 
5.24.108 
 j = * = 	N() − 	emNn − σ√o  
     −	a >AU()U TN() − em >AU()U Nn − σ√ob 
 
                                                 
108
 There are several versions of this formulation. This particular version is risk neutral and negates to include the 
optional rebate addition, and does not include dividends which accrue to the equity holders. The latter is included 
in the formulation within section 8.2. Brockman and Turtle (2003) offer several variants of this formulation. 
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 = ln(/) + n2 + (8	/2)o8√ 	 
 = ln(	/) + n2 + (8	/2)o8√? −  	 
(5.24) 
 
The definitions of the terms within this model are identical to those contained within 
Equation 5.21 but with the addition of the firm-specific barrier B, T, the date of expiry, 
and , the current date ((? − ), therefore equating to the time until expiry). Similarly to 
the Traditional model, the unobservable variables V (market value of assets) and σ 
(asset volatility) can be solved simultaneously by iterative or computative methods 
using equations (5.21) and (5.23). The barrier B can then be solved from Equation 
(5.24). The risk-neutral probability of default can then be calculated thusly: 
 
Prob = 1 − 	Nln >A + >μ − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
+	
	()U  ∙ < ln  	 + >μ − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
 
(5.25) 
Similar probabilities can also be found in Cox and Millar (1965), Ingersoll (1987), 
Rich (1994), and Reisz and Purlich (2007). 
 
Although this new wave of academic and proprietary adoption of the theoretically-
driven credit risk model has become popularised in recent years, we must remember that 
other theoretical models have been pursued in the past such as Wilcox (1973) gambler’s 
ruin theory. For whatever reasons, however, these alternative theories have not gained 
the popularity within academia as compared to that of the contingent claims models109. 
What is evident, however, is that the release of these proprietary publications sparked a 
deal of interest within academia, with a selection of  papers keen to prove that the 
                                                 
109
 Blums (2003) provides an interesting study which offers a model combining both the gambler’s ruin theory 
and option pricing theory. The model was able to correctly classify 100% of failed firms but only 43% of non-
failed companies. 
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traditional models based upon accounting data could still compare to these more modern 
techniques. 
 
Comparisons of the performance of contingent claims or ‘market’ models with that 
of traditional accounting-number based models forms the backbone of much of the 
empirical analysis found in the recent research; and such comparisons have yielded a 
variety of results. Tudela and Young (2003) find that their market model out-performs 
models which use accounting data, and that when the output of their market model is 
combined with accounting data accuracy can only slightly be improved. Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) compare their EC model with two accounting number-based methods (being the 
Altman 1968 ‘Z-score’ model and the Ohlson 1980 model), and find that the market 
model carries more information than the accounting number-based comparators. They 
argue that since accounting statements are prepared on a going-concern basis, they are, 
by design, of limited use in predicting bankruptcy.  
 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) construct a naïve version of the EC model in order to 
avoid some of the estimation complexity found in Hillegeist et al. (2004) who employ 
simultaneous equation solving of the unknown Merton model variables. Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) find little deterioration in model performance using this simplified 
method and suggest that the KMV-Merton model probability of default is a marginally 
useful default forecaster, but not a sufficient statistic for default. Reisz and Purlich 
(2007) compare both EC and DOC models with the Altman Z-score model; and find, in 
contrast to the findings of Hillegeist et al. (2004), that the Z-score model out-performs 
both contingent claims approaches in terms of receiver operating characteristic curves 
for a one-year ahead forecast. Brockamn and Turtle (2003) compare the DOC model to 
Altman’s Z-score and find that the DOC model dominates the Z-score in most cases in 
terms of predictive ability. For the UK, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find similarly to 
Reisz and Purlich (2007), comparing the Taffler (1983) accounting number-based 
model (the Taffler Z-score) with EC models of both Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Bharath 
and Shumway (2008). In their analysis, the Taffler Z-score achieved the highest 
accuracy (89%), with the models of Hillegeist et al. (2004) achieving 84% and Bharath 
and Shumway (2008) achieving 87%. Book to market and size variables were also 
examined, with the resulting accuracies being 68% and 75% respectively. Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008) suggest that: 
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“...traditional accounting ratio-based bankruptcy risk models are, in fact, not 
inferior to KMV-type option-based models for credit risk assessment purposes ... The 
apparent superiority of the market-based model approach claimed by Hillegeist et al. 
(2004) reflects the poor performance of their comparator models, not a particularly 
strong performance by their option-pricing model”. Agarwal and Taffler (2008, p. 
1,542) 
 
Gharghori et al. (2006) provide another comparative study as to the options verses 
accounting-number model debate. They compare the traditional Merton model to a 
barrier option variation, the book to market ratio, size (market value of equity), and a 
model based upon accounting numbers. Using Australian data, they find that the barrier 
option model is superior (when the barrier was set to below the value of liabilities), with 
a fractionally higher accuracy than the Merton model, the accuracies being 86.25% and 
86.24% respectively. Book to market ratio provided and accuracy of 76.78% whereas 
the variable size only achieved an accuracy of 64.3%. The accounting number-based 
model achieved and accuracy of 76%, far less than the options-based models. 
 
With conflicting academic evidence as to whether the contingent claims approach to 
insolvency prediction and credit risk is indeed superior to the more traditional forms of 
insolvency prediction modelling based upon accounting data, a large empirical study is 
undertaken within this thesis to provide further (and updated) evidence to this debate. 
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6 Objectives and research questions 
 
6.1 Objectives 
 
From the extensive review of prior literature which has been discussed within the 
previous section, it is apparent that the volume of previous research within the field has 
been vast. Although I do not claim to have covered every single piece of research that 
has previously been published, I am confident that all the key developments and 
enhancements have been conversed, which is hoped to give the reader a clear overview 
of the evolution of the art that is corporate insolvency prediction and credit risk 
modelling. Given this voluminous prior research, it is surprising that the art still attracts 
a great deal of research to this very day. Many current studies are still determined to 
hunt down a perfect prediction model but ultimately (and sadly) fail to acknowledge the 
key methodological issues and detractions arising from the prior research, often 
employing a somewhat arbitrary and gung-ho approach to arrive at yet another 
insolvency prediction model.  
 
In a later section of this thesis, I aim to show that creating a new model, given an 
arbitrary choice of variable and modelling technology, is a fairly simple process which I 
really have no interest in promoting. One common and potential beguiling question is 
whether or not a best of breed model may be constructed, based upon the best 
performing variables from each of the models tested. I have always provided the same 
answer to this comment in that this kind of research has little or no interest to me. I do 
feel however that this exercise is one which should be included within this thesis, if only 
to demonstrate how easily a model can be fitted and augmented around a particular data 
set, pass it off as being the most accurate model ever produced, and then realise that it is 
extremely unlikely that it would ever deliver the same efficiency if it were applied to a 
brand new set of data. 
 
The main objective of my thesis therefore, is not to succumb to this pitfall, but to 
provide an independent empirical analysis of extant corporate insolvency prediction 
technologies, in an attempt to discover if there is a single technology, methodology, or 
set of variables which outperforms all of its counterparts. In doing so, I can gain an 
impartial empirical study of extant models using up-to-date data, and determine their 
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relevance, efficiency, and applicability to the uncertain financial climate which is the 
early twenty first century and therefor determine if any one model/method is superior to 
its counterparts. It is also hoped that this study will be able to identify any potential 
room for improvement of the existing methods and technologies, with particular 
reference to UK firms within this current economic cycle. Choosing models which 
represent key developments in the literature, it should be possible to provide a truly 
independent empirical overview of the evolution of the art and provide an academic 
catalogue and reference upon insolvency prediction and credit risk technologies. 
 
The conclusions which result from this study could have great importance, and have 
a dramatic impact upon the whole of the financial fraternity. The up-to-date information 
it will provide to investors (particularly debt lenders) and regulators on the appropriate 
application of insolvency prediction and credit risk technologies, could prove to be 
invaluable and potentially save the financial sector not only monetary assets but the 
publicly paraded embarrassment which has recently and frequently been associated with 
loan defaults. With regards to the recent financial crisis there has been an obvious and 
well document drying up of credit where banks and other businesses are reluctant to 
lend monies, and will only tend to do so to the most credit worthy of companies. 
Whatever the reality maybe however, it is not in the interest of the bank not to lend 
money, it is after all how the institution makes the majority of its profit. There is 
therefore an inherent need in today’s climate not only in the identification of good 
credit, but an increased important upon the accuracy of any loan decision or credit 
rating systems, in order that loan applicants can be adequately ascribed the correct or 
appropriate rate of return. 
 
It is of course somewhat difficult to determine exactly what technologies and 
methodologies are used by individual debt lenders as each will have their own 
proprietary systems. Evidence within the literature suggests that the major credit rating 
agencies such as Moody’s rely on models based upon and adapted from the Black-
Scholes and Merton option pricing formulae. In order to assess the credit risk of larger 
public corporations, many other debt lenders such as banks will each have their own 
databases, proprietary systems, and algorithms, each being developed and adapted over 
some time. It is therefore possible that this thesis could help any number of stakeholders 
identify some of the pitfalls associated with their respective systems and help make 
apparent any possible improvements. 
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6.2 Research questions 
 
In mind of the research objectives detailed above, it is clear that in order to fulfil 
them, that there are several underlying questions which arise. The most important 
perhaps, certainly with respect to the recent financial crisis and the increased 
importance to adequately asses the credit worthiness of potential loan applicants, or to 
appraise the solvency of a potential investment, are the related questions: do insolvency 
prediction and credit risk models still provide the accuracy that has been claimed in the 
past?; do they still work, and are they still relevant in today’s financial climate?; and, 
can they be adequately relied upon today for decision making purposes? In order to 
answer this type of question it is fair to say that some amount of empirical research must 
be undertaken. This in turn opens up a new set of research questions which must also be 
answered in order to fulfil the objectives of the previous section. 
 
The first, and possibly the most obvious question which arises is which technologies 
and models warrant empirical testing? I have previously said that the objective of the 
thesis is to evaluate models that are representative of the evolution of the literature. The 
choice of models is an extremely important one and therefore one which requires some 
careful consideration. There are potentially hundreds of individual models which have 
been published in the prior literature, some of which I have discussed in my literature 
review, but this is no means an exhaustive list110. I have, of course, by guiding the 
readers through the literature, focused on what I believe are the key papers within the 
field from my own quest and lengthy search through the archives. It is safe to say 
therefore that we might expect that the models which are selected for the final empirical 
analysis will come from a much larger population which has already been pruned in my 
own pre-conceived way, and by the evolution of the literature itself111. Section 8 of this 
thesis provides the final method that was employed in order to determine the models 
                                                 
110
 From a simple “Google Scholar” search it is notable that Beaver (1966) “Financial ratios as predictors of 
failure” and Altman (1968) “Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy”, 
have 1,904 and 4,511 citations respectively within the journal archive JSTOR alone. Withstanding other 
archives, working papers, dissertations and theses from around the globe, the potential population of research 
papers within this field is vast indeed. 
111
 The organic growth and self-evolution of the literature will of course determine what are the” important” or 
key papers, with said papers inspiring a new generation of work. Those which are not so remarkable will 
inevitably pass us by without much after-thought or reflection.  
186 
 
which will appear in my empirical analysis, utilising both descriptive reasoning and 
statistical evidence in support. 
 
The second question which arises instinctively follows the first. Assuming I have 
made an adequate selection of models for testing, what exactly is (are) the test(s) which 
should be carried out, and what is (are) the most appropriate or best method(s) for 
efficacy comparison. There are several alternatives which must be considered, each with 
their own assumptions and restrictions. Similarly to the model selection itself, it would 
be desirable if the choice of comparative technique would also, in some way, follow the 
evolution of the art, taking into account all recent developments and enhancements. It 
would also be unwise to assume at this point, that a single method of comparison is 
likely to suffice, due to the amount of information that I would wish to capture and 
portray. Section 8 also discusses the choice of test possibilities along with any pertinent 
advantages and disadvantages for each of the candidates. 
 
Question three is a simple one. Are we significantly closer to a ‘perfect’ prediction 
model than was Beaver 45 years ago? One thing I hope that the reader has gathered 
from thesis thus far is that the wealth of research in this subject area has been vast. 
Given this voluminous research, the countless man-hours of reading, examining, 
number-crunching, postulating and concluding, the amount of money all this research 
would have cost the individuals, academia and financial institutions, we, or at least I, am 
interested to discover whether it has all been worth it? That is to say, using empirical 
evidence, in today’s climate, how does a single ratio such as Beaver’s cash-flow to total 
debt, compare to the latest developments in insolvency prediction modelling. 
  
Finally I am interested to determine if any of the extant modelling technologies be 
enhanced or adapted to produce a better performing model and is there some logical 
progression towards the next generation of corporate insolvency prediction or credit risk 
model. I have already divulged my disinterest in simply bolting together a horde of 
variables in some ad-hoc fashion, so any progression towards a new form of model 
would have to be backed up by some theoretical underpinning.112 
  
                                                 
112
 Section 10.2 provides a deliberate example of an arbitrary ad-hoc model. Section 8.2 provides an example of 
a theoretically based model extension as a natural progression to the literature. 
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7 Data 
 
7.1 Specification of data items required and data sets sought 
 
It is paramount that the empirical undertakings of this thesis should be conducted 
upon data which is relevant to the nature of the research questions, consistent and 
reliable, and is up-to-date and recent enough in order to provide meaningful results for 
current applications beyond this thesis. To this end there are several considerations:  
 
7.1.1 First consideration 
 
The first consideration is to understand what timeframe (or window) should be 
adopted within which, the necessary data items ought to be collected. I have previously 
stated the necessity that data items and the study itself should be conducted upon the 
most up-to-date data currently available at a time where an empirical analysis can be 
satisfactorily conducted within the completion deadline of this thesis. This consideration 
is not problematic and will be discussed in due course. One question which does arise, 
however, is: how far back in time should the data be collected in order that it is still 
meaningful today? In order that a sound empirical analysis can be undertaken, it is 
desirable that the dataset is large in nature, containing as many firms (both failed and 
non-failed) and firm-year observations as possible. On the other hand, the age of the 
data which is collected, must also be taken into account. Economic conditions, 
accounting standards, practices and reporting requirements, and other company 
legislation will change and evolve over time, questioning the comparability of both data 
collected from company accounts and data gathered from market sources should the 
timeframe be too large. It is therefore anticipated (both through previous empirical 
exercises undertaken by myself, and from my understanding of the literature) that a 
sample period of just a few years is likely to yield a sample of too few data items 
(particularly that of the desired failed firm population) to justify a sound empirical 
analysis. The reverse is also true in that a sample period which is too wide, may provide 
an adequate population in respect to the failed firm population, but is unlikely to be 
consistence with respect to the individual data items over long periods of time. 
Therefore, a balance must be struck of an intermediate length in sample timeframe that 
best circumvents these possible problems. 
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7.1.2 Second consideration 
 
The second consideration notes the types of company and macro population from 
which the sample should be drawn. Section 4 dealt with this consideration at some 
length, detailing the potential research avenues and limitations for individuals, and both 
private and publicly traded companies. The conclusions gained through this discussion 
were that (a) large datasets on individuals is largely (if not wholly) proprietary in nature 
and therefore an empirical analysis upon this population is somewhat problematic. (b) 
For privately owned companies, accounting data is available but is somewhat limited as 
to what can be readily accessed in a cost and time effective manner. Questions also 
pertain as to the reliability of such accounts given that they do not require 3rd part audit. 
(c) Publicly traded companies offer the most potential for research, and indeed make up 
the vast majority of prior studies. This is primarily driven of course by the stricter 
reporting regulations faced by these firms and the increased transparency required to 
attract potential investors. Many financial databases exist containing vast amounts of 
information which can be readily accessed by the researcher. (d) The economic 
significance of public company becoming insolvent is also far greater than that of any 
other type of firm. 
 
It is therefore clear that an empirical study based upon publicly traded companies is 
preferred. It should also be evident from previous sections within this thesis that it is my 
wish to concentrate on matters within the UK and therefore selecting firms from outside 
the UK population would be nonsensical. 
 
7.1.3 Third consideration 
 
The third consideration relates to the overall size of the sample itself. More precisely 
the sample warrants two populations, a population of failed firms, and a population of 
non-failed firms; the size of each should be carefully considered. 
 
Insolvency prediction literature has traditionally relied on matched samples of failed 
and non-failed firms, as in, for example, Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Libby (1975), 
Taffler (1983), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), and Charitou et al. (2004). The paired 
sampling approach is most certainly a legacy of the discriminant analysis methodology 
frequently used in the 1960s and 1970s, where failed firms were matched on size and 
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industry with a non-failed mate. Stein (2002) posits that the variable accuracy of any 
prediction model is “primarily driven by the number of defaults, rather than the total 
number of observations”. This is supported by Falkenstein et al. (2000), who suggest 
that the hazard model of Shumway (2001) outperformed others in their evaluation 
because of the large number of defaults (300) in the sample. 
 
Current insolvency prediction and credit risk papers utilize the abundance of 
financial databases and related search tools to include a far greater number of non-failed 
firms in relation to the failed ones, more realistically representing the percentage of 
failures in the actual population. These technological advancements means that all listed 
firms have the potential to be analysed in greater detail. Moody’s “RiskCalc for Public 
Companies”, for example, uses a database of 1,406 failed and 13,041 non-failed firms 
for their proprietary version of the contingent claims model in the US. In the UK, the 
number of insolvencies is far less than that in the US, since the overall population of 
UK firms is much smaller. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) use data from 2,006 total firms 
and 103 failures over a fifteen year period in the UK, far less than Hillegeist (2004) for 
example, who studied 756 failures and 14,303 non-failed firms over an almost identical 
period. Table 7.1 compares sample sizes from a number of the studies cited in this 
paper. 
 
Table 7.1: Summary of the sample sizes analysed in a selection of prior studies 
Author(s) (year) Model type Country Failed Non-failed 
Beaver (1966) Single Ratio US 79 79 
Altman (1968) MDA US 33 33 
Ohlson (1980) Logit US 105 2058 
Taffler (1983) MDA UK 46 46 
Sobehart and Stein (2000)a Options US 1,406 13,041 
Charitou et al. (2004) Neural network UK 51 51 
Bharath and Shumway 
(2004/8) Options US 1,449 * 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) Options US 756 14,303 
Reisz and Purlich (2007) Options US 799 4985 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) MDA/Options UK 103 2,006 
* Not Disclosed. 
a
  RiskCalc for public companies  
 
The modern trend therefore seems to be geared towards using the maximum amount 
of data which is possibly available with recent studies employing sample proportions 
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relatively similar to that of the real world (which is of course bound to be true if almost 
all firms are considered). It is my intention therefore to follow these recent studies and 
also use the maximum number of observations conforming to the sample criterion. 
 
7.1.4 Fourth consideration 
 
The fourth consideration continues the discussion upon population sizes, but more 
directly discusses any possible firm size and industry restrictions. It is desirable that this 
study is all-encompassing, that is to say, that firms should not be discarded or 
eliminated from the empirical study simply due to their size or specific industry. With 
regards to size, it is apparent from the prior literature that the size of a firm (whether 
measured in total assets, market value, number of employees, or other), could play an 
important part in the ultimate survival of a firm as a large equity reserves or asset bases 
act as buffer for debt servicing, should a company suddenly lose liquidity and/or 
profitability. It is therefore important that an arbitrary elimination of potential firms 
from the sample population, based upon some predetermined maximum and minimum 
values does not take place. With regards to industry however, many previous studies 
(e.g. Altman, 1968; Taffler, 1983) have concentrated solely upon the 
industrial/manufacturing sector, where a small paired sample approach is used. Recent 
studies (e.g. Agarwal and Taffler, 2007; Hillgeist et al, 2004; Reisz and Purlich, 2007) 
offer up far larger sample populations, unlimited by industry sector, with just one 
exception. Firms with financial industry codes are often excluded from sample 
populations because of their differing capital structure, earnings profile and reporting 
requirements. To this end, I intend also to eliminate financial firms from my empirical 
analysis. 
 
7.1.5 Fifth consideration 
 
The Fifth consideration regards the individual data items themselves. A large 
selection of models are to be considered for the empirical section of this thesis, with 
each of the models requiring a different (but not necessarily exclusive) set of variables 
to be sought. Therefore the individual data items are model specific and should be 
collected accordingly. Considerations also need to be made as to the actual collection of 
these variables, as many financial databases offer similar financial information without 
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necessarily the same reliability. The most important factor is therefore the selection of a 
reputable source of information and to ensure that all data items are collected in a 
consistent manner from firm to firm. 
 
7.1.6 Sixth consideration 
 
Finally, consideration six relates to the possible division of the total sample into two 
smaller samples for the purposes of training and validation. It is evident from the 
majority of prior literature that in order to test/validate a new model proposal that the 
model must first be estimated upon one sample and then tested for its accuracy upon 
another. This procedure is commonly referred to as holdout sample validation. This 
holdout procedure, however, is only a desired necessity for models which need to be 
“trained” in some way in order to estimate the model’s parameters, e.g. MDA, logit, NN 
analyses or indeed every insolvency prediction model which is based upon a statistical 
or artificially intelligent system. Only models which are based on pure theory such as 
the option pricing formulae can be excluded from this testing and validation procedure 
as no parameters or coefficients require estimation. 
 
The purpose of holdout sample testing is to provide a true ex-ante assessment of a 
model’s predictive accuracy, although this has not always been applied in an 
appropriate manner, as I have previously discussed in section 5. Many of the recent 
studies in the field of insolvency prediction either concentrate on theoretically based 
models or the assessment of popular extant models derived in an earlier period in time, 
therefore the use of the holdout sample in recent years has been somewhat limited. It is 
only when a particular model requires updating (in the coefficients) or re-trained as per 
a neural network for example, that the training and validation procedure warrants 
employment. 
 
So the main question here is, do I need a holdout sample for my study? I am to test 
models representing the key developments within the literature, and as I have previously 
discussed it makes no sense to assume that the coefficients of earlier models should still 
be relevant/applicable today given the changes to the reporting environment over the 
previous half century. It is therefore practical to assume that with respects to any 
statistically driven models that a training and holdout sample setup will be desirable. 
Any theoretically driven models will not require training. Therefore, we must be in 
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mind that in order to aid comparability of the models, each must be validated upon the 
same sample of observations regardless of whether training is required or not. 
 
Various alternatives to model validation and to the holdout sample approach are 
evident in the literature. Early papers (e.g. Taffler, 1983) employ the Lachenbruch 
(1973) Jack-knife technique, usually where sample sizes are small and inefficient to 
divide. The Jack-knife technique reports to offer an almost unbiased measure of a 
models true ex-ante predictive accuracy and as previously discussed in section 5. In 
essence the Jack-knife technique is similar to that of “bootstrapping” where one or more 
observations are left out of the sample for validation based upon the result gained 
through training on the remaining observations. The process is repeated systematically 
until all observations have been validated from which estimates of the bias and variance 
of the models accuracy can be computed. 
 
A similar technique is that of cross-validation, where subsets of the data sample are 
held out with the remainder used for training. The size of the subset and the number of 
repetitions is an arbitrary choice by the researcher. The results for each repetition are 
then averaged to find the models accuracy. More precisely K-fold cross validation splits 
the sample into K subsets where each is held out in turn for validation. 
 
The problem with these alternative forms of validation however, is that they do not 
provide a true ex-ante determination of the models predictive ability. Section 8.3 
discusses these problems in more detail and provides descriptions of the validation tests 
selected for use within this thesis. 
 
7.2 Possible alternatives for the collection of data and associated problems 
 
A number of financial databases are provided by the University of Exeter for general 
use by its students and researchers. The list of possible databases available at this time 
was as follows: Datastream, Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS), Thomson 
Reuters One Banker, Compustat, Bloomberg, Reuters 3000xtra, Morningstar, Hemscott 
Company Guru, and the London Share Price Database (LSPD). 
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The selection of database(s) from which the data for this study was to be collected, 
took some careful consideration. Some previous experience of data collection obtained 
whilst studying for my master’s degree indicated that different databases offer a wide 
variety of data items, information, ease of use, and intuitiveness. The main requirements 
for the database utilised in this study were therefore not only to be able to necessitate 
the specifications and considerations as described in the previous section, but also to 
satisfy personal preferences when it come to the overall practicality, design, layout and 
functionality of the system. It was clear from the inception of this thesis that the data 
items required would include both historic accounting data and historic market data for 
(if possible) all UK public companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for at 
least the previous decade. 
 
Several of the databases were eliminated from consideration from the very beginning 
due to prior experience of the systems via both “hands-on” workshops, and through my 
own smaller prior studies. Hemscott Company Guru was eliminated due to a lack of 
company inclusions, and where data for companies did exist; the data items were often 
incomplete, missing or rounded to an inappropriate level. WRDS was eliminated due to 
the lack of data and information upon UK companies, again based on experience of the 
system some 12-18 months previous. This was considered somewhat unfortunate as the 
WRDS system itself offers a very usable interface with connectivity through its website, 
hence accessibility through any PC whether at the university or at home, something 
particularly desirable to myself. Compustat access is provided to the university via 
WRDS and therefore suffers the same inherent problems. Morningstar was a relatively 
new database to the university and was subject to a six month trial. The uncertainty as to 
the data collection timeframe, and the necessity to have a “re-collection of data” option 
at some point in the future (should additional companies or data items be unpredictably 
or suddenly required), meant that Morningstar could not be relied upon and therefore 
could not be considered. The Bloomberg database was also dismissed and was done so 
because of two factors. Firstly, the Bloomberg terminal interface is not very intuitive (at 
least not to myself) and involves the added complexity of a different keyboard layout 
and instructional language. Although these difficulties are not insurmountable, when 
coupled with the second factor, in that there is only one such Bloomberg terminal in the 
university, (which may be booked in one hour slots and has proven to be quite popular), 
guaranteeing usage of the system prior to booking several weeks in advance was 
impractical and it was felt that my time would be better applied elsewhere. Reuters 
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3000xtra was also eliminated, this time due to its somewhat awkward interface. I have 
previous completed and passed the Thomson Reuters Markets Academy course on the 
usage of this database but regardless, I did not find the interface particularly appealing 
or suitable for the needs of this study. The system has a lot of good points but several 
attempts to successfully locate the relevant data items pertinent to this study were not 
particularly fruitful. 
 
The choice of database and the collection of data items was now reduced to just three 
options; Thomson One Banker, Datastream, and LSPD. The LSPD only holds market 
data and therefore accounting number-based items are not available on this database and 
was therefore not considered for this purpose. LSPD does, however, have some very 
useful key information pertaining to the identification of failed companies; something 
from previous experience has been particularly difficult to obtain for UK listed 
companies. LSPD provides a comprehensive list of every company that that has been 
listed on the LSE since January 1955 with data collected from a number of recognised 
sources including the Stock Exchange Daily Official List, the Financial Times, and 
Extel’s EXSHARE service. The database is maintained and supported by the Institute of 
Finance and Accounting at London Business School. The list of companies (denoted by 
names and SEDOL numbers, is accompanied by various data items such as General 
Descriptive records (including deaths, de-listings, and types of death), Capital Changes, 
Dividends, Units, Prices, Share Capital. Information within the General Descriptive 
records has proven to be invaluable, and is something that I have found lacking from 
other databases in such a readily identifiable fashion. Previous smaller studies 
undertaken by myself have relied on company failure (or death) information gathered 
from the London Gazette, the “Official Newspaper of Record for the UK” as it is legal 
requirement by all insolvency processes to advertise here as part of their procedure (see 
Appendix B). The London Gazette is a publication which specialises in recording and 
disseminating official, regulatory and legal information and has an historical archive of 
over 350 years113. Using this resource it is possible to search the archive for notices on 
companies which match any of the insolvency criteria as discussed in some depth in 
section 4.3. However, it was clear that an obligatory manual search through the website 
archives was a particularly laborious process, even for my smaller pilot studies which 
                                                 
113
 http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/. 
 
195 
 
only incorporated one or two years of company data. Hence, to empirically evaluate a 
wider selection of companies over a longer timeframe, an alternative record of company 
failures and insolvencies had to be sought. Fortunately I was able to source a copy of 
the LSPD which not only provided all the information in one easily searchable database, 
but was also easily exportable into Microsoft Excel format to be manipulated as desired.  
 
Finally I must discuss the data items themselves and both Datastream and Thomson 
One Banker remained for consideration, and if am to be honest, this was a fairly easy 
decision to make. It was evident from the outset that Datastream was only available on 
two computers within the university, and like the Bloomberg terminal suffered from a 
very busy booking policy. Although this is something that can be worked around, it is 
not ideal as I like to be able to access information as and when I desire, dependant on 
workload, family commitments, etc. More importantly I find my work habits, idea 
generation, and dare I say enthusiasm, tend to be quite irregular and often quite 
spontaneous. Therefore if I suddenly find myself in a position where I have a great idea, 
and have a sudden urge to download and play with some data, I generally like to involve 
myself with it almost immediately, and therefore waiting to book a computer at the 
university in two weeks’ time, is something I would tend to avoid, in favour of a system 
that I can readily access through any computer at any time of the day. 
 
Thomson One Banker (Thomson Financial) satisfies nearly all of my requirements 
from a database and is adequately suited to my needs and style of working. The 
database itself allows access to quotes, earnings estimates, financial fundamentals, 
transaction data, corporate filings and many other data items for over 60,000 global 
companies. More importantly for this study, there is an abundance of UK listed firms 
contained in the database with access to both accounting and market-based data with 
large historical archives. The data itself is sourced from many industry leading sources 
such as Worldscope, Reuters, Extel, Datastream, and Investext. A study by Lara et al 
(2006) examines the effects of database choice on accounting research and provides 
evidence that Thomson Financial delivers more complete data items than a selection of 
six alternate sources with regards to UK companies. These results empirically justify 
my choice of database and the collection of data. 
 
The database can be accessed via two routes. Firstly access can be gained through 
any web browser, although this proved to be inefficient when trying to gather multiple 
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company records and seems to be focused upon data at individual or firm specific level. 
The most attractive feature of this database however, is the second method of access, 
which comes in the form of a Microsoft Excel plugin. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Thomson One Banker command ribbon. 
 
The plugin integrates itself fairly seamlessly into an existing Excel package, adding a 
comprehensive set of functions to a new tab within the command ribbon as per Figure 
7.1. What follows therefore is a brief discussion of the methodology employed in 
gathering the required information as well as a description of the final data set employed 
in the empirical section of this thesis. 
 
7.3 Methodology and composition of the final dataset 
 
The first task was to realise the timeframe (or window) in which this study was to be 
based upon. From my research objectives it was evident that I needed to use the most 
up-to-date data which was available, but the question pertained as to how far back in 
time data should be collected in order that it should still be meaningful and relevant. 
The timeframe required is largely dependent upon the number failed firms to be used 
within the empirical analysis, as past studies have shown (e.g. Stein, 2002) that the 
accuracy of any insolvency prediction model is primarily driven by the number of firms 
within the failed/insolvent group. In order to collect a sufficient number of failed firms 
for a sound empirical analysis, an average failure rate of around fifteen public 
companies per year was identified and therefore (somewhat arbitrarily) a decade of firm 
failures with an expected population of 150 was deemed to be sufficient. 
 
The initial goal therefore was that the study utilised accounting and market data upon 
a sample of LSE-listed non-financial failed and non-failed firms, the sample period for 
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such data being the decade 1st January 2000 to the 31th December 2009. All firm specific 
information being obtained through LSPD and Thomson One Banker.114 
 
The next step was to create a list of companies that were both non-failed (alive) 
during this period and separate these from those which had failed (died). LSPD provides 
a General Descriptive record for every firm listed on the LSE since 1955. One of the 
fields in the General Descriptive record is G10 (Type of Death), which provides an 
indication of the reason why the company ceased to be quoted in the SEDOL. Several 
codes within this field are relevant to this study with the death codes matching my 
description of forms of failure and insolvency as per section 4; 7, the company is 
valueless after a creditor liquidation; 16, the company is valueless after the appointment 
of an administrator; 20, the company is in administration / administrative receivership; 
and 0, indicates that the firm is still alive and trading on the LSE. 
 
As regards failed firms, this study takes the population of all London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) listed non-financial firms recorded on the London Share Price 
Database as failing between 30th September 2000 to 30th September 2009, reduced only 
by the exclusion of firms for which insufficient data is available to allow application of 
the insolvency prediction models under consideration. Failed firms were identified from 
the LSPD general descriptive record (G10) by codes 7, 16 and 20.115 Firms with 
financial industry codes116 are excluded from the population because of their differing 
capital structure, earnings profile and reporting. The final number of failed firms 
considered in the study is 178. 
 
The sample of non-failed firms was selected from a non-financially coded population 
which was deemed to be “alive” at 30th September 2009 with LSPD code G10 “Type of 
Death” equal to zero. For this study a non-failed sample containing 2244 eligible firms 
was identified for potential analysis.  
 
                                                 
114
 One possible problem associated with this specific timeframe is the adoption by the UK of IFRS reporting 
standards in 2005. A change in reporting such as this may have a dramatic effect on empirical results if not dealt 
with in a correct manor. The treatment of this accounting regulation change is dealt with later in this section. 
Whereas this is not ideal, to gather an adequate number of failed firms, this was unfortunately a necessity. 
115
 Representing, respectively: creditor liquidation, receiver appointed, and in administration. 
116
 LSPD (G17) codes 8X, 8XX and 8XXX representing firms from the financial sector. 
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Once the name and SEDOL for each firm within the failed and non-failed groups had 
been identified through LSPD, the next step was to begin the construction of a master 
spreadsheet (or database). Careful consideration was required as to the layout, format, 
and usability and to the requirement that unforeseen/additional data items may be added 
with relative ease if desired at some point post collection. It was clear from the outset 
that none of the database report templates provided by Thomson would be adequate for 
my requirements and therefore I needed to design my own.  
 
Within the chosen sample period it was desired that for each company, a number of 
firm-year observations would be required following recent prior literature. Therefore a 
maximum of ten years’ worth of data was potentially available for each firm identified 
through LSPD. The inclusion of multiple firm years of observations has several 
impactors. Firstly it enables the observation of trends in ratios/model scores over time, 
particularly in the periods preceding the onset of insolvency. Secondly it enables a 
direct comparison of firms which fail within a certain year with accounting numbers and 
financials from the non-failed population within that same year. If only one year of 
observations (i.e. from the last set of accounts and likely to be circa 2009) was collected 
from the non-failed population, then these cannot be directly compared to a failed 
company’s data circa 2000 due to changes in economic and reporting conditions. By 
collecting multiple years of data, the total sample can be split and contrasted over each 
year of the decade, a further and more detailed discussion of this can be found in the 
forthcoming section entitled the “structure of annual samples”. 
 
It was possible to import the list of firms (or entities) identified through LSPD into 
Thomson One Banker, although this proved to be somewhat monotonous. Although 
LSPD provides company name and SEDOL reference, Thomson likes to use its own 
reference key for populating its datasheets117. Once the Thomson key had been 
established for each firm, using a purposely written excel macro, it was possible to 
manipulate the layout of the datasheet so that each firm had ten identical rows (one for 
each year) each containing the company’s descriptive information from the LSPD, 
along with the Thomson key identifier. 
 
                                                 
117
 It would have been simpler (and saved a lot of time) to match the SEDOL numbers provided by LSPD to 
those of Thomson. A number of attempts (for unknown reasons) did not yield satisfactory results and I was 
forced to match each company individually. 
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The next stage was to populate the datasheet with the data items themselves, but this 
led to the inevitable question of which items should be included. From the prior 
literature it is evident that ratios representing liquidity, profitability and size are 
commonplace and that variations of these ratios are often composed of a number of key 
variables. Also taken into consideration were possible prediction model candidates for 
inclusion in the empirical analysis although at this point the choice of models was not 
conclusive. The initial number data items required, not including firm specific 
descriptors, was just seventeen118 and were as follows: total assets, total debt, current 
assets, current liabilities, cash, retained earnings, EBIT, sales, inventories, operating 
expenses, depreciation, net income, funds from operations, ROE, dividends, market 
capital and price volatility. 
 
To populate the data items, it was necessary to enter the functions specific to 
Thomson One Banker into the Excel spreadsheet. For example, to populate the sheet 
with the previous ten years of total assets in descending rows, for the entity in cell A2 I 
used the function: 
 
=TFDL("TF.TotalAssets","DBCPA","-10Y",$A2,"Total Assets","GBP,6","DOWN","0","",) 
 
As by convention, each column of the datasheet represents a different data item, and 
therefore the function (which acts as a header for each firm set) is repeated across all 
columns with only the data item reference (for the case of total assets this is 
“TF.TotalAssets”) and the column header (Total Assets) requiring amendment 
according to the desired item. Figure 7.2 shows a section of the resulting datasheet, 
noting that if no data items are available for a particular year then the function returns 
the value #N/A. 
 
                                                 
118
 The number of possible two-variable ratio combinations in this instance is 289 (172). There are of course 
many more possibilities if more than two variables are combined. 
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Figure 7.2: Sectional extract of the resulting initial datasheet. 
 
The final step of the collection procedure was to eliminate the rows which contain 
the header information for each firm along with the blank row separator and those rows 
for years with no data. This was simply achieved by running another custom macro after 
copying the values of the “live” spreadsheet into a new blank sheet. The resulting sheet 
contained all firms (failed and non-failed) with all anticipated data items, for all years of 
available data between 2000 and 2010, as per Figure 7.3. This resulting dataset 
contained 820 firm year observations for the 178 failed firms, whereas the non-failed 
group provides 12,855 firm-year observations from the 2244 available firms. 
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Figure 7.3: Sectional extract of the final dataset. 
 
An additional data item, the risk-free rate of return was also anticipated as being 
required for some models, particularly the evaluation of the latest form of credit risk 
assessment models based on option pricing formulae. The risk-free rate of return is 
calculated annually using the nominal yield on a 12-month UK treasury bill as at 30th 
September each year in order to satisfy the requirements of the portfolio structure 
detailed below. 
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7.4 Structure of annual samples 
 
The empirical analysis involves the consideration on the same date each year of a set 
of all firms from my sample for which pertinent data is available in respect of that year, 
some of which fail within twelve months of the portfolio date (failed firms), and the 
remainder which do not (non-failed firms). In the prior literature, such sets have been 
referred to as annual ‘portfolios’.  
 
The predictive power of any model depends upon when the information (financial 
report) is assumed to be available. Some previous studies have not been careful in this 
regard. (Ohlson, 1980). 
 
The formation of annual portfolios is a necessity for my empirical analysis due to the 
inclusion of both market and accounting data. To aid a realistic and correct comparison 
between the models it is essential that the market data is taken from the same date on 
each year to withstand seasonal changes in economic and financial conditions, and that 
the accounting data is given a sufficient lead-time to allow for preparation and 
publication after the fiscal year-end.  
 
A portfolio is created for each year from 2000 to 2009 on 30th September, following 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) to aid both comparability with that study and between the 
different models which I test. Each portfolio is constructed on the 30th September using 
market data up to and including this date. Accounting data, however, is taken only from 
annual reports made up to 30th April of the same year or before, to duplicate the 
information conditions which would have been available to a real-world user of the 
models on 30th September of the year concerned.   
 
The choice of the portfolio date is somewhat arbitrary. Hillegeist et al. (2004) use a 
four month lag of portfolio creation presumably due to the SEC requirement of report 
publishing within four months of the accounting year end. In the UK the statutory 
requirement is that public limited company reports must be filed and published within 
seven months of the accounting year end. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) use the 30th 
September of each year (at least five months from the fiscal year end) to construct their 
portfolios and I do the same. The resulting portfolios provide an average lead-time of 
9.5 months quite a bit shorter than Olson’s (1980) lead-time of 13 months. Interestingly 
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whereas Ohlson found that the lead-times were on average larger in length for failed 
companies in the year prior to insolvency, from data it is evident that no such anomaly 
exists, with failed and non-failed companies exhibiting remarkably similar average lead-
times. Figure 7.4 shows the frequency of lead-times pertinent to this study along with 
the matching distribution of fiscal year-ends. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Lead-time between portfolio date and availability of accounting data 
 
7.5 Reduction, training and validation 
 
In order that I conduct an empirically sound study upon the collected data, two 
factors need to be considered; with the first these factors ultimately leading to a 
reduction of the potential 12,855 firm year observations as described previously to 
approximately half. 
 
It is critical for an empirical comparison of any nature that the same sample (in this 
case the sample of firms) remains of the same with respect to both size, and of 
population, i.e. the exact same number of firms, as well as each individual firm, must be 
constant throughout all of the tests. Particular to this study, and true to many statistical 
tests, the number of “events” for which one is trying to classify, is critical to the results 
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which are obtained. The events in this case are corporate insolvencies, and from 
previous studies mentioned in this thesis along with the potential data sample as 
described in the previous sub-sections, the reader will be aware that from a whole 
population, these events are somewhat rare. Stein (2002) demonstrates that the number 
of these rare events is critical in determining the classification accuracy of insolvency 
prediction models through the use of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves 
(see section 8.3), and is therefore apparent that each model and each test should be 
conducted upon the exact same sample of firms119. 
 
With this data restraint it is therefore paramount that each firm-year observation will 
contain all of the variables and data items attributable to each of the different models 
which are sought to be tested and these models are described in detail subsequently 
within section 8. As much as this reduction is a necessity, it does potentially attract 
some bias into the test results. Zmijewski (1984) investigates the bias in predictive 
accuracy of conditional probability models when samples are selected (or hand-picked) 
to ensure data is complete, such as the intentions of this study. He notes that: 
 
The sample selection bias is examined by comparing probit estimates of a financial 
distress model conditional on complete data to estimates from a bivariate probit 
assessment of the model which incorporates the probability of an observation having 
complete data into the estimation of the financial distress model parameters. The 
bivariate probit model consists of two probit equations, the financial distress equation 
and the complete data equation. The data constraint when using bivariate probit is that 
all observations must have complete data for the complete data equation. The results 
are qualitatively similar to the choice-based sample results in that a bias is clearly 
shown to exist, but, in general, it does not appear to affect the statistical inferences or 
overall classification rates. 
 
For the confines of this study therefore, it would suggest that this bias should not 
influence the results, but of course, a great deal of information is inevitably lost through 
the omission and deletion of firms who do not provide 100% of the data items sought. 
 
                                                 
119
 King and Zeng (2001) suggest that these rare events can also dramatically underestimate probabilities within 
popular statistical methodologies such as logistic regression, and propose an adjustment methodology to 
counteract this bias. 
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Lastly I would like to discuss training and validation. For some of the prediction 
models of which I test (notably any statistical model which requires some sort of 
parameter or coefficient estimation), both training and validation samples are required 
in order to assess the model’s predictive accuracy. There are various alternative forms 
of approach to validation (e.g., random sample cross-validation, k-fold cross validation, 
Lachenbruch jack-knife), each designed to portray a true ex-ante depiction of the 
models ability to distinguish firms which fail from those which do not. With regards to 
these alternative methodologies, it is thought that many are rather antiquated and have 
previously been adopted only where sample have been limited in size. A true measure 
of a models ex-ante predictive ability is based upon the holdout sample. Many studies 
previously described within this thesis have utilised holdout samples but are often 
selected from a population covering the same time period as that of the training sample 
and therefore disregard the issues pertaining to application focus which I discussed in 
section 5.5.  
 
For this study therefore, in the first instance, and in order to reflect the practices of 
construction and use of the models by real-world users, I split the sample through time 
rather than by some random assignment. Training data comes from portfolios 2000-
2005 inclusively, and the validation data (on which all models, irrespective of whether 
or not they require training, are tested) is derived from portfolio years 2006-2009.120 
 
Table 7.2 presents the number of firm-year observations employed in the training and 
validation samples within this study, noting the reduction in total number of non-failed 
firm-years from a potential 12,855 (as described in section 7.3) to 6,595 in order to 
satisfy the condition of completeness. 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                 
120
 Accounting data required for validation/testing, therefore, is from the post-IFRS implementation era. It would 
have been more satisfactory to conduct the whole study using IFRS data. Obtaining an acceptable sample size (in 
respect of number of failed firms) to incorporate both training and validation samples post-IFRS is, however, not 
yet possible. 
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Table 7.2: The Number of firm-year observations employed in the study 
Training Validation 
Period 2000-05 2006-09   
Failed 39 62 101 
Non-Failed 2964 3530 6494 
Total 3003 3592 6595 
 
 
Additionally, I generate 10,000 random splits between training and validation 
samples. In each case the number of both failed firm-year observations and non-failed 
firm year observations in the training and validation samples are as in Table 7.2; but the 
allocations now being made on a random basis, rather than according to chronology. 
This provides me with the opportunity to investigate variation in efficacy of the 
prediction models resulting from variation in allocation of observations between the 
training and validation samples.   
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8 Method 
 
8.1 Model selection 
 
The academic literature contains a vast array of techniques which have been posited 
over the last five decades to ‘predict’ corporate insolvency. The selection choice of 
technologies for comparative study in this paper is based on three factors: (i) the 
frequency of study and reported efficacy in the prior academic literature; (ii) relevance 
to the UK; and (iii) the desire to incorporate and compare market-based contingent 
claims models and their traditional accounting number-based counterparts.  
 
My review of the literature has identified 24 different methodologies,121 which are 
shown as the abscissa labels in Figure 8.1. These range from the univariate and 
multivariate discriminant analysis of the 1960s and 1970s, through the logit and probits 
of the eighties and the artificial learning models of the 1990s, to the recent crop of 
contingent claims models in the 2000s. 
 
A number of papers in the literature compare and contrast these various 
methodologies and techniques, e.g., Scott (1981), Zavgren (1983), Laitinen and 
Kankaanpaa (1999), and Balcaen and Ooghe (2006). A meta-analysis by Aziz and Dar 
(2006) considers a number of methods and techniques from a sample of 89 empirical 
studies (although there is little representation of market-based contingent claims type 
models). Their paper compares the frequency of usage (by academics) and efficacy of 
16 different methodologies which they identified as being used to predict insolvency 
and assign each of them to one of three categories, ‘statistical models’( represented by 
black bars in the following charts), ‘artificially intelligent expert systems (AIES)’ 
(represented by grey bars), and ‘theoretical models’ (represented by white bars). The 
Aziz and Dar results show MDA and logit to be the most popular for study amongst 
academics; and AIES, such as neural networks and genetic algorithms, to have, 
marginally, the best reported efficacy. 
 
                                                 
121
 Many more, if variations within method are counted. 
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Figure 8.1 shows the frequency of my academic investigation of each of the 24 
corporate insolvency prediction technologies found in my literature review, grouped 
according to the Aziz and Dar (2006) categories. Having surveyed over 350 papers, a 
larger sample of studies than was considered by these authors, the relative frequency of 
academic investigation of techniques that I find is in accordance with their results.122 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Frequency of models employed in previous studies 
 
 
                                                 
122
 Although approximately 350 papers have been surveyed, the differing nature of the literature means that there 
are not 350 different models. Some papers offer a new model (1 entry), some are purely discursive (0 entries), 
and some papers are comparative (a paper empirically evaluating 4 types of models would therefore have 4 
entries). 
Theoretical models 
Statistical models 
Artificially intelligent models 
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Further to this frequency analysis, the next stage was to determine whether any of the 
prediction technologies demonstrate proportionally higher prediction accuracy over its 
counterparts. In order to determine the accuracies of each individual technology, 
reported accuracies of each model within the groupings needed to be collated from the 
individual papers within my literature catalogue.  
 
Some difficulty arose when trying to determine what constitutes “accuracy” as the 
literature contains varied methods on how to report the efficacy of these types of models 
(differing sample types, holdout verses validation tests, one-to-five year ahead forecasts, 
confusion matrices, ROC curves etc). As there is no general acceptable rule for 
reporting accuracy, directly comparing empirical results from one paper to the next, 
making inferences within this regard is somewhat dangerous. What this investigation 
can do however is act as a meta-generalisation of the literature which may or may not 
provide an insight into classification accuracies across different modelling 
methodologies. 
 
To ensure as much comparability as possible, the accuracies of the methodologies 
are, where possible, are taken from individual model tests one-year prior to failure. In 
addition, those accuracies reported are preferably from holdout sample tests, whether 
that be a cut-off and overall error approach, a Jack-knife validation approach, ROC 
curves or k-fold validation. This analysis resulted in 188 observations across the 24 
different modelling technologies. 
 
This process was quite lengthy and somewhat tedious, but was a necessary part of the 
review process. It was hoped that the results would demonstrate whether one particular 
prediction technology on average provided consistently higher accuracies and therefore 
warrant inclusion in the empirical work within this thesis. The results of this meta-
analysis are shown in Figure 8.2 with summary statistics presented in Table 8.1. 
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Figure 8.2: Accuracy of insolvency prediction models employed in previous studies 
 
 
The technologies show accuracies of between 63% and 93% across the sample of 
literature, although several of the technologies do not offer a sufficient number of 
papers to provide empirical robustness. Only seven of the technologies provide five 
observations or more rendering the accuracies of the less-used technologies difficult to 
interpret. From these seven technologies, the best performer on average is the Probit 
model (86.8%) closely followed by neural networks (86.1%). The lowest ranked from 
these seven are the univariate studies (76.9%). 
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Table 8.1: Summary statistics for different model types and their accuracy 
Model type N 
Mean 
accuracy 
(%) SD  
Balance sheet decomposition measures 4 87.7 3.3 
Gambler's ruin theory 4 86.5 8.7 
Cash management theory 3 67.3 8.3 
Contingent Claims models 14 85.1 5.2 
Chaos theory model 2 74.6 13.5 
Univariate 10 76.9 8.0 
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) 52 82.2 11.7 
Logit 40 82.2 16.0 
Probit 6 86.8 10.4 
Mixed Logit 2 93.0 2.8 
Cumulative sums procedures (CUSUM) 2 83.7 1.7 
Partial adjustment processes 1 81.0 n/a 
Survival analysis (Hazard) models 3 78.3 15.7 
Fuzzy rules based classification 1 73.8 n/a 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) 1 89.5 n/a 
Linear Goal Programming (LGP) 1 85.0 n/a 
Multi-criteria decision aid approach 
(MCDA) 1 63.2 n/a 
Risk index models 1 96.0 n/a 
Recursive partitioning 5 87.2 11.3 
Case-based reasoning 2 83.0 2.1 
Neural networks 23 86.1 8.4 
Genetic algorithms 4 88.7 8.8 
Support vector machines 3 75.0 8.5 
Rough sets 3 80.0 13.1 
TOTAL 188     
 
 
If I combine these scores and present them in their three main groups, theoretical, 
statistical, and artificially intelligent models, one can observe that the accuracies 
become less disperse. Statistical models are the weakest (82%), theoretical models are 
second (83%), and the best performing group are the artificially intelligent systems 
(85%). The overall average reported accuracy for all models representing all 
technologies and all studies throughout the evolution of the literature is approximately 
83%. 
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Figure 8.3: Aggregated predictive accuracies across the literature 
 
The inclusion (exclusion) of models in (from) the empirical examination content of 
this thesis is therefore based upon the finding of the meta-analyses highlighted above. 
Univariate, MDA, logit, NN and Contingent Claims models warrant inclusion due to 
their popularity in the literature and representative predictive accuracies in comparison 
to the mean average. These five model types also allow for representation of the three 
broader groupings of model types – Theoretical, Statistical, and Artificially Intelligent. 
Technologies which provide small proportions of the catalogue, despite some instances 
of above average predictive accuracy, are reluctantly excluded from the study as they do 
not represent the literature as a whole. Individual model selection(s) representing the 
chosen technologies are described in the following section along with the reasons for 
inclusion. 
 
8.2 Model specification  
 
8.2.1 Single variable models 
 
 
I include three single variable ‘models’ in the comparative analysis: cash-flow to 
total debt (which I designate model BV); firm size (model SIZE); and book-to-market 
value ratio (model B/M).  
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Vassalou and Xing (2004) find empirical evidence that ‘both size and book-to-
market exhibit a strong link with default risk’; and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) use these 
variables as benchmarks against which to compare multivariate models. Size is 
intuitively appealing as a factor in a firm’s chances of surviving financial setbacks, 
since high equity reserves or asset bases act as buffer to enable continued debt 
servicing, should a company suddenly lose liquidity and/or profitability. This can be 
seen in the case of BP PLC. In 2010 BP, one of the largest companies listed on the 
FTSE, saw its share-price collapse as a result of both ecologic and political blunders 
surrounding the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The sheer size of BP has ultimately 
ensured its survival (despite the $20 billion spill response fund it was ordered to create 
by US President Obama. In contrast, one the largest companies to suffer insolvency 
proceedings in the last five years was Woolworths PLC, one of the UK’s largest and 
established high street chains, although with an asset base of just 1% of BP’s. 
Woolworths could not weather the onset of recession, and bad management and the 
failure to modernise are attributed to its demise. I use the natural logarithm of GDP 
deflated Market value of equity as a proxy (SIZE) to determine its influence on failure 
probability. The histogram for this, and proceeding models, represents the ratio/score 
when converted into a probability using the formula	^ = Q;m/(1 + Q;m9. The 
requirement for conversion is dealt with in section 9.3 but in essence it acts as a control 
in order that each of the models which I test are comparable. The plots are broken down 
into failed and non-failed firms, normalised and over-laid with a normal curve 
approximating the distribution using the SAS procedure UNIVARIATE with the option 
histogram / normal. This provides a consistent view of the data within each of the 
models which I test to further aid comparability in a visual sense. 
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Table 8.2: Summary statistics for SIZE variable 
Model Mean Median SD Var Kurt. Skew Min Max N 
SIZE FAILED 0.197 0.1565 0.172 0.029 0.838 1.176 0.001 0.717 101 
NON-FAILED 0.062 0.016 0.109 0.012 10.447 2.970 0.000 0.870 6494 
t-stat 7.856* 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms after converting scores into 
probabilities. 
 
 
 
The second variable I include is the book to market ratio (B/M) defined as the book 
value of a firm (total assets less total liabilities) divided by the market value of the firm 
(market capital). I use this ratio to investigate whether failed firms are typically over-
valued compared to the non-failed firms and whether a lower ratio score suggests a 
higher probability of failure. The book to market ratio allows, in essence, investigation 
of the extent of which market capitalisation of future earnings is useful alone in 
predicting failure. The book-to-market ratio is converted into a failure probability using 
the formula	^ = Q;m/(1 + Q;m9. 
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Table 8.3: Summary statistics for B/M variable 
Model Mean Median SD Var Kurt. Skew Min Max N 
B/M FAILED 0.790 0.782 0.160 0.026 -1.33 -0.077 0.467 1.0 101 
NON-FAILED 0.741 0.725 0.137 0.019 -0.03 0.064 0.000 1.0 6494 
t-stat 3.008*         
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms after converting scores into 
probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third single variable that I incorporate is cash-flow to total debt as determined by 
Beaver (1966) to be the best performing ratio for the prediction of failure. Re-
examinations of this ratio are infrequent in recent literature123 as most studies focus on 
an array of multivariate and non-linear approaches. I include Beaver and his best 
performing ratio (BV), to investigate how one of the simplest and earliest posited 
methods of insolvency prediction compares with the latest efforts of academics, 
practitioners and modern processing power. That is, to see if developments over the last 
                                                 
123
 Although Zavgren (1983), for example, includes Beaver’s ratio in her comparative study. 
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44 years have significantly advanced our ability to separate the failing from the non-
failing firms. 
 
Table 8.4: Summary statistics for BV model 
Model Mean Med SD Var Kurt. Skew Min Max N 
BV FAILED 2.794 0.125 20.39 415.71 95.4 9.664 0 202.9 101 
NON-FAILED 40.90 0.407 737.9 544540 3461 53.890 0 50493 6494 
t-stat -4.063*         
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms after converting scores into 
probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.2 Discriminant Analysis (Z-Score Models) 
 
 
I examine two forms of the Z-score model, the Altman (1968) Z-score and the 
Taffler (1983) Z-score. 124 These are included in my study owing to their popularity in 
prior literature, past reported efficacy and for the latter, UK relevance. For the initial 
test where I split the sample through time and thus replicating a real-world setting, I test 
each of these the models with both their original coefficients and with updated 
                                                 
124
 The latter model coefficients being later disclosed in Agarwal and Taffler (2007). 
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coefficients as estimated from my more recent data set (the training sample). It is 
intuitive to expect that the models, for which the coefficients have been updated, would 
outperform their original counterparts given that these models were derived using data 
from the 1960s and 1970s. Moyer (1977) was able to reduce misclassification from 25% 
to 10% by updating the coefficients and I would expect similar results. Table 8.7 sets 
out the models and their original and updated coefficients. Model re-estimations are 
performed using the training sample (approximately half of my data set and non-IFRS 
accounting data), and a validation sample (again, approximately half of my data set but 
using IFRS accounting data) is used to assess each model’s performance. As previously 
described, I do this in order to replicate real-world information conditions whilst 
ensuring two large samples of firms. The identities of the variables in the models are as 
follows: WC/TA is working capital divided by total assets; RE/TA is retained earnings 
divided by total assets; EBIT/TA is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total 
assets; VE/TL is market value of equity divided by total liabilities; S/TA is sales divided 
by total assets; PBT/CL is profit before tax divided by current liabilities; CA/TL is 
current assets divided by total liabilities; CL/TA is current liabilities divided by total 
assets; and NCI is the ‘no-credit interval’, being the period a company can continue its 
operations using its immediate assets if all other forms of short term finance are cut off. 
More directly, NCI is defined as immediate assets (current assets – stock) less current 
liabilities, divided by daily operating costs excluding depreciation. All variables are 
calculated from data items as obtained from Thomson One Banker. The summary 
statistics for each of the variables and Z-scores, along with the normalised distributions 
of the resulting models are provided in Tables 8.5 and 8.6.125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125
 Although the updated models AZU and TZU are trained on the training sample and tested for accuracy via the 
validation sample, here the coefficient estimates are applied to the whole sample to generate the summary 
statistics. 
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Table 8.5: Summary statistics for Altman’s Z-score and its variables 
Variable Group Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max 
WC/TA Failed 
-0.100 -0.049 0.499 0.249 39.970 -5.07 -4.066 0.743 
  (-0.061) 
Non-failed 0.099 0.098 0.490 0.240 1309.598 -27.7 -25.881 0.992 
  (0.414) 
  t-stat -3.990*               
RE/TA Failed 
-1.156 -0.169 3.962 15.698 62.899 -7.42 -36.173 0.496 
  (-0.626) 
Non-failed -1.654 0.091 92.190 8499 6469 -80.3 -7422 5.364 
  (0.355) 
  t-stat 0.411               
EBIT/TA Failed 
-0.270 -0.116 0.501 0.251 10.334 -2.88 -2.946 0.318 
  (-0.318) 
Non-failed -0.043 0.058 0.539 0.291 321.321 -14.7 -16.663 1.718 
  (0.153) 
  t-stat -4.508*               
VE/TL Failed 5.539 1.056 17.331 300.361 42.997 6.02 0.025 144.45 
  (0.401) 
Non-failed 265.775 4.732 4297 18465972 3072.79 50.79 0.004 282458 
  (2.477) 
  t-stat -4.878*               
S/TA Failed 0.956 0.799 0.731 0.534 2.639 1.250 0.000 3.996 
  (1.500) 
Non-failed 1.175 0.973 1.500 2.250 477.685 17.08 0.000 51.145 
  (1.900) 
  t-stat -2.926*               
Model Group Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max 
AZ Failed -1.64 -0.87 12.49 155.99 25.05 -2.18 -84.3 59.85 
Non-failed -158 -4.36 2527.5 6388456 3244.9 -51.9 -169474 230.05 
  t-stat 4.99*               
AZU Failed 0.018 -0.06 1.505 2.265 40.067 5.15 -2.225 11.998 
Non-failed -0.69 -0.71 1.423 2.024 962.23 20.96 -17.929 69.562 
  t-stat 4.72*               
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
     The values in parenthesis represent the values presented within the original formulation of the model to aid 
comparison between the updated and original models.  
** The signs of the coefficients have been reversed so that the resulting score is increasing with the probability 
of failure. Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms after converting 
scores into probabilities. 
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Table 8.6: Summary statistics for the Taffler Z-score and its variables 
Variable Group Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max 
PBT/TL Failed 
-0.695 -0.199 1.484 2.203 9.900 -2.975 -7.628 1.304 
Non-failed -0.116 0.168 2.622 6.873 2150 32.938 -37.984 159.762 
  t-stat -3.830               
CA/TL Failed 6.273 1.247 34.413 1184.283 91.431 9.386 0.052 340.493 
 
Non-failed 67.399 2.485 834.744 696798 2593 44.836 0 53027 
  t-stat -5.603               
CL/TA Failed 0.511 0.405 0.535 0.286 51.520 6.239 0.032 5.036 
Non-failed 0.370 0.323 0.489 0.239 1442 30.310 0.003 26.881 
  t-stat 2.636               
NCI Failed 
-13.696 -55.893 564.508 318670 85.990 8.896 -704.388 5387.986 
Non-failed 132.745 -3.544 3525 12426818 1657.84 39.263 -16891 155125 
  t-stat -2.057               
  
Model Group Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max 
TZ** Failed -1.3 6.912 90.14 8125 73.396 -8.07 -830 91 
Non-failed -167 -5.58 2088 4363385 2581 -44.6 -132545 542.4 
  t-stat 6.04*               
TZU** Failed 1.001 0.852 0.964 0.928 49.72 6.045 -0.316 9.088 
Non-failed 0.653 0.579 1.021 1.043 855.7 16.32 -20.93 48.4 
  t-stat 3.59*               
 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
** The signs of the coefficients have been reversed so that the resulting score is increasing with the 
probability of failure. Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms 
after converting scores into probabilities. 
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The models updated via the initial chronological split, show that not all of the 
original variables are significant or add much information to the model. For the Altman 
model AZU I can observe that VE/TL returns a very small value adding no information 
to the model at all, likewise with the variable RE/TA. For TZU I find that only PBT/CL 
and CL/TA are significant (both containing the CL variable, intrinsically related to both 
liquidity and short-term profitability. The signs of each coefficient are mostly acting in 
the same direction as their original counterpart, particularly within the Taffler model, 
and notably all of the significant coefficients have identical signs to their original 
counterparts. This suggests that each variable’s directional influence upon insolvency is 
the same as it was when the original model was formulated which I would expect to be 
the case. The changes in magnitude reflect the population and period in which the 
training samples were constructed.  
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Table 8.7: Z-score models and their initial parameter estimates 
Altman (1968) Model WC/TA RE/TA EBIT/TA VE/TL S/TA   
Original Coefficients (AZ)a -1.2 -1.4 -3.3 -0.6 -0.99   
Updated Coefficients (AZU)b -2.67*** 0.001 -0.423*** 0.000 -0.38**   
Taffler (1984) PBT/CL CA/TL CL/TA NCI     
Original Coefficients (TZ)a -12.18 -2.5 10.68 -0.029     
Updated Coefficients (TZU)b -0.131*** -0.0001 1.78*** -0.0001     
Significance of estimates of updated coefficients: ***, **, * denote two-tailed significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
levels. 
a The signs of the original coefficients for each model have been reversed so that the resulting score is 
increasing with the probability of failure. 
b The updated coefficients are raw canonical coefficients estimated using the SAS procedure PROC CANDISC 
in an attempt to mimic the discriminant approach of the original authors. The base data for re-estimation of the 
Altman model and Taffler models (the “training sample”) is described in section 7. 
 
The original Altman model for example was derived from US data from the period 
1946-1965, compared to my study which uses UK data from 2000-2005 (in this 
instance, the chronologic training sample). It is therefore of little surprise if there is 
significant change in the coefficient estimates. The Taffler Z-score is based on data 
from the same country to my study and is more recent (1968-1976) than the Altman 
model. The small magnitude of two (out of four) variables, however, suggests that these 
indicators are not as relevant to UK distress prediction as perhaps they once were (at 
least relative to PBT/CL and CL/TA). 
 
One further cause for the change in magnitude of these coefficients may lay in the 
discriminant process itself and its heavy reliance on both variance and covariance of the 
underlying variables. Both of these original models were formulated using small, 
carefully designed datasets with restrictions placed on company attributes such as size 
and sector. As previously discussed in section 7 of this thesis, with the exception of the 
removal of all financially coded companies, no such limitations have been placed upon 
my empirical study. Section 9.3 investigates this further by studying the effects of 
Winsorisation upon both the accuracy and coefficients estimates of these two 
discriminant models. In short the results show that under a certain amount of 
Winsorisation, both the original and updated models can achieve identical accuracies 
and under this circumstance demonstrate very similar values for their coefficient 
estimates. 
 
These coefficients which are estimated using this time-split approach are just one 
part of this evaluation. Further within this thesis I generate 10,000 new sets of 
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coefficients based upon random sample splits, for both of the Z-score models. I do this 
to investigate the distributional properties of the models predictive accuracy over the 
last decade and to determine whether splitting the data sample by chronology gives a 
fair representation of the models predictive ability. Section 9.4 provides the results of 
this investigation. 
 
8.2.3 Ohlson’s  logit model 
 
 
I test one particular version of the logit model, that of Ohlson (1980). The reason for 
its inclusion is based on its popularity and influence in the prior literature (e.g., Zavgren, 
1983; Begley et al, 1996; Hillegeist, 2004). I test the model with both its original 
coefficients (OL) and with updated coefficients (OLU) as estimated using my training 
sample. Table 8.3 sets out the model with its original and updated coefficients. 
 
The identities of the variables in the models are as follows: SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of GDP-deflated total assets; TL/TA is total liabilities divided by total assets; 
WC/TA is working capital divided by total assets; CL/CA is current liabilities divided by 
current assets; OENEG is a dummy variable equal to one if total liabilities exceed total 
assets, and zero otherwise; NI/TA is net income divided by total assets; FUTL is funds 
from operations (pre-tax income plus depreciation and amortization) divided by total 
liabilities; INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if  net income was negative over 
previous two years, and zero otherwise; CHIN is the scaled change in net income 
calculated as (NIt-NIt-1)/(|NIt|+|NIt-1|), where NIt is the net income for the most recent 
period. All variables are calculated from data items as obtained from Thomson One 
Banker. 
 
Table 8.8 presents the specifications for the original Ohlson logit model, and a model 
in which the coefficients have been updated using the chronological training sample. 
Similar to the Z-score model updates I can see that the majority of coefficient estimates 
(seven out of ten) have the same sign. Only three variables WC/TA, INTWO, and CHIN 
(measures of short term liquidity and profitability) are statistically significant, whereas 
FUTL provides almost nothing to the model. Similarly to the MDA models, the changes 
in coefficient magnitude reflects the population and period in which the training 
samples were constructed, suggesting that their influence has changed over time and/or 
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is distorted by inter-country differences. The original Ohlson model was derived from 
US data from the period 1970-1976 and is therefore unrealistic to expect too many 
similarities to my study, although there is nothing to suggest that any of the variables 
used in the model(s) would not be an intuitive predictor.    
 
Table 8.8: Ohlson's logit model and parameter estimates 
Ohlson (1980) Model Constant SIZE TL/TA WC/TA     
Original Coefficients -1.32 -0.41 6.03 -1.43     
Updated Coefficientsa -1.91*** -0.217* 2.492*** -0.946*     
 
      
      
              
  CL/CA OENEG NI/TA FUTL INTWO CHIN 
  0.08 -2.37 -1.83 0.285 -1.72 -0.52 
  -0.007 -12.208*** 0.321 0.003 1.434** -0.639 
  
 Significance of estimates of updated coefficients: ***, **, * denote two-tailed significant at the 1%, 5%, 
10% levels. 
a
 The updated coefficients are estimated by logistical regression using the SAS procedure LOGISTIC. 
The base data for the re-estimation (the training sample) is in accordance with that which is described in 
section 7. 
 
 
The summary statistics for each of the variables and Z-scores, along with the 
normalised distributions of the resulting models are provided in Table 8.9. On an 
individual basis, seven of the nine variables have means which are significantly 
different between the failed and non-failed groups of firms. The magnitudes of the 
values in all but one case are comparable to the values presented in Ohlson (1980). The 
reason for this scaling difference is due to a number of observations in which the total 
debt figure is considerably low in comparison to the funds from operations.126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126
 Although the updated models AZU and TZU are trained on the training sample and tested for accuracy via the 
validation sample, here the coefficient estimates are applied to the whole sample to generate the summary 
statistics. 
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Table 8.9: Summary statistics for the Ohlson logit model and its variables 
Variable Group Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max 
SIZE Failed 17.004 16.914 1.718 2.950 0.248 0.235 11.750 21.535 
  (12.134) 
 
(1.38) 
     Non-failed 18.330 18.117 2.271 5.155 -0.056 0.321 7.844 26.039 
 
  (13.26) (1.570) 
  t-stat -7.656*               
TL/TA Failed 0.362 0.326 0.289 0.084 23.044 3.560 0.003 2.388 
  (0.905) (0.637) 
 
Non-failed 0.224 0.178 0.257 0.066 145 8.042 0.000 7.072 
  (0.488) (0.181) 
  t-stat 4.791*               
WC/TA Failed 
-0.100 -0.049 0.499 0.249 39.970 -5.073 -4.066 0.743 
  (0.041) (0.608) 
Non-failed 0.099 0.098 0.490 0.240 1309.598 -27.783 -25.881 0.992 
 
  (0.310) 
 
(0.182) 
       t-stat -3.990*               
CL/CA Failed 1.705 1.217 1.919 3.684 18.476 3.918 0.046 12.740 
  (1.32) 
 
(2.52) 
     Non-failed 1.268 0.771 13 171 3244.264 54.414 0.008 864 
 
  (0.525) 
 
(0.740) 
       t-stat 1.746               
OENEG Failed 0.010 0.000 0.100 0.010 101.000 10.050 0 1 
 
  (0.18) 
 
(0.385) 
     
 
Non-failed 0.010 0.000 0.098 0.010 98.166 10.007 0 1 
 
  (0.0044) 
 
(0.0660) 
       t-stat 0.020               
NI/TA Failed 
-0.298 -0.137 0.502 0.252 10.091 -2.852 -2.954 0.380 
  (-0.208) (0.411) 
 
Non-failed -0.075 0.030 0.538 0.290 320 -14.354 -17 1.678 
  (0.052) (0.075) 
  t-stat -4.426*               
FUTL Failed 
-2.413 -0.178 14.396 207.259 94.902 -9.616 -143.513 1.109 
  (-0.117) (0.421) 
Non-failed -7.654 0.311 161.205 25987 1154.631 -29.835 -7684 381.83 
 
  (0.28) 
 
(0.36) 
       t-stat 2.130*               
INTWO Failed 0.743 1.000 0.439 0.193 -0.746 -1.126 0 1 
  (0.39) 
 
(0.488) 
     Non-failed 0.367 0.000 0.482 0.232 -1.696 0.552 0 1 
 
  (0.043) 
 
(0.203) 
       t-stat 8.508*               
CHIN Failed 
-0.203 -0.214 0.605 0.367 -0.791 0.348 -1 1 
 
  (-0.322) 
 
(0.644) 
     
 
Non-failed 0.017 0.053 0.559 0.313 -0.431 -0.117 -1 1 
 
  (0.0379) 
 
(0.458) 
       t-stat -3.635*               
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        Model Group Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max 
OL** FAILED 0.65 0.813 0.356 0.126 -1.331 -0.519 0.013 1 
NON-FAILED 0.256 0.069 0.349 0.122 0.015 1.267 0 1 
  t-stat 11.0*   
  
          
OLU** FAILED 0.723 0.814 0.218 0.047 0.274 -1.07 0.016 0.972 
NON-FAILED 0.464 0.408 0.228 0.052 -0.867 0.406 0 1 
  t-stat 11.8*               
 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
** The signs of the coefficients have been reversed so that the resulting score is increasing with the 
probability of failure. Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms. 
The values in parenthesis represent the values presented within the original formulation of the model to 
aid comparison between the updated and original models. 
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8.2.4 Artificial Neural Networks 
 
 
For the neural network analysis I use a particular training algorithm called the 
backpropagation algorithm. Backpropagation verifies and adjusts the weighted signals 
produced by each node in the hidden layer according to the amount in which they 
contribute to the overall least squares error function 
 
N = 	 	∑ |Z − Z|	Z  (8.1) 
 
where Z 	 is the output produced by the training observation c and Z 	is the target output 
for the same observation. The algorithm looks for the minimum of this error function in 
weight space using the method of gradient descent. The signals are fed back through the 
network and the combination of weights which minimizes the error function is 
considered to be a solution of the learning problem. Figure 8.4 visualises the three 
layers of the NN along with the inter-connections. A full derivation of the 
backpropagation algorithm can be found in Rojas (1996).127 
                                                 
127
 It was desirable that this derivation was included within the Appendix to this thesis. The length of the 
derivation and the time constraints put upon me has meant that this has not been possible. However Appendix I 
does offer a small discussion of the leading principles involved within the development of the training 
algorithm.. 
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Figure 8.4: A feedforward neural network with backpropagation 
 
I apply the NN methodology described above to form three different models based 
upon the variables employed by Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Taffler (1983). By 
comparing the original model, the model with updated coefficients, and the non-linearly 
constrained NN model, I hope to determine and evaluate each models performance from 
a different perspective, i.e. from the perspective of the technology employed when the 
inputs remain constant, rather than that of the model itself. 
 
With respect to the construction of the hidden layers, referring back to section 5.4 
and with reference to the majority of situations, there is no clear-cut method for 
determining the optimal number of hidden layers and the number of nodes within them, 
without training several networks and estimating error rates for each. Too few hidden 
units will result in a high training error and high classification errors when applied to 
further samples because the model is under-fitted. On the other hand, if one has too 
many hidden units one might get a low training error but might still get large errors 
when applied to further samples because of over-fitting. Tetko et al. (1995) provide a 
discussion as to the effects of this trade-off, whilst others offer certain “rules of thumb” 
for selecting the number of hidden layers and nodes (Berry and Linoff, 1997; Blum, 
1992; Swingler, 1996; Boger and Guterman, 1997). 
 
For my networks therefore, there was a certain amount of trial and error while trying 
to determine the optimal level of hidden layer items, training epochs, and momentum. 
The optimal structure consisted of n inputs in the input layer (model dependant), n+1 
hidden nodes, one output node, zero momentum and twenty-five raining cycles (epochs) 
229 
 
using the backpropagation algorithm; this was applied to each of the three models to aid 
comparability. 
 
For a description of the variables used for each model please refer back to Sections 
(8.2.2) and (8.2.3). Table 8.10 provides the summary statistics for each of the three 
models.128 
 
Table 8.10: Summary statistics for the neural network models 
Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
AZN FAILED 0.011 0.011 0.000 7.85E-09 5.738 2.233 0.0116 0.0121 62 
NON-
FAILED 0.011 0.011 0.000 1.34E-08 645.1 18.906 0.010 0.0161 3530 
t-stat 3.77*         
TZN FAILED 0.034 0.032 0.005 3.14E-05 8.557 2.880 0.029 0.057 62 
NON-
FAILED 0.031 0.031 0.003 1.2E-05 827.27 23.331 0.024 0.171 3530 
t-stat 3.85*         
OLN FAILED 0.043 0.032 0.0396 0.0015 0.161 0.995 0.0033 0.1560 62 
NON-
FAILED 0.012 0.007 0.034 0.0012 319.6 15.199 0.001 0.996 3530 
t-stat 6.11*         
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level. 
Histograms map the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms after converting scores 
into probabilities. 
 
                                                 
128
 Due to the black-box nature of the neural network, the scores were not available for the training sample, The 
summary stats are therefore only available for the validation sample. 
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8.2.5 The European call contingent claims model 
 
The methodology and theoretical underpinning to the contingent claims models have 
previously been discussed within section 5.6 of this thesis; therefor this first paragraph 
merely acts as a reminder of the basic principles of the model. What follows is a 
discussion of two different approaches to the pertaining parameter estimation process. 
 
The EC model is used to measure the default probability of a firm and is based on the 
work of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) and adopted and modified by 
Moody’s Rating Methodology as described in Sobehart and Stein (2000) and Crosbie 
and Bohn (2003). 
 
The model views equity as a European call option on a firm’s assets with a strike 
price equal to the face value of its liabilities. All liabilities are assumed to be zero-
coupon bonds following Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). The option 
expires at time T when the debt matures. At this point the equity holders either; exercise 
their option and pay off the debt (if the firm’s assets (V9	are of greater worth than the 
face value of its liabilities (X9) or, let the option expire (if the assets are not sufficient to 
cover the cost of the maturing debt). If the option is left to expire then the debt holders 
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will file for liquidation and the assets will be transferred to them without cost. The 
residual claim for the equity holders is zero. The contingent claims model determines 
the probability of these two outcomes. McDonald (2002, p. 604), shows that the 
probability of failure V	(T9	<	X can be calculated as follows: 
 
Prob	 = N a− pqT	>	–	k	SUUAl√l b (8.2) 
 
Equation (8.2) contains variables which are both observable and those that are not. 
The observable variables of Equation (8.2) are  (face value of long-term liabilities), ? 
(time to expiry – taken to be one year), and   (annual dividend rate). , σ and μ are not 
directly observable and, therefore, must be estimated. 	represents the market value of 
the firm’s assets, σ is the asset volatility and μ is the expected return of the firm. The 
next section summarises two versions of the EC model which are evaluated within my 
study, that contain differing approaches to the estimation of the unobservable 
parameters , σ and μ, and to treatment of the  value. 
 
8.2.5.1 Hillegeist et al. (2004) 
 
The value of equity as a call option on the value of the firm’s assets j 	is:129 
 
j = eklN(9 − 	QmlNn − σ√?o + n1 − eklo (8.3) 
 
where  
 = p

qT	>m	–	kT	SUUAl√l   
 
Here, the optimal hedge equation is defined as: 
 
8j = G¡¢£¤(¥S9J¦	  (8.4) 
 
The values  and 8 can be found by solving Equations (8.3) and (8.4) 
simultaneously. The solution methods employed by Moody’s are described by Crosbie 
                                                 
129
 The call equation is modified to include dividends, reflecting that the dividend stream flows to equity holders. 
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and Bohn (2003) as a “complex iterative procedure” and Hillegeist et al. use SAS 
implementation to back-out these unknowns. In this study I use a modified version of 
the SAS code as provided by Hillegeist el al. (2004, pp 30-31) with initial values of  
and 8	computed according to Bharath and Shumway (2008). The values of X are 
proxied by total liabilities, departing from the Moody’s method that uses current 
liabilities plus half of long-term debt. Hillegeist et al. suggest that lowering the value of 
liabilities mechanically reduces the probability of failure estimates and slightly weakens 
the model.  
 
The expected return on the firm’s assets μ is proxied by the actual return on assets 
for the previous year thus: 
 
μ§ 	= max p	«T	¬M7M¥¥;«¡S«¡S , 2q (8.5) 
 
where 2 represents the risk free rate and 3­3Qg` are the sum of the common and 
preferred dividends declared during the year. The expected return from Equation (8.5) is 
bounded below by the risk-free rate (as shown), and also bounded above by 100%. 
 
Inserting the values derived from expressions (8.3) through (8.5) into expression 
(8.2) provides the Hillegeist et al. (HKCL) probability of default.130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130
 Moody’s methodology differs here in that the defaults are not taken from an assumed normal distribution, but 
instead mapped to historical default frequencies from their large proprietary database. 
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Table 8.11: Summary statistics for HKCL model and its variables 
Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
HKCL FAILED 0.065 0.021 0.114 0.013 11.280 3.081 0.000 0.686 101 
NON-
FAILED 0.009 0.000 0.044 0.002 153.42 10.27 0.000 0.978 6494 
t-stat 4.90* 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms. 
 
 
8.2.5.2 The Bharath and Shumway (2008) “naive” approach 
 
The naive EC model presented Bharath and Shumway (2008) simplified the 
methodology examined by Hillegeist et al. (2004) – in which where the values of  and 
σ are estimated by solving two simultaneous non-linear equations. Bharath and 
Shumway instead use the following formulations: 
 
 = j +  (8.6) 
 
8 = ¦ 8j + V 8¬ (8.7) 
 
8¬ = 0.05 + 0.258j (8.8) 
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Where 8¬ represents the volatility of the firms debt – naively deduced by a linear 
transformation of the volatility of equity, 8j. 
 
Bharath and Shumway approximate the value of liabilities, , to be current liabilities 
plus one half of long term debt, following Moodys’ methodology. Reisz and Purlich 
(2007) present that within a barrier option framework, the barrier that triggers 
insolvency is more likely to be lower than the face value of long-term liabilities, 
therefore, current liabilities plus one half of long term debt may be a more realistic 
approach for a call option model. 
 
The expected return on the firm’s assets μ is estimated simply by using the prior year 
stock return bounded between the risk-free rate and 100%. According to Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008), a problem with this bounded variable is that 
 
“…even if realized return on equity is a good proxy for expected return on equity, it 
will be a good proxy for expected return on assets only if the expected return on debt is 
the same for all the firms”.  
 
More problematic may be that, in a real world setting, the prior year stock return is 
likely to be negative particularly within a sample period enveloping a period of 
economic downturn, thus setting a floor at the risk-free rate does not reflect the 
possibility of equity degradation. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) show, however, that the 
expected return generating model does not significantly affect the outcome of the 
probability estimates. 
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Table 8.12: Summary statistics for BS model and its variables 
Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
BS FAILED 0.126 0.074 0.134 0.018 -0.057 1.007 0.000 0.482 101 
NON-
FAILED 0.020 0.000 0.064 0.004 20.681 4.348 0.000 0.548 6494 
t-stat 7.93* 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms. 
 
 
8.2.6 The down-and-out call barrier option 
 
 
The barrier option framework extends the EC model and treats the underlying value 
of firm equity to be treated as a DOC option. Debt holders own a portfolio of risk-free 
debt and a DOC option on the firm’s assets which can be exercised should the value of 
the firm falls below a predetermined barrier.  The implied firm-specific barrier level is 
estimated by using market values of firm traded equities (or an appropriate proxy) 
which can be achieved by adopting Equation (8.9) and solving for the barrier (B). 
Equation (8.9) shows the DOC formula under the condition that the barrier is set at, or 
below, the strike-price/liability value.131 
                                                 
131
 See Brockman and Turtle (2002) and  Reisz and Purlich (2007) for details of possible variations, and an 
excellent discussion and formulation of barrier options framework. The DOC formula is often present as 
containing an included term to take into consideration a possible rebate which may be attributable to the 
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 j = * = 	ekN() − 	emNn − σ√o  
     −	aek >AU(¡¢)U TN() − em >AU(¡¢)U Nn − σ√ob 
 
 = ln(/) + n2 −   + (8	/2)o8√ 	 
 = ln(	/) + n2 −   + (8	/2)o8√? −  	 
(8.9) 
 
The setting of the barrier (higher than, lower than, or at, the liability value is a matter 
of contention, of which a good discussion is provided by Reisz and Purlich (2007). For 
example, companies which exhibit a low credit rating, high monitoring costs or long 
term illiquid assets, may see debt-holders set a barrier above the liability value. 
However, given the definition of insolvency as being V (T) < X, I would not anticipate 
that a barrier set above liabilities would trigger any insolvency procedure in the UK. I 
would expect that the position of the barrier would be set at, or below, the value of debt 
to be serviced. Moody’s practitioners Crosbie and Bohn (2003) find that: 	
“...in general firms do not default when their asset value reaches the book value of 
their total liabilities. While some firms certainly default at this point, many continue to 
trade and service their debts. The long-term nature of some of their liabilities provides 
these firms with some breathing space. We have found that the default point, the asset 
value at which the firm will default, generally lies somewhere between total liabilities 
and current, or short-term, liabilities”. 
 
The definitions contained within Equation (8.9) are similar to the EC option formula, j represents the market value of equity,  is the market value of assets, 8 is the asset 
volatility, 2	 equals the risk-free rate of return and τ = (? − ) and is the time until the 
option expires. As with the section 4.5.1 the values  and 8 are determined by solving 
                                                                                                                                                        
shareholders should the option expire. As with similar studies, we assume a zero rebate so the term collapses. 
Note that if both the rebate and the Barrier are set to zero, then the equation further collapses into the non-
dividend EC option model. 
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the call option equation (8.4) and the optimal hedge equation (8.5). Several papers132 
follow Moody’s and set liabilities (X) equal to current liabilities plus half long-term 
debt. Others stick more closely to the BSM theory and use total liabilities for X133	and I 
do the same. 
 
Once B, V and σ have been backed out, the probability of default can be calculated 
using Equation (8.10) which represents the actual probability of default rather than the 
risk neutral probability.134 
 
  
Prob = 1 − 	Nln >A + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
+	
	(k)U  ∙ < ln  	 + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
(8.10) 
 
     
For my study, I employ two different versions of the DOC model. The first model 
(DOC) is constructed according to the method described above. The known input 
variables for the model are the market value of equity, volatility of equity (standard 
deviation of daily log returns), Time until expiry (one year), rebate amount (zero), risk-
free rate of return (proxied by 12 month UK Treasury bond yields), and annual dividend 
rate. I then solve for the unknowns B, V and σ. Firstly I solve Equations (8.3) and (8.4) 
to derive my estimates of V and σ.	Return on assets µ can then be calculated as per 
Equation (8.5). Second, I determine the size of the barrier as per Equation (8.9). I then 
apply equation (8.10) to obtain the rick neutral probability of default within one year. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
132
 For example: Vassalou and Xing (2004), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Reisz and Purlich (2007). 
133
 E.g. Hillegeist et.al. (2004). 
134
 A concise derivation can be found in Appendix 16.8 which follows Reisz and Purlich (2007) (Appendix A. 
pp123-129) which in turn follows that of Merton (1974). 
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Table 8.13: Summary statistics for  DOC and its variables 
Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
DOC FAILED 0.066 0.015 0.116 0.014 6.074 2.490 0.000 0.550 101 
NON-
FAILED 0.010 0.000 0.044 0.002 65.772 7.289 0.000 0.731 6494 
t-stat 4.84* 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed. 
 
 
8.2.7 A new naive DOC model 
 
It may be argued that a large part of the success/interest which has surrounded the 
Altman Z-score throughout its existence, as well as its implied predictive ability, is its 
sheer simplicity. Five variables, a simple linear model, and a proven track record, has 
established the Altman Z-score as the insolvency prediction model which first comes to 
mind for the average student or academic. I therefore attempt to simplify the DOC 
model so that it might more easily be applied across varying practices and disciplines, 
as a theoretically driven, convenient and practical model which determines a within-
one-year probability of failure. 
 
Just as Bharath and Shumway (2008) propose a naive version of the EC option 
model, I attempt to do the same for the DOC model. I first follow Bharath and 
Shumway in eliminating the backing out of V and σ  by estimating their values as per 
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Equations (9) and (10)135. I then calculate the firm specific barrier, not by solving 
equation (12), but setting the barrier to the same level as the firm’s total liabilities which 
I feel to be an acceptable proxy given the legal balance sheet insolvency definition as 
being V(T)< X. I also assume a no dividend policy, zero rebate, costless insolvency 
proceedings, and set the return on assets equal to the risk-free rate. 
 
The naive risk-neutral DOC (JW_DOC) is shown below in Equation (8.11). 
 
JW_DOC =  N a>A>mSUUA b +  >VA
UU < a>AT>mSUUA b (8.11) 
 
where, 
 
  X = Book value of total debt 
V = j  +  
σ = 
¦ 8j + V (0.05 + 0.258j9 (σE = SD of daily log returns) 
r = risk free rate of return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135
 X is proxied by book value of total debt, VE is the market value of equity and σE is the volatility of equity 
taken as standard deviation of daily log returns over the previous twelve months. 
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Table 8.14: Summary statistics for  JW_DOC and its variables 
Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
JW_DOC FAILED 0.240 0.157 0.251 0.063 -0.093 0.992 0.000 0.938 101 
NON-
FAILED 0.040 0.000 0.121 0.015 18.486 4.109 0.000 0.986 6494 
t-stat 7.95* 
* Denotes significant difference in means at 5% level 
Histogram maps the difference in distribution between failed and non-failed firms. 
 
8.3 Comparing the models 
 
 
This section provides a discussion of the test procedures used to compare and 
contrast each of the sixteen models.  From the literature it is evident that many different 
techniques have been used to evaluate model accuracy and performance since the 
conception of the art, and to describe, discuss and apply each and every technique is not 
an efficient use of time resources. Some early techniques for model evaluation for 
example are out-dated and somewhat irrelevant to this study and therefore would make 
no sense in their application. The literature review of section 5 discussed in some detail 
several early classification procedures such as the confusion matrix, the Lachenbruch 
(1967) jack-knife technique, and k-fold cross validation. Although these techniques are 
still valid and could be correctly applied to this study, they have been improved upon 
and superseded by the techniques which are used in this study and are now discussed. 
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8.3.1 Converting scores into probabilities 
 
 
In order that the continuous Z-score and single ratio models may be directly 
compared to both the logit and contingent claims probability measures, I follow both 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) by using the logistic cumulative 
function ^ = QX;m/(1 + QX;m).136 
 
This transformation is not a panacea, as noted by each of the aforementioned studies. 
Maddala (1983) shows that discriminant scores should be converted into probabilities 
using a linear probability model after suitable transformation through regression sum of 
squares. McFadden (1973) shows, however, that the MDA and logit approaches are 
closely related under normality assumptions and therefore the use of the logistic 
cumulative transformation is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.3.2 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves  
 
 
For the first test of model comparativeness, I assess each model’s predictive ability 
using the ROC curve. Traditional tests for model accuracy have relied on the 
minimising of type I and type II errors based on an arbitrary cut-off point chosen by the 
researcher. Table 8.4 shows the form of a typical classification table, similar to that first 
used by Altman (1968). The problem with this classification method is the single cut-off 
point. The ROC curve addresses this issue by evaluating the model’s performance over 
the whole range of possible cut-off points.137  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 Having reversed the signs for the coefficients in the original MDA models, we do the same for BV and SIZE 
so that the ratios increase with the probability of failure. 
137
 ROC curves have traditionally and most commonly been used in the field of medicine for assessing various 
diagnostic procedures and treatment techniques. 
243 
 
Table 8.15: The confusion matrix 
  ACTUAL 
PREDICTION Failed Non-failed TOTAL 
Failed TP FP a TP+FP 
Non-failed FN b TN FN+FP 
TOTAL TP+FN TN+FP TP+FP+TN+FN 
a
 Type II error       
b
 Type I error 
Notes: TP (True Positive) is the correct classification of a failed firm. TN (True Negative) is the correct 
classification of a non-failed firm. A false negative outcome (FN) is predicting a firm to survive when it 
actually fails (type I error). A false positive outcome (FN) is predicting a firm to fail when it actually 
survives (type II error). 
 
My construction of ROC curves is as in Gönen (2006). Firm-year observations from 
each portfolio are ranked from the highest probability of failure to the lowest. For each 
of 101 possible cut-offs in probability, ranging from 1.00 to 0.00 on steps of 0.01, the 
number of TP, FP, TN and FN outcomes are be observed. Then for each of the 101 
possible cut-offs, the true positive rate (TPR) and the true negative rate (TNR) are 
deduced. The TPR is calculated as TP / (TP+FN) and is often referred to as the 
“sensitivity”. The TNR is calculated as TN / (TN+FP) and is referred to as the 
“specificity”. The ROC curve is then plotted as sensitivity against 1-specificity (also the 
false positive rate) as cut off probability varies. The model’s overall accuracy is then 
deemed to be represented by the area under the ROC curve, θ138. Three examples of the 
ROC curve can be found in Figure 8.5 below. The figure depicts two models which 
have strong and medium accuracies, along with one of a random choice model 
demonstrated by the 450 line. As demonstrated by the example, a model with high or 
near perfect accuracy will have each of its measurements (for each cut-off) clustered 
near to the position (0,1) where there is 100% sensitivity and 100% specificity. 
 
 
                                                 
138
 Stein (2000) provides an excellent examination and interpretation of the meaning of the area under a ROC 
curve. 
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Figure 8.5: ROC examples 
 
The area under the ROC curve is estimated using the trapezoid rule for which Hanley 
and McNeil (1982) show is “virtually identical” to the Wilcoxon test statistic and an 
unbiased estimator of the true smoothed area under the curve. As my ROC curves are 
constructed using percentile values of specificity and, my probability estimates are on a 
continuous scale, the trapezoid rule for calculating the area is empirically sound. The 
standard error of the area under the ROC curve :N(·¸) is calculated following Hanley 
and McNeil (1982) as per Equation (8.12). 
 
:N(·¸) = ¹θ¸n1 − θ¸o + (gº − 1)n» − θ¸	o + (g¤ − 1)(»	 − θ¸	)gºg¤  
(8.12) 
 
where gº and g¤ are the number of failed and non-failed firms in the sample 
respectively; » is the probability that two randomly selected failed firms will both be 
classified as having a higher probability of failure than a randomly selected non-failed 
firm (» =  θ¸ ÷ (2 − θ¸)); and »	 is the probability that one randomly selected failed 
firm will be classified as having a higher probability of failure than two randomly 
selected non-failed firms (»	 = 2θ¸	 ½ (1 + θ¸)). The standard error is used to determine 
the t-statistic for any significant difference in the model’s accuracy over a model with 
no predictive ability.139 
                                                 
139
 A model with no predictive accuracy, a random choice model, is represented by a 45degree line on the ROC 
diagram and therefore has an area of 0.5. 
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The accuracy ratio, AR, of each model, following Englemann et al. (2003), is a linear 
transformation of the area under the ROC curve: AR = 2*(θ - 0.5). 
 
8.3.3 Test of economic value  
 
 
The ROC curve described in the previous section, although a common tool for model 
comparison, suffers from the problem of ascribing equal error costs which, although 
convenient for econometric modelling, does not provide a true picture similar to what 
one might find in a real-world situation. Within a loan market, the cost to a lender of 
misclassifying a failing firm as being non-failing, granting a loan, and potentially losing 
100% of the loan amount, is potentially far greater than the reverse in which a non-
failing firm is deemed to be failing and hence the lender forgoes potential interest 
repayments. Many researchers have neglected to take into account these differing error 
costs, treat them as being equal, and simply aim to minimize the combined total error 
rate presumably because in practice, the specification of error costs seems to be difficult 
and very subjective (Steele, 1995). Therefore if I presume that the misclassification 
costs are not equal, how does one go about determining a value for these costs? 
 
Differing misclassification costs have been used within insolvency prediction ever 
since its conception, but not necessarily used with respect to assessing a model’s 
performance. Anderson (1962), Edminster (1972), and Altman (1977) for example used 
these differing misclassification costs in order to determine an optimal cut-off score for 
their predictive models. Altman (1993) provides an example of how to determine these 
costs, a revised approach to that which is found within Altman (1977); used to calculate 
the optimal cut-off score for the ZETA model as previously described in section 5.2. 
With regards to costing the type I error, Altman (1977) investigated a small sample of 
33 regional banks and 25 large city banks (1969-1975) and determined that the loss 
incurred by banks with regards to defaulting loans was approximately 69% of the loan 
value for small banks and a loss of 72% by the major banks upon the loan value. For 
“computational purposes” Altman took the cost of misclassifying a failed company as 
being non-failed (type I error) as being 70% of the loan value. A revised value of the 
type I error appears in Altman (1993) as being 62% of the loan value, which is based on 
questionnaires returned from 55 commercial banks from the period 1975-1977 with 
information on 377 loans. 
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We can observe that over a small number of years, differing information and from 
slight changes to calculation methodology, the cost of a type I error can indeed be very 
subjective; shifting 8% in value for the Altman example. More recent studies such as 
Stein (2005), Blochlinger and Leippold (2006), and Agarwal and Taffler (2008), 
determine the type I error cost to be much lower than that of Altman’s 62% which is not 
surprising given the decades between the studies. Stein (2005) uses a base loss rate of 
50% in his discussion of ROC analysis and loan pricing; Blochlinger and Leippold 
(2006) use a loss given default (LGD) rate of 40% based on a weighted average of 
collateralised and unsecured credits gained through their positions with Credit Suisse 
and the Swiss Banking Institute; Agarwal and Taffler (2008) use an LGD of 45% under 
the assumption that the banks within their test of economic value follow the Basel II 
Foundation Internal Ratings-based approach, and that all loans are unsecured senior 
debt. For comparability, relevance, and desire to follow internationally accepted 
treatments of LGD, for my analysis of economic value of insolvency prediction models, 
I also treat the LGD as being 45%. 
 
The cost of classifying a non-failed firm as being failed (type II error) is also open to 
a degree of subjectivity, although it is perhaps easier to measure in real monetary terms 
than its type I counterpart. The cost of not making a loan to a non-failing, payment 
making company, because your model determined the company to fail, can be based on 
the concept of opportunity costing. Within this concept, the lender will negate to collect 
the loan repayments from the credit worthy company because it has failed to lend, but 
the opportunity cost is the rate of interest the lender might have earned if the loan 
amount was invested elsewhere. Therefore the type II error cost in this instance is the 
forgone rate of return on the rejected loan, minus the opportunity cost that could be 
made through investing. The opportunity cost in this situation is likely to be somewhere 
around the base rate of interest (currently 0.5%) that will fluctuate over time, whereas 
the forgone loan rate will be firm specific, making an absolute value for a type II error 
difficult to assess. Altman (1993) approximates this cost at 2%, although I would 
suggest that in today’s financial climate this would perhaps be too high, and a more 
appropriate value might be around the 1% mark. The model that I use for testing 
economic value when misclassification costs differ, which I will now go on to describe, 
does not, however, specifically require a fixed type II error cost. Instead the model, as 
247 
 
we shall discover, treats the cost of a type II error as pure loss of business, affecting the 
lender’s profit and return figures in an artificial economy. 
 
The economic value model which I use is based upon the framework defined in 
Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) (B&L) in which they provide a method to link the 
accuracy of credit risk models in distinguishing good and bad loans, the pricing of said 
loans, and the decision making process of both lender and borrower. B&L note that the 
traditional cut-off regime is “rather conservative since the bank uses the credit score at 
an exogenously given risk premium”, i.e. in reality a bank will offer a spread of interest 
rates – firms with higher perceived default risk will be charged a higher rate of interest 
than a firm which has a lower perceived default rate. Additionally, firms which are 
determined to be of too high a risk will not be offered a loan at all. B&L derive a pricing 
regime which determines the credit risk spread as a function of a firm’s credit score (as 
determined by a particular model). Assuming that the lender will only offer loans which 
have a positive net present value, and ignoring any strategic value which might be 
gained through relationship banking, the chargeable rate of interest can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
¾() = '(O = 1|: = )'(O = 0|: = ) =¿ + À 
(8.13) 
 
Where R(t) is the chargeable interest rate given a credit score t, '(O = 1|: = ) is 
the probability that the borrower will become insolvent and default on its loan given a 
credit score of t, '(O = 0|: = ) is the probability that the borrower will not default 
given a credit score t, LGD is the percentage of the loan value lost given borrower 
default, and k is the interest rate charged to those borrowers perceived to be of the 
highest quality. B&L round the value of R(t) up to the nearest quarter of one per cent. 
 
With respect to the test itself, I follow B&L and imagine an artificial economy, with 
a number of banks competing for business. Each bank within the economy prices its 
loans based upon a particular credit scoring method (e.g. Altman’s Z-score) and 
presents its offer to the potential borrower. A rational borrower will accept the loan 
from the bank which offers the lowest rate of interest which, with the omission of any 
relationship banking, provides the most favourable terms. B&L note that: “When the 
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bank derives the price from the credit score, a low-power model results in a non-
competitive pricing system (does not get the customer’s business). Hence, a marginal 
power improvement may lead to a sizeable profitability increase (grants more loans 
because it is more attractive to borrowers)”. 
 
The test, therefore, is constructed thusly: I assume that the total value of the loan 
market is worth £100 billion and that each of the n firms (borrowers) within the loan 
market are seeking an equal loan of value £100bn / n. The economy has within it m 
banks competing for business, each using a different credit scoring model140. Each bank 
refuses loans to those companies which fall within the bottom 5% of their respective 
credit spread but otherwise will offer a loan at interest rate	¾(). The potential borrow 
will evaluate all the loan offers that are presented, and accept the offer which provides 
the lowest rate of interest. In the event that two (or more) bank offers are of equal terms, 
the value of the loan is divided equally between these banks. The scenario may also 
arise where one (or more) firms are refused loans by all banks, and therefore it is 
possible that the market share gained by the banks may not sum to one. 
 
Once all of the loan applications have been processed I can determine the 
profitability and return on assets (ROA) figures generated by each bank, based upon 
total loan value, interest charged, and loan amounts lost through default. The banks 
performance will be ranked according to their resulting ROA and thus provide an 
insight into the economic value for of the insolvency prediction and credit risk models 
investigated within this thesis, for when misclassification costs differ. 
  
                                                 
140
 Several scenarios are played out. The first scenario is based upon the original validation sample split through 
time (2006-2009) and includes all sixteen models. The second scenario incorporates the whole decade (2000-
2009) and includes ten models: AZU, AZN, TZU, TZN, OLU, and OLN are dropped from the original collection 
of sixteen models as to not to allow any bias to enter the test (these six models being estimated using data from 
the period 2000-2005). 
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9 Results and findings 
 
I present first, in Sections 9.1 and 9.2, results based on my chronological split 
between training and validation/testing samples (with training data from portfolios 
2000-2005 inclusive, and validation data from portfolio years 2006-2009). This split 
was performed in order to reflect the practices of construction and use of the models by 
real-world users. I then proceed into section 9.4 and present findings as to the 
distributional properties of θ for each model, derived by a 10,000-iteration Monte Carlo 
approach to training and validation sample splits. Section 9.5 presents the test results for 
economic value when misclassification costs differ. 
 
9.1 ROC Analysis: summary statistics 
 
 
The mean predicted probability of firm failure as between failed on non-failed firms 
from each model is presented in Table 9.1. The table summarises the failure 
probabilities as defined formerly within the model specification, and are transformed 
into probabilities where appropriate. All the models give a higher mean predicted 
probability of failure for the group of actually failed firms that they do for the non-failed 
firms141; and this significant at the 1% level for twelve out of sixteen models - the 
exceptions being OLU, AZN, TZN and OLN, where there is no significance at generally 
acceptable levels. 
 
The measure of how closely a model’s predicted probability of failure conforms to 
the actual failure rate is known as calibration. The actual failure rate within my sample 
is 1.7%, being 62 of 3,592 firm-years in the validation sample. This percentage is much 
lower than that predicted by many of the accounting number-based models tested here 
(excluding neural network versions), indicating that these models are not particularly 
well calibrated. 
 
Far better calibrated in general are the market-based models, with models HKCL and 
DOC predicting failure in 1.1% and 1.2%, respectively, across all firms; and their naïve 
counterparts, models BS and JW_DOC, predicting 2.4% and 4.7% respectively.142  
                                                 
141
 Albeit this is only apparent in the fifth decimal place for model AZN. 
142
 Also, model OLU predicts a 1.5% failure rate across the sample. 
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The failure probabilities provided by the European call models HKCL and BS are 
close to (yet marginally higher than) the 0.96% and 2.12%, respectively, reported by 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008). The single variable SIZE model (itself based on market 
price data) is reasonably, but no so, well calibrated, predicting failure of 6.6% of firms. 
Therefore, the financial turbulence and economic recession during my validation sample 
period does not seem to have had any dramatic impact on the market-based model’s 
failure probability calibration. Stein (2002, pg. 7) suggests that the calibration of a 
model can be achieved by mapping its score to an empirical probability of default using 
historical data and adjusting for the difference; without Moody’s proprietary database 
however, this is somewhat problematic. The calibration of the models is not a necessity 
here, however, because it does not impact on the overall accuracy of the individual 
model to discriminate between failed and non-failed firms, the ordinal ranking is 
unaffected, and hence the overall power of a model is unaffected by its calibration.143 
 
Table 9.1: Mean predicted probabilities of failure for failed versus non-failed groups 
Model All Non-Failed Failed t-stata 
SIZE 0.066 0.063 0.198 6.400* 
Book to Market (B/M) 0.738 0.737 0.781 2.385* 
Beaver (1966) best performing ratio CF/TD (BV) 0.307 0.305 0.404 3.734* 
Altman (1968) Z-score (AZ) 0.116 0.111 0.366 7.956* 
Altman Z-score with updated coefficients (AZU) 0.401 0.399 0.520 5.334* 
Altman Z-score estimated using NN (AZN) b 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.003 
Taffler (1983) UK Z-score (TZ) 0.193 0.186 0.571 8.038* 
Taffler UK Z-score with updated coefficients (TZU) 0.433 0.431 0.497 3.937* 
Taffler UK Z-score estimated using NN (TZN) b 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.171 
Ohlson (1980) Logit Model (OL) 0.267 0.261 0.615 7.665* 
Ohlson Logit model with updated coefficients (OLU) 0.015 0.014 0.040 1.500 
Ohlson Logit model estimated using NN (OLN) b 0.013 0.013 0.044 1.830 
Hillgeist et al. (2004) market model (HKCL) 0.011 0.009 0.067 3.317* 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) naive market model (BS) 0.024 0.022 0.115 5.019* 
Barrier option as Down-and-Out-Call (DOC)  0.012 0.011 0.069 3.334* 
New naïve down-and-out call (JW_DOC) 0.047 0.044 0.221 7.800* 
Notes:  
* denotes one-tailed significance at the 5% level. 
a Test of difference in mean predicted probability of failure, non-failed firms versus failed firms. 
This table reports the probabilities of failure for each firm observation in my sample at the end of September 
each year in accordance with the designed portfolio structure. Those firms which fail in the 12 months after this 
date are deemed failed and those which do not are the non-failed firms. 
b
 The relative magnitude of the neural network estimates are not directly comparable to the other models as 
previously noted. 
 
 
                                                 
143
 For a more detailed discussion of power, accuracy, and calibration refer to Stein (2002).  
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Somewhat surprisingly, the largest significant difference between the two groups of 
firms comes from the original Taffler Z-score model (TZ), followed closely by the 
original Altman Z-score (AZ), JW_DOC and Ohlson (OL) models. With respect to 
these original accounting number-based models, the separation is much wider than that 
of their updated counterparts (although still highly significant), which is not what one 
might expect, and as the next section demonstrates, does not necessarily translate into a 
higher predictive accuracy. 
 
9.2 ROC Analysis: predictive power 
 
The ROC results are presented numerically in Table 9.2 and graphically in Figure 
9.1, highlighting several interesting points for discussion. The accuracy ratio of the 
single variable B/M model is a low outlier at 0.15; with the accuracy ratios of the rest of 
the models being in the range 0.31 to 0.68. Again, I observe the market-based models 
performing well in comparison with the accounting number-based models, with models 
HKCL and DOC at 0.65 and 0.64 respectively; and their naïve versions at 0.68 and 0.66 
respectively. The single variable SIZE model, with an accuracy ratio of 0.61, stands 
above the accounting number-based models, with the exception of OLN whose accuracy 
ratio is 0.62. 
 
Focusing on the area under the ROC curve, the single variable B/M model is the 
weakest, having θ = 57.7%, which is significantly different from 50% at only the 5% 
level. This is some distance from 68% θ reported for B/M by Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008), based on earlier UK data. All the other models which I test, however, have θ 
significant at the 1% level; indicating, broadly, success in my setting of the variables 
and technologies employed in the prediction of firm failure. The multivariate accounting 
number-based models, AZU, TZU and OLU (implemented using original variables and 
technologies, re-estimated on my own training data set) have θ of 68.9%, 65.3% and 
78.1% respectively; that is, AZU and TZU have similar predictive accuracy, while OLU 
outperforms them both. Employing a simple neural network technology allows us to 
obtain more predictive ability out of the Altman, Taffler and Ohlson variables, which is 
unsurprising, given that neural networks are less constrained than MDA and logit. The θ 
values achieved by the multivariate models in the current setting are, however, lower 
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than the θ values reported in earlier studies: Reisz and Purlich (2007) report θ at 78% 
for the original Altman model, using US data from 1988-2002; Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) report θ at 89% for the original Taffler model, using UK data from 1985-2001; 
and Duan and Shrestha (2011) report θ at 87.6% for the original Altman model and 
88.9% for the original Ohlson model. 
 
Ahead of the multivariate accounting number-based models, the best performing of 
the models in this study are the market-based models. The European call-based model 
HKCL achieves θ of 82.7%, with its naïve variant, BS, achieving 83.9%. The barrier 
option-based models achieve similar levels of accuracy, with DOC achieving a θ of 
81.8% and its naïve variant, JW_DOC, achieving θ = 83.0%. My result for the HKCL 
model is similar to the 84% reported by Agarwal and Taffler (2008); but is much higher 
than the 71% reported by Reisz and Purlich (2007). As regards model BS, Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008) report a θ of 87%, which, consistent with my findings, places it superior 
to the more sophisticated HKCL. Of the remaining single variable models, SIZE, with θ 
= 80.6%, outperforms the multivariate accounting number based models (indeed, it is in 
the league of the contingent claims-based models). Beaver’s best performing ratio, BV, 
at 45 years old, has θ = 67.0% - which places it alongside the multivariate accounting 
number-based models AZU and TZU in terms of predictive accuracy. 
 
With regards to the original accounting models, the original Altman model provides 
the highest accuracy of all the original accounting-number based models at 
approximately 79%, closely followed by the original Ohlson model (76.3%) and the 
original Taffler model (74.9%), the only model here which was originally formulated 
from UK data. Beaver’s single ratio CF/TD (67%) provides a reasonable accuracy 
compared to several of the other models, but is towards the low end of the spectrum. 
These numbers are in contrast to the original author’s claims of 87% (Beaver), 83% 
(Altman), 85% (Taffler), and 85% (Ohlson).144 
 
                                                 
144
 With the exception of the Ohlson model, each percentage is taken from out-of-sample (holdout) tests and is 
the overall error percentage given a particular cut-off point. Ohlson does not provide an out-of-sample test as he 
was not concerned with providing a “precise evaluation of a predictive model”. The accuracy of the Taffler 
model was taken from Agarwal and Taffler (2007) due to its larger sample size.  
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With reference to the discriminant models of Altman and Taffler, one can observe 
that the original models outperform their updated counterparts. This result is not what I 
would expect given the age of the original formulations, and one would rather expect 
the updated models to be superior in accuracy. This counter-intuitive result can also be 
found in Altman et al. (1977) who attribute the anomaly to smaller within-group 
variances of the later sample and hence, making the discriminant separation less 
efficient. Section 9.3 deals with this in more detail and attributes this anomaly to 
outliers and high variances within the training sample of data, something detrimental to 
the MDA process and not prevalent in the carefully constructed sample selection of the 
original models. This anomaly, as I will later explain in more detail, is not one which 
causes a great deal of concern. 
 
Table 9.2: Area under curve (θ) and accuracy ratio (AR) 
Model AUC (θ) SE(θ) Z AR 
SIZE 80.6% 0.034 9.097 0.61 
Book to Market (B/M) 57.7% 0.038 2.004 0.15 
Beaver (1966) best performing ratio CF/TD (BV) 67.0% 0.038 4.461 0.34 
Altman (1968) Z-score (AZ) 78.7% 0.035 8.291 0.57 
Altman Z-score with updated coefficients (AZU) 68.9% 0.038 4.994 0.38 
Altman Z-score estimated using NN (AZN) 73.1% 0.037 6.293 0.46 
Taffler (1983) UK Z-score (TZ) 74.9% 0.036 6.882 0.50 
Taffler UK Z-score with updated coefficients (TZU) 65.3% 0.038 3.992 0.31 
Taffler UK Z-score estimated using NN (TZN) 72.4% 0.037 6.046 0.45 
Ohlson (1980) Logit Model (OL) 76.3% 0.036 7.364 0.53 
Ohlson Logit model with updated coefficients (OLU) 78.1% 0.035 8.048 0.56 
Ohlson Logit model estimated using NN (OLN) 80.9% 0.033 9.242 0.62 
Hillgeist et al. (2004) market model (HKCL) 82.7% 0.032 10.076 0.65 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) naive market model (BS) 83.9% 0.032 10.733 0.68 
Barrier option as Down-and-Out-Call (DOC)  81.8% 0.033 9.655 0.64 
New naïve down-and-out call (JW_DOC) 83.0% 0.032 10.267 0.66 
The probability of firm failure is estimated using ten accounting number-based models (BV, AZ, AZU, 
AZN, TZ, TZU, TZN, OL, OLU and OLN) and six market based models (SIZE, B/M, HKCL, BS, DOC 
and JW_DOC). The area under the ROC curve, AUC(θ), represents a model’s overall accuracy. AUC(θ) 
is calculated using the trapezoid method which Hanley and McNeil (1982) show to be equal to the 
Wilcoxon test statistic. The standard error, SE(θ), is also calculated following Hanley and McNeil (1982). 
The accuracy ratio (AR), following Englemann et al. (2003), is a linear transformation of the area under 
the ROC curve: AR = 2*(θ - 0.5). The Z column contains shows the test statistic on deviation from a null 
hypothesis that the area under the curve = 0.5, i.e., no predictive ability. 
 
An issue pertaining to the accounting number-based models was the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in the UK from January 2005. 
Accounting standard changes will certainly impact on the predictive ability of an 
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accounting number-based failure prediction model. As discussed above, this sub-section 
has reported results based on testing/validation of each of the models using post-IFRS 
data, but with training/estimation of certain models performed using predominantly pre-
IFRS accounting data – the empirical method being designed to: (i) use up-to-date data; 
(ii) include sufficient failed firms to allow for sound analysis; and (iii) replicate use in 
practice, by estimating models (where required) on a sample period preceding model 
application. Avoidance of the transition to IFRS is, for the time being, not realistic; and 
a study based wholly in the post- IFRS era might be an area for future research. In the 
following sub-section, however, I consider the distributional of properties of θ for each 
model, derived by a 10,000-iteration Monte Carlo approach to training and validation 
sample splits – without any chronological constraint on the membership of the training 
and validation samples, i.e., allowing pre- and post-IFRS data in both training and 
validation samples. 
 
With regards to the neural networks, when I run the less restrictive feedforward 
neural network with backpropagation training algorithm  using the variables described 
in the original model as the input variables to the neural network, additional accuracy is 
achieved over the original technology. The increased accuracy is between 3 and 7 
percentage points overall, depending on the model type. Given the additional 
mathematical complexity of the models, this result is unsurprising, but it is interesting to 
see that the MDA models are able to be improved a great deal more than the logit 
model. 
 
The results obtained by using single variables as predictors are strikingly varied. B/M 
ratio does not provide any predictive ability at all with an AUC of just 57.7%, a very 
slight improvement on a random model. In contrast to this I find that using the SIZE 
variable I am able to predict insolvency quite well with an accuracy of 80.6%. 
Interestingly this accuracy is higher than that of almost all the accounting-number based 
models and is only out-performed by the Ohlson-based model (OLN) , and also each of 
the contingent claims models. The 45 year-old single ratio of Beaver shows a reasonable 
predictive accuracy of 67%, a score towards the bottom end of the sample, indicating 
that insolvency prediction has been as substantial as the literature might imply.  
 
Finally, I provide evidence that using contingent claims models for insolvency 
prediction in the current UK climate would be preferred to traditional accounting 
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models. Each of the four models has a higher accuracy than their accounting-number 
counterparts. 
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Single ratio models Altman Z-score and variants 
  
Taffler Z-score and variants 
 
Ohlson logit model and variants 
  
 
Single period call option models 
 
Barrier option models 
  
 
Figure 9.1: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.  
The 45-degree line (BASE) represents a model with no predictive accuracy, i.e., a random 
choice model with enveloped area equal to 50%. 
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9.3 The effects of outliers on discriminant function accuracy 
 
 
Under ROC analysis, updating the coefficients with the original technologies (MDA 
and logit) I am surprisingly only able to increase the accuracy of Ohlson’s logit model; I 
am unable to increase the accuracy for the Altman and Taffler models using 
discriminant analysis to re-estimate the coefficients. This result is counter-intuitive and 
contrary to what I would expect, given the age of the data employed to construct their 
original forms, and the number of firms within the original samples.  
 
An initial explanation could simply be that that accounting data is no longer 
sufficient (at least employing these particular variables) to be able to discriminate 
between failed and non-failed firms, or at least not as apparent as perhaps they once 
were. Insolvency in today’s climate and the onset of corporate failure may be a swifter 
process than in the past, due perhaps to the less complex administration process which 
is available in the UK today. If this were the case however, it does not explain why the 
original Altman and Taffler models are able to make this distinction to greater effect, 
and therefore this explanation falls flat. 
 
A further explanation may lie in my sample design itself, and perhaps the mix of 
IFRS and non-IFRS populations has had a greater impact than I might have anticipated. 
This problem is circumnavigated in the next section by randomly selecting training and 
validation samples and applying the technologies 10,000 times. 
 
There are several assumptions/design fundamentals of the MDA process which are 
also potential causes of this strange phenomenon, the first relating to sample size. The 
original models were constructed using small samples of a matched-pair nature, 
carefully selected by the authors. Within my sample of firms, because failure is such a 
relatively rare event, a matched sample approach would severely reduce the sample size 
of this study, eliminating the majority of non-failed firms. It is generally accepted that 
conducting discriminant analysis with unequal sample sizes is acceptable (Poulson and 
French, 2004; Tabachnick, 1989), and therefore unequal sample sizes is unlikely to be 
the cause of the poor performance of the MDA process. The only constraints with 
respect to sample sizes are that the smallest group needs to exceed the number of 
predictor variables, and that the smallest sample size should be at least 20 but preferably 
at least 5 times that of the number of predictor variables. The number of variables is 5 
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for the Altman model, and 4 for the Taffler model, therefore my training sample of 39 
failures is sufficient.  
 
The assumption of multivariate normality has been discussed at length in section 5 of 
this thesis. Lachenbruch et al. (1973), and Altman et al. (1977), find that linear 
discriminant models are not compromised in terms of their predictive ability when the 
assumption of multivariate normality is overlooked and compare favourably to their 
quadratic counterparts. Poulson and French (2004) note that violations of the normality 
assumption are not “fatal” and the resultant significance tests are still reliable as long as 
non-normality is caused by skewness and not outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
 
This therefore leads me to what I suspect is the cause of the poor performance of the 
models updated using the MDA process (AZU and TZU) as compared to the original 
models with the original coefficients (AZ and TZ) – outliers. The overall significance 
tests within the MDA process are based upon pooled variances (the average variance 
across both the failed and non-failed groups).  Therefore, the significance tests of the 
variables which provide the largest means along with the largest variances would be 
based upon and calculated using the variances of the other variables with the relatively 
smaller variances. This would therefore result in poor estimates and inferences 
regarding the significance and value of the coefficients variables with larger 
distributions of data. 
 
Table 9.3: Descriptive statistics for AZ and TZ 
Altman Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
Variable WC/TA 0.10 0.10 0.49 0.24 1282 -27.3 -25.88 0.99 6595 
RE/TA -1.65 0.09 91.48 8369 6568 -80.9 -7422.3 5.36 6595 
EBIT/TA -0.05 0.06 0.54 0.29 315 -14.0 -16.66 1.72 6595 
VE/TL 261.7 4.64 4264.2 18184155 3120 51.18 0.00 282457 6595 
S/TA 1.17 0.97 1.49 2.22 481 17.13 0.00 51.15 6595 
Taffler Mean Med SD Var Kurt Skew Min Max N 
Variable PBT/CL -0.12 0.164 2.609 6.806 2159 32.91 -37.984 159.76 6595 
CA/TL 66.46 2.453 828.37 686199 2633 45.18 0.001 53027 6595 
CL/TA 0.372 0.324 0.490 0.240 1408 29.79 0.003 26.88 6595 
NCI 130.5 -3.94 3498 12241633 1682 39.54 -16891 155125 6595 
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Table 9.3 provides summary statistics for the variables used within the two 
discriminant models. It can be seen that severe outliers in four out of the nine variables 
create exceptionally high variances within the data set. This is therefore a possible 
explanation for the poor performance of the updated discriminant models AZU and 
TZU. 
 
To investigate this further, I designed some code which would enable me to compare 
AZ to AZU, and likewise TZ to TZU, as the number of outliers are gradually reduced. 
The code was designed to automatically Winsorise the data with 0.2% decrements from 
100% Winsorisation (no change in data) to 50% Winorisation (the top 25% of scores are 
set to the 25th percentile, and the bottom 25% of score are set to the 25th percentile)145. 
At each of these stages the coefficients were updated for AZU and TZU and then AUC 
was calculated for each of the four models. The Winsorisation was conducted upon the 
training sample of firms and the validation sample was left unchanged. By lowering the 
variances of the variables this way, I am able to determine what effect (if any) outliers 
have on the predictive accuracy of the resulting discriminant function. Figures 9.2 and 
9.3 show the plots of how AUC changes as the outliers are gradually reduced through 
Winsorisation. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2: The effects of Winsorisation on the Altman model 
                                                 
145
 Beyond 50% Winsorisation the models begin to fall apart. 
Winsorisation 
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Figure 9.3: The effects of Winsorisation on the Taffler model 
 
The solid lines in each Figure represent the models with their original coefficients, 
and because the validation sample remains unchanged, so do the predictive accuracies 
of the models. The AZU and TZU plots begin at 100% Winsorisation (the original AZU 
and TZU models as derived through the chronological splitting of firms into training 
and validation, i.e. with no removal of outliers). As I move across the graphs from left 
to right, the data within the training sample is progressively Winsorised using 0.2% 
intervals. The graphs show initially, for both models, that there is a sharp increase in 
model accuracy over the first 3% of Windorisation. This rapid increase in accuracy is 
what I would expect given the removal of the most extreme outliers, which 
consequently reduces the variance of the independent variables and allows the 
discriminant function to be calculated more efficiently. 
 
After this initial increase in predictive power, the scale of this increase deteriorates 
but in both cases the accuracies steadily approach that of the original coefficients. For 
the Altman model this occurs at approximately 56% Winsorisation, and for the Taffler 
model this occurs at approximately 60% (i.e. 60% of the data remains unchanged). After 
this crossover point, accuracy is accelerated for several percent until both of the models 
break down at around 54% Winsorisation, as the data becomes too uniform for the 
discriminant process to operate effectively. 
Winsorisation 
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 Figures 9.2 and 9.3, clearly demonstrate what effect outliers can have on the 
discriminant process and to what extent the careful selection of firms within the samples 
has on the overall accuracy of the predictive model. Both of the original models were 
formulated using very small numbers of carefully selected firms with variables falling 
within pre-specified ranges. For example Altman (1968) limited his sample to 66 
manufacturing firms with asset sizes below $25 million, whilst Taffler (1984) excludes 
firms which appeared to be “less than healthy” from the non-failed sample of 23 firms. 
Peel and Peel (1987) note that “This type of a priori screening process appears to go 
somewhat further than merely excluding loss-making firms”, with reference to Taffler 
(1984) eliminating weaker firms from the non-failed sample. Therefore the removal of 
outliers has the potential to substantially increase the overall accuracy of the predictive 
discriminant model, and a carefully selected sample is likely to generate more positive 
results than one chosen randomly from the population. 
 
An interesting observation within this sub-study is the coefficient values of the 
updated models at the point in which the original and updated models provide equal 
AUC’s. Table 9.4 shows the comparison of model coefficients at the point of 
intersection.  
 
 
Table 9.4: Comparison of coefficients at the point of intersection 
Altman (1968) Model θ (%) WC/TA RE/TA EBIT/TA VE/TL S/TA 
Original Coefficients (AZ) 78.7 1.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 0.99 
Updated Coefficients (AZU) 78.7 5.74 2.43 13.80 0.09 -0.32 
Taffler (1984)  PBT/CL CA/TL CL/TA NCI   
Original Coefficients (TZ) 74.9 12.18 2.5 -10.68 0.029   
Updated Coefficients (TZU) 74.9 18.44 1.29 -14.31 0.037   
 
With respect to the Taffler model, it may be observed that the coefficient estimates 
for updated model are remarkably similar to those of the original model formulated 
upon 40-year-old UK data with a much smaller sample. The magnitudes of the 
coefficient estimates are similar and their signs are identical. It is, however, difficult to 
interpret this result, given that the same exacting cohesion cannot be seen within the 
Altman model. The coefficient estimates at the point of intersection for the Altman 
models (AZ and AZU) are fairly close in terms of magnitude and all of the signs are 
identical except for the variable S/TA in which the sign is reversed. For this particular 
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variable, increasing the extent of Winsorisation lowers the value of the coefficient. If I 
refer back to the formulation of AZU with no changes to the data, this coefficient 
estimate was 0.39. This value falls steadily as I increase the number of outliers which 
are Winsorised, switching signs in the process. 
 
To conclude this sub-section I have shown that the removal of outliers can have a 
dramatic effect on the accuracy and power of a prediction model. By systematically 
removing outliers from the training data, there is a convergence between the accuracy of 
the original model and that of the updated version. There are wide differences between 
my data set and those of the original authors, both in terms of sample size, type of firm, 
the decades between them, and the changes in reporting practices which have occurred 
in between. At the point of convergence, the coefficients of the original and updated 
models are remarkably similar, which is surprising, but difficult to interpret this result. 
Research upon different samples of firms should be open to future analysis to determine 
whether my results go some way to defining an optimal set of coefficients for these 
variables (in which the original authors may have already defined), or whether this 
result is mere coincidence. I leave this investigation to future research. 
 
9.4 Distributional properties of models using repeated random sub-
sampling. 
 
 
The previous ROC analysis was based upon a real-world scenario where a lender 
would have access to information in the past (the training sample) and apply it to loan 
decisions in the future (the validation sample). Although this may make intuitive sense, 
it may not provide a true or fair evaluation of the predictive accuracy of each model 
over the entire sample period. Therefore I investigate whether the results obtained in the 
previous section are representative and significantly indifferent to that which I might 
obtain through differing sample splits. In order to determine whether or not these 
previously obtained results are consistent throughout the sample period, it seemed 
appropriate to apply Monte Carlo simulation over different sample splits to determine 
the distributional properties of each of the models ROC accuracy. 
 
This approach is perhaps not too different to cross validation (where the training and 
validation samples are “switched” and the average of the two results are taken), or k-
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fold cross validation (where an average of k number of training samples are used to 
generate results from the remainder of the sample). What does differ here is the scale of 
the operation (10,000 repetitions) and its application to ROC accuracies, something that 
has not been seen in the literature before. 
 
In order to achieve this, each firm-year observation is assigned an evenly distributed 
random real number greater than or equal to 0 and less than 1. The observations are 
ordered lowest to highest. The first 50% of failed firms (with the lowest randomly 
generated numbers) and the first 50% of the non-failed firms are selected and 
transferred to the training sample with the remaining failed firms and non-failed firms 
being transferred to the validation sample. 
  
Where applicable (AZU, TZU, OLU), model estimation is performed on the training 
sample which providing parameter estimates for each variable used in each of the three 
models. These parameter estimates are then applied to the firms within the validation 
sample resulting in a failure probability for each firm year observation. For the 
remaining models (those which do not require parameter estimation), ROC analysis is 
simple conducted upon the randomly generated validation sample and the model’s 
accuracy is then determined by the area under a receiver operating characteristics curve 
(AUC) as described in the previous section. This process is repeated multiple (10,000) 
times in order to investigate the distributional properties of the AUC for each of thirteen 
models. I also plot the 10,000 ROC curves for each model, to obtain a visual 
interpretation of its accuracy for which I have termed distributional feathers. 
 
The reader may notice the reduction in model numbers at this point, dropping from 
sixteen to thirteen. The reason for this reduction is the loss (or non-inclusion) of the 
three Neural Network models from the sample which requires some explanation. The 
primary reason for the loss is time limitation; each of the 10,000 repetitions, and the 
whole of this analysis, is based upon custom Visual Basic macros for which I have had 
to write myself. I could not find a way of generating the required results using SAS (as 
my preferred statistical package), and the time spent investigating and developing a 
process, which might not even be possible, was deemed to be better spent writing the 
procedure in Visual Basic for which I am more comfortable, being certain that the goal 
could be achieved. The resulting macro procedures incorporated the random sample 
generation, the Discriminant Analysis and Logit  coefficient generation (where 
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appropriate), the construction of the ROC curve, and the calculation of the various 
statistics required for each run. 
 
Each run varied in its duration of calculation depending upon each model’s 
requirement for estimation, and the computer upon which it would run. For models that 
did not require any re-estimation (SIZE, BV, B/M, AZ, TZ, OL, BS, HKCL, DOC, and 
JW_DOC) the typical run would take anywhere between 7-10 seconds, meaning that 
each model would usually require somewhere between 24 and 28 hours to generate 
10,000 repetitions.  
 
For models that did require re-estimation, the relative timeframe required to generate 
10,000 runs was dramatically increased. The estimation of OLU required the necessity 
to invoke the solver function to complete the maximum likelihood estimation, and 
generate a set of new coefficients. One complete logit run cycle would typically take 
between 2-3 minutes on my Dell Latitude E6400 laptop146 which was left to number-
crunch in the corner of the room. For 10,000 repetitions this process took around 20 
days. The MDA estimation of AZU and TZU increased this timescale even further. Due 
to the nature of the estimation process using matrix algebra upon a large data set, the 
aforementioned laptop could not manage the estimation process on a dataset larger than 
2000 firms due to its limitation in specifications, and even a limited sample size would 
result in a 10 minute run window. Fortunately one of my home computers has a little 
more performance and was able to manage the task more effectively147 although the 
average run time was still a large 4 minutes. These two sets of results took 
approximately 2 months to generate. In hindsight it would be fair to say that an 
alternative method would have been advantageous, and that a more advanced 
knowledge of statistical software may have produced these results in a shorter time 
period. 
 
This then leads me back to the original explanation of why the NN models have not 
been included in this analysis. The first problem is incorporating an existing (or 
designing from scratch) a NN algorithm macro which would fit neatly into my existing 
VBA program. Although not outside the realms of possibility, early attempts have not 
                                                 
146
 2GB RAM, 160GB HDD and Intel Core Duo P8400 running Windows Vista 32bit OS. 
147
 16GB RAM 1TB HDD and AMD PhenomII X6 1055T running Windows 7 64bit OS. 
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been successful and time constraints have seen my time spent on other areas of this 
thesis. I also envisage that even if I had the NN/ROC macro working at this present 
moment in time, it would not be any faster than the other models which required re-
estimation and therefore would be entirely possible that it might take another 3 months 
to generate another 3 sets of results for AZN, TZN, and OLN, which is time I currently 
do not have. It would therefore, I think, be more beneficial to leave these 3 models for 
future research, where a more efficient generation process could be explored and 
developed. I now return the attention to that of the results which I have generated for the 
remaining thirteen models. 
 
Summary statistics regarding θ for the remaining thirteen insolvency prediction 
models are set out in Table 9.5 along with distribution histograms148 and ROC 
“feathers” depicted in Figure 9.4; the relative frequency distributions of θ for each of 
these models are superimposed graphically in Figure 9.5. Table 9.6 compares the 
average accuracies of the distribution exercise to those results gained through the 
original training and validation samples (time-split).  
 
Results as to the efficacy of the models as measured by the mean of θ are in 
agreement with the results presented in the previous section. The ordering of model 
efficacy by mean θ from Table 9.5 is almost identical to that according to the original θ 
from Table 9.2. Further, each θ from Table 9.2 is close to the corresponding mean θ also 
depicted within Table 9.65.  
                                                 
148
 Each histogram is overlaid with a normal curve based upon the models mean and standard deviation. Tests for 
normality suggest that the actual distributions for the models are not significantly normal, although the overlaid 
plot demonstrates that this is very difficult to distinguish by eye. 
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Table 9.5: Distributional propertiesa of model predictive accuracy, as measure by area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ). 
Model [model designation] Mean Median SD Skewness Excess kurtosisb Minimum Maximum 
Jarque-Bera ~ 
χ2(2) 
Single variable approaches 
        
 SIZE 80.5% 80.5% 0.0149 0.0403 -0.1327 75.1% 86.3% 10.04** 
 Book to Market [B/M] 58.3% 58.3% 0.0260 0.0391 -0.0314 49.1% 68.8% 2.96 
 Beaver (1966) best performing ratio CF/TD [BV] 69.5% 69.5% 0.0195 0.0472 -0.0823 62.9% 76.7% 6.53* 
Altman Z-score [AZ] 80.7% 80.7% 0.0171 0.0788 -0.0277 75.0% 87.6% 10.67** 
Altman Z-score with updated coefficients [AZU] 73.5% 73.6% 0.0256 -0.1206 0.0979 60.4% 83.0% 28.25** 
Taffler UK Z-score [TZ] 77.9% 77.9% 0.0184 0.0819 -0.0728 71.8% 85.7% 13.39** 
Taffler UK Z-score with updated coefficients [TZU] 69.4% 69.7% 0.0346 -0.3681 -0.1861 54.2% 79.3% 240.24** 
Ohlson logit model [OL] 78.4% 78.4% 0.0125 0.0652 -0.0533 73.7% 82.9% 8.27* 
Ohlson logit model with updated coefficients [OLU] 78.6% 78.7% 0.0207 -0.2298 0.2614 68.6% 87.1% 116.51** 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) market model [HKCL] 83.2% 83.1% 0.0165 0.1116 -0.1266 77.8% 89.0% 27.43** 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) naïve market model [BS] 86.1% 86.0% 0.0131 0.1103 -0.1995 81.9% 91.0% 36.84** 
Barrier option as down-and-out call [DOC] 81.5% 81.5% 0.0167 0.0648 -0.0605 75.4% 87.8% 8.52* 
New naïve down-and-out call [JW_DOC] 85.0% 85.0% 0.0138 0.1319 -0.1511 80.5% 89.9% 38.52** 
 
a Based on 10,000 random splits between training and validation samples. In each case the number of both failed firm-year observations and non-failed firm year 
observations in the training and validation samples are as in Table 7.2; but the allocations now being made on a random basis, rather than according to chronology. 
b Excess kurtosis is the unbiased measure of deviation of kurtosis from 3 (3 being the kurtosis of a normal distribution). 
**, * denote one-tailed significance at the 1% level and 5% level respectively 
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Also it is shown that there are no differences between Table 9.2 and corresponding 
Table 9.5 mean θ significant at the 5% level as presented in Table 9.6. The results of 
section 9.2 are not, therefore, outliers or atypical in the context of the distributions of 
possible θs. 
 
The θ distributions of all of the models show a reasonable degree of regularity and 
symmetry; but Jarque-Bera testing of the distributions finds that a null of normality may 
be rejected for nine of the thirteen models at the 1% level of significance. The 
exceptions are BV, OL and DOC, where normality may be rejected only at the 5% level 
of significance; and B/M, where normality may not be rejected at any generally 
acceptable level of significance. It is interesting to note that model B/M, which has the 
most ‘normal-like’ of the distributions, is by far the least efficient of the models tested. 
 
Concerning the ordering of the different models by mean θ, each model’s mean θ is 
different from the mean(s) of the model(s) of neighbouring efficacy with significance at 
the 1% level. Whilst the means of the distributions ordered by efficacy are significantly 
different one to the next, it is clear from Figure 9.4 that there is considerable overlap in 
the distributions – and that a particular sample split into training and validation samples 
might suggest an alternative ordering. This leads to discussion of the spread of the 
distributions. 
 
The less spread in a distribution, the less sensitive the model’s efficacy to variation in 
the composition of training and validation/test samples. Model TZU’s θ distribution 
shows the highest spread, with a standard deviation of 0.0346. Models B/M, AZU, OLU 
and BV have distributions with the next highest standard deviations (being 0.0260, 
0.0256, 0.0207 and 0.0195 respectively). In this respect, superior again are the market-
based models: BS, JW_DOC, SIZE, HKCL and DOC, with their distributions of θ 
having standard deviations of 0.0131, 0.0138, 0.0149, 0.0165 and 0.0167 respectively. 
The relatively high standard deviations of θ distributions for the accounting number-
based multivariate models AZU, TZU and OLU is consistent with, indeed may explain, 
the variety of efficiency claims for these models as between different studies.  
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Model Distribution ROC plots 
SIZE 
 
B/M 
 
BV 
 
  
 
Figure 9.4: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as measured 
by area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) 
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Model Distribution ROC plots 
AZ 
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Figure 9.4 Continued: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as 
measured by area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) 
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Model Distribution ROC plots 
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Figure 9.4 Continued: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as 
measured by area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) 
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Model Distribution ROC plots 
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Figure 9.4 Continued: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as 
measured by area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) 
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Model Distribution ROC plots 
JW_DOC 
  
   
 
Figure 9.4 Continued: Distributional properties of model predictive accuracy, as 
measured by area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) 
 
 
Table 9.6: Comparison of ROC accuracies between original time-split sample and Monte 
Carlo simulation 
MODEL Time-split 
Monte 
Carlo SD Z
1
 
SIZE 80.6% 80.5% 1.5% 0.09 
BV 67.0% 69.5% 1.9% -1.31 
B/M 57.7% 58.3% 2.6% -0.24 
AZ 78.7% 80.7% 1.7% -1.16 
AZU 68.9% 73.5% 2.6% -1.82 
AZN 73.1% N/A  N/A   N/A   
TZ 74.9% 77.9% 1.8% -1.65 
TZU 65.3% 69.4% 3.5% -1.19 
TZN 72.4% N/A   N/A   N/A   
OL 76.3% 78.4% 1.2% -1.74 
OLU 78.1% 78.6% 2.1% -0.25 
OLN 80.9% N/A   N/A   N/A   
HKCL 82.7% 83.2% 1.6% -0.30 
BS 83.9% 86.1% 1.3% -1.63 
DOC 81.8% 81.5% 1.7% 0.17 
JW_DOC 83.0% 85.0% 1.4% -1.42 
 
        
1
 Significance of the difference between the original time-split samples to that of the Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
* Significantly different at 95% confidence level (none). 
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Figure 9.5: Relative frequency distributions of area under receiver operating characteristic curves (θ) for thirteen insolvency prediction models. 
Based on 10,000 random splits between training and validation samples
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It is debatable whether the Monte Carlo simulation provides a truer depiction of 
performance over that of the original time-split analysis, but it can go some way to 
determine how the accuracy of the models may vary over time, depicted by their 
standard deviation. The simulation is however, not necessarily a good conveyor of the 
real-life decision making faced by lenders with respect to each of the models which 
require training, as each repetition produces a different set of coefficients to which 
future judgements and decision making must be made. 
 
The two models which are repeatedly re-estimated using discriminant analysis (AZU 
and TZU) provide average accuracies of approximately ten percentage points lower than 
their original counterparts, of which the coefficients were estimated using much smaller 
data samples, many decades earlier. Why the persistent re-estimation of these models 
provides results which are less favourable then their original counterparts can be 
explained by the outlier effect as described in the previous sub-section, but it is 
somewhat surprising as to the extent of this effect over 10,000 repetitions. Logistical 
regression in contrast is more robust with the updated model providing a higher average 
accuracy than its original counterpart over the simulation. 
 
For the remaining ten models (the models which do not require coefficient 
estimation) some generalised observations can be made. Although, as previously 
suggested, this particular examination of the models does not act as a true ex-ante study 
of the models accuracy, it is likely to be beneficial to any potential lending decisions 
made in the future. The distribution of the model accuracy is based upon randomly 
selecting half of the total sample and applying ROC analysis to determine the models 
predictive power, and therefore the 10,000 repetitions of this process allow us to 
observe how much each model is dependent upon sample selectivity. 
 
I can observe that the higher scoring models have lower standard deviation 
suggesting better consistency as well as accuracy and therefor are certainly more 
reliable than their underperforming counterparts. The lower scoring models tend to have 
larger variances and thus one snapshot may not give a true picture for example; B/M 
ranges from between forty-nine and sixty-nine per cent, and BV ranges from between 
sixty-three and seventy-seven per cent, indicating that the choice of sample make a huge 
difference to the resulting model power with power-spreads of up to 20%. The lowest 
power-spread comes from the models OL, JW_DOC and BS with spreads of around ten 
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per cent (standard deviations of 1.3%), with JW_DOC and BS also providing the 
highest average accuracies from all of the models of which I test. 
 
The inclusion of the distributional feather plots aids us further in visualising the 
performance of the models. It is clear to observe that the worse performing model B/M 
shows no sign of being a curve at all, as suggested by its 58% average accuracy. The 
plot simple straddles the 450 random model line in a somewhat parallelogramesque 
manner. For the other models each feather is what one might expect, with the lower 
scoring models providing fatter, flatter feathers compared to the thinner, curvaceous 
feathers associated with the higher power models. One point of interest to note 
regarding the feathers is their position within the graph as the different models increase 
in accuracy. In each case the feather gravitates towards the top right-hand of the plot 
area (i.e. where sensitivity is 100%) rather than the opposite bottom left-hand corner of 
the plot area where specificity is at 100%. The phenomenon is readily explained by the 
sample sizes of the failed and non-failed groups of firms. With approximately 70 times 
more non-failed firms in the sample than failed firms, it is far easier for the model to 
capture all of the failed firms than it is to capture all of the non-failed firms. Other than 
analysing equal group sizes (which will of course detract from the empirical validity of 
the any study, given the relatively small number of failed firms in the population), the 
slightly skewed feather shape will inevitably persist. 
 
In sum, my results show that the market-based, contingent claims models, in all of 
the guises I adopt, performed better than the accounting-number based models; and that, 
within the family of accounting number-based models, the Altman Z-score is 
persistently more accurate than all of the other models, and the single variable approach 
of Beaver (1966), does not perform as well as I would have hoped, being one of the 
poorest models as compared with the more complex multivariate approaches. Reversely 
using a single variable representing size can provide highly comparable predictive 
accuracies compared to any other methodology. 
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9.5 Economic value 
 
This section applies the economic value model described in section 8.3 within 
several scenarios. The first scenario envisages an economy consisting of sixteen banks, 
each bank making lending decisions based upon a different insolvency prediction or 
credit risk model. The data for this economy is provided by my original validation 
sample in order that six of the bank’s models can be trained in accordance to what has 
been previously described in this thesis. 
 
Similar to Agarwal and Taffler (2007), because each of the models to which I test are 
miscalibrated as noted in section 9.1, it is evident that it would not be appropriate to 
employ the loan rate formulae as detailed in section 8.3. As this formula relies upon the 
default probability as determined a particular model, and the average probability of 
default varies enormously (as detailed in Table 9.1 to range between 72% for the B/M 
model and 1.2% for the DOC model), in this example the DOC model would always 
charge a lower rate of interest than the B/M model and therefore a truly biased economy 
would exist. 
 
To eliminate the problem of miscalibration, a single credit spread is used for each 
model. For each model the firms are ranked from lowest probability of default to 
highest probability of default and then separated into twenty separate groups. The 5% of 
firms with the lowest probability of default are ascribed a risk premium k of 0.3% 
following both Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) and Agarwal and Taffler (2007). At the 
other end of the spectrum, the 5% of firms with the highest probability of default are not 
offered a loan at all by the bank. The remaining 90% of firms are ascribed loan offer 
rates according to Table 9.8 with each class of loan increasing by 0.25% as the 
probability of default increases. 
 
The remaining specifications of this test and the model construction are now detailed 
and recalled. The artificial economy which is created contains 3499 firms, 61 of which 
are known to have failed. Each firm requires an equal share of a loan market worth 
£100bn (approximately £28.5m each). Within the economy are sixteen banks competing 
for business, each using a different model to assess credit worthiness of each firm. All 
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of the banks reject firms within the bottom 5% of their credit spread149, but make offers 
to each of the others based upon their position in the spread (Table 9.7). For the 
customer, or firm perspective, each firm will accept an offer from a bank based upon the 
lowest offered rate. If one or more banks offer the same low rate then the value of the 
loan is divided equally among this number. 
 
Once all lending and borrowing decisions have been made, I am then able to 
calculate revenue, profitability, loss given default, market share, and ROI for each of the 
banks to determine which model has the greater economic value. Loss given default 
(LGD) is calculated as being 45% of the loan value, following the Basel II internal 
ratings approach.150 
 
Table 9.7: Credit spread for artificial economy 
LOAN TYPE GROUP Premium 
HIGHEST QUALITY 1 0.30% 
  
2 0.55% 
  
3 0.80% 
  
4 1.05% 
  
5 1.30% 
GOOD 
 
6 1.55% 
  
7 1.80% 
  
8 2.05% 
  
9 2.30% 
  
10 2.55% 
MEDIUM 
 
11 2.80% 
  
12 3.05% 
  
13 3.30% 
  
14 3.55% 
  
15 3.80% 
POOR 
 
16 4.05% 
  
17 4.30% 
  
18 4.55% 
  
19 4.80% 
DO NOT LEND 20 N/A 
 
 
  
                                                 
149
 As a consequence, the market share may not sum to 1 if all banks refuse to loan to one or more firms. 
150
 Agarwal and Taffler (2007) also use this value on their 2-bank analysis. Blochlinger and Leippold use 40% in 
their study based upon their findings at Credit Suisse and the Swiss Banking Institute. 
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Table 9.8: Economic value tests upon sixteen credit scoring models 
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Table 9.8 presents the result of this first test of economic value based upon all 
sixteen banks/models with several points of interest emerging. Firstly, the return on 
investment for each of the banks is consistent with prior studies, being less than 1% in 
all instances, suggesting that aggregated lending profits for banking institutions are not 
as substantial as one might expect given the volume of potential transactions. The 
results from this sixteen bank economy show that ROI ranges from 0.98% (SIZE) to -
1.87% (B/M). Whereas it is not unsurprising that B/M has the least economic value 
given its poor performance in prior ROC analysis, it is interesting that the SIZE model 
is the top performer at almost one quarter of a percent higher ROI than its nearest rivals 
JW_DOC (0.75%) and BV (0.73%), which is also quite interesting given the relatively 
poor performance of BV in the distributional test. 
 
Three out of the top four models, SIZE, JW_DOC, and BS do well to avoid lending 
to any of the failed firms within the sample. With respect to JW_DOC and BS, this 
avoidance of losses is perhaps key to their higher ROI given that overall market share 
for these two firms are among the three lowest (2.6% and 2.4% respectively). With 
profit figures of £19.28m and £16.71m, these models are mid-ranked but their smaller 
initial outlay ensures that they are highly ranked with respects to ROI. Profits for SIZE 
are the largest of all the banking institutes at almost £300m, some £90m ahead of its 
nearest rival explained by it having the highest market share (13.3%) and one of the 
highest average lending rates (0.98%). 
 
Several of the models do not perform particularly well in this test for economic 
value. Four models (B/M, AZU, TZN, and DOC) post negative profits for this test, 
which translates into ROI’s of -1.87%, 0%, -0.05%, and -0.03% respectively. The large 
losses incurred by B/M are again consistent with the weaknesses of this model 
discovered in prior accuracy tests. Although B/M gains a high percentage of non-
defaulting loans (10%), its value is lost by lending to 37.4% of the failed firms, which 
leads to overall losses of £190m. One surprising result here is the poor performance of 
the DOC model, to which one might have expected a relatively much higher ROI given 
its performance in the accuracy tests. However, a small market share (4.1%) and a 4.6% 
share of defaulters led to an overall loss of £1.37m. 
 
Further to this sixteen bank study, a second-phase test is now performed. The 
second-phase test expands the sample timeframe to cover the whole of the decade 2000-
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2009 inclusive. To ensure that no bias enters the findings, the six banks using models 
which require training (AZU, AZN, TZU, TZN, OLU, and OLN) are dropped from test, 
resulting in an economy consisting of the ten remaining banks. Given the relatively 
mediocre impact that these models have provided within all prior tests contained within 
this thesis, it may be more beneficial to eliminate these firms all together in order that 
the sample size may be increased. As a consequence, comparisons can be made to the 
previous sixteen-bank economy in terms of both competition and of customer 
availability. 
 
Table 9.9 shows the results of this second-phase test and several similarities are 
evident. Firstly, SIZE remains the better bank, posting profits of £233m and an ROI of 
0.97% almost identical to the previous test. The main difference in the numbers reported 
by SIZE is that is has now contracted 7.7% of the defaulting loans compared to its 
previously healthy 0%. An increased market share of 24% is almost double that which it 
achieved in the sixteen bank economy and cements its position as the most profitable 
bank, suggesting that the size of a potential loan customer is important to making 
profits. JW_DOC and BS which were previously in the top four firms remain so, with 
an increase in BS from 0.69% to 0.75%, and a decrease in JW_DOC from 0.75% to 
0.66%. Although both of their market shares have now increased, this time it is only BS 
which avoids defaulting loans altogether, and the only bank to do so in this test. 
 
B/M remains the worst performing bank in terms of economic value, posting losses 
of £92m and an ROI of -0.48. Its share of defaults is almost half at 46% which cannot 
be compensated by a high market share of 19%, cementing its place at the bottom of the 
rankings in terms of both profits and ROI. In this test B/M is the only bank to post a 
negative ROI and with all other firms making profits of between £12.95m (HKCL) and 
£233m (SIZE). 
 
With the change in economy, the elimination of six of the banks and an increase in 
customer base, the DOC model has a reversal of fortune. Previously DOC posted losses 
and a negative ROI, but here the bank posts profits of £32.56m and an ROI of 0.48%. 
Although its share of defaults has changed only slightly, it has managed to increase its 
share of good loans from 4% to 6.8%, almost double what it previously achieved.  
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Table 9.9: Economic value second-phase test upon ten credit scoring models 
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Some other points to note regarding the change in economy are as follows. One of 
the better performing models in the previous test was BV with an ROI of 0.73%, but 
here an increase in loan defaults from 2.5% to 17.1% sees this ROI drop to 0.54% but 
still ranked 5th on this basis. The remaining models which have not been mentioned up 
until now have been largely inconspicuous. AZ, TZ, and OL have managed to increase 
their respective profits and ROI’s as compared to the prior sixteen bank test, with AZ 
and TZ each holding lower to middle rankings. OL shows the biggest improvement in 
terms of ROI rankings, now posting the third highest ROI at 0.63%; and what of 
HKCL?  
 
HKCL was ranked third in the distributional properties test in section 9.4 and the 
third best performer in the ROC analysis of section 9.2. Here, in terms of economic 
value, the model does not perform so well. ROI has increased from 0.30% to 0.37% as I 
change the structure of the economy, but neither test posts any note-worthy results, 
ranking towards the lower end of the spectrum. 
 
These results suggest that lending decisions based on the size (market capitalisation) 
of a potential customer are more profitable than any other credit rating methodologies 
that this thesis has investigated, and has quite an intuitive and interesting appeal which 
can be linked back to several of the causes of financial distress and insolvency as 
discussed in section 3. It is clear that the size of a company is closely related to its age 
and profitability; many companies will start off small and will only grow in size over a 
number of years given sound managerial decision-making and consistent provision of 
profit. Smaller companies will inevitably find it harder to raise capital, attract good 
management, and have the capability to reclaim bad debts, noted by the R3 as being key 
factors in the cause of insolvency. The largest factor and cause of insolvency as stated 
by the R3 is loss of market which attributes to 29% of all insolvencies. Larger firms 
traditionally will have age, brand identity, customer loyalty and a substantial share of a 
particular market. The size of the operation means that these larger firms may better 
adapt to shrinking or changing market places by being able to invest more heavily in 
research and development than smaller, less-established firms. 
 
To conclude this section I present a third-phase test of economic value when 
misclassification costs differ which extends the previous ten-bank economy model 
thusly. The test of economic value gained in terms of profitability and ROI is now 
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repeated over subsequent “years”, in which the competitive nature of the banking 
industry means that after each test, the bank with the lowest ROI is eliminated from 
model. The test is then repeated with the remaining banks (upon the same data) until 
only one bank remains. By performing this test it is hoped that I might better understand 
the effect that the number of banks has on this type of test, and the interaction between 
them, given that prior studies have been limited to two or three banks; the “elimination” 
test will also provide an alternate method of evaluating and ranking the economic value 
of each of the banking models, to that of the previous two economies. The ROI figure 
for each bank and for each year is presented in the summary Table 9.10 below. Detailed 
results of this test can be found in Appendix I. 
 
Table 9.10: Economic value elimination test – resulting ROI 
BANK Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
AZ 0.41% 0.68% 0.71% 0.70% 0.71% 0.71% 0.95% 1.15% 1.27% 
SIZE 0.97% 0.96% 0.97% 1.00% 1.01% 1.07% 1.11% 1.11% 1.19% 
BS 0.75% 0.58% 0.43% 0.54% 0.65% 0.93% 0.92% 1.07% 
 OL 0.63% 0.53% 0.53% 0.52% 0.53% 0.55% 0.70% 
  BV 0.54% 0.43% 0.43% 0.52% 0.54% 0.46% 
   DOC 0.48% 0.48% 0.52% 0.56% 0.51% 
    HKCL 0.37% 0.31% 0.38% 0.43% 
     TZ 0.29% 0.33% 0.35% 
      JW_DOC 0.66% 0.22% 
       B/M -0.48% 
        
 
 
Each bank is order top (best) to bottom (worse) according to economic value 
elimination test which yield some surprising results. Year 1 contains the ROI’s as 
previously depicted in Table 9.9 with the lowest ranked bank B/M eliminated from year 
2 and with the elimination of B/M; year 2 throws a surprising result. JW_DOC, 
previously ranked in the top three for all of the accuracy, power, and economic value 
tests, provides the lowest ROI attributable to a large increase in its share of defaults 
(8.3%). Although generating profits of £13m, as the lowest scoring model it is 
reluctantly eliminated. The next model to be eliminated in year 3 is TZ followed 
surprisingly by two more of the contingent claims-based models which performed so 
well in the ROC and distributional tests. Subsequently BV, OL, and BS are eliminated 
in that order leaving an economy consisting of just two banks, SIZE and AZ. 
Unexpectedly it is the Altman Z-score which comes out on top in this head-to-head test, 
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despite SIZE’s top performance and AZ’s average performance in the previous two 
tests.  
 
By analysing the ROI and how it changes over time as competition is reduced, we 
can see that for SIZE it is quite consistent, steadily increasing as the number of banks 
diminishes from 0.97& in year 1 to 1.19% in year 2. AZ also increases over time but is 
more irregular increasing from 0.4% in year 1 to 0.68% in year two, remaining at 
approximately 0.7% through years 3-6 and then rising in the final three years to 1.27%, 
beating SIZE in the process. 
 
It is difficult to interpret these results given the swing in rankings to both the sixteen 
and ten bank tests. Two consistencies remain within these comparisons; B/M provides 
no economic value to lending decisions and seems to be firmly rooted to the bottom of 
the results table, not only in the economic value tests, but within the ROC and 
distributional tests discussed previously. SIZE also remains consistent but at the other 
end of the spectrum, ranking first in two out of the three economic value tests and 
ranking second in the other. Other results are more perplexing such as the poor 
performance of the contingent-claims models JW_DOC, DOC and HKCL. HKCL 
performs poorly in all of the economic value tests and DOC not much better, which is 
surprising given their good showing throughout sections 9.1, 9.2 and 9.4. Further, the 
poor ROI of JW_DOC in year 2 of the latter test is in complete contrast to all previous 
results, to which this model has done particularly well on all accounts.  
 
It is with respect to this particular result that one final test is conducted in which 
bank JW_DOC re-enters the economy to tend for business against the top two 
performers AZ and SIZE. The test is conducted purely out of curiosity given JW-DOC’s 
previously excellent results. 
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Table 9.11: Re-entry of JW_DOC 
BANK SIZE AZ JW_DOC TOTAL 
Value of Good Loans 42004 33651 22273 97929 
Value of Defaulting Loans 
(£m) 597 491 348 1436 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 42602 34142 22621 99365 
Market Share 42.9% 34.4% 22.8% 100% 
Average lending rate 1.8% 1.8% 1.7%   
Share of Good Loans 42.9% 34.4% 22.7% 100% 
REVENUE (£m) 761 620 387   
Share of Defaults 41.6% 34.2% 24.2% 100% 
LOSS (£m)  269 221 156   
PROFIT (£m) 492 399 230   
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.15% 1.17% 1.02%   
 
 
The re-entry of JW_DOC as shown in Table 9.11 shows some consistency in the 
results previously gained in that AZ is still the better performing bank (albeit by a much 
smaller margin) over SIZE, with JW_DOC performing least well out of the three. This 
shows that despite my eagerness for JW_DOC to re-enter the model, provide the highest 
ROI, and completely turn the prior results on their head, the better performing banks, 
with respect to economic value at least, are SIZE and AZ with the more consistent bank 
being that of SIZE across each of the tests performed concerning economic value. The 
results therefore suggest that given this simplified economy, lending decisions based 
upon the size of the borrower alone is the most profitable approach. 
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10 Thesis extension: a best of breed model 
 
 
 
Section 6 posited the notion that it would be desirable to offer a new model – based 
upon the best components, traits, and variables contained within the selection of extant 
models that have been analysed within this thesis thus far. However, unless it can be 
based on some sound underlying theoretical argument, the addition of another 
statistically derived insolvency prediction model into the literature has little appeal. This 
being said, it is apparent that for an all-encompassing thesis, it would be of benefit and 
of some interest to the reader, if this exercise was undertaken. 
 
There are two main considerations which much be addressed when developing a 
model of this type: (1) what variables are to be used? and (2) which statistical 
technology is best able to provide both maximum separation of the two groups of firms 
and also provide a readily understandable model? With regards to the selection of 
variables, I begin by citing a relevant paragraph by Falkenstein et al. (2000): 
 
“Financial ratios are related to firm failure the way that the speed of a car is related 
to the probability of crashing: there's a correlation, it's nonlinear, but there's no point 
at which failure is certain. Failure depends upon other variables, such as the 
environment and driver skill. When modelling such phenomena, one must, therefore, 
build in a tolerance for extreme values, as these observations do not necessarily relate 
to failure - as evidenced by their prevalence. 
 
Yet all is not noise: higher leverage, lower profitability, firm size, and liquidity are 
all related to default in ways most credit analysts would expect. What is not clear is the 
shape of the relationship (what default rates correspond to which input ratio levels), 
which ratios are most powerful (e.g., profitability: net income or EBIT?), and how 
correlations affect the relative weightings assigned to these various ratios in a 
multivariate context.” Falkenstein et al. (2000, p.27) 
 
The literature review of section 5 refers to a vast array of variables which have been 
used to model credit risk and predict insolvency over the last half century with most 
accounting models centred on the size, profitability, and liquidity paradigm, with 
leverage and variability being addressed within the market models. Studies such as 
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Keasey and McGuiness (1990), with particular reference to UK data demonstrate that 
profitability and efficiency ratios are important in explaining failure in the years 
immediately prior to failure. The model which I develop should therefore incorporate all 
of these aspects of failure. 
 
Firstly I deconstruct the Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Taffler (1984) models to 
obtain the variables within, and categorise according to type. This results in 17 different 
variables out of the 18 variables available (WC/TA appearing in both the Altman and 
Ohlson models). These variables are OL SIZE151, TL/TA, WC/TA, CL/CA, OENEG, 
NITA, FUTL, INTWO, CHIN, RE/TA, EBITTA, VE/TL, S/TA, PBTCL, CA/TL, 
CL/TA, NCI152. I also include the three single variables SIZE, B/M and Beaver’s 
CF/TD (BV). The probabilities of failure as designated by all four of the market models 
BS, HKCL, DOC and JW_DOC, are also included as input variables to the model, this 
results in a total of 24 variables for initial inclusion into the best-of-breed model. 
 
With regards to the best technology to employ, not only to best separate the two 
groups of firms, but to produce a meaningful model with coefficients applicable to 
future samples, I decided to employ the logit model. The MDA methodology was 
disregarded due to its vulnerability to outliers as discussed in section 9.3, and the Neural 
Network methodology negated due to its black box nature as discussed in section 5.4. A 
probit model was considered to be an option, but findings such as in Zmijewski (1984) 
relating to the similarity of performance between the logit and probit models suggests 
that both methodologies would perform equally as well. The logit model was arbitrarily 
chosen because of its greater popularity within the literature. Should the aim of thesis 
been focused upon deriving and presenting a brand new arbitrary model, one might have 
opted to use a mixed logit approach similar to that described by Jones and Hensher 
(2004), a type for which little research has been undertaken in subsequent years. Given 
the almost perfect results of the Jones and Hensher study, it is certainly an avenue that 
would warrant further investigation. For simplicity purposes and given the nature of this 
thesis extension however, the standard linear logit model is employed. 
 
In order to determine the best combination of the 24 variables within the logit model, 
and ignoring (for now at least) the fact that there may be correlation between some of 
                                                 
151
 OLSIZE being Ohlson’s Size variable (ln GDP deflated total assets), which is not to be confused with SIZE 
(ln GDP deflated market value of equity). 
152
 Please refer back to section 8.2 (model specification) for precise variable definitions. 
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these variables, I employ a “step-wise” procedure which eliminates one variable at a 
time from the model. The criterion for elimination is simply the variable which adds the 
least to the model, i.e. has the least significant coefficient, using the chronologic 
training sample of data (2000-2005).  
 
As the variables are reduced from 24 down to just 1, at each stage of the process I 
apply the coefficients (the model) to the validation sample of data (2006-2009) and 
calculate the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve. This step-wise 
reduction of variables is detailed in Table 10.1 below. For each model, T24 to T1, the 
coefficient estimates are shown along with the corresponding Wald Chi-Squared test 
statistic. The variable with the lowest test statistic is eliminated from the model. Panel A 
shows the estimates for models from T24 through T13, and Panel B shows the estimates 
for models T12 through T1. 
 
It can be seen from the results contained within Table 10.1 that this step-wise 
procedure yields some interesting (possibly strange) results. Firstly, HKCL, one of the 
best performing variables on an individual basis, is the fourth variable to drop out of the 
model, and not what I would expect. Reversely, B/M, the poorest performing variable 
(model) under ROC analysis, does not drop out until T12 or half way through the 
procedure. BS remains until T7, but I would expect that this variable would be the “last 
one standing” given that it achieved the highest accuracy in previous ROC tests.  
 
The explanation for these strange results may lie in the fact that there may be some 
correlation between a number of the variables, and that this correlation may affect the 
estimation process. 
 
The two most significant variables are SIZE and OLSIZE respectively, which is not 
too surprising given the previous good performance of SIZE in both ROC and 
information content tests. These two variables however, are potentially highly correlated 
which may also affect the estimation procedure. This problem of correlation is 
addressed further later in this section.
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Table 10.1: Panel A. Step-wise reduction showing coefficient estimates with Wald ChiSq in 
parenthesis 
N
CI
 
0.
00
 
(0.
02
)  
                      
TL
TA
 
0.
18
 
(0.
04
)  
0.
18
 
(0.
04
) 
                    
CA
TL
 
0.
01
 
(0.
61
)  
0.
01
 
(0.
61
) 
0.
00
 
(0.
02
) 
                  
H
KC
L 
1.
27
 
(0.
05
)  
1.
26
 
(0.
05
) 
1.
10
 
(0.
04
) 
1.
15
 
(0.
04
) 
                
EB
IT
TA
 
-
0.
92
 
(0.
09
) 
-
0.
93
 
(0.
10
) 
-
0.
75
 
(0.
07
 
-
0.
75
 
(0.
07
 
-
0.
73
 
(0.
07
 
              
N
IT
A 
1.
02
 
(0.
12
)  
1.
02
 
(0.
12
) 
0.
82
 
(0.
09
) 
0.
84
 
(0.
10
) 
0.
82
 
(0.
09
) 
0.
12
 
(0.
05
) 
            
VE
TL
 
0.
00
 
(0.
13
)  
0.
00
 
(0.
13
) 
0.
00
 
(0.
08
) 
0.
00
 
(0.
11
) 
0.
00
 
(0.
10
) 
0.
00
 
(0.
11
) 
0.
00
 
(0.
12
) 
          
CL
TA
 
-
0.
43
 
(0.
16
) 
-
0.
44
 
(0.
17
) 
-
0.
34
 
(0.
11
) 
-
0.
35
 
(0.
12
) 
-
0.
37
 
(0.
13
) 
-
0.
38
 
(0.
14
) 
-
0.
46
 
(0.
22
) 
-
0.
36
 
(0.
14
) 
        
FU
TL
 
-
0.
02
 
(0.
93
) 
-
0.
02
 
(0.
93
) 
-
0.
01
 
(0.
48
) 
-
0.
02
 
(0.
75
) 
-
0.
02
 
(0.
74
) 
-
0.
02
 
(0.
76
) 
-
0.
02
 
(0.
75
) 
-
0.
01
 
(0.
57
) 
-
0.
01
 
(0.
61
) 
      
CF
TD
 
-
0.
07
 
(0.
72
) 
-
0.
07
 
(0.
72
) 
-
0.
05
 
(0.
40
) 
-
0.
05
 
(0.
48
) 
-
0.
05
 
(0.
48
) 
-
0.
05
 
(0.
44
) 
-
0.
05
 
(0.
37
) 
-
0.
07
 
(0.
69
) 
-
0.
07
 
(0.
71
) 
-
0.
06
 
(0.
57
) 
    
CH
IN
 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
02
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
01
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
05
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
04
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
09
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
07
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
02
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
07
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
06
) 
-
0.
28
 
(1.
07
) 
-
0.
29
 
(1.
14
) 
  
PB
TC
L 
0.
13
 
(0.
49
)  
0.
13
 
(0.
49
) 
0.
13
 
(0.
50
) 
0.
13
 
(0.
49
) 
0.
13
 
(0.
52
) 
0.
12
 
(0.
48
) 
0.
15
 
(1.
25
) 
0.
14
 
(1.
19
) 
0.
14
 
(1.
15
) 
0.
13
 
(1.
11
) 
0.
15
 
(1.
26
) 
0.
12
 
(1.
09
) 
BM
 
-
1.
93
 
(1.
56
) 
-
1.
93
 
(1.
57
) 
-
1.
91
 
(1.
52
) 
-
1.
91
 
(1.
55
) 
-
1.
92
 
(1.
56
) 
-
1.
99
 
(1.
72
) 
-
1.
97
 
(1.
69
) 
-
1.
98
 
(1.
69
) 
-
2.
07
 
(1.
88
) 
-
2.
11
 
(1.
96
) 
-
2.
11
 
(1.
96
) 
-
2.
07
 
(1.
88
) 
CL
CA
 
-
0.
20
 
(1.
33
) 
-
0.
20
 
(1.
34
) 
-
0.
20
 
(1.
41
) 
-
0.
20
 
(1.
44
) 
-
0.
20
 
(1.
45
) 
-
0.
21
 
(1.
52
) 
-
0.
21
 
(1.
58
) 
-
0.
21
 
(1.
54
) 
-
0.
19
 
(1.
43
) 
-
0.
19
 
(1.
43
) 
-
0.
20
 
(1.
48
) 
-
0.
21
 
(1.
57
) 
IN
TW
O
 
0.
82
 
(3.
08
)  
0.
82
 
(3.
08
) 
0.
81
 
(3.
04
) 
0.
81
 
(3.
03
) 
0.
82
 
(3.
09
) 
0.
83
 
(3.
17
) 
0.
82
 
(3.
14
) 
0.
82
 
(3.
08
) 
0.
81
 
(3.
05
) 
0.
83
 
(3.
19
) 
0.
81
 
(3.
03
) 
0.
80
 
(2.
95
) 
JW
 
-
6.
77
 
(1.
67
) 
-
6.
80
 
(1.
68
) 
-
6.
78
 
(1.
69
) 
-
6.
71
 
(1.
66
) 
-
7.
18
 
(2.
27
) 
-
7.
05
 
(2.
22
) 
-
7.
04
 
(2.
20
) 
-
7.
10
 
(2.
26
) 
-
7.
21
 
(2.
35
) 
-
7.
21
 
(2.
34
) 
-
7.
38
 
(2.
43
) 
-
7.
90
 
(2.
82
) 
D
O
C 
-
6.
7 
(1.
8) 
-
6.
6 
(1.
8) 
-
6.
6 
(1.
8) 
-
6.
6 
(1.
8) 
-
5.
8 
(3.
8) 
-
5.
8 
(3.
8) 
-
5.
8 
(3.
9) 
-
5.
8 
(3.
8) 
-
6.
0 
(4.
3) 
-
6.
0 
(4.
3) 
-
6.
1 
(4.
4) 
-
6.
4 
(4.
9) 
BS
 
18
.
7 
(3.
1) 
18
.
8 
(3.
1) 
18
.
9 
(3.
1) 
18
.
8 
(3.
1) 
19
.
8 
(4.
2) 
19
.
5 
(4.
1) 
19
.
5 
(4.
1) 
19
.
4 
(4.
1) 
19
.
5 
(4.
1) 
19
.
5 
(4.
1) 
20
.
1 
(4.
3) 
21
.
3 
(4.
9) 
R
ET
A 
0.
1 
(0.
7) 
0.
1 
(0.
7) 
0.
1 
(1.
2) 
0.
1 
(1.
1) 
0.
1 
(1.
1) 
0.
1 
(1.
2) 
0.
1 
(1.
9) 
0.
1 
(1.
9) 
0.
1 
(2.
0) 
0.
1 
(2.
0) 
0.
1 
(2.
6) 
0.
1 
(2.
9) 
O
EN
EG
 
-
5.
3 
(3.
8) 
-
5.
3 
(3.
8) 
-
5.
1 
(3.
9) 
-
5.
1 
(3.
9) 
-
5.
0 
(3.
9) 
-
5.
2 
(4.
5) 
-
5.
2 
(4.
6) 
-
5.
3 
(4.
6) 
-
5.
6 
(5.
7) 
-
5.
6 
(5.
8) 
-
6.
0 
(6.
4) 
-
6.
1 
(6.
9) 
W
CT
A 
-
3.
0 
(6.
5) 
-
3.
0 
(6.
5) 
-
3.
1 
(7.
0) 
-
3.
1 
(7.
1) 
-
3.
1 
(7.
1) 
-
3.
1 
(7.
4) 
-
3.
2 
(7.
8) 
-
3.
1 
(7.
5) 
-
2.
8 
(12
.
1)  
-
2.
8 
(12
.
1) 
-
3.
0 
(14
.
5) 
-
3.
0 
(15
.
1) 
ST
A 
-
0.
4 
(3.
6) 
-
0.
4 
(3.
6) 
-
0.
4 
(4.
1) 
-
0.
4 
(4.
1) 
-
0.
4 
(4.
1) 
-
0.
4 
(4.
0) 
-
0.
4 
(4.
2) 
-
0.
4 
(4.
4) 
-
0.
4 
(5.
8) 
-
0.
4 
(5.
9) 
-
0.
4 
(5.
9) 
-
0.
4 
(5.
7) 
O
LS
IZ
E 
0.
5 
(2.
8) 
0.
5 
(2.
8) 
0.
5 
(3.
1) 
0.
5 
(2.
9) 
0.
5 
(2.
9) 
0.
5 
(3.
1) 
0.
5 
(3.
0) 
0.
5 
(3.
6) 
0.
6 
(4.
5) 
0.
6 
(4.
5) 
0.
6 
(5.
0) 
0.
6 
(5.
3) 
SI
ZE
 
-
1.
0 
(9.
1) 
-
1.
0 
(9.
1) 
-
1.
0 
(10
.
0)  
-
1.
0 
(9.
8) 
-
1.
0 
(9.
8) 
-
1.
0 
(10
.
4) 
-
1.
0 
(10
.
2) 
-
1.
0 
(11
.
6) 
-
1.
0 
(12
.
6) 
-
1.
0 
(12
.
6) 
-
1.
1 
(13
.
6) 
-
1.
1 
(14
.
0) 
al
ph
a
 
-
1.
4 
(1.
1) 
-
1.
4 
(1.
1) 
-
1.
5 
(1.
2) 
-
1.
4 
(1.
1) 
-
1.
4 
(1.
1) 
-
1.
4 
(1.
0) 
-
1.
4 
(1.
0) 
-
1.
4 
(1.
1) 
-
1.
5 
(1.
4) 
-
1.
5 
(1.
3) 
-
1.
6 
(1.
5) 
-
1.
6 
(1.
5) 
 
T2
4 
 
T2
3 
 
T2
2 
 
T2
1 
 
T2
0 
 
T1
9 
 
T1
8 
 
T1
7 
 
T1
6 
 
T1
5 
 
T1
4 
 
T1
3 
 
290 
 
Table 10.1: Panel B. Step-wise reduction showing coefficient estimates with Wald ChiSq in 
parenthesis 
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Before I attempt to address the correlation problem, I must first present the results of 
the ROC analysis for each of the 24 models based on this initial step-wise procedure. 
The over-riding aim of this section was to prove that by a simple data-mining exercise it 
would be possible to formulate a model which, using my training and validation datasets 
could out-perform all of the sixteen prior insolvency prediction and credit risk models 
which have been evaluated within this thesis. Figure 10.1 plot the ROC accuracy of the 
model(s) as the variables are reduced from 24 down to 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1: ROC accuracies achieved through step-wise reduction of 24 variables 
 
 
If I refer back to section 9.2, the highest accuracy achieved through ROC analysis 
based on the chronological training and validation data samples was the naïve market 
model of Bharath and Shumway (2008), BS, which achieved an accuracy (area under 
the ROC curve) of 83.9%. 
 
The plot of ROC accuracies achieved through step-wise reduction of 24 variables 
shows that 18 out of 24 versions of the model have an accuracy higher than 84%. The 
plot dips under the 84% mark at T11, T10, and T9 but regains “domination” 
culminating in a maximum ROC accuracy of 84.9% at T5. From this point the model 
diminishes in accuracy as it approaches T1, the single variable SIZE, which provides an 
accuracy of 80.6% in concordance with the result within section 9.2. 
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The highest accuracy is achieved with 5 variables (SIZE, OLSIZE, WC/TA, 
OENEG, and S/TA) at 84.9%. The resulting best-of-breed model would therefore be 
presented as follows: 
 
 '¾@Á=Á?O		@Á=Â¾N = 11 + QÃ 
 
 
where 
  = 	−3.03 − 1.28(:ÁN9 + 0.84(=:ÁN9 − 2.13(Ä*/?@9 − 4.04(N<N¿9 − 0.50(:/?@9 
 
 
I have shown within the literature review of section 5 that quite often in these 
multivariate models, the signs of the coefficients make no intuitive sense although they 
cannot be interpreted in the same way as a linear regression for example. Here, the 
variables SIZE and OLSIZE, natural logarithms of GDP deflated market value of equity 
and total assets respectively, should be expected to have a high correlation, yet the signs 
of the coefficients are opposite to each other. OENEG (a dummy variable, 1 if total 
liabilities exceed total assets and 0 otherwise), would be expected to act in the opposite 
direction to the other variables, but it does not. The variables do however represent key 
features of the failure process. WC/TA is a liquidity variable, S/TA represents 
profitability, OENEG attributable to leverage, and SIZE and OLSIZE representing size. 
This demonstrates to some degree therefore, that the model encapsulates the key 
components of the failure process. 
 
Previously mentioned in this section was the problem with correlated variables. To 
investigate this further, the intention is to re-run the step-wise procedure after the 
removal of highly correlated variables. To do this I perform Pearson rank correlation 
tests on the 24 variables. Variables are removed in order that correlation coefficients are 
less than the critical value 0.404 (N(24)-2 degrees of freedom at 5% significance – 2 tail 
test).153  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153
 A good explanation of the critical values can be found at 
http://www.une.edu.au/WebStat/unit_materials/c6_common_statistical_tests/test_signif_pearson.html. 
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Table 10.2: Correlation between the 24 variables 
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The removal of variables can be justified as follows. The high correlations between 
the market models are unsurprising and because BS outperformed each of the other 
market models in previous tests, HKCL, DOC and JW_DOC are removed. CL/TA has 
high correlations with four other variables and therefore it is removed. NITA has high 
correlations with three other variables and is also removed. SIZE is, as expected, 
heavily correlated with OLSIZE and I arbitrarily remove OLSIZE. OENEG is 
significantly correlated with TL/TA and given that OENEG is a dummy variable and 
TL/TA is not, OENEG is removed. The resulting variable population is therefore 
reduced to 17 from the original population of 24. 
 
I repeat the previous step-wise reduction, this time only utilising these 17 variables. The 
results of this reduction are shown in Table 10.2 with the ROC accuracies show in 
Figure 10.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2: ROC accuracies achieved through step-wise reduction of 17 variables
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Table 10.3: Panel A. Step-wise reduction of non-correlated variables, showing coefficient 
estimates with Wald ChiSq in parenthesis 
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Table 10.3: Panel B. Step-wise reduction of non-correlated variables, showing 
coefficient estimates with Wald ChiSq in parenthesis 
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The highest accuracy is achieved with the 3 variable model (SIZE, BS, WCTA) with 
an accuracy of 84.5%, higher than any model tested within section 9.2 This model 
however, falls slightly short of the 84.9% achieved previously within the 24-variable 
step-wise procedure. Despite this small shortfall, the elimination of variables (now that I 
have removed those which were heavily correlated) is done so in a more logical 
sequence. B/M is the first variable to be eliminated which is in accordance with its poor 
prior performance, and the variables within the poor-performing Taffler model are also 
quick to be eliminated. It also makes sense that BS is the most significant variable given 
that it achieves the highest accuracy in the ROC tests within section 9.2. The resulting 
best-of-breed model in this instance is therefore presented as follows: 
 
 '¾@Á=Á?O		@Á=Â¾N = 11 + QÃ 
 
 
where 
  = 	−3.54 + 7.28(:9 − 0.39(:ÁN9 − 0.27(Ä*/?@9 
 
 
It has been demonstrated therefore that through careful selection of variables, it is 
possible to provide several models which perform better than any of the sixteen 
insolvency prediction models plucked from the prior literature, based upon a statistical 
step-wise reduction of variables. Although this data mining approach provides a 
model(s) with the highest accuracy in this study there is, of course, no theoretical 
underpinning, and there is also no guarantee that similar accuracies would be achieved 
when applied to future datasets. For these reasons alone it not my intention to champion 
any of these models as being superior to anything presented in the prior literature, but 
merely act a demonstration as to what can be achieved through an appropriate selection 
of variables and modelling criterion. 
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11 Integration of results and conclusions 
 
11.1 Summary of objectives, methods and findings 
 
 
Within this thesis I have presented a review of the methodologies proposed and 
employed for the prediction and corporate insolvency and the assessment of credit risk 
over the last five decades, and catalogued 25 different methods within three broad 
groupings: theoretical, statistical and artificially intelligent. This thesis, for the first 
time, brings together these different approaches to insolvency prediction and credit risk 
analysis, in a single document of reference, utilising both descriptive and quantitative 
methods for contrast, assessment and evaluation of performance. 
 
Informed by prior frequencies of use and reported efficacies of the various models in 
combination with an extensive literature review, I select a variety of these models for 
testing, representing key developments and initiatives spanning the evolution of the 
literature. The empirical study uses up-to-date UK data, including post-IFRS data, with 
the sample period encompassing the recent financial crisis to determine whether the 
reported accuracy of extant models and whether their ability to correctly distinguish 
between insolvent and healthy firms still holds true in times of economic turmoil. I also 
develop and test a new naïve version of the down-and-out call barrier option model and 
find that this model performs favourably in relation to the fifteen extant models which 
are investigated. 
 
Using ROC curve analysis, not only in a chronological separation of training and 
validation samples, but using a Monte Carlo random separation procedure based upon 
10,000 repetitions, I show that the traditional accounting-based models are 
outperformed in this setting by theoretically-driven, market-based, contingent claims 
methods. Of sixteen models tested, the four best performing models are based on 
European call and barrier option models. The new, naïve version of the down-and-out 
call option model which I propose is second only the Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
naïve market model in predictive accuracy; and each of these models outperforms its 
antecedent. This Monte Carlo approach in combination with ROC analysis is presented 
as a new and innovative method for assessing the accuracy of prediction models, 
providing evidence as to the distributional properties of model accuracy over time. 
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Two single variable accounting number-based models, the book-to-market ratio and 
Beaver’s (1966) best performing ratio, cash-flow to total debt, do not compare well 
against more sophisticated multivariate accounting number-based approaches using this 
methodology. Despite its use as focal/benchmark variable in earlier studies, in my 
setting book-to-market ratio – capturing, in essence, extent of market capitalisation of 
future earnings – is not found to be useful alone in predicting firm failure. In stark 
contrast, the single variable SIZE (natural logarithm of GDP deflated market value of 
equity) performs well compared to the multivariate approaches. 
 
With reference to the accounting number-based models, I am able to obtain only 
marginally improved predictive ability from the variables of the Altman (1968), Taffler 
(1983) and Ohlson (1980) models by applying simple Neural Network technology, over 
that of the original technologies of MDA and logit. An unexpected result was in 
reference to the original MDA models of Altman (1968), and Taffler (1983) when 
applying their original coefficients. In ROC tests these models outperformed their 
updated counterpart which was not what I would expect. The reason for this result could 
be explained by the heavy impact that outliers have on the MDA technology, relying 
heavily on the variance and covariance’s of the variables. Further results indicated that, 
as the number of outliers was reduced through winsorisation, the area under the ROC 
curve increased, and proceeded to dominate the original models, increasing in accuracy 
up to a point where the models simply collapsed. The use of winsorisation upon the 
associated Altman and Taffler MDA samples shows that this methodology relies 
heavily on a carefully selected sample. The original authors were able to use restricted 
samples of a small number of firms to carefully remove the incidents of outliers, thus 
ensuring the efficacy of the MDA process. When the MDA is applied to a sample of 
firms representative of the actual population, the MDA process is found lacking. 
 
Regarding the relatively poor performance of accounting number-based models in 
the ROC tests, it is not surprising that they are inferior to their market-based 
counterparts. Since accounting information is historical and does not reflect the current 
position of a firm, even on its date of publication, the accuracy of multivariate 
accounting number-based models to predict insolvency is unlikely to be stable over a 
period of significant and general economic turmoil. Market-based models, incorporating 
up-to-date market information, are likely to fare better.  
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This hypothesis was put to the test with the development of a best-of-breed model 
which utilised a step-wise reduction of 24 accounting and market variables. Several 
models where proposed, each providing a higher ROC accuracy than any of the sixteen 
previously-tested extant corporate insolvency and credit risk models. The best 
performing best-of-breed model contained both market and accounting variables when 
there was no significant correlation between the initial variable populations. The results 
of this thesis extension demonstrate that producing an insolvency prediction model 
which purports to be higher in predictive accuracy than any prior extant model, is a 
relatively simple exercise. Caution must be used, however, when suggesting that these 
types of model, statistically fitted to one particular training dataset and tested on a 
similar holdout sample of data, would demonstrate the same efficacy when applied to 
further samples in the future. This casing point is seen by the poor performance of the 
Taffler model for example within my analysis. Previous studies by the author have 
demonstrated near perfect predictive accuracy, but the same levels of performance are 
not prevalent in my own empirical study. 
 
The empirical ROC analysis within this thesis, regardless of model methodology or 
variable selection, indicated that there was a maximum accuracy which could be 
achieved. This maximum accuracy was 85%, and this barrier could not be broken by 
any of the models whether extant or proprietary best-of-breed. This is somewhat in-line 
with the meta-analysis conducted within section 5.8 in which the average accuracy 
reported from the prior literature was determined to be approximately 83%. To date, my 
empirical analysis has provided an impartial comparison upon more insolvency and 
credit risk models, and upon a larger selection of companies, than any study previously 
found within the literature. The 85% accuracy barrier however, was provided only by 
one particular test, the ROC curve. The accuracy achieved by such a test does not take 
into account the differences in economic value of the different associated error types. A 
type I error (incorrectly classifying a failed firm as not failing) would be expected to 
incur a larger economic loss within a lending scenario, than A type II error (incorrectly 
classifying a healthy firm as one which will fail). To allow for these differences in 
economic value, a further test of predictive accuracy was empirically evaluated. 
 
The second-phase of testing involved the economic value of the insolvency 
prediction and credit risk models, where an artificial economy was created. The 
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economy contained 3499 firms, 61 of which are known to have failed. Each firm 
required an equal share of a loan market worth £100bn (approximately £28.5m each), 
and each insolvency and credit risk model was assigned to a different bank. Banks 
would base their loan decisions purely upon the failure probability provided by their 
particular model. The rate at which each bank was willing to lend to a particular 
company was determined by its position in the credit spread as defined by the banks 
failure probability default model. Each firm within the economy (the chronologically 
derived validation sample) acted as a potential loan customer who would ultimately 
borrow from the bank which offered the best loan deal, denoted by the lowest offered 
rate of interest. For each loan applicant, the bank would either succeed in attracting the 
business or it would not. For the loans which were granted there would be two 
outcomes, either the customer would survive the loan period and make the repayments, 
or the customer would default. Using this information I was able to determine which of 
the banks was the most profitable, and therefore which of the models provides the most 
economic value. 
 
The results of the economic value tests demonstrated similarities to those of the ROC 
tests but initially there where some stark differences. In the initial test several of the 
models do not perform particularly well, with four models (B/M, AZU, TZN, and DOC) 
posting negative profits and therefore negative returns. What is surprising here is the 
poor performance of DOC and its inability to provide positive economic value, given 
that it was one of the better performing models under ROC analysis. The remainder of 
the market models out-perform most cases of the models being based upon accounting 
numbers. 
 
In order to circumnavigate the training requirement of six of the models (AZU, TZU, 
OLU, AZN, TZN, and OLN), and to also provide a larger sample of firms for the 
analysis, the second test dropped the aforementioned models from the economy. The 
new results showed that the book-to-market ratio performed least well, again posting 
negative returns for its respective bank, consistent with its prior poor performance under 
both ROC analysis and the first test of economic value. The remaining nine banks each 
posted positive returns, with SIZE posting the largest return and the market models BS 
and JW_DOC ranking second and third respectively. 
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The third test of this nature involved the removal of one (the least profitable) bank 
after each year of trading. In this test, SIZE was the penultimate bank standing but was 
out-survived somewhat surprisingly by the original Altman Z-score, although both 
banks reported to be profitable. The reason for the good performance of the Altman Z-
score can be attributed to its ability to capture the key components attributable to 
company survival namely profitability, liquidity and size. In this regard the model 
appears to capture a company’s health far more effectively than its competitor 
accounting-number models, the Taffler Z-score and the Ohlson logit model, of which 
the former does not perform particularly well in any of the tests undertaken within this 
thesis. 
 
The single variable SIZE was shown to be a consistently good performer being the 
dominant bank in two out of the three tests undertaken. Although these economic value 
tests are based upon a very simplified economy, the results could be seen as mirroring 
the real loan making decisions faced by banks every day. Size is an important factor in 
the loan-making process, with companies with large asset bases for security more likely 
to be granted loans, and also less-likely to default. I have previously stated that the size 
of a company is closely related to its age and profitability; many companies will start 
off small and will only grow in size over a number of years given sound managerial 
decision-making and consistent provision of profit. Smaller companies will inevitably 
find it harder to raise capital, attract good management, and have the capability to 
reclaim bad debts, noted by the R3 as being key factors in the cause of insolvency. The 
largest factor and cause of insolvency as stated by the R3 is loss of market which 
attributes to 29% of all insolvencies. Larger firms traditionally will have age, brand 
identity, customer loyalty and a substantial share of a particular market. The size of the 
operation means that these larger firms may better adapt to shrinking or changing 
market places by being able to invest more heavily in research and development than 
smaller, less-established firms. Therefore the incidents of SIZE being the most 
profitable bank are not that surprising. 
 
What is not so clear within the tests of economic value is why the four market 
models perform so inconsistently, with banks utilising decision making based upon 
simple factors, such as the size of a company, gaining comparatively larger returns for 
their investment. In the first two tests these models perform relatively well and in 
keeping with my prior findings. In the third (elimination) test, once the bank using 
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book-to-market as its tool was eliminated, three out of the four market models quickly 
follow, leaving just the Bharath and Shumway (2008) model to survive into third place.  
 
With the exception of the book-to-market model, in terms of economic value, the 
ability of insolvency and credit risk models to generate positive returns within a period 
of global financial turmoil is apparent. The scale of these returns and how they might be 
affected year-on-year is a matter for future research and something I wish to pursue. It 
would be an interesting exercise to map and measure the performance of each bank over 
several years of isolated data, and determine whether the return trends would match that 
which we might see within the real UK economy. This matter is discussed further in 
section 12.4 (Difficulties, limitations and suggestions for further research). 
 
11.2 Conclusions and achievement of objectives 
 
 
The overriding objective of this thesis was to provide an independent discussion and 
empirical analysis of extant corporate insolvency prediction technologies, in an attempt 
to discover if there is a single technology, methodology, or set of variables which 
outperforms all of its counterparts both in terms of model accuracy and the economic 
value which they deliver. In doing so, I hoped to be able to gain an impartial view of 
extant models and determine their relevance, efficiency, and applicability to the 
uncertain financial climate which is the early twenty first century, and whether these 
types of model can be relied upon in times of economic turmoil. As a further 
consequence it was hoped that this thesis may act as a catalogue of insolvency 
prediction and credit risk literature, covering the key developments throughout the 
evolution of the art, and pin-pointing its current state. 
 
To this end, I believe that the objectives and research questions discussed within 
section 6 have been answered effectively. Given the potential scope and direction in 
which this thesis could have taken, and the voluminous amount of literature available 
for review, I have been able to adequately condense the information into a single 
document. By separating the literature into sub-suctions based upon a chronological 
timeframe, I have been able to structure the literature and its developments into readily 
identifiable passages reflecting the changes in the art through the decades, which is 
something that has not been apparent in the literature before. 
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This thesis adds to the literature upon the relative efficiency of different models for 
insolvency prediction, using post-IFRS data from the UK, providing comparisons 
between broader range of contingent claims and accounting number-based models than 
are found in earlier extant studies, and using receiver operating characteristic curves and 
tests of economic value as the basis for those comparisons. This thesis also examines, 
for the first time, the distributional properties of model accuracy when the training and 
validation samples vary in formation using Monte Carlo simulation of receiver 
operating characteristic curve accuracies. 
 
The results of both the ROC analysis and the tests of economic value delivery, 
provide a range of fortunes for different models which are examined. As a general rule, 
it is apparent that as the field of insolvency prediction and credit risk modelling evolves 
over time, the models are better able to distinguish between the failed and non-failed 
firms. Single variables (with the exception of SIZE) on average perform the least well, 
with multivariate models based upon simple statistical techniques such as MDA and 
logit providing further predictive ability. The accuracy of such models is able to be 
improved upon by applying more complex statistical techniques as represented in this 
thesis by Neural Networks, although the margin of improvement is not as great as one 
might expect. When evaluating the performance of the latest credit risk (market model) 
approaches, it is evident that these types of model are generally superior to those based 
on accounting numbers alone. 
 
I posited the question whether we are any closer to developing a perfect insolvency 
prediction model than we were 45 years ago after the publication of Beaver’s seminal 
work on single variables as predictors. The 45 year-old single ratio of Beaver (cash-flow 
to total debt) shows a reasonable predictive accuracy of 67%, in the chronologically 
split holdout ROC tests, fairing slightly better in the Monte Carlo simulation. With an 
average accuracy of 69.5% however, it is a score residing at the lower end of the 
spectrum of results. These results would therefore suggest that improvements in 
insolvency prediction over the past few decades has been quite substantial, which is 
perhaps what one would expect given the importance and economic significance of the 
field, coupled with the vast amount of literature which accompanies it.  
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Given my findings overall,  I suggest that insolvency prediction based upon 
accounting numbers alone, and given that the Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Taffler 
(1983) models are now over a quarter of a century old, give way to techniques which 
consider market-based information alongside accounting numbers; including research, 
development and implementation of market-based, contingent claims models. It has 
been demonstrated that even with complex statistical techniques such as the Neural 
Network; the use of accounting numbers alone is not enough to adequately distinguish 
between failed and non-failed companies, with these types of models consistently being 
out-performed by market models under ROC analysis. 
 
When investigating the economic value of insolvency and credit risk models, the 
simple economies generated within this study provide evidence that lending decisions 
based upon a single variable can be just as profitable (and indeed more profitable) than 
those decisions based upon more complex modelling techniques. This suggests that the 
size of a company is one of the most important factors when it comes to firm survival. 
 
11.3 Implications 
 
 
Within the introduction of this thesis I posited the question as to whether these types 
of models can be relied upon in times of economic turmoil, suggesting a need for 
accurate and reliable credit scoring models to aid loan decisions. With regards to the 
recent financial crisis there has been an obvious and well document drying up of credit 
where banks and other businesses are reluctant to lend monies, and will only tend to do 
so to the most credit worthy of companies. It is therefore important to understand 
whether existing insolvency prediction and credit risk models can accurately determine 
the credit worthiness of their potential customers. 
 
It is somewhat impossible to gauge exactly what proprietary methodologies and 
systems are put in place by lending institutions to evaluate the credit worthiness of their 
potential customers. This thesis has demonstrated that there is a large variety of 
modelling methodologies available to the lender and that the greatest predictive 
accuracies can be achieved by using a combination of different approaches (e.g. using 
the default probability obtained through a market-style model as variable in conjunction 
with measures of size, profitability and liquidity). 
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Although the results within this thesis show a mixture of fortunes for the different 
models tested, the credit scoring methodologies based upon the option pricing formulae 
do a good job in distinguishing between failed and non-failed firms. Given that these 
methods are readily used by ratings institutions, albeit mapped to proprietary default 
frequencies instead of the normal approximation (used by the models within this thesis), 
and combined with other proprietary data, it is reasonable to suggest that credit ratings 
issued to public companies are a reliable indication of their credit worthiness. My 
findings therefore can act as some reassurance to both lenders and investors, in that 
these types of model continue to provide accurate predictions of insolvency. Given that 
these ratings institutions have come under the spotlight in recent times due to their 
instrumental influence upon market prices and underlying economic factors, this is an 
important and reassuring finding as the global economy seeks to promote financial 
stability and economic growth. 
 
11.4 Difficulties, limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
11.4.1 Addition of technologies 
 
Whilst every effort was undertaken to ensure that this thesis represented an all-
encompassing review and analysis of the prior insolvency prediction and credit risk 
literature, it is evident, given the voluminous prior research, that it would be impossible 
to cover every aspect of the art in meticulous detail. Section 8 of this thesis detailed 
some twenty-five different technologies which have been used in prior studies in order 
to distinguish between failed and non-failed firms. Whilst the empirical analysis within 
this thesis has covered sixteen different models for comparison, more than any other 
study to date, these models only represent five of these differing approaches, namely 
Univariate, MDA, logit, Neural Networks, and Contingent Claims, although these 
technologies do represent the vast majority of the literature in terms of individual 
models. 
 
To incorporate and represent each of the twenty-five different technologies within an 
empirical analysis would inevitably be a considerable undertaking, and one which I do 
not believe to be possible within a realistic timeframe. The inclusion of a small number 
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of additional technologies may be beneficial, for example, the gambler’s ruin approach 
would be an excellent addition given its sound theoretical underpinning. Similarly 
alternate AIES technologies could be included such as Genetic Algorithms and Support 
Vector machines, which might possibly be able to surpass the predictive ability of the 
simple Neural Networks used within this thesis, given their increased complexity. Such 
technologies would however require further specialised software and the incorporation 
of results into both the ROC and economic value models; something which I am sure 
would be overly time-consuming with respect to this current research project, 
particularly with regards to the distributional properties contained within section 9.4.  
 
A further consideration might be to include additional extant models to the 
population which I test. The literature review of section 5 detailed several of these 
models which might warrant an inclusion (Edminster, 1972; Deakin, 1972; Blum, 1974; 
Altman et al., 1977, for example). Zmejewski’s (1984) probit model is one that in 
hindsight would have been relatively straight forward to incorporate into the study, and 
would represent an additional technology. Likewise, a mixed logit model in the vein of 
Jones and Hensher (2004) would also have been beneficial, although more complex and 
time-restricted in comparison. Given the vast number of different models that have been 
presented in the literature and the similarity in both variables and modelling technology, 
particularly through the 1970s and 1980s, it would, again, require a huge undertaking 
which may not yield any insightful results. I therefore feel that my inclusion of several 
of these models, and possibly the best known (i.e. Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 
1980; and Taffler, 1984), provides a fair depiction of the art throughout this period of 
time. Future studies may of course wish to expand this model selection further. 
 
11.4.2 Distributional properties of neural network models 
 
 
Section 9.4 investigated the distributional properties of insolvency prediction and 
credit risk models. One regrettable limitation of this analysis was the omission of the 
three Neural Network models AZN, TZN, and OLN. Within the chronological training 
and validation sample split of section 9.2, each of these models performed (slightly) 
better than their original counterpart suggesting that the Neural Network technology 
was superior to that of both MDA and logit in the separation of failed and non-failed 
firms. Unfortunately, time constraints meant that the running of 30,000 Neural 
Networks (10,000 for each of the three models), could not be achieved. If I were to 
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successfully design and implement a statistical program which would randomly split the 
sample of firms into two, train the Neural Network upon the training sample, apply the 
network to the validation sample, run a ROC analysis, collect the results and repeat 
10,000 times, I would expect this process to take approximately 34 days. This 
timeframe is calculated by using the average time for one manually-run Neural Network 
(approximately 5 mins) as used within the chronologically split analysis of section 9.2.  
 
Further investigation is therefore warranted in order to determine a more efficient 
way of generating multiple Neural Network results within a Monte Carlo simulation. If 
this were to be achieved, I feel that it would contribute a great deal extra to the results 
already delivered by this thesis, with regards to the full extent of the increased accuracy 
gained through Neural Network implementation over that of the original technology. 
 
 
 
11.4.3 Data limitations and representativeness of sample 
 
Section 7 of this thesis described the data collection process which was not without 
its share of difficulties, highlighting several limitations which have been imposed upon 
this study. Firstly, as this is study of UK listed companies, the population of firms is one 
which is limited, particularly if compared to the population of firms within the US. 
Using LSPD I was available to identify 2244 non-failed and 178 failed firms eligible for 
inclusion within the empirical analysis. When compared to Sobehart and Stein (2000) 
for example whose study utilises 13,041 non-failed and 1,406 failed companies, this 
limitation in population size is effectively highlighted, but of course one which is 
inherently unavoidable. 
 
It was decided that a maximum of 10 years of data for each non-failed firm was to be 
collected (firm years) within the period January 2000 – December 2009.  This resulted 
in the collection of 12,855 non-failed firm years, approximately 5.7 firm years per 
company, and questions the completeness of the Thomson One Banker (T1B) database. 
If we are to naively believe that the T1B database has complete records for all 
companies listed in the UK, this would suggest that the average age of a PLC is 5.7 
reporting years, something I find difficult to comprehend. It would therefore be sensible 
to suggest that this database is, perhaps, only 57% complete. 
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Further issues arise when we investigate the firm year data in more detail. For the 
empirical analysis, it was necessary for a fair comparison of the models, that a firm year 
was only to be included if it contained all of the required financial information to 
construct each of the sixteen models. From the 12,855 potential observations, only 
6,595 contained all of the required data (51%), which in turn means that only 29% (51% 
of 59%) of the data sought for the study was adequate enough to be used for empirical 
analysis. This observation is slightly worrying now that I have had time to reflect on the 
data collection process, and question whether T1B was the correct choice as a data 
source. Given that T1B collect data from various sources including Datastream and 
Worldscope, and purports to be one of the largest providers of UK company data, one 
also wonders whether an alternate database would provide any additional observations 
and advantages. Given the finding of studies such as Lara et al (2006), empirical 
evidence exists to support a notion that T1B is the most complete database, with regards 
to UK companies, and at the time of writing this thesis therefore, the best selection that 
could have been made. 
 
The largest reduction in firm year data required for this study was undoubtedly 
attributable to the data item Total Debt (or total liabilities). Out of the 6,260 firm years 
which were eliminated due to missing data, approximately half (2,893) of these were 
eliminated because the total debt value returned as zero154. The fact that so many of the 
firm years reported to have a debt value of zero raises a number of interesting points. 
Firstly is the value of debt really zero? We might expect some companies not to have 
any debt but it is unlikely that 22% (2,893/12,855) of the procured sample of 
observations have no debt. This raises issues as to how we are to treat these items. If the 
company has indeed zero debt, it is likely to be in a rather healthy and solvent position, 
or alternately the debt may be on the balance sheet of one of its subsidiaries. The only 
method available to check whether or not these zero debt observations are correct would 
be the manual inspection of each company’s annual reports, something very time 
                                                 
154
 A subsequent examination of these 2,893 missing/zero debt values involved the re-collection of these items 
through Thomson Financial in an attempt to ascertain errors in the original collection process. This re-collection 
(some 24 months after the original collection process) yielded values for 418 observations (14.7%) which were 
previously unobservable. The re-collection of the Total Debt values, and the fact that there are still some 19% of 
desired observations within the potential sample, highlights some significant shortcomings/limitations in the 
Thomson Financial database. 
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consuming when we are talking about some 2,893 firm year observations. Nevertheless, 
a small sample of 20 companies was selected at random to be included in a manual 
collect of the total debt figure through annual reports obtained through the Perfect 
Information Navigator (PIN) database.  
 
The results of this small investigation indicated that eleven out the twenty companies 
reported zero total debt in their annual reports, suggesting that potentially half of the 
missing values may be discoverable via manual collection. In practice however, this is 
something that would take a considerable amount of time. 
 
 
In the cases where zero debt values are true, and not simply an error or missing value 
on the database, then this raises a further issue problematic to models marked for 
analysis. Many of these models contain formulations or ratios which depend upon total 
debt as a denominator, which is of course problematic when dividing by zero. Therefore 
the only option available for the treatment of these zero debt values, with respect to this 
empirical study at least, and not withstanding recollection from a different source, is to 
eliminate these observations all together. 
 
To satisfy that the data sample used within my study provides a fair 
representativeness of the wider potential population of firms, the characteristics of these 
firms with zero debt values (2,893 observations) are compared to those firms which are 
used throughout this thesis as the sample of firms to which all data requirements were 
satisfied (6595 observations). The characteristics of the final sample of firms are also 
compared to the results reported by Lara et al (2006) in which several key statistics are 
compared across multiple databases. 
 
Table 11.1: Comparison of included and excluded samples 
 
Excluded sample Included sample 
 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD t-stat 
Total Assets 37.93 122.96 1423.61 8258.90 13.62* 
Market value of equity 91.58 381.60 1253.40 6561.81 14.31* 
Net Income 0.94 20.75 56.20 728.01 6.16* 
Working Capital 10.69 30.87 14.22 574.54 0.50 
Profitability (NI/TA) -0.94 20.49 -0.08 0.54 2.23* 
* Significantly different at the 5% level 
Values reported in £millions 
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Table 11.1 compares two groups of firms; the actual (included) sample of firms on 
which the empirical section of this thesis is conducted, and the sample of firms which 
the Thomson database reports zero debt values (excluded). The five variables chosen for 
comparison represent the key characteristics of the two groups in summary; Total 
Assets and Market value of equity representing company size; Net Income and Net 
Income / Total assets representing profitability and; Working Capital representing 
liquidity. Although the liquidity variable demonstrates no difference in mean at the 5% 
level between the two groups, the same cannot be said for the remaining four variables. 
Both size variables show a clear difference between those firms which are included in 
the study and those which are not, the latter being considerably smaller on average. The 
two profitability measures also indicate clear differences between the included and 
excluded samples, although when controlled for size, this difference is only just 
apparent at 5% significance and not with any higher confidence level. 
 
The results therefore show that there are clear differences between the firms which 
are included and analysed within this thesis, and those which are excluded due to 
missing values. A consequence therefore is that a certain amount of bias is prevalent in 
the conclusion and results of this study, but the true extent of this bias, by the very 
nature of the missing variables, is unobservable. 
 
In a secondary analysis between these two samples I investigated the frequency of 
industry, to determine whether the exclusion/inclusion of observations has any basis 
upon its industrial sector. The results of this analysis provide some interesting points for 
discussion. All observations within the two samples of firms are assigned one of 142 
unique LSPD industrial codes. The frequency of each industry within each of the 
samples can then be calculated along with the resulting proportions. For the majority of 
cases (138 industries) there was little difference between the proportions contained 
within the included and excluded samples of firms. There were however 4 industries 
which showed a difference in proportions, and hence show differences in the make-up 
of the samples with regard to industry. Table 11.2 presents the proportions of the two 
samples attributable to each of these 4 industrial classifications. 
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Table 11.2: Differences in industry proportions 
Industry 
Proportion of 
Included Firms 
Proportion of 
Excluded Firms 
Exploration & Production 3.1% 12.2% 
General Mining 2.3% 9.5% 
Gold Mining 1.2% 6.2% 
Business Support Services 9.5% 2.6% 
 
The first three rows within table 11.2 can be grouped under the general classification of 
mining companies. What is interesting is that for the group of firms in which Thomson 
Financial reports to have zero debt values, the proportion of mining companies within this 
sample is much larger than that of the “included” population. The sum of these proportions 
for the excluded sample is 28% indicating that almost one third of this sample are mining 
and exploration companies when the remaining industrial mining categories are included. 
This is much larger than the 6.6% of the included sample which are classified equivalently 
as being within the mining industry. A selection of these non-debt mining companies was 
chosen at random for a manual search of their annual reports to deduce whether or not 
these zero debt figures were correct. In each of the 20 reports selected, the companies were 
indeed found to have zero debt. Whereas I can find no regulatory or reporting explanation 
for the high percentage of mining companies excluded due to zero debt, one can 
reasonably explain the cash-rich balance sheets of these companies, given the lucrative 
nature of the industry, particularly with regards to the large increases in oil, mineral and 
precious metals prices over the last decade, and deduce that any liabilities have simply 
been repaid. The large reduction in the proportion of Business Support Services between 
the two samples presented in table 11.2 would suggest that these companies in contrast, 
have a greater tendency to deliver a total debt figure to the balance sheet. 
 
The penultimate part of this sub-section compares key characteristics of the final 
(included) sample of firms used for analysis within this thesis, with those presented by 
Lara et al (2006). Lara et al (2006) compare summary statistics for a number of data items 
collected and contrasted across several datasets for a variety of countries. By comparing 
the final sample used within this thesis with their results, I am able to demonstrate that the 
sample of firms used for my empirical study is representative of the wider population of 
firms. Lara et al (2006) provide three data items directly attributable to UK firms across six 
different databases. Table 11.3 compares these three items (the median values of 
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shareholders’ equity, market capitalisation, and net income) to ascertain whether my 
sample differs to any significant degree to the findings of these authors. 
 
Table 11.3: Comparing the sample to Lara et al (2006) 
Item 
Thesis 
sample 
Company 
Analysis Datastream Extel 
Global 
Vantage 
Thomson 
Financial Worldscope 
Shareholders' 
equity 37.0 44.0 45.0 45.4 43.6 42.6 42.6 
Market 
capitalisation 75.9 100.9 99.6 99.6 101.8 101.3 101.3 
Net income 2.3 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.8 
Median values reported in £millions 
 
The results suggest that no significant differences in populations are observable between 
this study and that of Lara et al (2006). The median of shareholders’ equity is slightly 
lower than each of the values obtained within the prior study. Market capitalisation is 
perhaps lower than I might expect in comparison, considering that the prior study of Lara 
et al was conducted upon data a decade prior to my own (1990-1999), but raises no cause 
for concern within this context. The net income median value is also marginally lower than 
any of those reported in the prior study of Lara et al (2006) but is likely to be explained by 
the recessive period encompassing my own dataset. Overall the key characteristics of the 
datasets, despite the removal of the zero total debt observations, are comparable - 
suggesting that the sample of firms analysed within this thesis is representative of the UK 
population of public firms. 
 
A further consideration regards the limitations of the data, which are not database 
related, but stem from both statutory reporting regulations, and the social and political 
cultures embedded in society. Insolvency prediction, and any other types of statistical 
models, can only be as accurate as the data on which they are based. Earnings management 
for example would undoubtedly have some influence upon the predictive accuracy of these 
types of model, but is something which is extremely difficult to assess both in terms of 
frequency and extent. Another factor which has particular relevance to, and impact upon, 
insolvency prediction and credit scoring models, is the accounting standards on which 
accounting statements, and the values contained within, are derived in the first instance. 
The method of presentation and valuation of accounting numbers is intrinsically linked to 
the guidelines laid out within these standards, which are continuously being reviewed and 
amended. The numbers obtained and used within this thesis are those reported by UK 
public companies, and therefore they are required to report in accordance with 
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International Accounting Standards. The quality of these standards therefore, will have 
considerable impact upon the accounting numbers which are produced as a result of their 
implementation. IAS32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation), IAS39 (Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement), and IFRS7 (Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures), have each received significant criticism with regards to their content and 
guidelines. The main criticisms focus upon the complexity and lack of comparability 
produced by allowing for the classification of financial assets and liabilities into one of 
several different categories; and that concerns pertain as to the impairment requirements 
which delays identification and recognition of potential problems. These issues are sought 
to be addressed with the mandatory adoption of IFRS9 (Financial Instruments) from 
January 2015, although classification and measurement issues are unlikely to be fully 
resolved by this time. The IASB also continue to develop guidance on other issues such as 
hedge accounting which is seen as being overly complex and confusing. Each of these 
issues is likely to have considerable impact upon the credit or insolvency risk of any 
company which uses these financial instruments, as their valuation could potentially show 
a great deal of fluctuation depending on the recognition and measurement criteria of these 
assets. 
 
One major change in reporting standards which is highly relevant to this thesis is the 
change from UK GAAP to IFRS in 2005. Real world application of insolvency prediction 
and credit risk models to UK companies will gradually see these models being developed 
and adjusted over time, as more IFRS data becomes available. The timesplit analysis of 
this thesis (Section 9.2) sought to replicate the real work conditions faced by lending 
institutions (where model training was required upon UK GAAP data and applied to IFRS 
data). Those models which did not require any form of training were validated upon IFRS 
data only, and no UK GAAP data was introduced at this point. The results in terms of 
model accuracy for the non-trainable models (and those which did require training), were 
not significantly different to those results gained through Monte Carlo simulations (Section 
9.4) which combine both UK GAAP and IFRS data for training and validation purposes. It 
is therefore evident that the change in accounting standards in 2005 did not (at least in the 
case for this particular sample of firms), affect the accuracy of any of the models to any 
significant degree. 
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11.4.4 Multiple year-ahead forecasts 
 
Many corporate insolvency prediction studies throughout the literature have 
investigated the predictive ability of models, many years before the failure event occurs. 
Within the context of the empirical study within this thesis, the primary (and only) focus 
has been upon predicting failure up to one year before the event. It was my intention 
when designing this empirical study that I would investigate the one, two, three, four 
and five-year ahead predictive ability of each model. It quickly became apparent 
however that the scale of this idealistic thesis would be a vast undertaking. The 
summary statistics of section 9.1, the ROC analysis of section 9.2, the distributional 
properties of section 9.4 and the tests of economic value within section 9.5, would all 
need to be done in quintuplicate with another section combining the multi-layered 
analysis into something understandable. This is something which I do not think would 
have been possible within a three-year timeframe. 
 
It is apparent that the majority of lending (in terms of value) would be done on a long 
term basis, and therefore the lender would be likely to assess the long term solvency 
position of its potential loan customer, and not simply whether it will fail within the 
next 12 months. The literature has shown us however, that predicting insolvency more 
than 12 months before the event is particularly difficult with model accuracies dropping 
remarkably two, three, four and five years before the event. In this regard it would be of 
interest to observe the predictive abilities of the sixteen models as the event horizon is 
increased and something which should be investigated within a future study. 
 
11.5 Afterword 
 
 
One final thought is in relation to the concept of insolvency prediction and credit 
scoring itself. When assessing the efficacy of insolvency prediction models we must be 
mindful of two impactors (which work contrary to one another) on model efficacy 
which will arise when models are applied in practice, but which have rarely been 
mentioned in the academic literature. The first is that an efficient model should become 
the victim of its own success. If it is possible to formulate a prediction model of high 
accuracy, then efficiency arguments would suggest that the model would come into 
widespread use to identify failing firms; and allow targeted interventions designed to 
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save the firms from demise. Even a partial success rate for such interventions would 
lead to the apparent reduced efficacy of the prediction model (and, indeed, cause a 
higher concentration of failures owing to or correlated with factors not considered by 
the model). Contrary to this impactor is another: that a model of questionable efficiency 
may make a self-fulfilling prophesy of firm failure: the mere prediction of failure might 
cause failure since the prediction leads to withdrawal of funding and trade credit, the 
migration of staff and a reduced set of strategic options. The practical application of 
such models should therefore be treated with caution. 
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12 Appendices 
 
12.1 Appendix A: Member bodies of the joint insolvency committee 
 
 
• The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICEAW); 
• The Chartered Accountants Regulatory Board; 
• The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; 
• The Insolvency Practitioners Association; 
• The Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform; 
• The Solicitors Regulation Authority of the Law Society. 
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12.2 Appendix B: Formal procedures of the five main insolvency processes 
 
 
The formal definitions contained herein were obtained primarily from Beer & Young 
which were in turn extracted from the insolvency and enterprise acts. Beer & Young has 
been established since 1998, and has become a leading company delivering turnaround 
equity solutions to SME’s. It manages the largest and most active network of private 
investors active in turnaround business finance and offers practical advice to 
entrepreneurs who face challenging circumstances. http://www.beerandyoung.com 
 
Appendix B.I Company voluntary arrangement 
 
 
Directors, 
Administrator or 
Liquidator  
The Directors, Administrator or Liquidator (as appropriate) 
makes a 'Proposal' to the creditors. The Proposal sets out the 
proposed terms of the CVA  
Insolvency 
Practitioner  
The Insolvency Practitioner agrees to act on the implementation 
of the Proposal and then becomes known as the Nominee 
The Nominee  The Nominee will convene a Creditors Meeting giving notice to 
all the creditors of the Proposal and providing proxy forms for 
voting purposes 
The Creditors 
Meeting  
The Creditors Meeting is then held and the creditors may 
approve, reject or propose amendments to the Proposal. The 
creditors may also choose another Nominee. If a majority of 
75% in value of the creditor's present and voting vote in favour, 
the Proposal becomes binding on all unsecured creditors. 
The Supervisor  Following the approval of the Voluntary Arrangement, the 
Nominee becomes known as the Supervisor and implements the 
Arrangement in accordance with the terms of the Proposal. 
Secured Creditors  A CVA cannot effect the rights of a secured creditor of the 
company to enforce its security except with the agreement of 
the secured creditor  
Challenge Period  A creditor may challenge the Arrangement within 28 days of its 
approval if it is of the opinion that it has been unfairly 
prejudiced by the Proposal or if of the opinion that there is a 
material misstatement in the Proposal 
Sources of 
Dividend 
Funding  
Normally, funds come from pledging future profits for a 
two/three year period or from a third-party who wishes to 
acquire the business 
 
Appendix B.II Administration 
 
Prior to 15 September 2003, the procedure for the appointment of an Administrator 
solely involved the following:  
Petition  
A Petition for an Administration Order is presented to the 
Court. The Petition could be presented by the Company, its 
directors or creditors  
Independent The Petition was supported by an independent persons report, 
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Person's Report  usually an Insolvency Practitioner  
Notice  
Following the Petition, notice was given to any Floating 
Charge holder who could then consider alternative course of 
action, such as appointing an Administrative Receiver  
Administration 
Order  If successful, the Administration Order was granted 
Administrators 
Duties  
The Administrators duties were to manage the business. Make 
proposals as to the conduct of the Administration and call a 
meeting of creditors. 
Creditors Meeting  A creditors meeting was held pursuant within three months of the Administration Order  
 
 
The new legislation provides for a similar procedure to the 'old style' Administration 
to be utilised in less common circumstances. The Enterprise Act 2003 introduced a new 
out-of-court procedure, which has largely replaced the 'old-style' Administration. The 
'old style' Administration is available where:  
 
• Unsecured creditors wish to make an appointment  
• An Administrative Receiver has been appointed  
• A Provisional Liquidator has been appointed  
• A Winding-Up Petition or Administration application is outstanding  
• Administration is not available to companies that have applied for one within the 
previous 12 months.  
 
Post-Appointment Procedure 
Administrator's proposals to creditors  
Under the new regime the administrator is required to send his statement of proposals to 
all known creditors within a period of eight weeks  
Notice of the initial creditors meeting is given with the proposals and the meeting must 
now be held within a period of ten weeks from the date of the administration  
 
Period of administration  
Automatically ceases at the end of 12 months but can be extended  
If the out-of-court procedure is used and the purpose has been fulfilled, the 
administration ends when the administrator files the prescribed notice at court  
The court may order that the appointment ceases upon the application of a creditor  
 
Statutory exit routes  
Creditors’ voluntary liquidation  
Dissolution  
The administrator’s proposals may include a proposal for a Section 425 Scheme of 
arrangement or Company voluntary arrangement. 
 
Appendix B.III Administrative receivership 
 
The Lender  This procedure is available only to a Lender with Floating Charge 
security granted prior to 15 September 2003 
Default  
The Lender can appoint an Administrative Receiver when the 
borrower is in default of or in breach of the terms of the security 
document. The appointment of a Receiver usually follows a 
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demand for repayment 
Acceptance of 
Appointment  The Receiver must formally accept his appointment  
The Receiver  
The Receiver then notifies Companies House, the Company itself 
and its creditors. The Receiver must also advertise his 
appointment in The London Gazette and an appropriate newspaper  
Realisation of 
Assets  
The powers and the capacity of the Receiver depend upon the 
security document which should be referred to in all cases. The 
security document would normally enable the Receiver to carry on 
a company's business and realise its assets. Whilst in office, the 
Receiver acts as the agent of the company until liquidation 
Creditors 
Report  
Within three months of his appointment, the Receiver must send a 
report to the creditors and convene a Creditors Meeting to receiver 
the report. If, in the meantime, the company has gone into 
liquidation, the report need only go to the Liquidator 
Conclusion of 
Receivership  
The receivership is concluded and the Receiver ceases to act in 
office when he has realised the security, repaid any preferential 
creditors (if possible) and the appointer and Companies House are 
notified. 
 
Appendix B.IV Creditors’ voluntary liquidation 
 
Notice & 
Proxy Forms 
Notice and Proxy Forms must be sent to shareholders and creditors 
seeking a resolution to place the company into liquidation  
Advertising A Creditors meeting is advertised in The London Gazette and two 
appropriate newspapers  
Shareholders 
Meeting 
A Shareholders Meeting is held first and an Extraordinary 
Resolution must be passed to wind-up the company and an 
Ordinary Resolution is passed to appoint a Liquidator  
Creditors 
Meeting 
A Creditors Meeting must be held. This must be within 14 days of 
the passing of the shareholders resolution but normally follows 
immediately after the Shareholders Meeting. 
 
At the Creditors Meeting a Statement of Affairs and report on the 
history of the business and causes of the insolvency should be 
presented. The shareholders choice of Liquidator can be changed 
by the creditors, who can either confirm the shareholders choice or 
vote for an alternative Liquidator. Voting is by value of debt. 
The 
Liquidator 
The duties of a Liquidator are, as with Compulsory Liquidation, to 
realise the assets, investigate the company's affairs, agree creditors’ 
claims and distribute the funds 
 
Appendix B.V Compulsory liquidation 
 
 
Issue of Petition  
This is usually presented to the Court by a creditor on the 
grounds of the company's insolvency which is normally proven 
by the failure of the company to satisfy a Statutory Demand. It 
may however also be presented by the company itself of the 
shareholders. A hearing date will be given by the Court. 
Service The Petition must be served on the company 
Advertisement After the expiration of seven days after service on the company 
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the Petition must be advertised, normally in The London Gazette 
Winding-Up 
Order 
Unless successfully disputed at the hearing, a Winding-Up Order 
is made by the Court. The date of the commencement of the 
liquidation is deemed to be when the Petition is presented and 
dispositions after that date are void. 
 
When a Winding-Up Order has been made or a Provisional 
Liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding may be 
presented or commenced against the company or its property 
except by the leave of the Court. 
The Official 
Receiver 
The Official Receiver becomes Liquidator and has a duty to 
investigate the company's affairs and send a report to the 
creditors. The Official Receiver should advertise the Order in 
The London Gazette and any appropriate newspapers 
Conduct of the 
Liquidation 
If the assets are likely to cover the administrative costs, the 
Official Receiver will call a creditors meeting to appoint a 
Liquidator other than himself who  
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12.3 Appendix C: Theoretical derivation of the MDA methodology 
 
 
Following the methodology described in Dhrymes (1974), in general it can be said 
that a company will be characterised, and categorised, by a set of variables and 
attributes, specified by the vector 
 
h = (h, h	, … , hÅ9 (C.1) 
 
and if the company belongs to the ith class group, then x has a well-defined probability 
density function iM(∙9. 
 
h~	iM(∙9										3 = 1,2, … , À (C.2) 
 
where k is the number of class groups, (for the case of insolvency prediction this is just 
two, the firm is either failed or non-failed).  
 
The density function in most cases is taken to be the normal density function, 
although this is not a necessity upon the theory of the MDA methodology; it does 
however become beneficial when constructing tests of significance. For future reference 
the normal density function is provided here. 
 
i(h|	6, 8	) = 	ÆU 	Qh^ >−	(ÇÈ)U	U A (C.3) 
 
where µ is the mean and σ 2 is the variance of the distribution. 
  
In order to solve the classification problem, we first require some rule which 
classifies a company with particular vector of attributes into one of the classes. We can 
partition the m-dimensional Euclidean sample space into k disjoint sets, 
 NM ,           3 = 1,2, … , À (C.4) 
 
such that if a company is characterised by a vector of attributes and is a member of set 
Ei, then that company will be classified into the ith class. During this process, however, 
it is possible that we may commit the error of classifying a company into the jth class 
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when it is actually observed to belong to the ith class, and is also reasonable to attach a 
(positive) cost to this error. We can therefore let the cost of misclassification be denoted 
as cij and the cost of a correct prediction be zero. 
 
ÉMM = 0          3 = 1,2, … , À (C.5) 
 
The probability that a company will be classified into class j when it in fact belongs to 
class i is given by 
 
^MZ =  Ê iM(h)hjË  (C.6) 
 
and therefore the expected cost of correctly classifying a company into class i is 
 
*3 = ∑ ÉMZ^MZÌZ  (C.7) 
 
To find the expected cost of the entire classification procedure, we must weigh the 
quantities Ci by the probabilities attaching to membership of each class; i.e. Ci is a 
conditional cost of misclassification given that the company belongs to the ith class. The 
unconditional cost of the procedure is 
 
* = ∑ ÍM*M = ∑ Ê :Z(h)hjËÌZÌM  (C.8) 
 
where 
 
:Z(h) = ∑ ÍM*MZiM(h)ÌM  (C.9) 
 
and pii is the probability of membership of the ith population. 
 
The problem now is to choose regions Ej so that we minimise the unconditional 
expected cost of the procedure. It can be shown that if the Ej are chosen so that 
 
h ∈ NZ           c = 1,2, … , À (C.10) 
 
324 
 
this implies 
 
:Z(h) ≤ :M(h)          3 = 1,2, … , À (C.11) 
 
then (C.8) is minimised. 
 
Heuristically we can prove this as follows. Choosing any index, say j0, we can write 
 
* = Ê :ZÐ(h)h +jÑ ∑ Ê G:Z(h) − :ZÐ(h)J hjËZÒZÐ  (C.12) 
 
where NÅ denotes the m-dimensional Euclidean space. The first term in the right-hand 
side of equation (C.12) is independent of the choice of regions. Thus C will be 
minimised if the second term is minimised. We can do this if the NZ are defined so that 
they include points x for which :Z(h) − :ZÐ(h) ≤ 0 and exclude points for which 
:Z(h) − :ZÐ(h) ˃ 0.  But the definition of NZ  in (C.10) and (C.11) shows that no matter 
what the choice of j0  is, the term :Z(h) − :ZÐ(h) is non-positive over NZ. Therefore the 
choice of regions minimises C. 
 
The quantity −:Z(h) is termed the jth discriminant score of a company with an 
attribute vector x.  The classification rule implied by the procedure is as follows: If a 
company has an attribute vector x, compute its discriminant scores and assign it to that 
population for which its discriminant score is highest. The difficulty with this procedure 
is that, typically, the probability ÍM  will not be known and the misclassification cost *MZ  could not be assessed with great confidence. We can illustrate this procedure for the 
k =2, failed vs non-failed firm example, assuming the densities in (C.2) are  <(6(M),  ∑M). 
The classification criterion can now be expressed: 
 
Classify in E1 if 
 
ÓS(Ç)ÓU(Ç) ≤ 1 (C.13) 
 
and classify in E2 otherwise. But 
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:(h):	(h) =  Í	É	ÍÉ	 |∑|
	
|∑	|	 Qh^ −
12 {nh − 6(	)o∑	nh − 6(	)o − nh − 6()o∑nh − 6()o} 
 (C.14) 
 
A criterion equivalent to that in (C.14) is 
                  12 {nh − 6()o∑nh − 6()o − nh − 6(	)o∑	nh − 6(	)o} 
+ 	 Ög |∑S||∑U| ≤ Ög >ÆSSUÆUUSA (C.15) 
 
which in the case that the two covariance matrices are equal (∑1 = ∑2), then (C.15) may 
be reduced to 
 
n6() − 6(	)o∑h ≥ 	  n6() + 6(	)o′∑n6() − 6(	)o − Ög >ÆSSUÆUUSA (C.16) 
 
Notice that the assumption of a common covariance matrix for the two classes has 
reduced the criteria from a quadratic function in (C.15), (e.g. Altman et al. (1977)), to a 
linear function in (C.16), (e.g. Altman (1968)). 
 
The left hand side of the inequality in (C.16) is commonly known as the discriminant 
criterion155.  This formulation is in terms of known parameters of the two populations 
(i.e. the group means and the common covariance matrix), noting that when equal costs 
of errors and prior probabilities of failure are assumed, the final term on the right-hand 
side is eliminated. Zavgren (1983) notes that “Although these assumptions are 
unrealistic, they are usually made when error costs and prior probabilities are 
unknown”. 
 
Dhyrmes (p.68-69) shows that for cases where the parameters are not known, and the 
assumptions of equal error costs and equal prior probabilities is made, the estimator can 
be written as follows: 
 
∗(h) = n6() − 6(	)o∑h − 	  n6() + 6(	)o′∑n6() − 6(	)o (C.17) 
                                                 
155
 A more direct approach to this special case is provided by Fisher (1938) in which the resulting equations 
differ only by a constant of proportionality. 
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which reduced to the rule: Classify in population 1 if ∗(h) ≥ 0, and to population 2 
otherwise.  
 
The problem with the discriminant function formulation thus far is that we typically 
do not know the parameters of the populations involved. Dhrymes (p.70) suggests that 
although the above approach has a certain intuitive appeal, it is not clear that it would 
possess the optimal properties that are known to characterise the procedure indicated by 
(C.16) when the parameters of the population are known. Therefore, the following 
alternative procedure for classification, based on the likelihood ratio principle, is 
presented. This formulation is confined the assumption of two (normal) populations 
with the same covariance matrix. 
 
Suppose that we have n1 observations from population1 characterised by the 
density <(6(), ∑); denote the ith observation by xi, i = 1, 2, …, n1. We also have n2 
observations from population 2, whose density is <(6(	), ∑); denote the jth observation 
by yj, j = 1, 2, …, n2. Finally we have an observation z whose origin is unknown except 
for the fact that it belongs to either population 1 or to population 2. Of course, all 
observations are known to be mutually independent. The problem is how to classify z. 
Consider the null hypothesis 
 
 H0: (x1, x2, …, xn1, z)  belong to population 1 
    : (y1, y2, …, yn2)                 belong to population 2 (C.18) 
 
as against the alternative 
 
H1: (x1, x2, …, xn1)  belong to population 1 
    : (y1, y2, …, yn2, z)              belong to population 2 (C.19) 
 
Using the assumptions already made concerning the densities of the two populations, 
the maximum likelihood estimators of 6(), 6(	),  and ∑ under the null hypothesis are 
 
          6̂() = XT∑ ÇWÜSWÝSST             6̂(	) = ∑ ÞË
ÜUËÝSU   
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∑ßàá = STUT p∑ nhM − 6̂()onhM − 6̂()o + ndM − 6̂()ondM − 6̂()oSM   
   + ∑ nCZ − 6̂(	)onCZ − 6̂(	)oUZ q (C.20) 
 
It follows, therefore, that the maximum of the likelihood function, L(z, x1, x2, …, xn1,  
y1, y2, …, yn2 ;  6(), 6(	), ∑), under the null hypothesis is given by 
 
 HÐMax Lnz … ;   6(), 6(	), Σo =  (2π)SUÅ(STUT)ç∑ßàáçSU(STUT)  
∗  exp p−	é(g + g	 + 1)q 
 
 (C.21) 
  
 
Under the alternative hypothesis, the maximum likelihood estimators of 
6(), 6(	),  and ∑ are given by 
 
          6̂() = ∑ ÇWÜSWÝSS             6̂(	) = ÃT∑ ÞË
ÜUËÝSUT   
∑ßàS = STUT p∑ nhM − 6̂()onhM − 6̂()oSM   
   + ∑ nCZ − 6̂(	)onCZ − 6̂(	)o + ndM − 6̂(	)ondM − 6̂(	)oUZ q (C.22) 
 
Thus 
HMax Lnz … ;   6(), 6(	), Σo =  (2π)SUÅ(STUT)ç∑ßàSçSU(STUT)  
∗  exp p−	é(g + g	 + 1)q 
(C.23) 
 
It therefore follows that that the likelihood ratio is 
 
ê = ë@ + UUT(d − Cì)(d − Cì)′ëë@ + SST(d − h̅)(d − h̅)′ë  
 
= ë1 + UUT(d − Cì)′@(d − Cì)ëë1 + SST(d − h̅)′@(d − h̅)ë  
(C.24) 
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where 
@ = î(hM − h̅)(hM − h̅) + înCZ − CìonCZ − Cìo
U
Z
S
M
 
 
 
h̅ = ∑ hMSMg  , Cì =
∑ CZUZg	  
(C.25) 
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12.4 Appendix D: A brief guide to gambler’s ruin theory 
 
For reference, the text within this section is extracted from several sources to 
summarise the gambler’s ruin theory. The sources include Wilcox (1976), Scott (1981) 
and Altman (1983). The gambler’s ruin strand of insolvency prediction is fairly 
uncommon today due, in part, to the lack of convincing empirical test results achieved 
in past studies. 
 
The gambler in this theory begins the game with an arbitrary amount of money. He 
wins a dollar with probability P or loses a dollar with probability Q (1 - P). The game 
continues until the gambler loses all his money or until his component loses his. The 
theory based on this simple scenario is well developed; there are expressions for the 
probability of ultimate ruin, for the gambler’s expected ultimate gain or loss, for the 
expected duration of the game, and so on. In financial applications, the firm is viewed as 
the gambler, and bankruptcy occurs when the firm’s net worth falls to zero. Scott (1981, 
pp. 322-333). 
 
The following summary of Wilcox (1976) largely follows Altman (1983, pp. 161-
163). Wilcox adapted the classic gambler’s ruin problem (Feller, 1968) to measuring 
business risk and focused upon net liquidation value (NLV) and the factors which cause 
it to fluctuate. NLV is simply a dollar level determined by liquidity inflow and outflow 
rates. For a given period, Wilcox defined the inflow rate as net income minus dividends 
and the outflow rate as the increase in book value of assets minus the increase in the 
liquidation value of those assets. Using the familiar bathtub (or following the course of 
this thesis, the liquid reservoir) analogy, NLV is the water level in the tub (reservoir) 
with both its spigot and drain open. When the inflow rate exceeds the outflow rate, NLV 
increases; when the opposite occurs, NLV decreases. Combining inflow and outflow 
variables, Wilcox referred to this net flow as the “adjusted cash-flow,” the period-to-
period change in NLV, excluding stock issues, accounting changes, and other non-
continuing processes. 
 
The main concern of the model was with the predicting when NLV will be negative, 
which often portends bankruptcy. Assuming a “stable process,” Wilcox postulated that 
the probability of NLV being reduced to zero (insolvency) is a f unction of (1) the 
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current NLV or current wealth, (2) the average adjusted cash-flow, and (3) the 
variability of the adjusted cash-flow, measured by its variance, σ2. To summarise, 
 'm(<= < 0) = i(<=, μ, σ	). 
(D.1) 
 
Other things being equal, the smaller the NLV, the smaller the adjusted cash-flow, 
and the larger the variation of the adjusted cash-flow, the greater the chance of failure 
(Pr). To determine how much NLV and average adjusted cash-flow are needed for a 
given degree of safety, Wilcox introduced a concept called the “size of bet” (S). He 
interprets S as the adjusted cash-flow at risk each year or as the simplest probabilistic 
process underlying the NLV cash-flows. 
 
In terms of the gambler’s ruin model, NLV = NS (where N is the number of states 
away from failure and S is the size of the bet) = μ	 + σ	. As an approximation, Wilcox 
measured S2 as the average of the squared annual changes in NLV. the firm was viewed 
at time t, as being in state N with wealth of NLV = NS. In period t + 1, the firm (the 
gambler) moves either to state N – 1 with wealth of (NLV – S) or to state N +1 with 
wealth of (NLV +S). In period t + 2, the firm moves from its new state with a change in 
wealth of either + S or – S depending upon whether it “wins” or “loses”. If the 
probability of winning is denoted by P and the probability of losing by Q (or 1 – P), the 
probability of ruin (failure) is: 
 
'm(9 = (»/'9 
(D.2) 
 
If P ≤ Q then failure is inevitable. 
 
A firms average winnings per period, µ, is equal to S (P – Q). Defining µ/S as X, the 
ratio Q/P is equal to (1 – X) / (1 + X). Thus,  
 
'm(9 = ï1 − 
¤
1 −  ð ≅ 1 − 2<. 
(D.3) 
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While Wilcox conceded that the gambler’s ruin model (in the business failure 
context) is an extreme over-simplification, he argued that the parameters X and N are 
fundamental indicators of relative financial risk, especially if they are based upon five 
years of adjusted cash-flows. 
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12.5 Appendix E: Derivation of the conditional probability models 
 
The following derivation is adapted from the proof which is found within Gujarati 
(2003). 
 
Within this thesis I focus upon two different forms of the conditional probability 
model (CPM), the logit and the probit. Both models are derived from the Linear 
Probability Model (LPM), (E.1), (also a CPM), which in the first instance resembles a 
traditional linear regression. For simplicity we can use a single dependant variable M. 
 OM = Y + Y	M + μM (E.1) 
 
However, because the independent regressand is a dichotomous variable (taking the 
value 1 for failed or 0 for non-failed), the model is called a LPM. The reason for this is 
because the conditional expectation of OM given M	, N(OM|M), can be interpreted as the 
conditional probability that firm failure will occur given M, that is, Pr (OM = 1|M). If we 
assume that the expected errors are zero and that the model is an unbiased estimator 
then we obtain 
 N(OM|M) = Y + Y	M (E.2) 
 
Now, if 'M is the probability that OM = 1(that is, failure occurs), and  (1 − 'M) is the 
probability that OM = 0 (failure does not occur), then OM follows the Bernoulli probability 
distribution. Therefore, by the definition of mathematical expectation we obtain: 
 N(OM) = 0(1 − 'M) + 1('M) = 'M (E.3) 
 
and therefore 
 N(OM|M) = Y + Y	M = 'M (E.4) 
 
that is, the conditional expectation of the model (E.1) can be interpreted as the 
conditional probability of OM where, in general, the expectation of a Bernoulli random 
variable is the probability that the random variable equals 1. Since the probability 'M 
must lie between 0 and 1, we have the restriction 
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0 × N(OM|M) Ï 1 (E.5) 
 
that is, that the conditional expectation (or conditional probability) must lie between 
0 and 1.  
 
Additionally, the probability model requires two key features: (1) As M increases, 'M = N(O = 1|) increases but never breaks the bounds of the 0-1 interval, and (2) the 
relationship between 'M and M is non-linear where M approaches zero at slower and 
slower rates as M decreases, and approaches one at slower and slower rates as M gets 
very large. Geometrically the model which we desire would resemble something like we 
have in Figure E.1. 
 
 
Figure E.1: A cumulative distribution function. 
 
The S-shaped sigmoid curve very much resembles the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of a random variable, and therefore we can easily use the CDF to model 
regressions where the independent variable is dichotomous. For each random variable 
there is a unique CDF so we therefore need to establish which of these we are to use. 
For historical as well as practical reasons, the CDF’s commonly chosen to represent 0-1 
response models are the logistic and the normal, where the logistic CDF gives rise to the 
logit model and the normal CDF gives rise to the probit (or normit) model. 
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12.5.1 The logit model 
 
The (cumulative) logistic distribution function (LDF) has the following form 
 
 
* = 11 + QXW = QX1 + QX 
 (E.6) 
 
where M = Y + Y	M 
 
Therefore, 
 
'M = N(O = 1|) = 11 + Q(RSTRUVW) = 11 + QXW = QX1 + QX 
 (E.7) 
 
It is easy to verify that as M ranges from -∞ to +∞, 'M ranges between 0 and 1and that 'M is non-linearly related to M 	(i.e., M), thus satisfying the two model requirements. In 
satisfying these requirements we have inadvertently created an estimation problem 
because 'M is non-linear not only in  but also in the β’s as can be seen clearly in (E.7). 
This inherent problem means that we cannot simply use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation to estimate the parameters of the model, but instead we must use the 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method. This problem is more apparent than real 
however, because (E.7) can be linearised as follows: 
 
If 'M, the probability of firm failure, is given by (E.7), then (1 − 'M), the probability 
of firm survival, is 
 
1 − 'M = 11 + QXW 
 (E.8) 
 
Therefore we can write 
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'M1 − 'M = 1 + QXW1 + QXW = QXW 
 (E.9) 
 
Now 'M / (1 − 'M) is simply the odds ratio – the ratio of the probability that a firm 
will fail to the probability that a firm will survive. Thus, if 'M = 0.8, it means that odds 
are 4 to 1 in favour of the firm becoming insolvent. Now if we take the natural log of 
(E.9), we obtain a very interesting result, namely, 
 
 
=M = ln  'M1 − 'M = M = Y + Y	M 
 (E.10) 
 
 
that is, L, the log of the odds ratio, is not only linear in X, but also (from the 
estimation viewpoint) linear in the parameters. L is called the logit, and hence the name 
logit model. 
 
To estimate (E.10), we need, apart from M, the values of the regressand or logit =M. 
As we have data on the individual firm level, OLS estimation of (E.10) is infeasible, and 
is easy to demonstrate. 'M = 1 if the firm has failed and 'M = 0 if the firm survives, but 
if we put these values directly into the logit =M, we obtain: 
 =M = ln >ÐA if a firm has failed 
 =M = ln >ÐA if a firm survives 
 
Obviously, these expressions are meaningless and we therefore must us ML 
estimation thus: 
 
Suppose we have a random sample of n firm observations. Letting iM(OM) denote the 
probability that OM = 0 or 1, and the joint probability of observing the n Y values, i.e. iM(O, 	O	, … O) is given as: 
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iM(O, 	O	, …O) =òiM(OM) =ò'MóW

 (1 − 'M)óW 
 (E.11) 
 
Note that we can write the joint probability density function as a product of 
individual density functions because each OM is drawn independently and each OM has the 
same (logistic) density function. The joint probability given in (E.11) is known as the 
likelihood function (LF). (E.11) is a tad awkward to manipulate, but if we take its 
natural logarithm, we obtain what is called the log likelihood function (LLF). 
 
ln	iM(O, 	O	, … O) =î[ OMln	'M + (1 − OM)ln(1 − 'M)] 
=î[ OMln	'M − OMln(1 − 'M) + ln(1 − 'M)] 
=îôOMln  'M1 − 'Mõ +îln	(1 − 'M)



  
 (E.12) 
From (E.7) it is easy to verify that 
 
(1 − 'M) = 11 + Q(RSTRUVW) 
 (E.13) 
as well as 
 
ln  'M1 − 'M = Y + Y	M 
 (E.14) 
 
Using (E.13) and (E.14) we can write the LLF (E.12) as: 
 
ln	iM(O, 	O	, … O) = 	îOM(Y + Y	M) −îlnG1 + Q(RSTRUVW)J

  
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 (E.15) 
 
We can see from (E.15), the LLF is a function of the parameters Yand Y	, since the M are known.  
 
In ML our objective is to maximise this LLF, that is, to obtain the values of the 
unknown parameters in such a manner that the probability of observing the given Y’s is 
as high (maximum) as possible. To maximise this function we must differentiate (E.15) 
partially with respect to each unknown, set the resulting expression to zero and solve the 
resulting expressions. One can then apply the second-order condition of maximisation to 
verify that the values of the parameters we have obtained do in fact maximise the LLF. 
In reality, however, in solving these expressions, the reader will quickly realise that the 
resulting expressions become highly non-linear in the parameters and no explicit 
solutions can be obtained. We can, however, solve the LLF by using one of several non-
linear estimation techniques.156 
 
For this particular study, the LLF estimation of some 13,000 observations is, of 
course, impractical to solve by hand. I adopted two methods (for verification purposes) 
to solve the logit models within this study. Firstly, by simply using the SAS procedure 
PROC_LOGISTIC, the parameters of each model were easily estimated. To verify these 
results it is, again, fairly simple to construct an Excel spread sheet which makes use of 
the SOLVER function to maximise the LLF. 
  
                                                 
156
 Further discussion of these can be found in Gujarati (2003). 
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12.5.2 The probit model 
 
As previously noted, to explain the behaviour of a dichotomous dependant variable, 
we require the use of a suitably chosen CDF. Whereas the logit model uses the LDF 
(E.6), an alternative CDF which has been proven useful is the normal CDF. The 
estimating model which emerges from the normal CDF is the probit. Written explicitly 
in the continuation of the corporate failure example, the standard normal CDF is: 
 
CDF = 	 1√2Í ÷ QXU/	(RSTRUVW)ø dd 
 (E.16) 
 
In principle we can substitute the normal CDF in place of the LDF as per (E.7) and 
proceed in exactly the same fashion. It is however, widely recognised that the resulting 
ML estimation expression becomes rather more complicated in comparison to what has 
previously derived for the logit model. I will therefore not pursue this any further as I do 
not use any probit estimations within the empirical section of this thesis. An alternative 
and more manageable form of the probit estimation methodology can be found in 
McFadden (1973) and is based upon utility theory, or rational choice perspective on 
behaviour. 
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12.6 Appendix F: A brief guide to neural networks and back-propagation 
 
 
Much of this discussion is adapted or re-quoted from Fletcher and Goss (1993) which 
is in-turn a discussion of Rumelhart et al. (1986). A full and concise derivation of the 
back-propagation algorithm can be found in Rojas (1996), which unfortunately is 
deemed to be too lengthy to reproduce here in its entirety. This Appendix therefor is 
designed to give the reader a brief overview of the feed-forward neural network with 
back-propagation training algorithm in order to aid his or her understanding of some of 
the processes involved within this thesis. 
 
The feed-forward process 
 
In a back-propagation neural network, as developed by Rumelhart et al. (1986), 
independent variable patterns, or values, are normalised between zero and one at the 
input layer to produce the signal Oi prior to presentation to the hidden node layer. Each 
connection between the input layer and a hidden node has an associated weight Wij. The 
net signal Ij to an individual hidden node is expressed as the sum of all the connections 
between the input layer nodes and that particular hidden node plus the connection value 
Wgj from a bias node. This relationship may be expressed as: 
 
IZ =îÄMZM +ÄúZ 
 (F.1) 
 
The signal from the hidden layer is then processed with a sigmoid function which 
again normalises the values between 0 and 1 to produce Oj prior to being sent to the 
output layer. The normalisation procedure is performed according to: 
 
OZ = 11 + exp	(−IZ) 
 (F.2) 
 
The net signal to an output node Ik is the sum of all connections between hidden layer 
nodes and the respective output node, expressed as: 
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 IÌ =îÄZÌZ +ÄúÌ 
 (F.3) 
 
where ÄúÌ represents a single connection weight from a bias node with a value of 1 to 
the output layer. The net signal is again normalised with the sigmoid function to 
produce the final output value Ok, where 
 
OÌ = 11 + exp	(−IÌ) 
 (F.4) 
 
In terms of corporate insolvency prediction modelling, OÌ represents the probability 
of failure for the individual firm. 
 
The process of error back-propagation 
 
At the output layer the net signal, OÌ, (the estimated probability of failure, or 
dependent variable), is compared to the actual value of the dependant variable, TÌ, to 
produce an error signal which is propagated back through the network.  Widrow and 
Hoff (1960) were the first to develop a learning rule based upon least mean squares, 
which became known as the Generalised Delta Rule, where the output layer error 
signals are propagated back through the network to perform appropriate weight 
adjustments after each pattern presentation. Rumelhart et al. (1986) describe the process 
of weight adjustment by: 
 ∆ÄMZ(n + 1) = ηδþÌþZ + α∆ÄMÌ(n) 
 (F.5) 
 
where η is a learning coefficient and α is a “momentum” factor. The momentum factor 
determines the effect of past weight changes on the current direction of movement in 
weight space and proportions the amount of the last weight change to be added into the 
new weight change. 
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The error signal δ, back-propagated to the connection weights between the hidden 
and output layers is defined as the difference between the target value TþÌ for a 
particular input pattern p and the neural network’s feed-forward calculations of the 
signal from the output layer OÌ as: 
  þÌ = (TþÌ − þÌ)þÌ(1 − þÌ) 
 (F.6) 
 
Then connection weights between the input and hidden layers are changed by: 
 
 þZ = þZ(1 − þZ)î þÌÄZÌÌ  
 (F.7) 
 
The data feed-forward and error back-propagation process is continued until a 
“stopping” point is reached. This point is determined by comparing the errors in the 
training set and the test set. This methodology prevents over-learning or fitting the 
training set too closely with consequent large errors in the test set. 
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12.7 Appendix G: Derivation of the Down-and-out call option formulae 
 
The pricing of a down-and-out call option follows and adapts the derivation found in 
Reisz and Purlich (2007) which in turn follows that of Merton (1973). Here I focus upon 
the case where the barrier B is presumed to be smaller than the strike price X and the 
initial (or starting) value of the firm’s assets Vt. I begin by stating the subsidiary 
proposition Lemma A1. 
 
Lemma A1. Let K(s) = σW(s), where {W(s)} is a standard Brownian motion. Then for β 
< 0 and À ≥ β, 
 
 
À P((t) < À,min; (`) < 	Y) = 	 18√2Í e(	RÌ)U	U  
 (G.1) 
Proof. 
 
P((t) < À,min; (`) < 	Y) = 	P((t) < 2β − À,min; (`9 < β9 = P((t9
< 2β − À9 
 (G.2) 
where the left hand side equality results from the reflection principle and the second 
equality from the fact thatÀ ≥ β. Now since 
 P((t) < À,min; (`) < 	Y) = 	P(min; (`) < β) − P((t) > À,min; (`) < 	Y), 
À P((t) < À,min; (`) < 	Y) = − À P((t) < 	2Y − À9 = − À÷ Q
U	U
8√2Í
	RÌ
ø d	 
 
= − Àϕ2β − À8√  = 18√ φ 2β − À8√  
 (G.3) 
where ϕ and φ are denoted as being the standard normal cumulative probability function 
and density function respectively. 
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Lemma A2. Let {Y(t)} be a Brownian motion with mean αt (with α ≠ 0) and variance 
σ
2t (in the sequel: a (α, σ2)-BM, then for β < 0 and C ≥ β, C P(Y(t9 < C, minÐ;O(`9 < 	Y) = 	 Q	RU 18√2Í Q(Þ	R)U	U ≡ g(y,β) 
 (G.4) 
 
Proof. Let Äß () = Ä() − (/8); then, by Girsanov’s theorem, Äß () is a standard 
Brownian motion on [0,T] under the probability measure '¸ defined by '¸' = exp >8AÄ(?) − 12 >8A	 T ≡ Z(T) 
 (G.5) 
Hence σW(t) = σWß (9 +  is a (α,σ2)-BM under '¸.  
Let ) = minÐ;(`9 
 
where {X(t)} is, similarly to above, equal to σ{W(t)}, i.e., a (0,σ2)-BM under the 
probability measure P. Then 
 PßnσW(t9 ≤ y,) ≤ βo = EßG1σW(t9 ≤ y,) ≤ βJ = EGZ(t91σW(t9 ≤ y,) ≤ βJ 
= E ôexp  8	 () − 12 >8A	  1K(t) ≤ y,) ≤ βõ 
= ÷ Q> UAÌSU U«'(() ∈ À,Þø ) ≤ β) 
 (G.6) 
where 1 is the indicator function, i.e., 1{A}=1 if event A	⊂ Ω happens and 0 otherwise. 
This in turn is equal to, by Lemma A1, 
 
= ÷ Q> UAÌSU U«Þø 18√2Í e(	RÌ)/(	U)dk 
 (G.6) 
Differentiating with respects to y gives, after completing the square, the desired 
result. If we assume here that a firm’s assets follow a log normal diffusion, i.e., dVs = (µ 
- σ) Vs dt + σAVs dW(s). We can rewrite this as dVs = (r – δ) Vs dWß (s), where Wß (s) ≡ 
W(s) + [(µ- r) / σA] s is, by Girsanov’s theorem, a standard BM under the probability 
measure Pß defined by (dPß / dP) = exp{-[(µ- r) / σA]W(T) - [(µ- r) / σA]2 T/2}. Hence  
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l = QïmkU	 ð(l)T(ß (l)ß ()) ≡ Qó(,l) 
 (G.7) 
 
where {Y(t, T)} is a Pß-Brownian motion with drift >2 −   − U	 A (? − )≡ α (T - t) ≡ ατ 
and variance 8r	 (note that τ represents the maturity of the debt contract T – t). In 
complete markets, the down-and-out option is replicable and its time-t price can be 
written as 
 Qm	E 	p(Vl − )T 1 − 1 >min;l (`) ≤ A |q = Qm	E	[(Vl − )T|	] − Qm	E p(Vl − )T1 >min;l (`) ≤ A |q 
 
 (G.8) 
where 	E  [·] refers to the expectation under the measure '  and (k)+ denotes max(k, 0). 
The first term of equation (H.8) is the price of a standard (Black-Scholes) call option 
equation and the second term is that of a down-and-in call option. Since the only 
stochastic term in V(t) is Y(t,T) as described above, the conditioning on Ft can be 
dropped. Reisz and Purlich (2007) now concentrate on the second term noting that 
 min;l(`) ≤  	⇔ 	 min;l O(`) ≤ Y	 
 
where β = ln(B/Vt) < 0. Then, by Lemma A2 the time-t price of the down-and-in call 
option is: 
  
 
Qm÷ (QÞ − )ø>V«A ' (O ∈ C, min;l O(`) ≤ Y) 
= Qm÷ QÞ"(C, Y)ø>V«A C,−Qm÷ "(C, Y)
ø
>V«A C ≡ Qm[Á − Á	] 
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Now, 
Á	 = exp	ï2Y8r	 ð÷ ï 18r√2Íð Qh^ ï− [C − 2Y − ]	28r	 ð Cø>V«A  
= Qh^ ï2Y8r	 ð ∙ < ï2Y +  − ln	(/)8r√ ð 
= 
	(mk)U  ∙ < ln ô 		õ + 2 −   − 8r	2  8r√ , 
and 
Á = exp	ï2Y8r	 ð÷ ï QÞ8r√2Íð Qh^ ï− [C − 2Y − ]	28r	 ð C7(Þ	R)/√ø>V«A  
∙ exp	ï2Y8r	 + 2Yð÷ ïQ7√2Í ð Qh^− a­ − #/8r2 b
	­ø(>V«	R)/√A  
= Q(mk9 
	(mk)U T ∙ < ln ô 		õ + 2 −   + 8r	2  8√  
 
after completing the square. Putting the parts together we arrive at the formula which 
values the equity of the company as per equation (8.9) in the main text. 
 * = 	 ekN() − 	emNn − σ√o  
     − 	aek >«AU(¡¢)U T N() − em >«AU(¡¢)U Nn − σ√ob 
 
 = ln(/) + n2 −   + (8	/29o8√ 	 
 = ln(	/) + n2 −   + (8	/29o8√? −  	 
 
Computing the probability of bankruptcy 
 
Let us first remind ourselves of how insolvency is defined under the barrier options 
approach. Insolvency is deemed to occur when either; the underlying asset value crosses 
the barrier B from above at any time before T, or the underlying asset value stays above 
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the barrier throughout time T, but is less than amount of debt owed at the date of 
maturity, i.e. at time T. Using this definition we can derive the actual probability of 
insolvency occurring using the actual asset drift. Let t* be the first time the asset value 
crosses the insolvency barrier B. The probability of crossing the barrier before maturity 
is equal to: 
 P(t∗ ≤ T) = 	P(min;l O(`) ≤ β) = P(Y(T) ≤ β) + P(min;l O(`) ≤ Y, O(?) > 	Y) 
 = Ê i(C)C +Rø Ê "(C, Y)C = < >R√AøR + Q	R/U ∙ < >R√A, 
(G.9) 
 
where the expression for "(C, Y9 comes from Lemma A2. It is integrated in the same 
way as for the computation of I2, replacing ln(X/Vt) with ln(B/Vt) as the lower limit of 
the integration. Since we are interested in actual, and not risk neutral probabilities of 
default, α is now equal to (µ - δ -	8r	/2), and the probability of early insolvency is equal 
to 
 
P(t∗ ≤ T9 = 	Nln >A − >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
+ 	
	(k)U  ∙ < ln >A + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
 
(G.10) 
As for insolvency occurring at the end of the period where the asset value is greater than 
the barrier but below the value of debt, it suffices to realise that 
 P(Y(T9 ∈ dy, min;l O(`9 ≥ Y9 =P(Y(T9 ∈ dy9 − P(Y(T9 ∈ dy, min;l O(`9 < Y9 = i(C9C − "(C, Y9C 
 
to write the probability of this event as: 
 '( ≤ l < , min;l O(`) × Y) 
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'( ≤ Qó() < , min;l O(`) × Y) = ÷ i(C)C −	(
V«)
R ÷ "(C, Y)C	(
V«)
R  
 
 
= $÷ i(C)C −øR ÷ i(C)C − ÷ "(C, Y)C + ÷ "(C, Y)Cø	(V«)
ø
R
ø
R % 
 
These four integrals are integrated in much the same way as the integral I2 was 
computed. For integrals involving	"(C, Y), or as N(d2) is computed in the Black-
Scholes case for integrals involving i(C). We come to the result: 
 '( ≤ l < , min;l O(`) × Y) 
 
= <ï − Y8r√ ð − <Ög >
A + 8r√  − Q
	RU ∙ &<ï + Y8r√ ð − <Ög 
	 + 8r√ ' 
 
= 	< Ög >A + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   − <Ög >
A + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −  
− 
	(Èk)U 
∙ &<Ög >A + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −  
− < Ög  	 + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −  ' 
(G.11) 
 
Finally we can sum the two insolvency conditions of equations (H.10) and (H.11) to 
get the actual probability of insolvency occurring: 
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P(Insolvency9 = 1 − 	< ln >A + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
+ 	
	(k)U  ∙ < ln  	 + >μ −   − 128r	A (? − )8r√? −   
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12.8 Appendix H: Derivation of the European call option pricing formulae 
 
 
In order to derive the price of a European call option upon a firm’s assets (assuming 
in the first instance a firm which pays no dividends), we could solve the Black-Scholes 
Partial Differential Equation either by employing appropriate boundary conditions, or 
by calculating the expectation explicitly using techniques from probability. For this 
derivation I will use the latter due to its relative simplicity.  To begin, we assume that 
the dynamic of the assets (V) follows a geometric Brownian motion and under a risk-
free neutral measure is given by: 
  = 2 + 8d 
(H.1) 
 
Where r is the risk-free rate. The solution to the above equation is given by the 
following which has previously been derived. 
 
l = QïmU	 ð(l)TX£ 
(H.2) 
 
where ZT ~ N(0,T). 
 
The value of the option, with a strike price equal to the companies’ debt X and 
maturity T is given by the expected value of the options’ payoff, discounted back to 
today:  
  = Qml+[max(l − , 0)] 
(H.3) 
 
Equation (H.3) can be evaluated by deriving explicitly the value for  by first 
integrating against the density of a random variable with distribution N(0,1) 
 
Qml+[max(l − , 0)] = Qml+[max,ÐQïmU	 ð(l)TX£ − , 0-] 
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= Qml+[max,ÐQïmU	 ð(l)T√lX£ − , 0-] 
Qml÷ ,ÐQïmU	 ð(l)T√lX − - 1√2Íán¡(U 9/Uo(£9.√£/0V QXU/	d 
(H.4) 
 
Determine the bounds and separate the subtraction 
 
Qml÷ ,ÐQïmU	 ð(l)T√lX − - 1√2ÍX0(V/á9nm(U9/	ol√l QXU/	d 
 
Qml÷ ÐQïmU	 ð(l)T√lX 1√2Íø(V/á9nm(U9/	ol√l QXU/	d	−	Qml÷
1√2Íø(V/á9nm(U9/	ol√l QXU/	d 
(H.5) 
 
Change the limits using the property of the normal density function, complete the square 
and simplify 
 
ÐQU/	l÷ 1√2Í
(á/V9Tnm(U9/	ol√lø QXU	 T√ld	−	Qml÷ 1√2Í
(á/V9Tnm(U9/	ol√lø QXU/	d 
 
 
 
Ð÷ 1√2Í
(á/V9Tnm(U9/	ol√lø Q(X#l9U/	d	−	Qml÷ 1√2Í
(á/V9Tnm(U9/	ol√lø QXU/	d 
 
Let h = d − 	8√? and change the limits of the integration 
 
Ð÷ 1√2Í
(á/V9Tnm(U9/	ol√lø QÇU/	h	−	Qml÷ 1√2Í
(á/V9Tnm(U9/	ol√lø QXU/	d 
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= Ð<()	−	Qml<( − σr√?9 
(H.6) 
where 
 = Ög pÐ q +	>2 −	128r	A?8r√? 	
 
Finally we need to adjust the formula incorporate dividends, reflecting that the 
dividends which are paid by the firm will accrue to equity holders. Firstly we adjust V0 
to account for the reduction in asset value due to the payment of dividends prior to time 
T. Secondly, the risk free rate of return r is replaced by the “real” rate of return of the 
firm. This return is given by the return on assets µ , minus the dividend rate δ. Finally we 
include an additional term n1 − ekloÐ as it is the equity holders who receive the 
dividends. When the dividend rate is equal to zero, this term is valueless and disappears. 
The resulting formula is therefore: 
 
 j = ÐeklN() − 	QmlNn − σr√?o + n1 − ekloÐ 
(H.7) 
where  
 = ln pÐ q +	>μ	– 	  +	128r	A?σr√?  
 
This resulting model assumes that the natural log of future assets values is normally 
distributed with mean pln[Ð] +	>2 −		8r	A?q, and variance 8r	. McDonald (2002) 
shows therefore that the probability of insolvency occurring, i.e. V < X at the end of the 
period T is: 
 
Prob	 = N |− ln pÐ q +	>μ	– 	  −	128	A ?σ√? ~ 
(H.8)) 
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12.9 Appendix I: Detailed results of the elimination test 
 
Year 1 
BANK SIZE B/M BV AZ TZ OL BS HKCL DOC JW 
Value of Good Loans 23874 18587 15072 5556 9115 8668 3650 3490 6686 3759 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 118 711 263 64 171 97 0 30 79 8 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 23993 19298 15335 5620 9286 8765 3650 3520 6765 3767 
Market Share 24.0% 19.3% 15.3% 5.6% 9.3% 8.8% 3.6% 3.5% 6.8% 3.8% 
Average lending rate 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 
Share of Good Loans 24.2% 18.9% 15.3% 5.6% 9.3% 8.8% 3.7% 3.5% 6.8% 3.8% 
REVENUE (£m) 286 228 201 52 104 99 27 27 68 28 
Share of Defaults 7.7% 46.1% 17.1% 4.2% 11.1% 6.3% 0.0% 2.0% 5.1% 0.5% 
LOSS (£m)  53 320 118 29 77 44 0 14 36 3 
PROFIT (£m) 233 -92 83 23 26 55 27 13 33 25 
RETURN ON ASSETS 0.97% -0.48 0.54% 0.41% 0.29% 0.63% 0.75% 0.37% 0.48% 0.66% 
 
Year 2 
BANK SIZE BV AZ TZ OL BS HKCL DOC JW 
Value of Good Loans 29093 18661 8627 10578 9402 4650 3939 7888 5620 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 265 475 87 214 155 50 51 117 128 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 29358 19136 8714 10792 9556 4700 3990 8005 5748 
Market Share 29.4% 19.1% 8.7% 10.8% 9.6% 4.7% 4.0% 8.0% 5.7% 
Average lending rate 1.4% 1.6% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2% 
Share of Good Loans 29.5% 19.0% 8.8% 10.7% 9.5% 4.7% 4.0% 8.0% 5.7% 
REVENUE (£m) 402 296 98 132 120 50 35 91 70 
Share of Defaults 17.2% 30.8% 5.6% 13.9% 10.0% 3.3% 3.3% 7.6% 8.3% 
LOSS (£m)  119 214 39 96 70 23 23 53 58 
PROFIT (£m) 283 82 59 36 50 27 12 39 13 
RETURN ON ASSETS 0.96% 0.43% 0.68% 0.33% 0.53% 0.58% 0.31% 0.48% 0.22% 
          
Year 3 
BANK SIZE BV AZ TZ OL BS HKCL DOC 
Value of Good Loans 29384 19162 8846 10750 9708 6974 5250 8384 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 266 493 87 214 160 126 72 125 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 29649 19655 8933 10964 9868 7100 5322 8509 
Market Share 29.6% 19.7% 8.9% 11.0% 9.9% 7.1% 5.3% 8.5% 
Average lending rate 1.4% 1.6% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 
Share of Good Loans 29.8% 19.5% 9.0% 10.9% 9.9% 7.1% 5.3% 8.5% 
REVENUE (£m) 408 305 102 135 124 87 53 100 
Share of Defaults 17.2% 31.9% 5.6% 13.9% 10.4% 8.2% 4.7% 8.1% 
LOSS (£m)  120 222 39 96 72 57 32 56 
PROFIT (£m) 289 84 63 39 52 31 20 44 
RETURN ON ASSETS 0.97% 0.43% 0.71% 0.35% 0.53% 0.43% 0.38% 0.52% 
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Year 4 
BANK SIZE BV AZ OL BS HKCL DOC 
Value of Good Loans 30389 21565 12788 11777 7410 5491 9038 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 281 533 168 231 126 72 132 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 30670 22098 12955 12008 7536 5563 9170 
Market Share 30.7% 22.1% 13.0% 12.0% 7.5% 5.6% 9.2% 
Average lending rate 1.4% 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 
Share of Good Loans 30.9% 21.9% 13.0% 12.0% 7.5% 5.6% 9.2% 
REVENUE (£m) 434 356 166 166 97 56 111 
Share of Defaults 18.2% 34.6% 10.9% 15.0% 8.2% 4.7% 8.6% 
LOSS (£m)  126 240 75 104 57 32 60 
PROFIT (£m) 307 116 91 62 41 24 52 
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.00% 0.52% 0.70% 0.52% 0.54% 0.43% 0.56% 
 
Year 5 
BANK SIZE BV AZ OL BS DOC 
Value of Good Loans 30740 21892 12933 12050 10049 10794 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 281 534 168 232 150 178 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 31021 22426 13101 12282 10199 10971 
Market Share 31.0% 22.4% 13.1% 12.3% 10.2% 11.0% 
Average lending rate 1.4% 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 
Share of Good Loans 31.2% 22.2% 13.1% 12.2% 10.2% 11.0% 
REVENUE (£m) 439 361 168 170 134 136 
Share of Defaults 18.2% 34.6% 10.9% 15.0% 9.7% 11.5% 
LOSS (£m)  126 240 75 104 67 80 
PROFIT (£m) 313 121 93 65 66 56 
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.01% 0.54% 0.71% 0.53% 0.65% 0.51% 
 
Year 6 
BANK SIZE BV AZ OL BS 
Value of Good Loans 32966 23402 14877 12750 14461 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 289 644 197 251 163 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 33255 24046 15074 13001 14624 
Market Share 33.3% 24.0% 15.1% 13.0% 14.6% 
Average lending rate 1.5% 1.7% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 
Share of Good Loans 33.5% 23.8% 15.1% 13.0% 14.7% 
REVENUE (£m) 487 399 195 184 209 
Share of Defaults 18.7% 41.7% 12.7% 16.3% 10.5% 
LOSS (£m)  130 290 88 113 73 
PROFIT (£m) 357 109 107 71 136 
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.07% 0.46% 0.71% 0.55% 0.93% 
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Year 7 
BANK SIZE AZ OL BS 
Value of Good Loans 35097 18826 27598 16891 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 363 224 711 244 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 35460 19050 28309 17135 
Market Share 35.5% 19.1% 28.3% 17.1% 
Average lending rate 1.6% 1.5% 1.9% 1.6% 
Share of Good Loans 35.7% 19.1% 28.0% 17.2% 
REVENUE (£m) 558 282 517 267 
Share of Defaults 23.5% 14.5% 46.1% 15.8% 
LOSS (£m)  163 101 320 110 
PROFIT (£m) 395 181 197 157 
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.11% 0.95% 0.70% 0.92% 
 
Year 8 
BANK SIZE AZ BS 
Value of Good Loans 41503 33815 22656 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 620 507 325 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 42123 34321 22982 
Market Share 42.4% 34.5% 23.1% 
Average lending rate 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 
Share of Good Loans 42.4% 34.5% 23.1% 
REVENUE (£m) 747 622 393 
Share of Defaults 42.7% 34.9% 22.4% 
LOSS (£m)  279 228 146 
PROFIT (£m) 468 394 247 
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.11% 1.15% 1.07% 
 
Year 9 
BANK SIZE AZ 
Value of Good Loans 49652 47475 
Value of Defaulting Loans (£m) 809 612 
TOTAL LOAN VALUE (£m) 50461 48087 
Market Share 51.2% 48.8% 
Average lending rate 1.9% 1.9% 
Share of Good Loans 51.1% 48.9% 
REVENUE (£m) 964 885 
Share of Defaults 56.9% 43.1% 
LOSS (£m)  364 276 
PROFIT (£m) 600 609 
RETURN ON ASSETS 1.19% 1.27% 
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12.10 Appendix J: Genetic algorithms 
 
 
This brief explanation of Genetic Algorithms is reproduced from Back et al. (1996). 
For a more thorough description of genetic algorithms refer to Goldberg (1989). 
 
A genetic algorithm simulates Darwinian evolution. It maintains a population of 
chromosomes, where a chromosome is a candidate-solution to the problem we want to 
solve. Chromosomes are often called strings in a genetic algorithm context. A string in 
its turn, consists of a number of genes, which may take some number of values, called 
alleles. The genetic algorithm terms for genes and alleles are features and values. 
Associated with each string is a fitness value, which determines how 'good' a string is. 
The fitness value is determined by a fitness function, which we can think of as some 
measure of profit or goodness that we want to maximise. Basically, there are three 
operators that lead to good results in a genetic algorithm, namely reproduction, 
crossover, and mutation. 
 
Reproduction This is a process in which strings are copied onto the next generation. 
Strings with a higher fitness value have more chance of making it to the next generation. 
Different schemes can be used to determine which strings survive into the next 
generation. A frequently used method is roulette wheel selection, where a roulette wheel 
is divided in a number of slots, one for each string. The slots are sized according to the 
fitness of the strings. Hence, when we spin the wheel, the best strings are the most likely 
to be selected. Another well-known method is ranking. Here, the strings are sorted by 
their fitness value, and each string is assigned an offspring count that is determined 
solely by its rank. 
 
Crossover A part of one string is combined with a part of another string. This way, 
we hope to combine the good parts of one string with the good parts of another string, 
yielding an even better string after the operation. This operation takes two strings, the 
parents, and produces two new ones, the offspring. Many kinds of crossover can be 
thought of. Two kinds of crossover are illustrated in Figure 16.10a and 16.10b.  
 
Mutation A randomly selected gene in a string takes a new value. The aim of this 
operator is to introduce new genetic material in the population, or at least prevent the 
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loss of it. Under mutation, a gene can get a value that did not occur in the population 
before, or that has been lost due to reproduction. Mutation is illustrated in Figure J.  
 
 
 
Figure J: Parts (a) and (b) illustrate two different kinds of crossover operations. Part 
(c) illustrates a mutation operation. 
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